An analysis of transition from limited entry to transferable quota: Non-marshallian principles for fisheries management

Natural Resource Modeling

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 53-83

  Weninger, Quinn R ^a   Just, Richard E ^b  

^a UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002032142     PISSN: 08908575     EISSN: 19397445     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1939-7445.1997.tb00210.x     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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