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Volumn 15, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 33-54

Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency

Author keywords

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Indexed keywords


EID: 0030188420     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0058     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (33)

References (15)
  • 1
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    • On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting
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    • Abreu, D.1
  • 2
    • 0011687938 scopus 로고
    • working paper, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
    • ASHEIM, G. (1991). "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," working paper, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
    • (1991) Individual and Collective Time Consistency
    • Asheim, G.1
  • 4
    • 0000429880 scopus 로고
    • Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
    • BERNHEIM, D., AND RAY, D. (1989). "Collective Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games," Games Econ. Behav. 1, 295-326.
    • (1989) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.1 , pp. 295-326
    • Bernheim, D.1    Ray, D.2
  • 5
    • 84936526487 scopus 로고
    • Sustainable plans
    • CHARI, V., AND KEHOE, P. (1990). "Sustainable Plans," J. Polit. Econ. 98, 783-802.
    • (1990) J. Polit. Econ. , vol.98 , pp. 783-802
    • Chari, V.1    Kehoe, P.2
  • 6
    • 38249017738 scopus 로고
    • One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify Stackelberg equilibrium
    • DEKEL, E., AND FARRELL, J. (1990). "One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium," Games Econ. Behav. 2, 299-303.
    • (1990) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.2 , pp. 299-303
    • Dekel, E.1    Farrell, J.2
  • 8
    • 85086705967 scopus 로고
    • Fixed point and minimax theorems in locally convex topological linear spaces
    • FAN, K. (1952). "Fixed Point and Minimax Theorems in Locally Convex Topological Linear Spaces," Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 38, 121-126.
    • (1952) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. , vol.38 , pp. 121-126
    • Fan, K.1
  • 9
    • 0001435324 scopus 로고
    • Renegotiation in repeated games
    • FARRELL, J., AND MASKIN, E. (1989). "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Games Econ. Behav. 1, 327-360.
    • (1989) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.1 , pp. 327-360
    • Farrell, J.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 12
    • 0001027223 scopus 로고
    • Reputation and time consistency
    • STOKEY, N. (1989). "Reputation and Time Consistency," Amer. Econ. Rev. 79, 134-145.
    • (1989) Amer. Econ. Rev. , vol.79 , pp. 134-145
    • Stokey, N.1
  • 13
    • 0000237339 scopus 로고
    • Credible public policy
    • STOKEY, N. (1991). "Credible Public Policy," J. Econ. Dynam. Cont. 15, 627-657.
    • (1991) J. Econ. Dynam. Cont. , vol.15 , pp. 627-657
    • Stokey, N.1
  • 14
    • 84963071606 scopus 로고
    • Myopia and consistency in dynamic utility maximization
    • STROTZ, R. (1956). "Myopia and Consistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," Rev. Econ. Stud. 23, 165-180.
    • (1956) Rev. Econ. Stud. , vol.23 , pp. 165-180
    • Strotz, R.1
  • 15
    • 0000877467 scopus 로고
    • Analytical policy design under rational expectations
    • WHITEMAN, C. (1986). "Analytical Policy Design under Rational Expectations," Econometrica 54, 1387-1406.
    • (1986) Econometrica , vol.54 , pp. 1387-1406
    • Whiteman, C.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.