Uncertainty and the competitive decline of the British motor industry: 1945-75

New Political Economy

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 103-120

  Bowden, Sue ^a   Turner, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 0004692534     PISSN: 13563467     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13563469808406335     Document Type: Review

References (126)

1. Paul Turner & Sue Bowden, 'The British Car Industry - A Performance Record', Economic Review, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996), pp. 16-19; and D. G. Rhys, 'Britain's Car Industry Bounces Back', Parliamentary Brief, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1995), pp. 69-70.
2. Paul Turner & Sue Bowden, 'The British Car Industry - A Performance Record', Economic Review, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996), pp. 16-19; and D. G. Rhys, 'Britain's Car Industry Bounces Back', Parliamentary Brief, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1995), pp. 69-70.
3. British Motor Corporation (hereinafter BMC) was formed in 1952 from the merger of Austin and Morris; it later changed its name in 1966 to British Motor Holdings (hereinafter BMH) when it absorbed Jaguar; in 1968 BMH merged with Leyland to form British Leyland Motor Corporation.
4. Christopher Freeman & C. Perez, 'Structural crises of adjustment: business cycles and investment behaviour', in: Giovanni Dosi, Christopher Freeman, Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg & Luc Soete (Eds), Technical Change and Economic Theory (Pinter, 1988), pp. 38-66.
5. Sue Bowden, 'Demand and Supply Constraints in the Interwar UK Car Industry: Did the Manufacturers Get It Right?', Business History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1991), pp. 242-67; Sue Bowden & Paul Turner, 'Some Cross Section Evidence on the Determinants of the Diffusion of Car Ownership in the Interwar UK Economy', Business History, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993), pp. 55-69; and Sue Bowden & Paul Turner, 'The UK Market and the Market for Consumer Durables', Journal of Economic History, Vol. 53, No. 2 (1993), pp. 244-58.
6. Sue Bowden, 'Demand and Supply Constraints in the Interwar UK Car Industry: Did the Manufacturers Get It Right?', Business History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1991), pp. 242-67; Sue Bowden & Paul Turner, 'Some Cross Section Evidence on the Determinants of the Diffusion of Car Ownership in the Interwar UK Economy', Business History, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993), pp. 55-69; and Sue Bowden & Paul Turner, 'The UK Market and the Market for Consumer Durables', Journal of Economic History, Vol. 53, No. 2 (1993), pp. 244-58.
7. Sue Bowden, 'Demand and Supply Constraints in the Interwar UK Car Industry: Did the Manufacturers Get It Right?', Business History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1991), pp. 242-67; Sue Bowden & Paul Turner, 'Some Cross Section Evidence on the Determinants of the Diffusion of Car Ownership in the Interwar UK Economy', Business History, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993), pp. 55-69; and Sue Bowden & Paul Turner, 'The UK Market and the Market for Consumer Durables', Journal of Economic History, Vol. 53, No. 2 (1993), pp. 244-58.
8. James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones & Daniel Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (Rawson Associates, 1990).
9. Paul Hirst & Jonathon Zeitlin (Eds), Reversing Industrial Decline? Industrial Structure and Policy in Britain and her Competitors (Berg, 1989).
10. James Foreman-Peck, Sue Bowden & Alan McKinlay, The British Motor Industry (Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 217-50.
11. Womack et al., The Machine that Changed the World; and A. Altschuler, M. Anderson, D Jones, D Roos & J. Womack, The Future of the Automobile: The Report of MIT's International Programme (Allen & Unwin, 1984).
12. Womack et al., The Machine that Changed the World; and A. Altschuler, M. Anderson, D Jones, D Roos & J. Womack, The Future of the Automobile: The Report of MIT's International Programme (Allen & Unwin, 1984).
13. Karel Williams, John Williams, Colin Haslam & Andrew Wardlow, 'Facing up to manufacturing failure', in: Hirst & Zeitlin, Reversing Industrial Decline?, pp. 71-94.
14. The authors are indebted to Mike Dietrich for comments relating to the contents of this and the following paragraph. Surveys of the regulation approach are provided in K. Neilsen, 'Towards a flexible future: theories and politics' in: B. Jessop, K. Neilsen, H. Kastendiek & O. K. Pedersen (Eds), The Politics of Flexibility (Edward Elgar, 1991); and Bob Jessop, 'Twenty Years of the (Parisian) Regulation Approach: The Paradox of Success and Failure at Home and Abroad', New Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1997), pp. 499-522.
15. The authors are indebted to Mike Dietrich for comments relating to the contents of this and the following paragraph. Surveys of the regulation approach are provided in K. Neilsen, 'Towards a flexible future: theories and politics' in: B. Jessop, K. Neilsen, H. Kastendiek & O. K. Pedersen (Eds), The Politics of Flexibility (Edward Elgar, 1991); and Bob Jessop, 'Twenty Years of the (Parisian) Regulation Approach: The Paradox of Success and Failure at Home and Abroad', New Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1997), pp. 499-522.
16. Robert Boyer, 'Technical change and the theory of régulation', in: Dosi et al., Technical Change and Economy Theory, p. 71.
17. Charles Bean & Nicholas Crafts, 'British economic growth since 1945: relative economic decline...and renaissance?', in: Nicholas Crafts & Gianni Toniolo (Eds), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945 (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1996), pp. 153-8; Barry Eichengreen, 'Mainsprings of economic recovery in post-war Europe', in: Barry Eichengreen (Ed.), Europe's Post War Recovery (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 11, 23 and 31; and Barry Eichengreen, 'Institutions and economic growth: Europe after World War II', in: Crafts & Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, pp. 45-50.
18. Charles Bean & Nicholas Crafts, 'British economic growth since 1945: relative economic decline...and renaissance?', in: Nicholas Crafts & Gianni Toniolo (Eds), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945 (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1996), pp. 153-8; Barry Eichengreen, 'Mainsprings of economic recovery in post-war Europe', in: Barry Eichengreen (Ed.), Europe's Post War Recovery (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 11, 23 and 31; and Barry Eichengreen, 'Institutions and economic growth: Europe after World War II', in: Crafts & Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, pp. 45-50.
19. Charles Bean & Nicholas Crafts, 'British economic growth since 1945: relative economic decline...and renaissance?', in: Nicholas Crafts & Gianni Toniolo (Eds), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945 (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1996), pp. 153-8; Barry Eichengreen, 'Mainsprings of economic recovery in post-war Europe', in: Barry Eichengreen (Ed.), Europe's Post War Recovery (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 11, 23 and 31; and Barry Eichengreen, 'Institutions and economic growth: Europe after World War II', in: Crafts & Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, pp. 45-50.
20. Martin Weiner, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 (Cambridge University Press, 1981); Karel Williams, 'BMC/BLMC/BL - misunderstood failure', in: Karel Williams, John Williams & Dennis Thomas, Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
21. Martin Weiner, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 (Cambridge University Press, 1981); Karel Williams, 'BMC/BLMC/BL - misunderstood failure', in: Karel Williams, John Williams & Dennis Thomas, Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing? (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
22. H. Simon, Administrative Behaviour: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organisations (Macmillan, 1957).
23. R. Heiner, 'The Origin of Predictable Behaviour', American Economic Review, Vol. 100, Supplement (1983), p. 83.
24. Edward Lorenz, 'Organisational Inertia and Competitive Decline: The British Cotton, Shipbuilding and Car Industries 1945-1975', Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1994), pp. 379-403.
25. G. A. Akerlof & J. L. Yerller, 'A Near-Rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia', Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 100 (Supplement) (1985), pp. 823-38.
26. Avinash Dixit, 'Investment and Hysteresis', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1992), pp. 107-32; Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton University Press, 1994); Robert S. Pindyck, 'Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Investment', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIX (1991), pp. 1110-48; and Robert S. Pindyck, 'A Note on Competitive Investment Under Uncertainty', American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (1993), pp. 273-77.
27. Avinash Dixit, 'Investment and Hysteresis', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1992), pp. 107-32; Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton University Press, 1994); Robert S. Pindyck, 'Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Investment', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIX (1991), pp. 1110-48; and Robert S. Pindyck, 'A Note on Competitive Investment Under Uncertainty', American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (1993), pp. 273-77.
28. Avinash Dixit, 'Investment and Hysteresis', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1992), pp. 107-32; Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton University Press, 1994); Robert S. Pindyck, 'Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Investment', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIX (1991), pp. 1110-48; and Robert S. Pindyck, 'A Note on Competitive Investment Under Uncertainty', American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (1993), pp. 273-77.
29. Avinash Dixit, 'Investment and Hysteresis', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1992), pp. 107-32; Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton University Press, 1994); Robert S. Pindyck, 'Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Investment', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIX (1991), pp. 1110-48; and Robert S. Pindyck, 'A Note on Competitive Investment Under Uncertainty', American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (1993), pp. 273-77.
30. Robert S. Pindyck & Andrew Solimano, 'Economic instability and aggregate investment', in: NBER Macroeconomics Manual (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993), pp. 259-303.
31. National Economic Development Office (hereinafter NEDO), Motors: Industrial Review to 1973 (NEDO, 1978), paras 1.7 and 1.8, p. 2. The value of intra-EEC trade in motor cars grew by 524 per cent between 1961 and 1971 (ibid., Table 2.2, p. 10). In 1956 the Ottawa Agreement of 1952 which had formalised trade relations between the UK and Australia was renegotiated, although these did maintain minimum preference margins of 7.5-10 per cent. See 'Australian trade and industry and related policies', mimeo, Economic History Archive, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1970, p. 27. Ten years later, the preferential tariff on complete passenger cars was increased by 10 per cent to 35 per cent. See ibid., p. 197.
32. National Economic Development Office (hereinafter NEDO), Motors: Industrial Review to 1973 (NEDO, 1978), paras 1.7 and 1.8, p. 2. The value of intra-EEC trade in motor cars grew by 524 per cent between 1961 and 1971 (ibid., Table 2.2, p. 10). In 1956 the Ottawa Agreement of 1952 which had formalised trade relations between the UK and Australia was renegotiated, although these did maintain minimum preference margins of 7.5-10 per cent. See 'Australian trade and industry and related policies', mimeo, Economic History Archive, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1970, p. 27. Ten years later, the preferential tariff on complete passenger cars was increased by 10 per cent to 35 per cent. See ibid., p. 197.
33. National Economic Development Office (hereinafter NEDO), Motors: Industrial Review to 1973 (NEDO, 1978), paras 1.7 and 1.8, p. 2. The value of intra-EEC trade in motor cars grew by 524 per cent between 1961 and 1971 (ibid., Table 2.2, p. 10). In 1956 the Ottawa Agreement of 1952 which had formalised trade relations between the UK and Australia was renegotiated, although these did maintain minimum preference margins of 7.5-10 per cent. See 'Australian trade and industry and related policies', mimeo, Economic History Archive, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1970, p. 27. Ten years later, the preferential tariff on complete passenger cars was increased by 10 per cent to 35 per cent. See ibid., p. 197.
34. National Economic Development Office (hereinafter NEDO), Motors: Industrial Review to 1973 (NEDO, 1978), paras 1.7 and 1.8, p. 2. The value of intra-EEC trade in motor cars grew by 524 per cent between 1961 and 1971 (ibid., Table 2.2, p. 10). In 1956 the Ottawa Agreement of 1952 which had formalised trade relations between the UK and Australia was renegotiated, although these did maintain minimum preference margins of 7.5-10 per cent. See 'Australian trade and industry and related policies', mimeo, Economic History Archive, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1970, p. 27. Ten years later, the preferential tariff on complete passenger cars was increased by 10 per cent to 35 per cent. See ibid., p. 197.
35. NEDO, Motors, para. 1.7, p. 2; and Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, Memorandum, written evidence in House of Commons Memoranda No. 27, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 1975, p. 378.
36. NEDO, Motors, para. 1.7, p. 2; and Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, Memorandum, written evidence in House of Commons Memoranda No. 27, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 1975, p. 378.
37. Central Policy Review Staff (hereinafter CPRS), The Future of the British Car Industry (HMSO, 1975), para. 24, p. 73; House of Commons, Fourteenth Report from the Expenditure Committee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee) Session 1974-5, The Motor Vehicle Industry, House of Commons Paper 617, PP 1974/5 para. 33, p. 12; House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee), Volume I, Evidence Taken up to 9 April 1975, Session 1974-5, The Motor Vehicle Industry, House of Commons Paper 617.I, PP 1974/5, p. 218. In Germany BL had about half as many outlets as its major import competitors; average sales per dealer were less than one-fifth of those of Ford dealers. In Belgium and Sweden BL was said to have too few dealers and those dealers they had were considered to be small and inadequate. CPRS, The Future, para. 24, p. 73.
38. Central Policy Review Staff (hereinafter CPRS), The Future of the British Car Industry (HMSO, 1975), para. 24, p. 73; House of Commons, Fourteenth Report from the Expenditure Committee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee) Session 1974-5, The Motor Vehicle Industry, House of Commons Paper 617, PP 1974/5 para. 33, p. 12; House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee), Volume I, Evidence Taken up to 9 April 1975, Session 1974-5, The Motor Vehicle Industry, House of Commons Paper 617.I, PP 1974/5, p. 218. In Germany BL had about half as many outlets as its major import competitors; average sales per dealer were less than one-fifth of those of Ford dealers. In Belgium and Sweden BL was said to have too few dealers and those dealers they had were considered to be small and inadequate. CPRS, The Future, para. 24, p. 73.
39. Central Policy Review Staff (hereinafter CPRS), The Future of the British Car Industry (HMSO, 1975), para. 24, p. 73; House of Commons, Fourteenth Report from the Expenditure Committee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee) Session 1974-5, The Motor Vehicle Industry, House of Commons Paper 617, PP 1974/5 para. 33, p. 12; House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee), Volume I, Evidence Taken up to 9 April 1975, Session 1974-5, The Motor Vehicle Industry, House of Commons Paper 617.I, PP 1974/5, p. 218. In Germany BL had about half as many outlets as its major import competitors; average sales per dealer were less than one-fifth of those of Ford dealers. In Belgium and Sweden BL was said to have too few dealers and those dealers they had were considered to be small and inadequate. CPRS, The Future, para. 24, p. 73.
40. Central Policy Review Staff (hereinafter CPRS), The Future of the British Car Industry (HMSO, 1975), para. 24, p. 73; House of Commons, Fourteenth Report from the Expenditure Committee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee) Session 1974-5, The Motor Vehicle Industry, House of Commons Paper 617, PP 1974/5 para. 33, p. 12; House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee), Volume I, Evidence Taken up to 9 April 1975, Session 1974-5, The Motor Vehicle Industry, House of Commons Paper 617.I, PP 1974/5, p. 218. In Germany BL had about half as many outlets as its major import competitors; average sales per dealer were less than one-fifth of those of Ford dealers. In Belgium and Sweden BL was said to have too few dealers and those dealers they had were considered to be small and inadequate. CPRS, The Future, para. 24, p. 73.
41. Peter Stubbs, The Australian Motor Industry: A Study in Protection and Growth (Cheshire Publishing, 1972), p. 145.
42. House of Commons, The Motor Vehicle Industry, para. 26, p. 9.
43. 'British Motor Corporation: the commercial crunch', The Economist, 26 November 1966.
44. Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain and Europe (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1957), pp. 138-39.
45. House of Commons, The Motor Vehicle Industry, para. 33, p. 12. The problem of exchange rates was highlighted in a letter to the authors by the late Douglas Jay. Our thanks to Lord Jay for pointing out the importance of the overvaluation of sterling for export performance.
46. BMC, Annual Report, 1957, p. 12; BLMC, Annual Report, 1969, p. 25; Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain and Europe, p. 137; Ford Motor Company, 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee', in: House of Commons, Minutes, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 5 March 1975, p. 259; and Vauxhall Motor Company Annual Reports, 1960, p. 5 ; 1961, p. 12; 1966, p. 4; and 1967, p. 4.
47. BMC, Annual Report, 1957, p. 12; BLMC, Annual Report, 1969, p. 25; Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain and Europe, p. 137; Ford Motor Company, 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee', in: House of Commons, Minutes, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 5 March 1975, p. 259; and Vauxhall Motor Company Annual Reports, 1960, p. 5 ; 1961, p. 12; 1966, p. 4; and 1967, p. 4.
48. BMC, Annual Report, 1957, p. 12; BLMC, Annual Report, 1969, p. 25; Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain and Europe, p. 137; Ford Motor Company, 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee', in: House of Commons, Minutes, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 5 March 1975, p. 259; and Vauxhall Motor Company Annual Reports, 1960, p. 5 ; 1961, p. 12; 1966, p. 4; and 1967, p. 4.
49. BMC, Annual Report, 1957, p. 12; BLMC, Annual Report, 1969, p. 25; Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain and Europe, p. 137; Ford Motor Company, 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee', in: House of Commons, Minutes, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 5 March 1975, p. 259; and Vauxhall Motor Company Annual Reports, 1960, p. 5 ; 1961, p. 12; 1966, p. 4; and 1967, p. 4.
50. BMC, Annual Report, 1957, p. 12; BLMC, Annual Report, 1969, p. 25; Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain and Europe, p. 137; Ford Motor Company, 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee', in: House of Commons, Minutes, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 5 March 1975, p. 259; and Vauxhall Motor Company Annual Reports, 1960, p. 5 ; 1961, p. 12; 1966, p. 4; and 1967, p. 4.
51. BMC, Annual Report, 1957, p. 12; BLMC, Annual Report, 1969, p. 25; Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain and Europe, p. 137; Ford Motor Company, 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee', in: House of Commons, Minutes, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 5 March 1975, p. 259; and Vauxhall Motor Company Annual Reports, 1960, p. 5 ; 1961, p. 12; 1966, p. 4; and 1967, p. 4.
52. BMC, Annual Report, 1957, p. 12; BLMC, Annual Report, 1969, p. 25; Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain and Europe, p. 137; Ford Motor Company, 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee', in: House of Commons, Minutes, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 5 March 1975, p. 259; and Vauxhall Motor Company Annual Reports, 1960, p. 5 ; 1961, p. 12; 1966, p. 4; and 1967, p. 4.
53. BMC, Annual Report, 1957, p. 12; BLMC, Annual Report, 1969, p. 25; Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain and Europe, p. 137; Ford Motor Company, 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Expenditure Committee', in: House of Commons, Minutes, Volume I, House of Commons Paper 617-I, 5 March 1975, p. 259; and Vauxhall Motor Company Annual Reports, 1960, p. 5 ; 1961, p. 12; 1966, p. 4; and 1967, p. 4.
54. Data on the new registrations of new cars are not available for Germany and France before 1958.
55. Ford Motor Company, in: House of Commons, The Motor Vehicle Industry, p. 235.
56. Sue Bowden & Paul Turner, 'The decline and rise of the '"British" motor industry', paper presented at the Economic History Conference, Edinburgh University, April 1995.
57. Stephen Wilks, Industrial Policy and the Motor Industry (Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 78.
58. Peter J. S. Dunnett, The Decline of the British Motor Industry: The Effects of Government Policy, 1945-1979 (Croom Helm, 1980).
59. Consumer Credit, Report of the Committee (the 'Crowther' Report), Volume 2 - Appendices, Cmnd. 4596 (HMSO, 1971), pp. 450-7.
60. A. Silberston, 'Hire Purchase and the Demand for Cars', Economic Journal, Vol. 73, No. 289 (1963), pp. 32-53;
61. and A. Silberston, 'Hire Purchase and the Demand for Cars', Economic Journal, Vol. 73, No. 291 (1963), pp. 556-8.
62. Department of Industry, The British Motor Vehicle Industry, Cmnd. 6377 (HMSO, 1976), para. 6, p. 2; and R. C. O. Matthews, 'The role of demand management', in: Sir Alec Cairncross (Ed.), Britain's Economic Prospects Reconsidered (Allen and Unwin 1971), pp. 13-35.
63. Department of Industry, The British Motor Vehicle Industry, Cmnd. 6377 (HMSO, 1976), para. 6, p. 2; and R. C. O. Matthews, 'The role of demand management', in: Sir Alec Cairncross (Ed.), Britain's Economic Prospects Reconsidered (Allen and Unwin 1971), pp. 13-35.
64. In 1968 Ford's Cortina held 12.5 per cent of market shares in the medium car class sales; BL's Maxi held 2.7 per cent. See Foreman-Peck et al., The British Motor Industry, Table 5.4, p. 142.
65. Ford Motor Company, in: House of Commons, Minutes, 5 March 1975, p. 258;
66. and Williams et al., Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing?, pp. 232-3.
67. Restrictive Practices Court, Proof of Evidence of Percy John Greaves, No 5 (Finance Houses Association Archives, London, 1961), Ref. H.1, para. 96, p. 46.
68. 'British Motor Corporation: the commercial crunch'.
69. Williams et al., Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing?, p. 231.
70. Foreman-Peck, et al., The British Motor Industry, p. 139.
71. Williams et al., Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing?, p. 223.
72. Dixit, 'Investment and Hysteresis', p. 108.
73. Ibid., p. 118.
74. George Maxcy, 'The motor industry', in: P. Lesley Cook (Ed.), Effects of Mergers: Six Studies (George Allen & Unwin, 1958), pp. 351-93.
75. BMC, Annual Report, 1959, p. 15; Ford, Annual Report, 1959; Maxcy, 'The motor industry', pp. 380-1; and Williams et al., Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing?, p 220.
76. BMC, Annual Report, 1959, p. 15; Ford, Annual Report, 1959; Maxcy, 'The motor industry', pp. 380-1; and Williams et al., Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing?, p 220.
77. BMC, Annual Report, 1959, p. 15; Ford, Annual Report, 1959; Maxcy, 'The motor industry', pp. 380-1; and Williams et al., Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing?, p 220.
78. BMC, Annual Report, 1959, p. 15; Ford, Annual Report, 1959; Maxcy, 'The motor industry', pp. 380-1; and Williams et al., Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing?, p 220.
79. BMC, Annual Report, 1960, p. 14.
80. NEDO, The Effect of Government Economic Policy on the Motor Industry (NEDO, 1968), pp. 18, 20.
81. At various stages in the 1950s and 1960s, the industry operated significantly below capacity. In the period up to 1953, in 1961 and again in 1969 it was operating at less than half capacity. The down phases of the business cycle in the 1950s delayed the utilisation of capacity created during the two investment phases of that decade and it was not until 1958 that the extra capacity created in the industry since 1954 was utilised for the first time (Dunnett, The Decline of the British Motor Industry, p. 62). But just three years later, at the upturn of the cycle, the industry was able to raise production to operate at 40 per cent capacity (ibid., p. 91). At the end of 1961, production had fallen to half a million units a year, at the very time when capacity was being increased to three million units a year (ibid., p. 91; and D. G. Rhys, The Motor Industry: An Economic Survey (Butterworths, 1972), p. 369).
82. At various stages in the 1950s and 1960s, the industry operated significantly below capacity. In the period up to 1953, in 1961 and again in 1969 it was operating at less than half capacity. The down phases of the business cycle in the 1950s delayed the utilisation of capacity created during the two investment phases of that decade and it was not until 1958 that the extra capacity created in the industry since 1954 was utilised for the first time (Dunnett, The Decline of the British Motor Industry, p. 62). But just three years later, at the upturn of the cycle, the industry was able to raise production to operate at 40 per cent capacity (ibid., p. 91). At the end of 1961, production had fallen to half a million units a year, at the very time when capacity was being increased to three million units a year (ibid., p. 91; and D. G. Rhys, The Motor Industry: An Economic Survey (Butterworths, 1972), p. 369).
83. At various stages in the 1950s and 1960s, the industry operated significantly below capacity. In the period up to 1953, in 1961 and again in 1969 it was operating at less than half capacity. The down phases of the business cycle in the 1950s delayed the utilisation of capacity created during the two investment phases of that decade and it was not until 1958 that the extra capacity created in the industry since 1954 was utilised for the first time (Dunnett, The Decline of the British Motor Industry, p. 62). But just three years later, at the upturn of the cycle, the industry was able to raise production to operate at 40 per cent capacity (ibid., p. 91). At the end of 1961, production had fallen to half a million units a year, at the very time when capacity was being increased to three million units a year (ibid., p. 91; and D. G. Rhys, The Motor Industry: An Economic Survey (Butterworths, 1972), p. 369).
84. At various stages in the 1950s and 1960s, the industry operated significantly below capacity. In the period up to 1953, in 1961 and again in 1969 it was operating at less than half capacity. The down phases of the business cycle in the 1950s delayed the utilisation of capacity created during the two investment phases of that decade and it was not until 1958 that the extra capacity created in the industry since 1954 was utilised for the first time (Dunnett, The Decline of the British Motor Industry, p. 62). But just three years later, at the upturn of the cycle, the industry was able to raise production to operate at 40 per cent capacity (ibid., p. 91). At the end of 1961, production had fallen to half a million units a year, at the very time when capacity was being increased to three million units a year (ibid., p. 91; and D. G. Rhys, The Motor Industry: An Economic Survey (Butterworths, 1972), p. 369).
85. NEDO, Industrial Report by the Motor Manufacturing EDC on the Economic Assessment to 1972 (NEDO, 1970), p. 19.
86. NEDO, Motors: Industrial Review to 1973, Annex D, p. 37; and Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, Memorandum, pp. 374, 384.
87. NEDO, Motors: Industrial Review to 1973, Annex D, p. 37; and Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, Memorandum, pp. 374, 384.
88. Lorenz, 'Organisational Inertia and Competitive Decline'.
89. Sue Bowden, 'Industrial organisation and the road to nationalisation in Britain 1920-1959: the motor vehicle industry', in: R. Millward & J. Singleton (Eds), Industrial Organisation and the Road to Nationalisation in Britain 1920-1959 (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Lewis Johnman, 'The Labour party and industrial policy', in: Nick Tiratsoo (Ed.), The Attlee Years (Pinter, 1991), p. 45;
90. Sue Bowden, 'Industrial organisation and the road to nationalisation in Britain 1920-1959: the motor vehicle industry', in: R. Millward & J. Singleton (Eds), Industrial Organisation and the Road to Nationalisation in Britain 1920-1959 (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Lewis Johnman, 'The Labour party and industrial policy', in: Nick Tiratsoo (Ed.), The Attlee Years (Pinter, 1991), p. 45;
91. Labour Party Research Department, Report on the British Motor Industry: Possibilities of Future Development with Special Reference to the Advantages and Disadvantages of Public Ownership, Labour Party Archive, 1948, National Museum of Labour History, Manchester, para. 220, parts a and b, p. 62.
92. Johnman, 'The Labour party and industrial policy', p. 35;
93. and Labour Party Research Department, Report, para. 224(8), p. 65.
94. D. T. Jones & S. J. Prais, 'Plant Size and Productivity in the Motor Industry: Some International Comparisons', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 40, No 2. (1978), pp. 131-51;
95. and S. J. Prais, Productivity and Industrial Structure: A Statistical Study of Manufacturing Industry in Britain, Germany and the United States (Cambridge University Press, 1981).
96. D. T. Jones, The Import Threat to the UK Car Industry, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 1985, No. 12, p. 13.
97. Michael Edwardes, Back from the Brink: An Apocalyptic Experience (Collins, 1983), pp. 32, 39.
98. Sue Bowden, James Foreman-Peck & Tom Richardson, 'Piecework and productivity decline: "Just-out-of-time" at Morris Motors in the 1960s', mimeo, Sheffield University Management School, October 1996; Sue Bowden & Josephine Maltby, 'Under-performance, short-termism and corporate governance: the 'City' and the British Motor Corporation, 1952-1967', mimeo, Sheffield University Management School, March 1997; and Sue Bowden & Josephine Maltby, 'More a National Asset than an Investor's Paradise: Financial Management and the British Motor Corporation', Accounting, Business and Financial History, Vol, 8, No, 1 (1998).
99. Sue Bowden, James Foreman-Peck & Tom Richardson, 'Piecework and productivity decline: "Just-out-of-time" at Morris Motors in the 1960s', mimeo, Sheffield University Management School, October 1996; Sue Bowden & Josephine Maltby, 'Under-performance, short-termism and corporate governance: the 'City' and the British Motor Corporation, 1952-1967', mimeo, Sheffield University Management School, March 1997; and Sue Bowden & Josephine Maltby, 'More a National Asset than an Investor's Paradise: Financial Management and the British Motor Corporation', Accounting, Business and Financial History, Vol, 8, No, 1 (1998).
100. Sue Bowden, James Foreman-Peck & Tom Richardson, 'Piecework and productivity decline: "Just-out-of-time" at Morris Motors in the 1960s', mimeo, Sheffield University Management School, October 1996; Sue Bowden & Josephine Maltby, 'Under-performance, short-termism and corporate governance: the 'City' and the British Motor Corporation, 1952-1967', mimeo, Sheffield University Management School, March 1997; and Sue Bowden & Josephine Maltby, 'More a National Asset than an Investor's Paradise: Financial Management and the British Motor Corporation', Accounting, Business and Financial History, Vol, 8, No, 1 (1998).
101. Roy Church, 'Deconstructing Nuffield: The Evolution of Managerial Culture in the British Motor Industry', Economic History Review, Vol. XLIX, No. 3 (1996), pp. 561-83.
102. Martin Adeney, The Motor Makers: The Turbulent History of Britain's Motor Industry (Collins, 1988), p. 201; Edwardes, Back from the Brink, p. 35; Foreman-Peck et al., The British Motor Industry, pp. 113-14; and G. Turner, The Leyland Papers (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971), pp. 88-100.
103. Martin Adeney, The Motor Makers: The Turbulent History of Britain's Motor Industry (Collins, 1988), p. 201; Edwardes, Back from the Brink, p. 35; Foreman-Peck et al., The British Motor Industry, pp. 113-14; and G. Turner, The Leyland Papers (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971), pp. 88-100.
104. Martin Adeney, The Motor Makers: The Turbulent History of Britain's Motor Industry (Collins, 1988), p. 201; Edwardes, Back from the Brink, p. 35; Foreman-Peck et al., The British Motor Industry, pp. 113-14; and G. Turner, The Leyland Papers (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971), pp. 88-100.
105. Martin Adeney, The Motor Makers: The Turbulent History of Britain's Motor Industry (Collins, 1988), p. 201; Edwardes, Back from the Brink, p. 35; Foreman-Peck et al., The British Motor Industry, pp. 113-14; and G. Turner, The Leyland Papers (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971), pp. 88-100.
106. Adeney, The Motor Makers, p. 201; and Turner, The Leyland Papers, pp. 88-100. Leonard Lord had been brought in by Morris in 1933 to restore the fortunes of his flagging empire. This Lord did within two years. The two parted company in 1938 on hostile terms (Morris refused Lord a share of the consequent profit) and Lord thereafter joined Austin from where he maintained a determination to 'screw Nuffield into the ground' (Turner, The Leyland Papers, p. 91).
107. Adeney, The Motor Makers, p. 201; and Turner, The Leyland Papers, pp. 88-100. Leonard Lord had been brought in by Morris in 1933 to restore the fortunes of his flagging empire. This Lord did within two years. The two parted company in 1938 on hostile terms (Morris refused Lord a share of the consequent profit) and Lord thereafter joined Austin from where he maintained a determination to 'screw Nuffield into the ground' (Turner, The Leyland Papers, p. 91).
108. Adeney, The Motor Makers, p. 201; and Turner, The Leyland Papers, pp. 88-100. Leonard Lord had been brought in by Morris in 1933 to restore the fortunes of his flagging empire. This Lord did within two years. The two parted company in 1938 on hostile terms (Morris refused Lord a share of the consequent profit) and Lord thereafter joined Austin from where he maintained a determination to 'screw Nuffield into the ground' (Turner, The Leyland Papers, p. 91).
109. Edwardes, Back from the Brink, p. 36.
110. Prais, Productivity and Industrial Structure, p. 164.
111. This, and the following paragraphs in this section, draw on the findings of the analysis of the shareholders' registers for the company analysed and reported in depth in Bowden & Maltby, 'Under-performance', and also discussed in Bowden & Maltby, 'More a National Asset than an Investor's Paradise'.
112. This, and the following paragraphs in this section, draw on the findings of the analysis of the shareholders' registers for the company analysed and reported in depth in Bowden & Maltby, 'Under-performance', and also discussed in Bowden & Maltby, 'More a National Asset than an Investor's Paradise'.
113. In 1943, Nuffield transferred all his holdings to the Nuffield Foundation. See Martin Adeney, Nuffield: A Biography (Robert Hale, 1993), p. 187.
114. BMC, Annual Report, 1963, p. 15.
115. BMC, Shareholders Registers, 1961-1963, Companies House, London.
116. The three trusts accounted for 29.3 per cent of the ordinary shares of BMC. BMC, Shareholders' Registers, 1952-1967, Companies House, London.
117. Adeney, Nuffield, p. 187.
118. BMC, Annual Reports.
119. See Bowden & Maltby, 'Under-performance', which discusses in detail the changes in the shareholdings of the major institutional shareholders.
120. Ibid.
121. Matthew Gaved, Ownership & Influence (London School of Economics, 1995), pp. 84-8. This was not an unusual occurrence for the Prudential. It had famously intervened in GEC in 1959. Robert Jones & Oliver Marriott, Anatomy of a Merger: A History of GEC, AEI and English Electric (Jonathan Cape, 1972), p. 236.
122. Matthew Gaved, Ownership & Influence (London School of Economics, 1995), pp. 84-8. This was not an unusual occurrence for the Prudential. It had famously intervened in GEC in 1959. Robert Jones & Oliver Marriott, Anatomy of a Merger: A History of GEC, AEI and English Electric (Jonathan Cape, 1972), p. 236.
123. Bowden & Maltby, 'Under-performance'.
124. Lewis Whyte, One Increasing Purpose - The Annals of an Investor (Hutchinson Benham, 1984), pp. 128-9.
125. Edwardes, Back from the Brink; and Douglas Hague & Geoffrey Wilkinson, The IRC - An Experiment in Industrial Intervention: A History of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 119-33.
126. Edwardes, Back from the Brink; and Douglas Hague & Geoffrey Wilkinson, The IRC - An Experiment in Industrial Intervention: A History of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 119-33.