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Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 174-195

Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents

(1) Al Najjar, Nabil I a

a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031144907 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2253 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (11)

References (13)

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- Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
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- An analysis of the principal-agent problem
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- Efficiency in partnerships
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- Unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents
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- Optimal incentive schemes with many Agents
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