Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 173-188

  Das, Satya P ^a  

^a INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007086097     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(96)01465-1     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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