Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 275-294

  Tsoulouhas, Theofanis ^a  

^a NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracts; Tournaments; Two sided moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007562214     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00068-2     Document Type: Article

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