Law, property, and marital dissolution

Economic Journal

Volumn 109, Issue 454, 1999, Pages 41-54

  Clark, Simon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001771860     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00415     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (30)

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