Consequences of local government involvement in the icelandic ITQ market

Marine Resource Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 107-126

  Matthiasson, Thorolfur ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ICELAND   (Iceland)

Author keywords

Fishing fleet capacity; Fishing fleet regulation; ITQs; Local communities

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003162653     PISSN: 07381360     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/mre.12.2.42629189     Document Type: Article

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