Empirical studies in comparative politics

Public Choice

Volumn 97, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 219-227

  Hinich, Melvin J ^a   Munger, Michael C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006857967     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005057920748     Document Type: Article

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