-
1
-
-
0347204205
-
Thinking Causes
-
J. Heil and A. Mele eds, Oxford UP
-
Donald Davidson, 'Thinking Causes, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds), Mental Causation (Oxford UP, 1993), pp. 3-17
-
(1993)
Mental Causation
, pp. 3-17
-
-
Davidson, D.1
-
2
-
-
0009251721
-
Can Supervenience and "non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism?
-
at p. 23
-
For instance J. Kim 'Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism?', in Heil and Mele, pp. 19-26, at p. 23
-
Heil and Mele
, pp. 19-26
-
-
Kim, J.1
-
3
-
-
0002180135
-
On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Eprphenomenalisn
-
at pp. 37-9
-
B.P. McLaughlin, 'On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Eprphenomenalisn', in Heil and Mele, pp. 27-40, at pp. 37-9
-
Heil and Mele
, pp. 27-40
-
-
McLaughlin, B.P.1
-
4
-
-
0009169969
-
Davidson's Thinking Causes
-
at pp. 45-8
-
E. Sosa, 'Davidson's Thinking Causes', in Heil and Mele, pp. 41-50, at pp. 45-8
-
Heil and Mele
, pp. 41-50
-
-
Sosa, E.1
-
5
-
-
0009235466
-
The Properties of Mental Causation
-
D. Robb, 'The Properties of Mental Causation', The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 178-94
-
(1997)
The Philosophical Quarterly
, vol.47
, pp. 178-194
-
-
Robb, D.1
-
6
-
-
67649164293
-
Mental Causation, Determinables, and Property Instances
-
at pp. 465-7
-
See D. Ehring, 'Mental Causation, Determinables, and Property Instances', Noils, 30 (1996), pp. 461-80, at pp. 465-7
-
(1996)
Noils
, vol.30
, pp. 461-480
-
-
Ehring, D.1
-
7
-
-
84963087823
-
Mental Causes and the Explanation of Action' (MCEA)
-
The position has also been advanced in C. and G. Macdonald, 'Mental Causes and the Explanation of Action' (MCEA), The Philosophical Quarterly, 36 (1986), pp. 145-58
-
(1986)
The Philosophical Quarterly
, vol.36
, pp. 145-158
-
-
MacDonald, C.1
MacDonald, G.2
-
8
-
-
60950456866
-
-
Oxford: Blackwell, (page references below to the latter), at pp. 37-40
-
repr. in L.F. Stevenson et al. (eds), Mind, Causation and Action (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 35-48 (page references below to the latter), at pp. 37-40
-
(1986)
Mind, Causation and Action
, pp. 35-48
-
-
Stevenson, L.F.1
-
9
-
-
33748367536
-
The Nature of Naturalism' (NN)
-
at pp. 231, 235-7
-
G. Macdonald, 'The Nature of Naturalism' (NN), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 66 (1992), pp. 225-44, at pp. 231, 235-7
-
(1992)
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
, Issue.SUPPL. 66
, pp. 225-244
-
-
MacDonald, G.1
-
10
-
-
17544384005
-
How to be Psychologically Relevant' (HPR)
-
C. and G. Macdonald (eds), Oxford: Blackwell
-
C. and G. Macdonald, 'How to be Psychologically Relevant' (HPR), in C. and G. Macdonald (eds), Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 60-77
-
(1995)
Philosophy of Psychology
, pp. 60-77
-
-
MacDonald1
MacDonald C, G.2
-
11
-
-
0003736353
-
-
Cambridge UP
-
J. Heil, The Nature of True Minds (Cambridge UP, 1992), pp. 135-9. In HPR the Macdonalds talk in terms of property-instances, but claim that these are not tropes because the latter are essentially typed whereas the former are not (p. 74 fn. 9). Not much is made of this difference; we can safely ignore it here
-
(1992)
The Nature of True Minds
, pp. 135-139
-
-
Heil, J.1
-
12
-
-
0001146378
-
Mental Causation
-
at pp. 259-60
-
S. Yablo, 'Mental Causation', The Philosophical Review, 101 (1992), pp. 245-80, at pp. 259-60
-
(1992)
The Philosophical Review
, vol.101
, pp. 245-280
-
-
Yablo, S.1
|