Maintaining the status quo: Federal government budget deficits and defensive rent-seeking

Journal of Economic Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 5-14

  Mixon Jr , Franklin G ^a   Wilkinson, James B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI   (United States)

Author keywords

Budgeting; Federal government; Rent

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002519738     PISSN: 01443585     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/01443589910252566     Document Type: Article

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