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Volumn 40, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 275-294

Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?

Author keywords

Contracts; Tournaments; Two sided moral hazard

Indexed keywords


EID: 0007562214     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00068-2     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (10)

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