Confucianism with a liberal face: The meaning of democratic politics in postcolonial Taiwan

Review of Politics

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 55-82

  Ling, L H M ^a   Shih, Chih Yu ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0005645497     PISSN: 00346705     EISSN: 17486858     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S003467050004393X     Document Type: Article

References (93)

1. See, for example, Zhigno gujian (Classics of governance), ed. G. Q. Han (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1991).
2. For a more detailed review of this literature, see L. H. M. Ling, "Democratization under Internationalization: Media Reconstructions of Gender Identity in Shanghai," Democratization 3 (1996): 140-157
3. East Asia's other CDS include Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. Hong Kong before its handover to China qualified only conditionally as a CDS given its formal status as a British colony. But since July 1997, Hong Kong has joined the region's latest CDS, China.
4. For a more detailed review of this literature, see P. Deans, "The Capitalist Developmental State in East Asia," in State Strategies in the Global Economy, ed. R. Palan and J. Abbott with P. Deans (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 78-102;
5. and J. Henderson, "Against the Economic Orthodoxy: On the Making of the East Asian Miracle," Economy and Society 22 (1993): 217.
6. Many consider Japan to be the sole exception with its multiparty representation, parliamentary elections, and formally free press. Feminists and other dissidents, however, dispute this claim given the patriarchal nature of Japan's corporatist state. See, for example, H. Fukui, "The Japanese State and Economic Development: A Profile of a Nationalist-Paternalist Capitalist State," in States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, ed. R. P. Appelbaum and J. Henderson (New York: Sage Publications, 1992), pp. 199-226;
7. M. Osawa, "Bye-bye Corporate Warriors: The Formation of a Corporate-Centered Society and Gender-Biased Social Policies in Japan," Annals of the Institute of Social Science 35 (1993): 157-94;
8. and Y. Mikanagi, "Understanding Japan's 'Undemocracy': A Study on Equal Employment Opportunity Law" (Paper presented at the conference on "Gender and Global Restructuring: Shifting Sites and Sightings," 12-13 May 1995, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands).
9. D. S. Landes, "Japan and Europe: Contrasts in Industrialization, " in The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, ed. W. W. Lockwood (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 93-182;
10. and C. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 1925-1975 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1982).
11. H. B. Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea," World Politics 39 (1987): 231-257
12. R. Denny, "Singapore, China, and the 'SoftAuthoritarian' Challenge,"Asian Survey 34 (1994): 231-42;
13. and E. Jones, "Asia's Fate: A Response to the Singapore School," National Interest 35 (1994): 18-28.
14. T. B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (New York: ME. Sharpe, 1986);
15. A. Amsden, "The State and Taiwan's Economic Development," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 78-106;
16. and A. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and Challenge to Dependency Theory," Modern China 5 (1979): 341-380
17. M. P. Petracca and M. Xiong, "The Concept of Chinese Neo- Authoritarianism," Asian Survey 30 (1990): 1099-1117.
18. For a comparison of East Asian capitalist authoritarianism with other types of repressive regimes in the Third World, see H. Feith, "Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia," Alternatives 7 (1981): 491-605.
19. See, for example, C. Y. Shih, "Public Citizens, Private Voters: The Meaning of Election for Chinese Peasants," in PRC Tomorrow: Development under the Ninth Five-Year Plan, ed. C. P. Lin (Kaohsiung: National Sun Yat-sen University, 1996), pp. 145-171
20. H. S. Rowen, "The Tide Underneath the 'Third jVave/" Journal of Democracy 6 (1995): 52-64.
21. M. Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review 87 (1993): 572.
22. L. W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) and "The State and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation," China Quarterly 127 (1991): 443-466
23. Y. Sakamoto, "Introduction: The Global Context of Democratization," Alternatives 16 (1991): 122.
24. See, for example, Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development";
25. R. Rose, "Toward a Civil Economy," Problems of Postcommunism 3 (1992): 13-26;
26. N. Genov, "The Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe: Trends and Paradoxes of Social Rationalization," International Social Science Journal 128 (1991): 331-41;
27. and D. Held, "Democracy and Globalization," Alternatives 16 (1991): 201-208
28. H. Overbeek and K. van der Pijl, "Restructuring Capital and Restructuring Hegemony," in Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy, ed. H. Overbeek (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 1.
29. M. Pei, "The Puzzle of East Asian Exceptionalism," Journal of Democracy 5 (1994): 102.
30. F. Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest (1989): 3-18.
31. In a later essay, Fukuyama modifies this statement to acknowledge that not all democratic polities need converge in form even while they embrace a common developmental program in content. Specifically, he notes a possible compatibility between Confucianism and democracy. But he spends the rest of the essay highlighting their differences only to conclude that "Confucian values might work well in a liberal society (as they clearly do for many Asian immigrants to the United States), where they can serve as a counterbalance to the larger society's atomizing tendencies." See, F. Fukuyama, "Confucianism and Democracy, "Journal of Democracy 6 (1995): 32-33. Casting East Asia's struggles with Confucianism and democracy in terms of the Asian diaspora in America not only shortchanges both historical experiences. It also underscores the Western bias that this paper critiques.
32. Note, for example, the rapist imagery underlying this nineteenth-century justification of colonialism, the historical precursor to twentieth-century liberalism as global ideology: "Colonization is the expansive force of a people; it is its power of reproduction; it is its enlargement and its multiplication through space; it is the subjection of the universe or a vast part of it to that people's language, customs, ideas, and laws" (original emphasis, French philosopher Leroy-Beaulieu quoted in E. Said, Orientalism [New York: Vintage Books, 1979], p. 219).
33. See, for example, J. Han and L. H. M. Ling, "Authoritarianism in the Hypermasculinized State: Hybridity, Patriarchy, and Capitalism in Korea," International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998): 51-76.
34. Ling, "Democratization and Liberalization," p. 145.
35. Foremost among its advocates are political leaders in the region like Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia, Suharto of Indonesia, and Roh Tae Woo of South Korea.
36. C. D. Neher, "Asian Style Democracy/' Asian Survey 34 (1994): 961.
37. This concept first appeared in a pre-Confucian source, the Shangshu. It stipulated that "heaven hears what the people hear, heaven sees what the people see." Subsequently, Mengzi (Mencius) incorporated this notion to conclude that the "people's heart" (minxin) should function as the ultimate arbiter of a regime's legitimacy. The people, Mengzi claimed, came first because they are the most noble, next comes the country, last is the prince. See, S. K. Lao, Zhongguo zhixue shi (The History of Chinese political philosophy), 4th ed. (Taipei: Sanmin, 1988).
38. See Y. C. Chin, Zhongguo minbengsixiangshi (Intellectual history of China's people-as-essence) (Taipei: Shangwu Publishing Co. Ltd., 1993).
39. Sun Yatsen sought to converge minben governance with Lincoln's democracy triad but ended up modifying the latter instead. Chinese nationalism, Sun claimed, instantiates government "of the people" (minyou) by permitting Chinese from all walks of life to participate in government. Ruling the country and evaluating their own performance thus constitutes government "by the people" (minzhi). Lastly, \maximizing "the people's livelihood" (minxiang) exemplifies government "for the people." See Y. Chou, Zhongshan sixiang xin quart (A New anthology of the thought of Sun Yatsen) (Taipei: Sanmin, 1990).
40. D. J. Kim, "Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values," Foreign Affairs, 1994, p. 191.
41. See, for example, L. H. M. Ling, "Rationalizations for State Violence in Chinese Politics: The Hegemony of Parental Governance," Journal of Peace Research 31 (1994): 393-1105
42. M. W. Sa, Rujia zhenglun yanyi (The Legacy of Confucian political thought) (Taipei: Tongta, 1982).
43. D. Bell and K. Jayasuriya, "Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework," in Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, ed. D. A. Bell, D. Brown, K. Jayasuriya, and D. M. Jones (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 2.
44. Ibid., p. 14.
45. D. M. Jones, K. Jayasuriya, D. A. Bell, and D. Brown, "Towards A Model of Illiberal Democracy," in Bell et al., Towards Illiberal Democracy, pp. 163-167
46. D. Brown and D. M. Jones, "Democratization and the Myth of the Liberalizing Middle Classes," in Bell et al., Towards Illiberal Democracy, pp. 78-106;
47. C. H. Nam, "South Korea's Big Business Clientelism in Democratic Reform," Asian Survey 35 (1995): 357-66;
48. and H. Koo, "The Interplay of State, Social Class, and World System in East Asian Development: The Cases of South Korea and Taiwan," in The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, ed. F. C. Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 165-181
49. Bell and Jayasuriya, "Understanding Illiberal Democracy," p. 13.
50. Confucian political thought requires both filial piety (xiao) and loyalty (zhong) for the polity, seen as family relations writ large. Whereas, Lockean liberalism celebrates the right of the individual to mature and live a life marked largely by contractual relations with both family and state. See, for example, Ling, "Rationalizations for State 'Violence in Chinese Politics."
51. See, for example, B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, H. Tiffin, eds., The Post-Colonial Studies Reader (London: Routledge, 1995).
52. See, for example, F. Buell, National Culture and the New Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994);
53. P. Darby and A. J. Paolini, "Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism," Alternatives 19 (1994): 371-97;
54. and S. Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity," in Culture, Globalization and the World System, ed. A. D. King (Binghamton: Department of Art and Art History, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1991), pp. 19-40.
55. H. Bhabha, "Cultural Diversity and Cultural Differences," in Ashcroft et al., The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, p. 209.
56. After his father's death in 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo served as Premier for three years under President Yen Chia-kan. Informally, though, Chiang gripped the reins of power. He first instituted political reforms with the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress in 1986. But many regard the first anti-KMT riot of 1977 in Chungli as the beginning of political reform in Taiwan.
57. See, for example, C. L. Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995);
58. J.J. Wu, Taiwan's Democratization (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995);
59. L. Chao and R. H. Myers, "The First Chinese Democracy," Asian Survey 34 (1994): 213-30;
60. S. C. Leng and C. Y. Lin, "Political Change on Taiwan: Transition to Democracy?" China Quarterly 136 (1993): 805- 39;
61. J. Domes, "Taiwan in 1992: On the Verge of Democracy," Asian Survey 33 (1993): 54-60;
62. P. R. Moody, Jr., Political Change on Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1992);
63. T. J. Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," World Politics 41 (1989): 471-99;
64. E. A. Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?" China Quarterly 99 (1984): 481-499
65. H. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? (NewYoricMeridian, 1958).
66. Brown and Jones, "Democratization and the Myth of Liberalizing Middle Classes," p. 97.
67. Since assuming the chairmanship of the KMT, Lee has subtly and irreversibly transformed Chiang Kai-shek's party into one that is pro-Taiwan rather than pro-China. For this reason, the KMT split into two: the "old new guard" of Lee supporters remains under the KMT banner while a "new new guard" of second-generation KMT loyalists-cum-intellectuals forms the New Party.
68. The National Assembly no longer elects the president but retains the authority to approve the president's nomination of the head of the Control, Justice, and Examination Yuans as well as their council members. The NDC proposal, in effect, would remove the premier, who chairs the Executive Yuan, from the Legislative Yuan's jurisdiction and shift his political allegiance completely to the president. Additionally, this proposal would allow President Lee to send the premier's cabinet to the National Assembly, thereby installing a de facto presidential caucus.
69. Meng Rong-hua, Central Daily News, 28 December 1996, p. 2. Taiwan's constitution currently stipulates that the premier heads the national administration and chairs the Executive Yuan. The NDC initially proposed to have the president chair the Executive Yuan's "routine meetings." But with its broader objectives in mind (i.e., presidential nomination of the premier without legislative approval and possible dissolution of the legislature at will), the NDC dropped this proposition as a show of compromise.
70. Central Daily News, 30 December 1996, p. 4.
71. -27 December 1996, p. 2.
72. Hu Wenhui, 27 December 1996, p. 2.
73. -28 December 1996, p. 2.
74. Hsu Wen-pin, Liberal Times, 29 December 1996, p. 7.
75. Central Daily News, 30 December 1996, p. 2.
76. The NAC sought popular support to terminate the incumbent National Assembly, the Control Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan by electing new representatives for each of these institutions.
77. Liberal Times, 29 December 1996, p. 3.
78. Public Records of the Legislative Yuan {Ufa gongbao) 85 (1996): 287-296
79. United Daily, 30 December 1996, p. 6.
80. The Thousand Island Incident occurred in April 1994 when three mainland Chinese robbed and burned 24 Taiwanese tourists along with their 8 mainland crew members on a yacht touring the area. Embarassed by the event, local mainland authorities stalled requests by Taiwanese families to retrieve the bodies of their loved ones and to see the burned yacht. For the implications of this event for mainland-Taiwan relations, see C. Y. Shih, "Human Rights as Identities: Difference and Discrimination in Taiwan's China Policy" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, 18-20 March 1995, Portland, Oregon).
81. Central Daily News, 1 January 1997, p. 3.
82. This form of self-address invokes traditional Confucian protocol for scholar-officials.
83. The term "freeze" (dong) was used to avoid the impression that Taiwan's provincial status was being eliminated even though that, in effect, would be the result.
84. Xunzi, Mengzi, and the Four Books (si shu) all targeted individual "desire" as a source of social disintegration. See Sa, Rujia, in footnote 29.
85. C. Y. Shih, "The Decline of China's Moral Regime," Comparative Political Studies 27 (1994): 272-301.
86. China Times, 21 September 1991, p. 4.
87. -20 May 1991, p. 2.
88. Former Minister of Justice (sifabu) Ma Yingjiou resigned when thousands of demonstrators demanded government action to restore public order when the 17-year-old daughter of a well-known actress was kidnapped and killed for ransom. This incident followed two other highly publicized murders, one committed against a DPP feminist in a taxicab and another with eight victims killed in the home of a KMT party member. These murders remain unsolved, thereby escalating public hysteria about law and order in Taiwan.
89. Records of the National Affairs Council, p. 226.
90. Central Daily News, 30 December 1996, p. 4.
91. F. Hu, Zhengzhi tvenhua de yihan yu guancha (Connotations and observations of political culture) (Tlanjin: Tianjin People's Publishing, 1995).
92. K. K. Huang, for instance, lambasts politics in Taiwan for failing to approximate the Western liberal democratic ideal by: (1) not functioning as a democracy but delivering a form of populism that is a "distorted product" {guai wu) of Oriental despotism and Western democracy; (2) failing to govern by tolerating personal power mongering;
93. and (3) deluding the public that money politics {jingqian zhengzhi) is really techno-industrial development and that mafia politics (heidao zhengzhi) constitutes a kind of family values. But he blames these structural and institutional problems on a single individual leader, Lee Teng-hui, and his moral character. See, K. K. Huang, Mincuiwangtailun (On the annihilation of Taiwan through populism) (Taipei: Choushang Wenhua Co. Ltd., 1995). This application of Confucian morality to liberal politics is ultimately self-contradictory and self-defeating. Logically, it implies that Taiwan needs another individual (most likely male) imbued with the moral "right stuff" to lead it to democracy. How, then, is this democratic?