Mental causation, determinables and property instances

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Volumn 30, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 461-480

  Ehring, Douglas ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649164293     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2216114     Document Type: Short Survey

References (11)

1. As suggested by Cynthia and Graham Macdonald in their "Mental Causation and Explanation of Action," in Mind, Causation and Action, ed. L. Stevenson, R. Squires, and J. Haldane (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 35-48
2. As C. and G. Macdonald seem to suggest in their "Mental Causation and Explanation of Action, p. 39
3. Jaegwon Kim, "Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event," in his Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1993, p. 9
4. 11D. M. Armstrong, A Theory of Universals, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1978, p. 118
5. Armstrong, A Theory of Universals, p. 117
6. Here I basically follow Keith Campbell in his Abstract Particulars, (Blackwell: Oxford), 1990
7. Donald Davidson, "Causal Relations," in his Actions and Events, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1980, p. 155
8. There is an enormous literature on this topic. A good selection of papers on this issue can be found in Mental Causation, eds. Heil, J. and Mele, A., (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1993)
9. S. Yablo, "Mental Causation," The Philosophical Review 101 (1992), pp. 245-280. He takes the relata of the causal relation to be events and does not defend an analogous mental/physical event identity thesis or a property instance identity thesis
10. See John Searle, "Determinables and the Notion of Resemblance," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supple, vol. 33,1959, p. 147
11. W. E. Johnson made a similar point: ". . . if a, b, c, are three determinates, there are cases in which we may say that the difference between a and c is greater than the difference between a and b; e.g. the difference between red and yellow is greater than the difference between red and orange. In this case the several determinates are conceived as necessarily assuming a certain serial order. . . ." W. E. Johnson, Logic (New York: Dover) 1964, vol. 1, pp. 181-182