The Nash bargaining theory with non-convex problems

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 681-685

  Zhou, Lin ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001744502     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171759     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. CONLEY, J., AND S. WILKIE (1995): "The Bargaining Problem without Convexity: Extending the Nash Solution," Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
2. GRANT, S., AND A. KAJII (1996): "A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," Econometrica, forthcoming.
3. HARTMAN, P. (1982): Ordinary Differential Equations. Birkhause: Boston.
4. HERRERO, M. J. (1989): "The Nash Program: Non-convex Bargaining Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, 49, 266-277.
5. KANEKO, M. (1980): "An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Problem and the Nash Social Welfare Function," Theory and Decision, 12, 135-148.
6. MASCHLER, M., G. OWEN, AND B. PELEG (1988): "Paths Leading to the Nash Set," in The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, ed. by A. Roth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. NASH, J. F. (1950): "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrics, 18, 155-162.
8. ROTH, A. (1977): "Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem," Mathematics of Operations Research, 2, 64-65.
9. RUBINSTEIN, A., Z. SAFRA, AND W. THOMSON (1992): "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, 60, 1171-1186.
10. THOMSON, W. (1996): Bargaining Theory: the Axiomatic Approach. New York: Academic Press, forthcoming.