Creating a disaster: NATO's open door policy

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 113, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 383-403

  Art, Robert J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006176507     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2658073     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. The agreement between NATO and Russia, entitled "Founding Act on Mutual Relationships, Cooperation, and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," was signed on 27 May 1997. The text can be found in Arms Control Today 27 (May 1997): 21-24. The "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine" was signed in Madrid on July 1997. The text can be found in NATO Review 4 (July-August 1997): 5-6 of the special insert.
2. The agreement between NATO and Russia, entitled "Founding Act on Mutual Relationships, Cooperation, and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," was signed on 27 May 1997. The text can be found in Arms Control Today 27 (May 1997): 21-24. The "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine" was signed in Madrid on July 1997. The text can be found in NATO Review 4 (July-August 1997): 5-6 of the special insert.
3. The agreement between NATO and Russia, entitled "Founding Act on Mutual Relationships, Cooperation, and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," was signed on 27 May 1997. The text can be found in Arms Control Today 27 (May 1997): 21-24. The "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine" was signed in Madrid on July 1997. The text can be found in NATO Review 4 (July-August 1997): 5-6 of the special insert.
4. The agreement between NATO and Russia, entitled "Founding Act on Mutual Relationships, Cooperation, and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," was signed on 27 May 1997. The text can be found in Arms Control Today 27 (May 1997): 21-24. The "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine" was signed in Madrid on July 1997. The text can be found in NATO Review 4 (July-August 1997): 5-6 of the special insert.
5. Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China," Political Science Quarterly 113 (Fall 1998): 361-382.
6. Ibid., 362.
7. Ibid., 382.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 380.
10. From 1992-1996, the West committed through various sources over $40 billion in aid, and in 1998 it put together an emergency package of another $22 billion in aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to deal with the financial fallout Russia experienced from the Asian crisis. See Coit D. Blacker, "Russia and the West" in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The New Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 172; and Press Briefing by Stanley Fischer, first deputy managing director of the IMF, 13 July 1998 at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1998/tr 980713.htm.
11. From 1992-1996, the West committed through various sources over $40 billion in aid, and in 1998 it put together an emergency package of another $22 billion in aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to deal with the financial fallout Russia experienced from the Asian crisis. See Coit D. Blacker, "Russia and the West" in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The New Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 172; and Press Briefing by Stanley Fischer, first deputy managing director of the IMF, 13 July 1998 at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1998/tr 980713.htm.
12. As one example of the rhetoric, President Boris Yeltsin, according to the Associated Press, said on 6 May 1997: "We shall do everything to minimize the consequences of NATO expansion for Russia's security. We shall continue to deepen integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially with Belarus. We shall strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries, first of all with China." Quoted in Stanley Kober, "Russia's Search for Identity" in Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, eds., NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998), 136.
13. William Wohlforth puts the matter well: "Officially and unofficially, Russians see no direct military threats for at least the next decade. . . . No power is thought to have interests that could lead to the direct use of force against Russian territory. . . . All sides - government and opposition, democrats and nationalists - agree that the probability of any direct security threat to Russia now or in the near future is low or nonexistent. The main threats are internal to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States and reflect uncontrolled processes or unintended consequences. . . . While politicians cannot resist the allure of nationalist great-power rhetoric, military and national security officials have dramatically lowered their threat assessments since 1992." See William Wohlforth, "Redefining Security: Russia's Intellectual Adjustment to Decline," Harvard International Review 29 (Winter 1996/ 1997): 59-60.
14. Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 368.
15. Resentment against enlargement is not simply an elite affair. In a poll conducted before the enlargement agreement was signed, 51 percent of Russians polled saw NATO expansion as a serious threat and only 14 percent disagreed with that premise. See Susan Eisenhower, "The Perils of Victory" in Carpenter and Conry, NATO Enlargement, 114.
16. Again, Wohlforth puts the point well: ". . . The overwhelming majority of Russia's policy elite sees NATO expansion as detrimental to Russia's security interests and as evidence of a policy failure of major proportions. Only the most committed of Westernizers can view NATO expansion with equanimity. However, even strident opponents of the move do not see it as motivated by any immediate designs on Russia, and their opinions vary on the actual significance of the security threat it implies." See Wohlforth, "Redefining Security," 59.
17. As one Russian scholar, Irina Zhinkina, put it: "How come that the new Russia, which has discarded its former ideology, remembered God, sworn loyalty to the new ideals of democracy and fallen into the embrace of its recent 'probable adversaries' is not accepted [sic] to Western civilization. What else must it do?" Quoted in Kober, "Russia's Search for Identity," 135-136.
18. Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40-126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28-35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review 16 (1996): 1-19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 272-284 and 285-302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16-62 and 63-107.
19. Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40-126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28-35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review 16 (1996): 1-19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 272-284 and 285-302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16-62 and 63-107.
20. Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40-126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28-35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review 16 (1996): 1-19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 272-284 and 285-302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16-62 and 63-107.
21. Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40-126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28-35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review 16 (1996): 1-19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 272-284 and 285-302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16-62 and 63-107.
22. Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40-126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28-35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review 16 (1996): 1-19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 272-284 and 285-302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16-62 and 63-107.
23. Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40-126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28-35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review 16 (1996): 1-19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 272-284 and 285-302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16-62 and 63-107.
24. Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40-126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28-35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review 16 (1996): 1-19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 272-284 and 285-302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16-62 and 63-107.
25. Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40-126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28-35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review 16 (1996): 1-19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 272-284 and 285-302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16-62 and 63-107.
26. Good overviews of the current Sino-Russian rapprochement are: Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 3; Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 40-126; Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Russian Relations," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 28-35; Sherman Garnett, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations," SAIS Review 16 (1996): 1-19; J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia" and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo" both in Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 272-284 and 285-302; and Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle" and David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle" both in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 16-62 and 63-107.
27. See Nathan and Ross, Great Wall, chap. 3, for a good overview of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Russian relations since 1950.
28. For details on the agreements and their negotiating history, as well as the issues still outstanding, see Anderson, Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, chap. 2.
29. Garnett, "Slow Dance," 30-31; and Anderson, Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, 36.
30. Garnett, "Slow Dance," 30-31; and Anderson, Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, 36.
31. On these matters, see Garnett, "The Russian Far East"; Nathan and Ross, Great Wall, 48-55; Peter Pavilions and Richard Giragosian, "The Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Central Asia," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 24-27 and 62-65; and Stephen J. Blank, "Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals," Central Asian Survey 14 (1995): 373-406.
32. On these matters, see Garnett, "The Russian Far East"; Nathan and Ross, Great Wall, 48-55; Peter Pavilions and Richard Giragosian, "The Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Central Asia," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 24-27 and 62-65; and Stephen J. Blank, "Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals," Central Asian Survey 14 (1995): 373-406.
33. On these matters, see Garnett, "The Russian Far East"; Nathan and Ross, Great Wall, 48-55; Peter Pavilions and Richard Giragosian, "The Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Central Asia," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 24-27 and 62-65; and Stephen J. Blank, "Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals," Central Asian Survey 14 (1995): 373-406.
34. On these matters, see Garnett, "The Russian Far East"; Nathan and Ross, Great Wall, 48-55; Peter Pavilions and Richard Giragosian, "The Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Central Asia," Harvard International Review 28 (Winter 1996/97): 24-27 and 62-65; and Stephen J. Blank, "Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals," Central Asian Survey 14 (1995): 373-406.
35. See Blacker, "Russia and the West," 178-188.
36. Anderson, Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, 24.
37. Good analyses of why collective security organizations do not work can be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1964), 412-418; Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relationship (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 5; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," Survival 34 (Spring 1992): 36-51; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 26-37.
38. Good analyses of why collective security organizations do not work can be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1964), 412-418; Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relationship (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 5; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," Survival 34 (Spring 1992): 36-51; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 26-37.
39. Good analyses of why collective security organizations do not work can be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1964), 412-418; Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relationship (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 5; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," Survival 34 (Spring 1992): 36-51; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 26-37.
40. Good analyses of why collective security organizations do not work can be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1964), 412-418; Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relationship (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 5; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," Survival 34 (Spring 1992): 36-51; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 26-37.
41. Russet and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 380.
42. NATO performed both these functions throughout the cold war. It was an alliance directed against the Soviet Union, but it also prevented conflict among its member, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus notwithstanding. Through NATO the United States placed a substancial fraction of its cold war military machine in Western Europe, concentrated it in West Germany, and thereby reassured Germany's allies that it would not revert to its aggressive past. "Keeping Russia out, Germany down, and the United States in" was how these two (or three) functions were usually described.
43. In the Washington Treaty that created NATO, the signators did not formally qualify the enemy against whom the alliance was directed, although all knew it was the Soviet Union. The treaty did, however, retain for the member states the right of national control over the use of force, thereby rendering military assistance not automatic, but contingent upon national decision. This was the price to be paid in order to get the Washington Treaty through the United States Senate. The text of the treaty makes the point clear. By Article 5, "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." By Article 11, however, the members provided a safety catch: "This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." (Emphasis added.) The Washington Treaty text can be found in NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook (Brussels, 1995), 231-235.
44. Russen and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 381.
45. For the argument that collective action problems will prevent even the NATO of present size from engaging in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, see Joseph Lepgold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem," International Security 23 (Summer 1998): 78-107.
46. Adding Russia to NATO is not popular with the European members of NATO. David Yost, a close observer of European security affairs, cites German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe's views, made clear in September 1994, as representative of European views on adding Russia: "Russia cannot be integrated, neither [sic] into the European Union nor into NATO. . . . If Russia were to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO apart. . . . It would be like the United Nations of Europe - it wouldn't work." Quoted in David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security," Survival 40 (Summer 1998): 139.
47. On this point, See Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 298-311.
48. The first action effectively destroyed the League. The second took place only because the Soviet Union happened to boycott the Security Council meeting on the day that the action was voted. The third was another American-run affair, which the UN essentially delegated to the United States and its NATO-Arab allies. The thirty-two interstate wars for these seventy years can be found in "Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992," (ICPR 9905), Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 1994.
49. Some may argue that Europe does not need such a structure. Others may argue that if it does, the United States need not be part of it. Still others may argue that the West does not need to take Russia's concerns into account. I do not think that Russett and Stam hold to any of these views, and neither do I. Our differences, therefore, center on the means to attain the end I believe we three share - to keep Europe as stable, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic as possible. For my veiws on the role of the United States in European affairs, see Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly 111 (Spring 1996): 1-39; and on Eurasia in general, Robert J. Art, Selective Engagement: An American Grand Strategy (forthcoming), chaps. 2 and 7.
50. Some may argue that Europe does not need such a structure. Others may argue that if it does, the United States need not be part of it. Still others may argue that the West does not need to take Russia's concerns into account. I do not think that Russett and Stam hold to any of these views, and neither do I. Our differences, therefore, center on the means to attain the end I believe we three share - to keep Europe as stable, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic as possible. For my veiws on the role of the United States in European affairs, see Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly 111 (Spring 1996): 1-39; and on Eurasia in general, Robert J. Art, Selective Engagement: An American Grand Strategy (forthcoming), chaps. 2 and 7.
51. Anatol Lieven, "The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution" in Carpenter and Conry, NATO Enlargement, 144.
52. Through its Partnership for Peace program (PFP), NATO has made a vague commitment to PFP members: "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security." This is not a defense pledge, but neither is it meaningless. It leaves the door open for NATO to decide whether it wants to aid a state under duress or attack. See Yost, "The New NATO," 144.
53. My proposal for a modern day Concert parallels in some respects that of Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan. They want to institutionalize great power concertation in the CSCE, effectively turning it into a formal collective security system by creating a security council of the five great powers. I do not think this is politically feasible, because forty-eight smaller powers of Europe and Central Asia will resist it. I also believe that collective security will not work for the reasons set forth earlier. My proposal, which is NATO's at least on paper, keeps cooperation looser and does not promise what cannot be delivered. For the details of what the revamped OSCE would look like, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 151-160. For a solution that closely parallels mine, see Yost, "The New NATO."
54. My proposal for a modern day Concert parallels in some respects that of Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan. They want to institutionalize great power concertation in the CSCE, effectively turning it into a formal collective security system by creating a security council of the five great powers. I do not think this is politically feasible, because forty-eight smaller powers of Europe and Central Asia will resist it. I also believe that collective security will not work for the reasons set forth earlier. My proposal, which is NATO's at least on paper, keeps cooperation looser and does not promise what cannot be delivered. For the details of what the revamped OSCE would look like, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 151-160. For a solution that closely parallels mine, see Yost, "The New NATO."
55. A good overview of the first Concert of Europe is found in Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," World Politics 38 (October 1985): 58-79.
56. Quotes are from the text of the Preamble and Sections 1-3 of the Founding Act, found in Arms Control Today, 21-23.