Contingency, catalysts, and international system change

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 115, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 591-616

  Lebow, Richard Ned ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007514816     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2657611     Document Type: Article

References (98)

1. F. H. Hinsley, "The Origins of the First World War" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 4.
2. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 2; A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 202-03; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 200-01.
3. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 2; A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 202-03; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 200-01.
4. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 2; A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 202-03; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 200-01.
5. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 2; A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 202-03; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 200-01.
6. Gabriel Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," World Politics 29 (July 1977): 496-522.
7. On the conduct of counterfactual experiments in history and international relations, see Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, "Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives" in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 15-16; and Richard Ned Lebow, "What's So Different About a Counterfactual," World Politics 52 (July 2000): 550-85.
8. On the conduct of counterfactual experiments in history and international relations, see Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, "Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives" in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 15-16; and Richard Ned Lebow, "What's So Different About a Counterfactual," World Politics 52 (July 2000): 550-85.
9. Max Weber, "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation" in The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, IL: Free Press of Glencoe, 1949 [1905]), 164-88.
10. Patricia L. Kendall and Katherine M. Wolf, "The Analysis of Deviant Cases in Communications Research" in Paul Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton, eds., Communications Research: 1948-49 (New York: Harper, 1949), 152-57; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political Science Review 65 (September 1971): 682-93; Harry Eckstein, "Case Study Theory in Political Science" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
11. Patricia L. Kendall and Katherine M. Wolf, "The Analysis of Deviant Cases in Communications Research" in Paul Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton, eds., Communications Research: 1948-49 (New York: Harper, 1949), 152-57; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political Science Review 65 (September 1971): 682-93; Harry Eckstein, "Case Study Theory in Political Science" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
12. Patricia L. Kendall and Katherine M. Wolf, "The Analysis of Deviant Cases in Communications Research" in Paul Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton, eds., Communications Research: 1948-49 (New York: Harper, 1949), 152-57; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political Science Review 65 (September 1971): 682-93; Harry Eckstein, "Case Study Theory in Political Science" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
13. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
14. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
15. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
16. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
17. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
18. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
19. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
20. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
21. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
22. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
23. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
24. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
25. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
26. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
27. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
28. Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252-85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2 (March 1969): 48-76; Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343-70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," Central European History 6 (March 1972): 3-43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," Historische Zeitschrift 202 (April 1966): 333-51; Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 442-74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First World War, 87-124: Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27-54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 795-818, and Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 33-56.
29. Kurt Riezler, Tagebücher, Aufsatze, Dokumente. Eingeleidet und hrs. Von Karl Dietrich Erdmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972); Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, introduction.
30. Kurt Riezler, Tagebücher, Aufsatze, Dokumente. Eingeleidet und hrs. Von Karl Dietrich Erdmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972); Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, introduction.
31. J. L. Mackie, "Causes and Conditions" in Myles Brand, ed., The Nature of Causation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 308-44; Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Science (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1979); Rom Harré and Peter Secord, The Explanation of Social Behaviour (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1973); Heikki Patomäki, "How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 2 (March 1996): 105-34.
32. J. L. Mackie, "Causes and Conditions" in Myles Brand, ed., The Nature of Causation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 308-44; Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Science (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1979); Rom Harré and Peter Secord, The Explanation of Social Behaviour (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1973); Heikki Patomäki, "How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 2 (March 1996): 105-34.
33. J. L. Mackie, "Causes and Conditions" in Myles Brand, ed., The Nature of Causation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 308-44; Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Science (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1979); Rom Harré and Peter Secord, The Explanation of Social Behaviour (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1973); Heikki Patomäki, "How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 2 (March 1996): 105-34.
34. J. L. Mackie, "Causes and Conditions" in Myles Brand, ed., The Nature of Causation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 308-44; Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Science (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1979); Rom Harré and Peter Secord, The Explanation of Social Behaviour (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1973); Heikki Patomäki, "How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 2 (March 1996): 105-34.
35. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
36. Barry Nalebuff, "Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science 9 (September 1985): 19-30; Robert Powell, "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD," American Political Science Review 81 (September 1987): 717-27; Powell, "Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," American Political Science Review 82 (March 1988): 155-78; Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 48-85.
37. Barry Nalebuff, "Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science 9 (September 1985): 19-30; Robert Powell, "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD," American Political Science Review 81 (September 1987): 717-27; Powell, "Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," American Political Science Review 82 (March 1988): 155-78; Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 48-85.
38. Barry Nalebuff, "Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science 9 (September 1985): 19-30; Robert Powell, "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD," American Political Science Review 81 (September 1987): 717-27; Powell, "Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," American Political Science Review 82 (March 1988): 155-78; Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 48-85.
39. Barry Nalebuff, "Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science 9 (September 1985): 19-30; Robert Powell, "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD," American Political Science Review 81 (September 1987): 717-27; Powell, "Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," American Political Science Review 82 (March 1988): 155-78; Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 48-85.
40. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), chap. 2.
41. Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision Making in Vietnam, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), vol. 3, 687-91; Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention: An Inside Account of How the Johnson Policy of Escalation Was Reversed (New York: David McKay, 1969), 30.
42. Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision Making in Vietnam, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), vol. 3, 687-91; Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention: An Inside Account of How the Johnson Policy of Escalation Was Reversed (New York: David McKay, 1969), 30.
43. Joachim Remak, "1914 - The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered," Journal of Modern History 43 (September 1971): 353-66.
44. F. R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 334-35.
45. Remak, "1914 - The Third Balkan War"; Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, 335-37; Herwig, The First World War, 8-18.
46. Remak, "1914 - The Third Balkan War"; Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, 335-37; Herwig, The First World War, 8-18.
47. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. to the author, 22 January 1999.
48. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), ii, 129-30; Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, (London: Macmillan, 1990), 85.
49. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), ii, 129-30; Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, (London: Macmillan, 1990), 85.
50. Williamson, "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process" and Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 51.
51. Alexander Spitzmüller-Harmersbach, .. . und hat auch Ursach, es zu Leben (Vienna: William Frick, 1955), 103; Georg Franz, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und die Pläne zur Reform der Habsburger Monarchie (Vienna: G.D.W. Callwey, 1943), 107, quotes a similar statement that Franz Ferdinand made to his wife in 1913.
52. Alexander Spitzmüller-Harmersbach, .. . und hat auch Ursach, es zu Leben (Vienna: William Frick, 1955), 103; Georg Franz, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und die Pläne zur Reform der Habsburger Monarchie (Vienna: G.D.W. Callwey, 1943), 107, quotes a similar statement that Franz Ferdinand made to his wife in 1913.
53. Williamson, "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process" and "The Origins of World War I."
54. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War, 434; David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 14, believes war much less likely in general if Franz Ferdinand had remained alive and continued to exercise restraint in Vienna.
55. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War, 434; David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 14, believes war much less likely in general if Franz Ferdinand had remained alive and continued to exercise restraint in Vienna.
56. József Galántai, Hungary in the First World War (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), 100-18; Gabor Vermes, István Tisza: The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 230-31; Williamson, "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process."
57. József Galántai, Hungary in the First World War (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), 100-18; Gabor Vermes, István Tisza: The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 230-31; Williamson, "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process."
58. József Galántai, Hungary in the First World War (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), 100-18; Gabor Vermes, István Tisza: The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 230-31; Williamson, "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process."
59. Konrad Jarausch, email to the author, 4 January 1999.
60. Moltke to Conrad, Der grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, A, Mendelsohn-Bartholdy, I. Lepsius, and F. Thimme, eds., 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-26), 10 February 1913, 38, i, no. 12,824; Franz Conrad von Hölzendorff, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 5 vols. (Vienna: Rikola, 1921-25), 3, 144ff.
61. Moltke to Conrad, Der grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, A, Mendelsohn-Bartholdy, I. Lepsius, and F. Thimme, eds., 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-26), 10 February 1913, 38, i, no. 12,824; Franz Conrad von Hölzendorff, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 5 vols. (Vienna: Rikola, 1921-25), 3, 144ff.
62. Alfred von Tirpitz, Politisiche Dokumente, 2 vols. (Berlin: Cotta, 1924-26), i, 242.
63. Lebow, Between Peace and War, 122-29, on the hold of the Bosnian precedent on German leaders in 1914.
64. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict: Choice and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977), 59-60, 205; and Lebow, Between Peace and War, 135-45.
65. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict: Choice and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977), 59-60, 205; and Lebow, Between Peace and War, 135-45.
66. Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966), 10-12, 408-09.
67. Ibid., 13-15.
68. Herman Kantorowicz, The Spirit of British Policy and the Myth of the Encirclement of Germany (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), 360; and Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 126.
69. Herman Kantorowicz, The Spirit of British Policy and the Myth of the Encirclement of Germany (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), 360; and Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 126.
70. Hans Rogger, "Russia in 1914" in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, eds., 1914: The Coming of the First World War (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 229-53; Arno J. Mayer, "Domestic Causes of the First World War" in Stern and Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn, 286-93.
71. Hans Rogger, "Russia in 1914" in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, eds., 1914: The Coming of the First World War (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 229-53; Arno J. Mayer, "Domestic Causes of the First World War" in Stern and Krieger, eds., The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn, 286-93.
72. Cited in Z. A. B. Zeman, "The Balkans and the Coming of War" in R. J. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 24; Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, chap. 7.
73. Cited in Z. A. B. Zeman, "The Balkans and the Coming of War" in R. J. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War, 24; Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, chap. 7.
74. Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, Heinz Norden, trans. (Coral Gables, FL.: University of Miami Press, 1970), ii, 196.
75. Stig Förster, "Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871-1914: Metakritik eines Mythos," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 54, no. 1 (1995): 61-95.
76. William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19 (Winter 1994-95): 91-129; Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism" and Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace?" in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 23-56, 57-84.
77. William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19 (Winter 1994-95): 91-129; Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism" and Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace?" in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 23-56, 57-84.
78. William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19 (Winter 1994-95): 91-129; Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism" and Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace?" in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 23-56, 57-84.
79. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," The American Political Science Review 74 (December 1960): 947-65.
80. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," The American Political Science Review 74 (December 1960): 947-65.
81. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 191-92, 197.
82. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War"; Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism."
83. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War"; Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism."
84. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
85. George Breslauer and Richard Ned Lebow, "Leadership and the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Experiment" in Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow, eds., Learning from the Cold War, forthcoming.
86. Jim Salter, Associated Press, 9 March 1999, "Missouri Set to Execute"; Court TV website, "Missouri Death Row Inmate Executed After Pope's Futile Plea for Governor's Mercy," 10 March 1999; Evelyn Nieves, "Being in the Wrong Place, News York Times, 9 May 1999, News of the Week in Review.
87. Jim Salter, Associated Press, 9 March 1999, "Missouri Set to Execute"; Court TV website, "Missouri Death Row Inmate Executed After Pope's Futile Plea for Governor's Mercy," 10 March 1999; Evelyn Nieves, "Being in the Wrong Place, News York Times, 9 May 1999, News of the Week in Review.
88. Jim Salter, Associated Press, 9 March 1999, "Missouri Set to Execute"; Court TV website, "Missouri Death Row Inmate Executed After Pope's Futile Plea for Governor's Mercy," 10 March 1999; Evelyn Nieves, "Being in the Wrong Place, News York Times, 9 May 1999, News of the Week in Review.
89. Steven Weber, "Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process," Security Studies 6 (Spring 1997): 167-79; Janice Gross Stein et al., "Five Scenarios of the Israeli-Palestinian Relationship in 2002: Works in Progress," Security Studies 7 (Spring 1998): 195-212; Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber, "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems," European Journal of International Relations 6 (March 2000): 43-76.
90. Steven Weber, "Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process," Security Studies 6 (Spring 1997): 167-79; Janice Gross Stein et al., "Five Scenarios of the Israeli-Palestinian Relationship in 2002: Works in Progress," Security Studies 7 (Spring 1998): 195-212; Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber, "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems," European Journal of International Relations 6 (March 2000): 43-76.
91. Steven Weber, "Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process," Security Studies 6 (Spring 1997): 167-79; Janice Gross Stein et al., "Five Scenarios of the Israeli-Palestinian Relationship in 2002: Works in Progress," Security Studies 7 (Spring 1998): 195-212; Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber, "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems," European Journal of International Relations 6 (March 2000): 43-76.
92. See the chapters by Archie Brown, Jacques Lévesque, Raymond L. Garthoff, and James Davis and William Wohlforth in Herrmann and Lebow, Learning from the Cold War.
93. Breslauer and Lebow, "Leadership and the End of the Cold War."
94. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Jervis, System Effects; Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent Properties in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
95. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Jervis, System Effects; Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent Properties in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
96. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Jervis, System Effects; Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent Properties in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
97. Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), i, chap. 2.
98. Jervis, Systems Effects.