Controlling selection incentives when health insurance contracts are endogenous

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 80, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 25-48

  Jack, William ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Health insurance; Risk adjusters; Selection incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009146576     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00103-1     Document Type: Article

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