Enfranchising the earth, and its alternatives

Political Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 5, 1996, Pages 835-849

  Goodin, Robert E ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0005652177     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00337.x     Document Type: Article

References (65)

1. My own is set out in Green Political Theory (Oxford, Polity, 1992), but nothing in the present article turns on those particular formulations.
2. That formulation intentionally straddles everything from the deepest green ecocentrism to the shallowest green anthropocentrism of a temporally-extended sort. The argument to be developed here for green democracy ought be equally effective at hooking into green values anywhere along that broad spectrum.
3. I defend that claim in Green Political Theory and will not elaborate it here, devoting my present efforts instead to the more positive task of supplying a linkage that I there bemoan is lacking.
4. It is unexceptionable at least among greens themselves, which is all that is relevant here. Remember, what I here hope to establish is less the objective correctness and more the internal coherence of green political thought.
5. Among them, perhaps, human cognitive structures, in ways which will be explicated below. Most defensible theories of interests build on this connection, as does my relational version of green value theory. If you are attracted to that theory of interests (as I am) and you are also attracted to green values (as I am) then I submit that that is the way to construe your green values. But that is another story, told elsewhere. See: Goodin, Green Political Theory, pp. 41 -54; D. H. Regan, 'Duties of preservation' in B. G. Norton (ed.), The Preservation of Species (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 195-220; and, on interests more generally, Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 1 and Goodin and Diane Gibson, 'Rights, Young and Old', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, forthcoming.
6. Among them, perhaps, human cognitive structures, in ways which will be explicated below. Most defensible theories of interests build on this connection, as does my relational version of green value theory. If you are attracted to that theory of interests (as I am) and you are also attracted to green values (as I am) then I submit that that is the way to construe your green values. But that is another story, told elsewhere. See: Goodin, Green Political Theory, pp. 41 -54; D. H. Regan, 'Duties of preservation' in B. G. Norton (ed.), The Preservation of Species (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 195-220; and, on interests more generally, Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 1 and Goodin and Diane Gibson, 'Rights, Young and Old', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, forthcoming.
7. Among them, perhaps, human cognitive structures, in ways which will be explicated below. Most defensible theories of interests build on this connection, as does my relational version of green value theory. If you are attracted to that theory of interests (as I am) and you are also attracted to green values (as I am) then I submit that that is the way to construe your green values. But that is another story, told elsewhere. See: Goodin, Green Political Theory, pp. 41 -54; D. H. Regan, 'Duties of preservation' in B. G. Norton (ed.), The Preservation of Species (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 195-220; and, on interests more generally, Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 1 and Goodin and Diane Gibson, 'Rights, Young and Old', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, forthcoming.
8. Among them, perhaps, human cognitive structures, in ways which will be explicated below. Most defensible theories of interests build on this connection, as does my relational version of green value theory. If you are attracted to that theory of interests (as I am) and you are also attracted to green values (as I am) then I submit that that is the way to construe your green values. But that is another story, told elsewhere. See: Goodin, Green Political Theory, pp. 41 -54; D. H. Regan, 'Duties of preservation' in B. G. Norton (ed.), The Preservation of Species (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 195-220; and, on interests more generally, Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 1 and Goodin and Diane Gibson, 'Rights, Young and Old', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, forthcoming.
9. To all except postmodernists, perhaps - but for the sort of postmodernist tempted to deny that proposition, people would have no interests which are genuinely different from mere desires anyway.
10. Represented in the professional discourse of political theory by, e.g., R. A. Dahl, 'Procedural democracy' in P. Laslett and J. Fishkin (eds), Philosophy. Politics & Society, 5th series (Oxford, Blackwell, 1979), pp. 97-133 and C. R. Beitz, Political Equality (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1989).
11. Represented in the professional discourse of political theory by, e.g., R. A. Dahl, 'Procedural democracy' in P. Laslett and J. Fishkin (eds), Philosophy. Politics & Society, 5th series (Oxford, Blackwell, 1979), pp. 97-133 and C. R. Beitz, Political Equality (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1989).
12. The partial, but discreditable, exception is foreigners; but even that disregard is typically, if perhaps disingenuously, justified, through the thought that those interests are represented elsewhere, and it would be wrong to double-count by including them here as well as there.
13. To employ the telling phrase coined by R. and V. Routley, 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism' in K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre (eds), Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century (Notre Dame IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 36-59.
14. The disanalogy, of course, is that all those other forms of chauvinism - racial or sexual or whatever - denigrate other people in some way or another. Perhaps what the principle in view requires is not equal consideration of interests tout court but merely equal consideration of each person's interests. I return to this issue at the end of this section.
15. This is to adapt to the context of interests arguments from Regan 'Duties of preservation' and Goodin, Green Political Theory, pp. 41-54.
16. Others would deny that claim, of course. On these issues, see J. Dancy and E. Sosa (eds), A Companion to Epistemology (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992).
17. See my 'Liberalism and the best judge principle', Political Studies, 38 (1990), 181-95 and 'Democracy, preferences and paternalism', Policy Sciences, 26 (1993), 229-47 and the further references contained therein.
18. See my 'Liberalism and the best judge principle', Political Studies, 38 (1990), 181-95 and 'Democracy, preferences and paternalism', Policy Sciences, 26 (1993), 229-47 and the further references contained therein.
19. 'Akin' here serves to straddle 'identity' and 'analogy'. Of course, it has been argued above that insofar as nature's objective values differ from interests, they actually command more rather than less respect - so little harm will be done conflating the two cases in this way.
20. For examples, see R. E. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), ch. 5 and R. Bendix and S. Rokkan, 'The extension of citizenship to the lower classes', in R. Bendix (ed.), Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, Wiley, 1964), pp. 74-104.
21. For examples, see R. E. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), ch. 5 and R. Bendix and S. Rokkan, 'The extension of citizenship to the lower classes', in R. Bendix (ed.), Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, Wiley, 1964), pp. 74-104.
22. 'Should trees have standing?' Southern California Law Review, 45 (1973), 450-501 at 471. Or as John Dryzek puts it, 'If the topsoil on which my crops depend is shrinking, then clearly nature is "telling" me something'. Rational Ecology (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987), p. 207.
23. 'Should trees have standing?' Southern California Law Review, 45 (1973), 450-501 at 471. Or as John Dryzek puts it, 'If the topsoil on which my crops depend is shrinking, then clearly nature is "telling" me something'. Rational Ecology (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987), p. 207.
24. They all have interests which we ought to protect, whether or not they might be said to have 'rights' strictly speaking. See J. Feinberg, 'The rights of animals and unborn generations' in W. T. Blackstone (ed.), Philosophy & Environmental Crisis (Athens GA, University of Georgia Press, 1974), pp. 43-68.
25. Sometimes (as with almost-mature children or colonies) there is a 'developmental' case to be made for giving people the vote as a means of perfecting their skills, even if it makes no practical difference (in the short term) to political outcomes. Such Millean considerations are, however, absent in the case of nature.
26. F. Schoeman, 'Rights of children, rights of parents and the moral basis of the family', Ethics, 91 (1980), 6-19.
27. Likewise perhaps the interests of foreigners can only or anyway best be made to be felt domestically only by being incorporated in the interests (through, for example, playing on the conscience) of those who are electors inside our own country.
28. Among the latter are problems of agenda-setting, boundary drawing and gerrymandering -together with the raft of irrationalities which social choice theorists have exposed in virtually all aggregation rules.
29. In ways suggested in, for example, J. J. Mansbridge (ed.). Beyond Self-interest (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1990).
30. And in other fora as well, as in the case of 'friends of nature' being empowered to sue in the courts (Stone, 'Should trees have standing?').
31. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality, chs 5 and 7.
32. Intuitively, we might suppose that unanimity rules are most useful in blocking environmentally destructive action but that some less demanding decision rule would be more useful where environmental protection requires active intervention. Remember, however, that not doing something is itself just one option among the many that must be voted upon: it should in no way be a privileged 'default' position which will win if nothing else does. See D. W. Rae, 'The limits of consensual decision', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 1270-94.
33. The inspiration is of course the work of Habermas, as best applied to the ecological sphere through a series of works of John Dryzek, Rational Ecology, esp. ch. 15; Discursive Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); and especially 'Ecology and discursive democracy: beyond liberal capitalism and the administrative state', Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 3 (1992), 18-42. Cf. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality, ch. 7 and J. Elster, 'The market and the forum' in J. Elster and A. Hylland (eds), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-22.
34. The inspiration is of course the work of Habermas, as best applied to the ecological sphere through a series of works of John Dryzek, Rational Ecology, esp. ch. 15; Discursive Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); and especially 'Ecology and discursive democracy: beyond liberal capitalism and the administrative state', Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 3 (1992), 18-42. Cf. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality, ch. 7 and J. Elster, 'The market and the forum' in J. Elster and A. Hylland (eds), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-22.
35. The inspiration is of course the work of Habermas, as best applied to the ecological sphere through a series of works of John Dryzek, Rational Ecology, esp. ch. 15; Discursive Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); and especially 'Ecology and discursive democracy: beyond liberal capitalism and the administrative state', Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 3 (1992), 18-42. Cf. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality, ch. 7 and J. Elster, 'The market and the forum' in J. Elster and A. Hylland (eds), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-22.
36. The inspiration is of course the work of Habermas, as best applied to the ecological sphere through a series of works of John Dryzek, Rational Ecology, esp. ch. 15; Discursive Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); and especially 'Ecology and discursive democracy: beyond liberal capitalism and the administrative state', Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 3 (1992), 18-42. Cf. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality, ch. 7 and J. Elster, 'The market and the forum' in J. Elster and A. Hylland (eds), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-22.
37. The inspiration is of course the work of Habermas, as best applied to the ecological sphere through a series of works of John Dryzek, Rational Ecology, esp. ch. 15; Discursive Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); and especially 'Ecology and discursive democracy: beyond liberal capitalism and the administrative state', Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 3 (1992), 18-42. Cf. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality, ch. 7 and J. Elster, 'The market and the forum' in J. Elster and A. Hylland (eds), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-22.
38. Logically, of course, it is perfectly possible to be utterly duplicitous in this matter, choosing actions for reasons of self-interest but defending them publicly on grounds of public interest. Psychologically, however, that seems hard to sustain over the long haul. Ultimately, talking continuously in terms of the public interest leads us almost inevitably to start thinking in terms of public rather than private interests as well. See Goodin, Motivating Political Morality, ch. 7.
39. Note that the 'generalized' versus 'particular' interests which Dryzek, following Habermas, sees emerging from discursive interactions are purely human interests in nature rather than the interests of nature as such; Dryzek, Rational Ecology, pp. 207-8.
40. D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, Clarendon, 1980). D. Lewis, Convention (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969). H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press 1989). Political scientists are coming increasingly to appreciate the importance of these analyses for their own theoretical and methodological activities; see P. M. Sniderman, 'The new look in public opinion research' in A. W. Finifter (ed.), Political Science. The State of the Discipline II, (Washington DC, American Political Science Association, 1993), pp. 219-45 at pp. 236-7.
41. D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, Clarendon, 1980). D. Lewis, Convention (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969). H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press 1989). Political scientists are coming increasingly to appreciate the importance of these analyses for their own theoretical and methodological activities; see P. M. Sniderman, 'The new look in public opinion research' in A. W. Finifter (ed.), Political Science. The State of the Discipline II, (Washington DC, American Political Science Association, 1993), pp. 219-45 at pp. 236-7.
42. D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, Clarendon, 1980). D. Lewis, Convention (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969). H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press 1989). Political scientists are coming increasingly to appreciate the importance of these analyses for their own theoretical and methodological activities; see P. M. Sniderman, 'The new look in public opinion research' in A. W. Finifter (ed.), Political Science. The State of the Discipline II, (Washington DC, American Political Science Association, 1993), pp. 219-45 at pp. 236-7.
43. D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, Clarendon, 1980). D. Lewis, Convention (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969). H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press 1989). Political scientists are coming increasingly to appreciate the importance of these analyses for their own theoretical and methodological activities; see P. M. Sniderman, 'The new look in public opinion research' in A. W. Finifter (ed.), Political Science. The State of the Discipline II, (Washington DC, American Political Science Association, 1993), pp. 219-45 at pp. 236-7.
44. R. A. Kagan, Regulatory Justice: Implementing a Wage-price Freeze (New York, Russell Sage Foundation 1978) p. 152. This will come as no surprise to lobbyists, who have long regarded direct personal communication as their preferred strategy; W. Milbrath, 'Lobbying as a communication process', Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), 33-53.
45. R. A. Kagan, Regulatory Justice: Implementing a Wage-price Freeze (New York, Russell Sage Foundation 1978) p. 152. This will come as no surprise to lobbyists, who have long regarded direct personal communication as their preferred strategy; W. Milbrath, 'Lobbying as a communication process', Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), 33-53.
46. R. Dawes, J. McTavish, and H. Shaklee, 'Behavior, communications and assumptions about other people's behaviour in a common dilemma situation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35 (1977), 1-35. J. M. Orbell, A. J. C. von de Kragt and R. M. Dawes, 'Explaining discussion-induced cooperation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54 (1988), 811-9. R. M. Dawes, A. J. C. van de Kragt and J. M. Orbell, 'Cooperation for the benefit of us - not me, or my conscience' in J. J. Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-interest, pp. 97-110. B. S. Frey and I. Bohnet, 'Cooperation, Communication and Communitarianism: An Experimental Approach', Journal of Political Philosophy, 4 (1996), forthcoming.
47. R. Dawes, J. McTavish, and H. Shaklee, 'Behavior, communications and assumptions about other people's behaviour in a common dilemma situation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35 (1977), 1-35. J. M. Orbell, A. J. C. von de Kragt and R. M. Dawes, 'Explaining discussion-induced cooperation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54 (1988), 811-9. R. M. Dawes, A. J. C. van de Kragt and J. M. Orbell, 'Cooperation for the benefit of us - not me, or my conscience' in J. J. Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-interest, pp. 97-110. B. S. Frey and I. Bohnet, 'Cooperation, Communication and Communitarianism: An Experimental Approach', Journal of Political Philosophy, 4 (1996), forthcoming.
48. R. Dawes, J. McTavish, and H. Shaklee, 'Behavior, communications and assumptions about other people's behaviour in a common dilemma situation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35 (1977), 1-35. J. M. Orbell, A. J. C. von de Kragt and R. M. Dawes, 'Explaining discussion-induced cooperation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54 (1988), 811-9. R. M. Dawes, A. J. C. van de Kragt and J. M. Orbell, 'Cooperation for the benefit of us - not me, or my conscience' in J. J. Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-interest, pp. 97-110. B. S. Frey and I. Bohnet, 'Cooperation, Communication and Communitarianism: An Experimental Approach', Journal of Political Philosophy, 4 (1996), forthcoming.
49. R. Dawes, J. McTavish, and H. Shaklee, 'Behavior, communications and assumptions about other people's behaviour in a common dilemma situation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35 (1977), 1-35. J. M. Orbell, A. J. C. von de Kragt and R. M. Dawes, 'Explaining discussion-induced cooperation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54 (1988), 811-9. R. M. Dawes, A. J. C. van de Kragt and J. M. Orbell, 'Cooperation for the benefit of us - not me, or my conscience' in J. J. Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-interest, pp. 97-110. B. S. Frey and I. Bohnet, 'Cooperation, Communication and Communitarianism: An Experimental Approach', Journal of Political Philosophy, 4 (1996), forthcoming.
50. J. M. Bilmes, 'The evolution of decisions in a Thai village: a quasi-experimental study', Human Organization, 38 (1979), 169-78.
51. J. Abramson, 'The jury and democratic theory', Journal of Political Philosophy, 1 (1993), 45-68 and We, the Jury (New York, Basic, 1994).
52. J. Abramson, 'The jury and democratic theory', Journal of Political Philosophy, 1 (1993), 45-68 and We, the Jury (New York, Basic, 1994).
53. H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American Jury (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1966).
54. For surveys see K. C. Gerbasi, M. Zuckerman and H. T. Reis, 'Justice needs a new blindfold: a review of mock jury research', Psychological Bulletin, 84 (1977), 323-45 and J. H. Davis, R. M. Bray and R. W. Holt, 'The empirical study of decision processes in juries: a critical review' in J. L. Tapp and F. J. Levine (eds), Law, Justice and the Individual in Society: Psychological and Legal Issues (New York NY, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977), pp. 326-61.
55. For surveys see K. C. Gerbasi, M. Zuckerman and H. T. Reis, 'Justice needs a new blindfold: a review of mock jury research', Psychological Bulletin, 84 (1977), 323-45 and J. H. Davis, R. M. Bray and R. W. Holt, 'The empirical study of decision processes in juries: a critical review' in J. L. Tapp and F. J. Levine (eds), Law, Justice and the Individual in Society: Psychological and Legal Issues (New York NY, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977), pp. 326-61.
56. R. Hastie, S. D. Penrod and N. Penington, Inside the Jury (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1983), ch. 5.
57. Hastie, Penrod and Pennington, Inside the Jury, ch. 6. This phenomenon led early commentators (Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury, p. 496) to comment, quite wrongly in light of subsequent research, that jury deliberation was a facade behind which majorities bullied minorities into agreeing to their preferred verdict.
58. Hastie, Penrod and Pennington, Inside the Jury, ch. 6. This phenomenon led early commentators (Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury, p. 496) to comment, quite wrongly in light of subsequent research, that jury deliberation was a facade behind which majorities bullied minorities into agreeing to their preferred verdict.
59. Hastie, Penrod and Pennington, Inside the Jury, ch. 4. D. G. Myers and H. Lamm, 'The group as a polarizer of attitudes', Psychological Bulletin, 83 (1976), 602-27.
60. Hastie, Penrod and Pennington, Inside the Jury, ch. 4. D. G. Myers and H. Lamm, 'The group as a polarizer of attitudes', Psychological Bulletin, 83 (1976), 602-27.
61. E. Burnstein and Y. Schul, 'Group polarization' in H. H. Blumberg et al. (eds). Small Groups and Social Interaction (Chichester, Wiley, 1983), vol. 2, pp. 57-64.
62. J. Fox and M. Guyer, 'Group size and others' strategy in an n-person game', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21 (1977), 323-39. J. Steiner and R. Dorff, A Theory of Political Decision Modes (Chapel Hill NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 83.
63. J. Fox and M. Guyer, 'Group size and others' strategy in an n-person game', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21 (1977), 323-39. J. Steiner and R. Dorff, A Theory of Political Decision Modes (Chapel Hill NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 83.
64. Whether they can succeed in decentralizing to that extent is a separate issue, to be debated elsewhere. Certainly there will be a problem as to how all these small units will coordinate effectively among themselves; Goodin, Green Political Theory, pp. 147-56. That problem is well illustrated by Mikael Skou Anderson's discussion of how Denmark's democratic tradition kept local authorities small to maintain democratic participation, but they then turned out to be too small to take on local farming interests which were the principal causes of water pollution; see his Governance by Green Taxes (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994).
65. Whether they can succeed in decentralizing to that extent is a separate issue, to be debated elsewhere. Certainly there will be a problem as to how all these small units will coordinate effectively among themselves; Goodin, Green Political Theory, pp. 147-56. That problem is well illustrated by Mikael Skou Anderson's discussion of how Denmark's democratic tradition kept local authorities small to maintain democratic participation, but they then turned out to be too small to take on local farming interests which were the principal causes of water pollution; see his Governance by Green Taxes (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994).