Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 48-71

  De Frutos, M Angeles ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009888930     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0772     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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3. Bulow J. I., Huang M., Klemperer P. Toeholds and Takeovers. J. Polit. Econ. 107:1999;427-454.
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5. Cramton P., Gibbons R., Klemperer P. Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently. Econometrica. 55:1987;615-632.
6. Engelbrecht-Wiggans R. Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to Bidders. Games Econom. Behavior. 6:1994;339-346.
7. Lebrun B. First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case. Int. Econ. Rev. 40:1999;125-143.
8. Lebrun B. Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions. Games Econom. Behavior. 25:1998;97-110.
9. Marshall R., Meurer M., Richard J-F., Stromquist W. Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions. Games Econom. Behavior. 7:1994;193-220.
10. Maskin E., Riley J. G. Auction Theory with Private Values. Ame. Econ. Rev. 75:1985;150-155.
11. Maskin E., Riley J. G. Asymmetric Auctions. Rev. Econ. Stud. 1999.
12. McAfee P. Amicable Divorce: Dissolving a Partnership with Simple Mechanisms. J. Econ. Theory. 56:1992;266-293.
13. Shaked M., Shanthikumar J. G. Stochastic Orders and their Applications. 1994;Academic Press, New York.
14. Singh, R. 1995, Takeover Bidding with Toeholds: The Case of the Owner's Curse, mimeo, Washington University at St. Louis.