Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance: Long-run vs. short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking

Pacific Basin Finance Journal

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 281-299

  Kane, Edward J ^a  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank; Capital forbearance; F3; G2; K2; Taxpayers

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006177055     PISSN: 0927538X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0927-538X(01)00018-X     Document Type: Article

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