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Volumn 25, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 97-110

Comparative statics in first price auctions

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0012944153     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0635     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (26)

References (13)
  • 1
    • 0001159553 scopus 로고
    • Towards a Study of Bidding Processes, Part Four: Games with Unknown Costs
    • Griesmer, J. M., Levitan, R. E., and Shubik, M. (1967). "Towards a Study of Bidding Processes, Part Four: Games with Unknown Costs," Naval Res. Quart. 14, 415-433.
    • (1967) Naval Res. Quart. , vol.14 , pp. 415-433
    • Griesmer, J.M.1    Levitan, R.E.2    Shubik, M.3
  • 2
    • 0030306654 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Existence of a Equilibrium in First Price Auctions," Econom
    • Lebrun, B. (1996). "Existence of a Equilibrium in First Price Auctions," Econom. Theory 7, 421-443.
    • (1996) Theory , vol.7 , pp. 421-443
    • Lebrun, B.1
  • 3
    • 0347884222 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case
    • in press
    • Lebrun, B. (1997a). "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," Int. Econom. Rev., in press.
    • (1997) Int. Econom. Rev.
    • Lebrun, B.1
  • 4
    • 0013038384 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case
    • (working paper series) 97-03, Université Laval. Requests should be sent to GREEN, Département d'économique, Université Laval, Québec, QC, G1K 7P4, Canada, or by E-mail to bleb@ecn.ulaval.ca
    • Lebrun, B. (1997b). "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," Les Cahiers de Recherches du GREEN (working paper series) 97-03, Université Laval. Requests should be sent to GREEN, Département d'économique, Université Laval, Québec, QC, G1K 7P4, Canada, or by E-mail to bleb@ecn.ulaval.ca.
    • (1997) Les Cahiers de Recherches du GREEN
    • Lebrun, B.1
  • 7
    • 0002081849 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • mimeo (revised version of working paper 407), University of California, Los Angeles
    • Maskin, E., and Riley, J. (1994). "Uniqueness in Sealed High Bid Auctions," mimeo (revised version of working paper 407), University of California, Los Angeles.
    • (1994) Uniqueness in Sealed High Bid Auctions
    • Maskin, E.1    Riley, J.2
  • 8
    • 0004232895 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • mimeo (revised version of working paper 254), University of California, Los Angeles
    • Maskin, E., and Riley, J. (1996a). "Asymmetric Auctions," mimeo (revised version of working paper 254), University of California, Los Angeles.
    • (1996) Asymmetric Auctions
    • Maskin, E.1    Riley, J.2
  • 9
    • 0002081849 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • mimeo (revised version of working paper 407), University of California, Los Angeles
    • Maskin, E., and Riley, J. (1996b). "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," mimeo (revised version of working paper 407), University of California, Los Angeles.
    • (1996) Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
    • Maskin, E.1    Riley, J.2
  • 10
    • 0001757115 scopus 로고
    • A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
    • Milgrom, P. R., and Weber, R. J. (1982). "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica 50, 1089-1122.
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 1089-1122
    • Milgrom, P.R.1    Weber, R.J.2
  • 13
    • 84980096808 scopus 로고
    • Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders
    • Vickrey, W. (1961). "Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders," J. Finance 16, 8-37.
    • (1961) J. Finance , vol.16 , pp. 8-37
    • Vickrey, W.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.