Strategies of coercion: Denial, punishment, and the future of air power

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 182-228

  Mueller, Karl ^a  

^a Dept of Compar Military Studies   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001433226     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419808429354     Document Type: Article

References (153)

1. For an overview, see Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell AFB, AL: Ak University Press, 1997).
2. Robert Pape's Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as BTW, followed by the page number.
3. The coercive target need not, strictly speaking, be an adversary; coercion may also be employed against friends and allies, and an individual action against one state may have varying coercive effects on a number of other actors.
4. Pape narrows this definition to exclude deterrent actions or threats, focusing only on what Thomas Schelling labeled as "compellence." I prefer Schilling's terminology, since making coercion synonymous with compellence leaves no term to describe the broader category of policy that encompasses both compellence and deterrence, and to which any scholar of the subject must frequently refer.
5. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 2-18.
6. A vivid example of this distinction appears in the 1964 James Bond movie Goldfinger. After being captured in the middle of the film, Bond is seen strapped to a table as a sinister-looking industrial laser cuts its way toward his center of gravity. Observing the beam's approach with considerable unease and misinterpreting it as a coercive threat, Bond asks the title villain "Do you expect me to talk?" "No, Mister Bond," Goldfinger replies, "I expect you to die." I am indebted to Walter Givhan for bringing this illustration to my attention.
7. Even in the German case, however, it can be argued that the Allied victory involved more than a trivial amount of coercion, since surviving German forces did not mount a futile last stand in the Bavarian and Austrian Alps, as Hitler had intended, and the German populace did not engage in substantial armed or civil resistance against the occupation forces.
8. It is common to see coercion defined as the use of limited force short of all-out war for coercive purposes, as in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder. Westview, 1994), and such cases are often worth analyzing as a universe unto themselves, especially from the point of view of the policymaker. This, however, should not lead either the scholar or the strategist to forget the essentially similarities between massive and limited uses of force.
9. Airlift and other nonviolent forms of air power are used for noncoercive purposes more frequently.
10. To a considerable extent, the same was true of the bombing campaign against Iraqi tanks and other armored vehicles, as General Colin Powell indicated when he stated his desire "to leave smoking tanks as kilometer fence posts all the way to Baghdad" (BTW, 224).
11. For further discussion of the origins, application, and potential refinement of this framework, see Thomas P. Ehrhard, Making the Connection: An Air Strategy Analysis Framework (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995).
12. This is not true, however, of the work of Thomas Schelling, the one social scientist among the theorists Pape analyzes. Schelling's approach to aerial coercion focuses primarily on the mechanism of manipulating the enemy's expectations about the future costs and benefits of resistance, and largely leaves the selection of targets to be determined by assessing what a particular enemy values. See Schelling, Arms and Influence.
13. See Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, D.C.: Office of Ak Force History, 1942/1983); and Phillip S. Meilinger, "Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 1-40. Most of Douhet's writings remain untranslated into English.
14. See Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, D.C.: Office of Ak Force History, 1942/1983); and Phillip S. Meilinger, "Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 1-40. Most of Douhet's writings remain untranslated into English.
15. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-1940 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1955/1992).
16. Col. John A. Warden III, interview by author, Maxwell AFB, AL, August 1994.
17. Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Pover (Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), 20.
18. Warden, "Success in Modern War," Security Studies 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98): 173.
19. Pape's characterization of the ACTS "industrial web" theory as being a punishment strategy is plausible, and I believe essentially correct, but the case is not as clear cut as he suggests. Even within one of the three ACTS lectures he identifies as central to the theory (Muir S. Fairchild, "National Economic Structure" 5 April 1939, USAFHRA, file K248.2019A-10), considerable emphasis is placed on the militarily incapacitating effects that the ACTS theorists expected would follow from attacks against key industrial and mining sectors. In general, ACTS instructors' explanations of the industrial web theory take a variety of positions regarding the relationship between punishment and denial in their thinking, ranging from: [O]ur intention in deciding upon this method of attack must be to so reduce the morale of the enemy civilian populace through fear - fear of death or injury for themselves or their loved ones - that they would prefer our terms of peace to continuing the struggle, and would force their government to capitulate. Any pressure that was exerted upon the war making capacity of the hostile nation, other than this, would be entirely incidental. to "this method of attack has the great virtue of reducing the capacity for war of the hostile nation, and of applying pressure to the population both at the same time and with equal efficiency and effectiveness" (ibid., 20-21, 22). Their lectures, however, do not as a rule include statements suggesting that the denial aspect of their strategy is more important than its punishment component. On the thinking of the interwar RAF, see among others Phillip S. Meilinger, "Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 41-78.
20. Pape's characterization of the ACTS "industrial web" theory as being a punishment strategy is plausible, and I believe essentially correct, but the case is not as clear cut as he suggests. Even within one of the three ACTS lectures he identifies as central to the theory (Muir S. Fairchild, "National Economic Structure" 5 April 1939, USAFHRA, file K248.2019A-10), considerable emphasis is placed on the militarily incapacitating effects that the ACTS theorists expected would follow from attacks against key industrial and mining sectors. In general, ACTS instructors' explanations of the industrial web theory take a variety of positions regarding the relationship between punishment and denial in their thinking, ranging from: [O]ur intention in deciding upon this method of attack must be to so reduce the morale of the enemy civilian populace through fear - fear of death or injury for themselves or their loved ones - that they would prefer our terms of peace to continuing the struggle, and would force their government to capitulate. Any pressure that was exerted upon the war making capacity of the hostile nation, other than this, would be entirely incidental. to "this method of attack has the great virtue of reducing the capacity for war of the hostile nation, and of applying pressure to the population both at the same time and with equal efficiency and effectiveness" (ibid., 20-21, 22). Their lectures, however, do not as a rule include statements suggesting that the denial aspect of their strategy is more important than its punishment component. On the thinking of the interwar RAF, see among others Phillip S. Meilinger, "Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 41-78.
21. Pape's characterization of the ACTS "industrial web" theory as being a punishment strategy is plausible, and I believe essentially correct, but the case is not as clear cut as he suggests. Even within one of the three ACTS lectures he identifies as central to the theory (Muir S. Fairchild, "National Economic Structure" 5 April 1939, USAFHRA, file K248.2019A-10), considerable emphasis is placed on the militarily incapacitating effects that the ACTS theorists expected would follow from attacks against key industrial and mining sectors. In general, ACTS instructors' explanations of the industrial web theory take a variety of positions regarding the relationship between punishment and denial in their thinking, ranging from: [O]ur intention in deciding upon this method of attack must be to so reduce the morale of the enemy civilian populace through fear - fear of death or injury for themselves or their loved ones - that they would prefer our terms of peace to continuing the struggle, and would force their government to capitulate. Any pressure that was exerted upon the war making capacity of the hostile nation, other than this, would be entirely incidental. to "this method of attack has the great virtue of reducing the capacity for war of the hostile nation, and of applying pressure to the population both at the same time and with equal efficiency and effectiveness" (ibid., 20-21, 22). Their lectures, however, do not as a rule include statements suggesting that the denial aspect of their strategy is more important than its punishment component. On the thinking of the interwar RAF, see among others Phillip S. Meilinger, "Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 41-78.
22. On deterrence by denial and punishment, see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), chap. 1; and Karl Mueller, "Deterrence, Accommodation, and Grand Strategy" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1991).
23. On deterrence by denial and punishment, see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), chap. 1; and Karl Mueller, "Deterrence, Accommodation, and Grand Strategy" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1991).
24. The distinction between risk and punishment is greater in nuclear compellence. This essay gives little attention to Pape's relatively familiar arguments about nuclear coercion. On the relationship between conventional and nuclear air strategies see, among many others, Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); and Karl Mueller, "Strategic Airpower and Nuclear Strategy," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 279-320. On nuclear compellence, see Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987).
25. The distinction between risk and punishment is greater in nuclear compellence. This essay gives little attention to Pape's relatively familiar arguments about nuclear coercion. On the relationship between conventional and nuclear air strategies see, among many others, Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); and Karl Mueller, "Strategic Airpower and Nuclear Strategy," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 279-320. On nuclear compellence, see Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987).
26. The distinction between risk and punishment is greater in nuclear compellence. This essay gives little attention to Pape's relatively familiar arguments about nuclear coercion. On the relationship between conventional and nuclear air strategies see, among many others, Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); and Karl Mueller, "Strategic Airpower and Nuclear Strategy," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 279-320. On nuclear compellence, see Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987).
27. "Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies," Security Studies 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98): 133, 144, 169. Glenn Snyder once offered a disclaimer that applies to formal representations of almost all good deterrence (or in this case compellence) theory: "The numerical illustrations are intended simply to set out as starkly as possible the essential logic of deterrence; there is no intent to light a torch for the 'quantifiability' of the factors involved, which are of course, highly intangible, unpredictable, unmeasurable, and incommensurable except in an intuitive way" (Deterrence and Defense, 16n). While Pape is far too categorical about some of his findings, Watts's critique of Laplacian theories of air power would, ironically, be better directed not at Pape but at the military theorists he criticizes - including Douhet, ACTS, and Warden - who do seem to believe in such deterministic and predictive certainty. See, for example, Douhet, "The War of 19 - ," in his The Command of the Air, 294-394; Peter R. Faber, "Interwar U.S. Army Aviation and the Ak War Tactical School," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 220; David S. Fadok, "John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower's Quest for Strategic Paralysis," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 377-81.
28. "Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies," Security Studies 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98): 133, 144, 169. Glenn Snyder once offered a disclaimer that applies to formal representations of almost all good deterrence (or in this case compellence) theory: "The numerical illustrations are intended simply to set out as starkly as possible the essential logic of deterrence; there is no intent to light a torch for the 'quantifiability' of the factors involved, which are of course, highly intangible, unpredictable, unmeasurable, and incommensurable except in an intuitive way" (Deterrence and Defense, 16n). While Pape is far too categorical about some of his findings, Watts's critique of Laplacian theories of air power would, ironically, be better directed not at Pape but at the military theorists he criticizes - including Douhet, ACTS, and Warden - who do seem to believe in such deterministic and predictive certainty. See, for example, Douhet, "The War of 19 - ," in his The Command of the Air, 294-394; Peter R. Faber, "Interwar U.S. Army Aviation and the Ak War Tactical School," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 220; David S. Fadok, "John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower's Quest for Strategic Paralysis," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 377-81.
29. "Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies," Security Studies 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98): 133, 144, 169. Glenn Snyder once offered a disclaimer that applies to formal representations of almost all good deterrence (or in this case compellence) theory: "The numerical illustrations are intended simply to set out as starkly as possible the essential logic of deterrence; there is no intent to light a torch for the 'quantifiability' of the factors involved, which are of course, highly intangible, unpredictable, unmeasurable, and incommensurable except in an intuitive way" (Deterrence and Defense, 16n). While Pape is far too categorical about some of his findings, Watts's critique of Laplacian theories of air power would, ironically, be better directed not at Pape but at the military theorists he criticizes - including Douhet, ACTS, and Warden - who do seem to believe in such deterministic and predictive certainty. See, for example, Douhet, "The War of 19 - ," in his The Command of the Air, 294-394; Peter R. Faber, "Interwar U.S. Army Aviation and the Ak War Tactical School," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 220; David S. Fadok, "John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower's Quest for Strategic Paralysis," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 377-81.
30. "Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies," Security Studies 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98): 133, 144, 169. Glenn Snyder once offered a disclaimer that applies to formal representations of almost all good deterrence (or in this case compellence) theory: "The numerical illustrations are intended simply to set out as starkly as possible the essential logic of deterrence; there is no intent to light a torch for the 'quantifiability' of the factors involved, which are of course, highly intangible, unpredictable, unmeasurable, and incommensurable except in an intuitive way" (Deterrence and Defense, 16n). While Pape is far too categorical about some of his findings, Watts's critique of Laplacian theories of air power would, ironically, be better directed not at Pape but at the military theorists he criticizes - including Douhet, ACTS, and Warden - who do seem to believe in such deterministic and predictive certainty. See, for example, Douhet, "The War of 19 - ," in his The Command of the Air, 294-394; Peter R. Faber, "Interwar U.S. Army Aviation and the Ak War Tactical School," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 220; David S. Fadok, "John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower's Quest for Strategic Paralysis," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 377-81.
31. Pape also offers a broad critique of decapitation strategies, arguing that they are very unlikely to work as advertised for a variety of reasons, some related to states' political resilience and others to the practical problems of locating enemy leaders in order to attack them and of completely severing communications links between national leaders and their subordinates (BTW, 80-86).
32. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), bk. 1, 77.
33. One can envision some differences between the two approaches. A state pursuing a denial strategy, for example, might be more interested in preserving an enemy leadership capable of surrendering, or of leaving intact communications links between the enemy leadership and its forces, than one that was seeking simply to annihilate the enemy. Less obviously, it is possible to imagine scenarios in which the actions that will defeat an enemy most efficiently will differ greatly from those that will most efficiently convince the adversary that it has been defeated. One such example is provided by the Viet Gong's 1968 Tet Offensive in South Vietnam.
34. The Berlin airlift was an exception to this generalization, arguably representing a successful denial strategy against the Soviet Union over territory of genuinely vital interest to the United States, but Pape excludes such nonviolent applications of air power from his analytical domain.
35. Because Pape subdivides some cases when significant changes occurred in the independent variables during a conflict, his statistical analysis is based on a total of forty data points.
36. Watts's justification for excluding cases such as coercive bombing in the Spanish Civil War or by Japan against China on the grounds that they occurred "during air power's infancy, before it achieved sufficient maturity to have any reasonable chance of posing a coercive threat to a major power" ("Ignoring Reality," 137) is not very convincing. Only two of these cases - the German bombing of Britain in the First World War and Germany's threat to bomb Britain and France in 1938 - actually involve major powers as targets, and in the latter case, the British did expect to suffer cataclysmic damage if the Germans bombed them (see, for example, Uri Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber [London: Royal Historical Society, 1980]).
37. Watts, "Ignoring Reality," 140-43. Watts also drops from his data set, without explanation, the 1979-88 Soviet coercive air campaign against the Afghan rebels, which Pape codes as a correct prediction for the military vulnerability theory and an incorrect one for civilian vulnerability. Presumably this was an accidental omission.
38. "The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts and John Warden," Security Studies 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98): 200-209.
39. Pape's decision to include the Suez case is questionable, for the Soviet nuclear "threat" against Britain and France was in fact highly ambiguous, and was promptly neutralized by American military diplomacy (see Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 62-65). In any event, the available evidence strongly indicates that the British and French decision to withdraw from Egypt was driven by American rather than Soviet coercive pressure, primarily related to the need for U.S. support for sterling in international monetary markets. See Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 444-68; William Roger Lewis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 63-82; Pape expands on his interpretation of this case in "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 115-17, but see Jonathan Kirshner, "Correspondence Regarding 'Why Sanctions Do Not Work'," unpub. letter to the editors of International Security, 1997.
40. Pape's decision to include the Suez case is questionable, for the Soviet nuclear "threat" against Britain and France was in fact highly ambiguous, and was promptly neutralized by American military diplomacy (see Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 62-65). In any event, the available evidence strongly indicates that the British and French decision to withdraw from Egypt was driven by American rather than Soviet coercive pressure, primarily related to the need for U.S. support for sterling in international monetary markets. See Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 444-68; William Roger Lewis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 63-82; Pape expands on his interpretation of this case in "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 115-17, but see Jonathan Kirshner, "Correspondence Regarding 'Why Sanctions Do Not Work'," unpub. letter to the editors of International Security, 1997.
41. Pape's decision to include the Suez case is questionable, for the Soviet nuclear "threat" against Britain and France was in fact highly ambiguous, and was promptly neutralized by American military diplomacy (see Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 62-65). In any event, the available evidence strongly indicates that the British and French decision to withdraw from Egypt was driven by American rather than Soviet coercive pressure, primarily related to the need for U.S. support for sterling in international monetary markets. See Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 444-68; William Roger Lewis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 63-82; Pape expands on his interpretation of this case in "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 115-17, but see Jonathan Kirshner, "Correspondence Regarding 'Why Sanctions Do Not Work'," unpub. letter to the editors of International Security, 1997.
42. Pape's decision to include the Suez case is questionable, for the Soviet nuclear "threat" against Britain and France was in fact highly ambiguous, and was promptly neutralized by American military diplomacy (see Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 62-65). In any event, the available evidence strongly indicates that the British and French decision to withdraw from Egypt was driven by American rather than Soviet coercive pressure, primarily related to the need for U.S. support for sterling in international monetary markets. See Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 444-68; William Roger Lewis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 63-82; Pape expands on his interpretation of this case in "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 115-17, but see Jonathan Kirshner, "Correspondence Regarding 'Why Sanctions Do Not Work'," unpub. letter to the editors of International Security, 1997.
43. Pape's decision to include the Suez case is questionable, for the Soviet nuclear "threat" against Britain and France was in fact highly ambiguous, and was promptly neutralized by American military diplomacy (see Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 62-65). In any event, the available evidence strongly indicates that the British and French decision to withdraw from Egypt was driven by American rather than Soviet coercive pressure, primarily related to the need for U.S. support for sterling in international monetary markets. See Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 444-68; William Roger Lewis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 63-82; Pape expands on his interpretation of this case in "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 115-17, but see Jonathan Kirshner, "Correspondence Regarding 'Why Sanctions Do Not Work'," unpub. letter to the editors of International Security, 1997.
44. Pape's decision to include the Suez case is questionable, for the Soviet nuclear "threat" against Britain and France was in fact highly ambiguous, and was promptly neutralized by American military diplomacy (see Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 62-65). In any event, the available evidence strongly indicates that the British and French decision to withdraw from Egypt was driven by American rather than Soviet coercive pressure, primarily related to the need for U.S. support for sterling in international monetary markets. See Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 444-68; William Roger Lewis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 63-82; Pape expands on his interpretation of this case in "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 115-17, but see Jonathan Kirshner, "Correspondence Regarding 'Why Sanctions Do Not Work'," unpub. letter to the editors of International Security, 1997.
45. All of these cases would be coded as successful predictions for both theories, with medium or less civilian and military vulnerability and coercive failure, except for Israel vs. Egypt, where coercion succeeded (largely independent of air power), and which would appear as a successful prediction for denial and a failed prediction for punishment. A number of other cases might well also qualify for inclusion in this set, depending on where one draws the problematic line between strategic and nonstrategic bombing, including: the British use of air power in the Greek Civil War, the Malayan Emergency, and against rebel forces in postwar Aden and Oman; Egypt's campaign against Yemeni Royalists in 1962-67; both sides' bombing campaigns in the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1971; and Iraq's and Turkey's coercion of the Kurds. The inclusion of the air campaigns against Egypt in 1956 and 1969-70, which Pape notes struck only military targets, does suggest that at least some of these other cases should be included; none of them was comparable to British interwar "air policing" against helpless native tribes, which Pape excludes with sound justification (BTW, 48-49). For overviews of air operations in these conflicts and those cited in the text (except the two Second World War sub-cases), see Victor Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft (New York: Facts on File, 1990).
46. All of these cases would be coded as successful predictions for both theories, with medium or less civilian and military vulnerability and coercive failure, except for Israel vs. Egypt, where coercion succeeded (largely independent of air power), and which would appear as a successful prediction for denial and a failed prediction for punishment. A number of other cases might well also qualify for inclusion in this set, depending on where one draws the problematic line between strategic and nonstrategic bombing, including: the British use of air power in the Greek Civil War, the Malayan Emergency, and against rebel forces in postwar Aden and Oman; Egypt's campaign against Yemeni Royalists in 1962-67; both sides' bombing campaigns in the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1971; and Iraq's and Turkey's coercion of the Kurds. The inclusion of the air campaigns against Egypt in 1956 and 1969-70, which Pape notes struck only military targets, does suggest that at least some of these other cases should be included; none of them was comparable to British interwar "air policing" against helpless native tribes, which Pape excludes with sound justification (BTW, 48-49). For overviews of air operations in these conflicts and those cited in the text (except the two Second World War sub-cases), see Victor Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft (New York: Facts on File, 1990).
47. Including USSR-Britain/France 1956, U.S.-USSR 1962, Israel-Egypt 1969-70, Israel-PLO 1970s, USSR-Pakistan 1980-86, U.S.-Libya 1986, and Iraq-Israel 1991. A number of other cases, including U.S.-Iraq 1991, involved territorial stakes that were major but still arguably less than truly vital. Except for the Suez case (see n. 30, above), all of these cases appear as successful predictions for both theories.
48. The beginning of Bombing ta Win states that "The accepted wisdom is that successful coercion, whether nuclear or conventional, rests on the threat to inflict harm on civilians." (BTW, 1). This may well be a reasonable statement to make about nuclear coercion, but it is clearly incorrect with respect to the coercive use of conventional force, especially during wartime; Pape cites no example of anyone actually endorsing the opinion that conventional coercion can only be achieved as the result of such threats, his footnoted quotes from Alexander George, Richard Betts, and Thomas Schelling notwithstanding (BTW, 7 n. 18).
49. The beginning of Bombing ta Win states that "The accepted wisdom is that successful coercion, whether nuclear or conventional, rests on the threat to inflict harm on civilians." (BTW, 1). This may well be a reasonable statement to make about nuclear coercion, but it is clearly incorrect with respect to the coercive use of conventional force, especially during wartime; Pape cites no example of anyone actually endorsing the opinion that conventional coercion can only be achieved as the result of such threats, his footnoted quotes from Alexander George, Richard Betts, and Thomas Schelling notwithstanding (BTW, 7 n. 18).
50. There are a total of eight data points for which Pape codes military vulnerability as medium or less, and civilian vulnerability as high or very high, but the other two - U.S.-China/North Korea in 1953 and USSR-Britain/France in 1956 - involve threats of nuclear punishment (at least according to Pape), and thus both Pape and the punishment advocates would anticipate successful coercion in these cases.
51. This also indicates the fallacy of Watts's attempt to prove that the punishment perspective, as Pape operationalizes it here, is as powerful a predictor of coercive success as denial is. First, Watts is defending a point of view (that only punishment causes coercion) that he almost certainly does not believe. Second, to falsify Pape's theory that denial is necessary for coercion, Watts would need to identify cases in which high civilian and low military vulnerability were associated with successful conventional coercion, something that he does not do in any of his proposed recodings.
52. The amount that can be learned from the case studies may be limited, however, by the fact that all five cases inolve the use of coercive air power by the United States (sometimes with allies) against nondemocratric enemies.
53. In his earlier treatment of the Vietnam case, Pape rejected the argument that American demands changed significantly between 1968 and 1972 ("Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," International Security 15, no. 2 [fall 1991]: 141-42), but he later acknowledges that significant changes had occurred (compare BTW, 205-6, though 5 seems somewhat contradictory). For the case that the change in U.S. demands was critical, see Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York Free Press, 1989).
54. In his earlier treatment of the Vietnam case, Pape rejected the argument that American demands changed significantly between 1968 and 1972 ("Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," International Security 15, no. 2 [fall 1991]: 141-42), but he later acknowledges that significant changes had occurred (compare BTW, 205-6, though 5 seems somewhat contradictory). For the case that the change in U.S. demands was critical, see Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York Free Press, 1989).
55. As Watts notes ("Ignoring Reality," 129-30), if the prospects of the target state decline during a war, the expected benefits of resistance may also decline, as the state reassesses what successful resistance might achieve. This, however, need not occur, for example if a reversal of fortune appears possible.
56. Philip A. Smith, "Bombing to Surrender The Contribution of Air Power to the Collapse of Italy, 1943" (Master's thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL, June 1997).
57. Air attacks accounted for 30 percent of the eight million tons of Japanese merchant shipping sunk by U.S. forces during the war; submarines sank 60 percent, and mines and surface attacks the remainder (Samuel Eliot Morison, The Info-Ocean War [Boston: Little, Brown, 1963], 511).
58. R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 373-74; Alfred C. Mierzejewksi, The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).
59. R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 373-74; Alfred C. Mierzejewksi, The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).
60. While in the case of Japan, Pape argues that earlier concentration of air attacks against the enemy's true economic vulnerability could have ended the war sooner, he argues that the German transport sector was not very vulnerable to air attack until Allied armies advanced dose to Germany (BTW, 282, 311-12). He suggests the same about the German liquid fuels sector (BTW, 282), but does not make a substantial case for it. For the case that earlier and more knowledgeable concentration of air power against railways and canals could have crippled the German economy prior to the Allied conquest, see Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy.
61. While in the case of Japan, Pape argues that earlier concentration of air attacks against the enemy's true economic vulnerability could have ended the war sooner, he argues that the German transport sector was not very vulnerable to air attack until Allied armies advanced dose to Germany (BTW, 282, 311-12). He suggests the same about the German liquid fuels sector (BTW, 282), but does not make a substantial case for it. For the case that earlier and more knowledgeable concentration of air power against railways and canals could have crippled the German economy prior to the Allied conquest, see Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy.
62. While in the case of Japan, Pape argues that earlier concentration of air attacks against the enemy's true economic vulnerability could have ended the war sooner, he argues that the German transport sector was not very vulnerable to air attack until Allied armies advanced dose to Germany (BTW, 282, 311-12). He suggests the same about the German liquid fuels sector (BTW, 282), but does not make a substantial case for it. For the case that earlier and more knowledgeable concentration of air power against railways and canals could have crippled the German economy prior to the Allied conquest, see Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy.
63. It also appears in his insistence that the atomic bombing of Japan had no impact on the end of the war (BTW, 135), which, as Watts notes, is entirely unnecessary in order to support his theory, which predicts that nuclear punishment may effectively coerce. For more discussion of the Japanese case and Pape's interpretation of it, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Compelling Japan's Surrender Without the A-bomb, Soviet Entry, or Invasion: Reconsidering the U.S. Bombing Survey's Early-Surrender Conclusions," Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 2 (June 1995): 101-48.
64. It also appears in his insistence that the atomic bombing of Japan had no impact on the end of the war (BTW, 135), which, as Watts notes, is entirely unnecessary in order to support his theory, which predicts that nuclear punishment may effectively coerce. For more discussion of the Japanese case and Pape's interpretation of it, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Compelling Japan's Surrender Without the A-bomb, Soviet Entry, or Invasion: Reconsidering the U.S. Bombing Survey's Early-Surrender Conclusions," Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 2 (June 1995): 101-48.
65. Why the Allies Won (New York: Norton, 1995), 133.
66. John Keegan, ed., The Times Atlas of the Second World War (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), 138.
67. Many other arguments can also be raised regarding the tangible contributions of the CBO to the Allied victory. Early production of the revolutionary Me-262 jet fighter, for example, was seriously hampered by 1943 U.S.A.A.F. air attacks on the Messerschmitt factory at Regensburg, and the Ta-154 high-altitude interceptor program was halted altogether by the bombing of a plant that manufactured unique adhesives required for its construction (David Donald, ed., Warplanes of the Luftwaffe [Westport: AIRtime, 1994], 93, 231). Although Germany continued to produce substantial numbers of aircraft, tanks, and other weapons until the final months of the war, maintaining its output in the face of Allied bombing and losses in combat often required the continued production of obsolescent equipment that might otherwise have been more fully supplanted by improved models. On the impact of air attack on the German aircraft industry, see R. J. Overy, The Air War 1939-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1981), 123-25.
68. Many other arguments can also be raised regarding the tangible contributions of the CBO to the Allied victory. Early production of the revolutionary Me-262 jet fighter, for example, was seriously hampered by 1943 U.S.A.A.F. air attacks on the Messerschmitt factory at Regensburg, and the Ta-154 high-altitude interceptor program was halted altogether by the bombing of a plant that manufactured unique adhesives required for its construction (David Donald, ed., Warplanes of the Luftwaffe [Westport: AIRtime, 1994], 93, 231). Although Germany continued to produce substantial numbers of aircraft, tanks, and other weapons until the final months of the war, maintaining its output in the face of Allied bombing and losses in combat often required the continued production of obsolescent equipment that might otherwise have been more fully supplanted by improved models. On the impact of air attack on the German aircraft industry, see R. J. Overy, The Air War 1939-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1981), 123-25.
69. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, rev. and updated ed. (New York: Penguin, 1997), chap. 29. For application of Pape's theory to this case prior to the event, see John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer A Partition Plan for Bosnia," New Republic, 14 June 1993, 22-28.
70. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, rev. and updated ed. (New York: Penguin, 1997), chap. 29. For application of Pape's theory to this case prior to the event, see John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer A Partition Plan for Bosnia," New Republic, 14 June 1993, 22-28.
71. For arguments in favor of physical decapitation attacks, see Bruce A. Ross, "The Case for Targeting Leadership in War," Naval War College Review 46, no. 1 (winter 1993): 73-93.
72. Mark J. Conversino, "The Changed Nature of Strategic Air Attack," Parameters 27, no. 4 (winter 1997/98): 31.
73. "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions," Security Studies 6, no. 3 (spring 1997): 32-64.
74. Pape does the same with economic sanctions in "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work."
75. Several of these are adapted from Kirshner, "Microfoundations"; and "Correspondence Regarding 'Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work'."
76. Several of these are adapted from Kirshner, "Microfoundations"; and "Correspondence Regarding 'Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work'."
77. See, for example, Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954).
78. Smith, "Bombing to Surrender."
79. See C. G. C. Treadway, More Than Just A Nuisance: When Aerial Terror Bombing Works (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1998).
80. See Ehrhard, Making the Connection, 21-25.
81. "Success in Modern War," 184-85.
82. Some 81,000 RAF Bomber Command and U.S. 8th Air Force personnel were killed in the strategic air campaign against Germany, and more than 18,000 aircraft were lost (Mark K. WeUs, Courage and Air Warfare [London: Frank Cass, 1995], 2). See also Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 204*12.
83. Some 81,000 RAF Bomber Command and U.S. 8th Air Force personnel were killed in the strategic air campaign against Germany, and more than 18,000 aircraft were lost (Mark K. WeUs, Courage and Air Warfare [London: Frank Cass, 1995], 2). See also Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 204*12.
84. "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions."
85. World Politics 1, no. 4 (July 1949): 467-88.
86. For a recent indictment of the professional education of military officers in the United States, see Williamson Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris," The National Interest (summer 1997): 57-64.
87. "The Air Force Strikes Back," 193. Presumably he is referring only to threats using conventional air power, considering his interpretations of the Korean case and the British withdrawal from Suez.
88. "Ignoring Reality," 162-63.
89. BTW, 317 n. 2; "The Limits of Precision-Guided Airpower," Security Studies 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98): 113; "The Air Force Strikes Back," 192. Pape also states that "we must question the wisdom of any long-term defense policy relying exclusively on air power" (BTIF, 313), though he does not indicate who, if anyone, has ever offered such a proposal.
90. BTW, 317 n. 2; "The Limits of Precision-Guided Airpower," Security Studies 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98): 113; "The Air Force Strikes Back," 192. Pape also states that "we must question the wisdom of any long-term defense policy relying exclusively on air power" (BTIF, 313), though he does not indicate who, if anyone, has ever offered such a proposal.
91. BTW, 317 n. 2; "The Limits of Precision-Guided Airpower," Security Studies 7, no. 2 (winter 1997/98): 113; "The Air Force Strikes Back," 192. Pape also states that "we must question the wisdom of any long-term defense policy relying exclusively on air power" (BTIF, 313), though he does not indicate who, if anyone, has ever offered such a proposal.
92. It is important to note when discussing the half-billion-dollar unit cost of the B-2 bomber that this includes many fixed program costs for a production run of only twenty aircraft; it was developed during the expensive infancy of stealth technology, and making an enormous bomber extremely stealthy is a far more challenging and thus costly task than providing a reasonable degree of stealth to a small fighter. The U.S.-British Joint Strike Fighter program to develop a stealthy successor for the F-16, F/A-18, AV-8B, and Sea Harrier has a unit price ceiling of $28 million for the USAF version, of which more than half will be spent on avionics.
93. In general, it seems to be time, indeed long past time, to discard traditional categories of strategic and theater air power dating back to the 1930s and associated with particular classes of aircraft, since these have little value if the same platforms and even the same munitions are typically used for both strategic and nonstrategic attack. See Conversino, "The Changed Nature of Strategic Air Attack"; Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Steady Climb: The Transformation of American Air Power Since Vietnam," unpub. ms, January 1998, 150-53.
94. In general, it seems to be time, indeed long past time, to discard traditional categories of strategic and theater air power dating back to the 1930s and associated with particular classes of aircraft, since these have little value if the same platforms and even the same munitions are typically used for both strategic and nonstrategic attack. See Conversino, "The Changed Nature of Strategic Air Attack"; Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Steady Climb: The Transformation of American Air Power Since Vietnam," unpub. ms, January 1998, 150-53.
95. Air Force Basic Doctrine, AFDD-1, September 1997, 51. "Strategic attack may also be conducted against fielded forces. Strategic attack, for example, may be conducted against identified COGs such as major reserves or politically significant military formations, space launch and support elements, or forces used for strategic nuclear attack. Strategic attacks can be conducted independently by air and space forces or in conjunction with friendly land and naval forces...the determining factor is that strategic attack should affect the enemy's entire effort rather than just a single action, battle, or campaign" (emphasis in original).
96. This was an issue of great concern in NATO air operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the United States typically favoring very extensive defense suppression and its European allies preferring a more geographically limited approach to maintaining air superiority. In the end, the U.S. view prevailed, and in Operation Deliberate Force NATO forces were allowed to attack air defense targets throughout the country, even while geographic limits were placed on the other targets that would be attacked. See Robert C. Owen, ed., Operation DELIBERATE FORCE: A Cast Study in Air Campaigning: Effort of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study, unpublished.
97. BTW, 326-27. See also "The Air Force Strikes Back," 191-92.
98. BTW, 326-27. See also "The Air Force Strikes Back," 191-92.
99. Carolyn Ziemke, "A New Covenant? The Apostles of Douhet and the Persian Gulf War," in The Eagle in the Desert, ed. William Head and Earl H. Tilford Jr. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 290-310; and her foreword in Earl H. Tilford Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, June 1991), ix-xi.
100. Carolyn Ziemke, "A New Covenant? The Apostles of Douhet and the Persian Gulf War," in The Eagle in the Desert, ed. William Head and Earl H. Tilford Jr. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 290-310; and her foreword in Earl H. Tilford Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, June 1991), ix-xi.
101. During this period, however, strategic bombing interests did not dominate any other air force.
102. The Military Balance 1997/98 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1997), 24.
103. Pape points out that following the Gulf War, Warden was assigned to revamp the USAF troubled intermediate service school, the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), where he did indeed place his imprint on the curriculum. It is also worth noting, however, that the same air force did not promote Warden beyond the rank of colonel, and hired Pape to teach coercive air strategy to the select ACSC graduates that it sent on to its new advanced studies program, the School of Advanced Airpower Studies.
104. "The Air Force Strikes Back," 212.
105. Ibid, 192.
106. Interestingly, enthusiasm for strategic attack does appear to be on the rise in the Air Force's Space Command, effectively the youngest arm of the service, and one that may eventually achieve full independence from the USAF. Pape's argument predicts that this trend will continue, and it may well be correct. See Karl Mueller, "Space Weapons and U.S. Security," unpub. paper, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, December 1997. On Billy Mitchell, see Mark Clodfelter, "Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell's Strategic Thought," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 79-114.
107. Interestingly, enthusiasm for strategic attack does appear to be on the rise in the Air Force's Space Command, effectively the youngest arm of the service, and one that may eventually achieve full independence from the USAF. Pape's argument predicts that this trend will continue, and it may well be correct. See Karl Mueller, "Space Weapons and U.S. Security," unpub. paper, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, December 1997. On Billy Mitchell, see Mark Clodfelter, "Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell's Strategic Thought," in Meilinger, The Paths of Heaven, 79-114.
108. Most Air Force officers admit that eliminating even the USAF Academy because of its questionable cost-effectiveness would be politically inconceivable due to the entrenched bureaucratic interests that protect it.
109. Lambeth, Steady Climb, 144-48. Interestingly, among the dozens of interviews conducted with USAF officers and others during preparation of the Air University Balkans Ak Campaign Study, the only person who argued that the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs during Operation Deliberate Force would have been sufficient to coerce them into negotiating the Dayton peace agreement, even in the absence of a land offensive by Bosnian government and Croatian forces, was a civilian. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, interview by author, New York, 24 May 1996.
110. For a classic taxonomy and discussion of organizational interests, see Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974), chap. 3.
111. This emphasis on deriving category boundaries from the target's decision calculus is based on the approach to deterrence strategy classification in Mueller, "Strategy, Asymmetric Deterrence, and Accommodation," chap. 2.
112. The British prevention of a cross-Channel invasion in 1940 can be regarded as a pure force rather than a coercive victory, since the defeat of the Luftwaffe made such an attack militarily impossible. The failure of the German air campaign, however, led to Hitler's decision to abandon his plans for near-term conquest of Britain and instead to turn his attention to the east in 1941, freeing Britain from the threat of invasion, in a clear case of effective coercion through denial.
113. All of the combatants in the conflict continued to violate the United Nations prohibition on military helicopter flights, but this was because of the conscious decision not to enforce the no-flight zone against rotary-wing aircraft.
114. The coercive use of air transport, other than in moving and supporting armed forces, is relatively unusual; most pure airlift operations, such as humanitarian relief missions, are intended to have direct rather than coercive effects. Coercion using positive rather than negative incentives, however, is both possible and potentially powerful; see David A. Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics 24, no. 1 (October 1971): 19-38.
115. This label was suggested by Michael Rampino.
116. Pape notes that within the military there was more enthusiasm for attacking the well-being of the North Vietnamese populace, but the actions that would have most contributed to such an effort, such as the mining of Haiphong harbor, were not taken during this period.
117. See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3. Similar debates occurred about deterrence and strategic nuclear targeting against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. See Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
118. See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3. Similar debates occurred about deterrence and strategic nuclear targeting against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. See Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
119. Karl Mueller, "Air Strikes Can't Accomplish Much," Los Angeles Times, 23 February 1998, B9.
120. The idea of punitive countermilitary attacks is more prominent in some discussion of nuclear targeting strategies. See, for example, Michael J. Mazarr, "Military Targets for a Minimum Deterrent: After the Cold War How Much is Enough?" Journal of Strategic Studies 15 (June1992): 147-71.
121. "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions."
122. Wallace Thies, When Governments Collide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
123. For a reiteration of his case following the Russian air force's successful decapitation attack against Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, see Robert A. Pape, "A Surgical Strike That Could Backfire," New York Times, 27 April 1996.
124. "Ignoring Reality," 147-48. Watts emphasizes the omission of mixed strategies from the statistical test.
125. "The Ak Force Strikes Back," 198-99. Pape also argues that in his 40-case statistical analysis, high denial and low punishment coerced successfully in eight out of nine cases and high denial and high, not low, punishment coerced in only four out of six, but this observation is too statistically insignificant to be very meaningful.
126. "Ignoring Reality," passim. In contrast, Watts's larger arguments about the rise of chaos and complexity theory, and other, less relevant, scientific advances such as quantum uncertainty, making the scientific study of warfare and politics pointless are deeply unsatisfying. There is insufficient room to delve into them here, but Pape critiques them ably in "The Air Force Strikes Back," 193-98.
127. "Ignoring Reality," passim. In contrast, Watts's larger arguments about the rise of chaos and complexity theory, and other, less relevant, scientific advances such as quantum uncertainty, making the scientific study of warfare and politics pointless are deeply unsatisfying. There is insufficient room to delve into them here, but Pape critiques them ably in "The Air Force Strikes Back," 193-98.
128. Most notably, Robert Jervis's System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). See also John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 5*58; and David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, June 1997).
129. Most notably, Robert Jervis's System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). See also John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 5*58; and David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, June 1997).
130. Most notably, Robert Jervis's System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). See also John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 5*58; and David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, June 1997).
131. On using a similar strategy for deterrence, see Mueller, "Strategy, Asymmetric Deterrence, and Accommodation," 44-47.
132. As noted above, however, denial can also affect the benefits of resistance if it causes the enemy to adopt a more modest image of what would constitute "successful" resistance.
133. On the psychological effects of air attack, see Irving L Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951; reprinted by Greenwood Press, 1976); Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars 1941-1991, Project Ak Force MR-576-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996); A. P. N. Lambert, The Psychology of Air Power (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1995).
134. On the psychological effects of air attack, see Irving L Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951; reprinted by Greenwood Press, 1976); Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars 1941-1991, Project Ak Force MR-576-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996); A. P. N. Lambert, The Psychology of Air Power (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1995).
135. On the psychological effects of air attack, see Irving L Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951; reprinted by Greenwood Press, 1976); Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars 1941-1991, Project Ak Force MR-576-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996); A. P. N. Lambert, The Psychology of Air Power (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1995).
136. Psychological Effects, 196-97.
137. Ernest May argues that these effects are so powerful that a change in the target state's leadership is a necessary precondition for acceptance of any major coercive demands. See Ernest May, "Lessons" of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), chap 5.
138. See Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
139. Air War and Emotional Stress, chap. 6.
140. Mark C. McLaughlin, "Assessing the Effectiveness of DELIBERATE FORCE," in Owen, Operation DELIBERATE FORCE.
141. Winds of Change 1914-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 522. If this was literally true, then Pape probably should have classified the German effort to coerce Britain during the Munich crisis among cases of nuclear, not conventional aerial coercion.
142. A case in point is that, until 1997, no detailed analysis of the effects of the Allied bombing of Italy had ever been written. Even the number of good historical operational- or strategic-level studies of air power in the Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan wars is very small, and aside from Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, scholarship on the use of air power in most other post-1945 conflicts is even more limited.
143. Similarly, he notes relevant scholarship regarding the causes and consequences of coups d'état (BTW, 83-84) in order to assess the prospects for air power being able to trigger them; also useful is Bruce W. Farcau, The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).
144. Similarly, he notes relevant scholarship regarding the causes and consequences of coups d'état (BTW, 83-84) in order to assess the prospects for air power being able to trigger them; also useful is Bruce W. Farcau, The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).
145. "Reality Ignored," 165-06.
146. Because long-wave IR sensors "see" the temperature difference between an aircraft and a warmer or cooler background, not simply its hot exhaust, the extent to which even a stealthy aircraft can be concealed against them is limited, especially when flying at high speeds or altitudes. Advanced IRST systems will appear on the next generation of European fighters and are in use on U.S. Navy F-14Ds, while less advanced but useful IRST systems are already carried by most modern Russian fighters.
147. Mueller, "Space Weapons and U.S. Security."
148. The only prominent employment of recently developed nonlethal weapons technology by coercive air power to date has been the use during the Gulf War of cruise missiles dispensing fibers of composite materials to short-circuit Iraqi electrical transmission lines without having to destroy the associated powerplants. In many cases, the powerplants were later bombed anyway.
149. On territorial defense strategies, see Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1986).
150. For a review of research on the subject, see Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus, MR-726-RC (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), and on the effects of intense casualty aversion in the USAF, Troy E. DeVine, "The Influence of America's Casualty Sensitivity on Military Strategy and Doctrine" (Master's thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 1997). There is, however, evidence that the American news media are hyperattentitive to U.S. (only) combat losses. Vanderbilt University Television News Archive transcripts, for example, indicate that the three major U.S. television networks together devoted a total of almost forty-five minutes of evening news coverage to stories about Bosnia on 2 and 3 June 1995, the two days following the loss of a patrolling USAF F-16 and the ejection of the pilot in hostile territory, compared to just over thirty-three minutes on 30 and 31 August 1995, the first two days of bombing in the Operation Deliberate Force air campaign. (It is worth noting that on 30 August a French Mirage 2000 was shot down by a Bosnian Serb missile, and the fate of its two-man non-American crew was unknown for several weeks.)
151. For a review of research on the subject, see Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus, MR-726-RC (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), and on the effects of intense casualty aversion in the USAF, Troy E. DeVine, "The Influence of America's Casualty Sensitivity on Military Strategy and Doctrine" (Master's thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 1997). There is, however, evidence that the American news media are hyperattentitive to U.S. (only) combat losses. Vanderbilt University Television News Archive transcripts, for example, indicate that the three major U.S. television networks together devoted a total of almost forty-five minutes of evening news coverage to stories about Bosnia on 2 and 3 June 1995, the two days following the loss of a patrolling USAF F-16 and the ejection of the pilot in hostile territory, compared to just over thirty-three minutes on 30 and 31 August 1995, the first two days of bombing in the Operation Deliberate Force air campaign. (It is worth noting that on 30 August a French Mirage 2000 was shot down by a Bosnian Serb missile, and the fate of its two-man non-American crew was unknown for several weeks.)
152. See, however, John Mueller, Policy and Opinion n the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 122*23.
153. Brodie, "Strategy as a Science" (1949), 474-75.