The limits of precision-guided air power

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 93-114

  Pape, Robert A ^a  

^a Dartmouth College   (United States)

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EID: 0346897710     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429343     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. For the core statement of this argument see John A. Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in The Future of Air Pewer in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ed. Richard H. Schultz Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1992), 57-83. Other contemporary advocates of strategic air power include Jason B. Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the Present," Airpower Journal 7, no. 4 (winter 1993): 4-15; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine," Airpower Journal 6, no. 1 (spring 1992): 24-31 . Those who stress the decisive role of strategic air power in Desert Storm include Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), esp. 188-200; John F. Jones, "Guilio Douhet Vindicated: Desert Storm 1991," Naval War College Review 45, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 97-101; Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Pawer Doctrinal Lessons for Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, 1992).
2. For the core statement of this argument see John A. Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in The Future of Air Pewer in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ed. Richard H. Schultz Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1992), 57-83. Other contemporary advocates of strategic air power include Jason B. Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the Present," Airpower Journal 7, no. 4 (winter 1993): 4-15; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine," Airpower Journal 6, no. 1 (spring 1992): 24-31 . Those who stress the decisive role of strategic air power in Desert Storm include Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), esp. 188-200; John F. Jones, "Guilio Douhet Vindicated: Desert Storm 1991," Naval War College Review 45, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 97-101; Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Pawer Doctrinal Lessons for Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, 1992).
3. For the core statement of this argument see John A. Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in The Future of Air Pewer in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ed. Richard H. Schultz Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1992), 57-83. Other contemporary advocates of strategic air power include Jason B. Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the Present," Airpower Journal 7, no. 4 (winter 1993): 4-15; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine," Airpower Journal 6, no. 1 (spring 1992): 24-31 . Those who stress the decisive role of strategic air power in Desert Storm include Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), esp. 188-200; John F. Jones, "Guilio Douhet Vindicated: Desert Storm 1991," Naval War College Review 45, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 97-101; Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Pawer Doctrinal Lessons for Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, 1992).
4. For the core statement of this argument see John A. Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in The Future of Air Pewer in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ed. Richard H. Schultz Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1992), 57-83. Other contemporary advocates of strategic air power include Jason B. Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the Present," Airpower Journal 7, no. 4 (winter 1993): 4-15; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine," Airpower Journal 6, no. 1 (spring 1992): 24-31 . Those who stress the decisive role of strategic air power in Desert Storm include Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), esp. 188-200; John F. Jones, "Guilio Douhet Vindicated: Desert Storm 1991," Naval War College Review 45, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 97-101; Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Pawer Doctrinal Lessons for Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, 1992).
5. For the core statement of this argument see John A. Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in The Future of Air Pewer in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ed. Richard H. Schultz Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1992), 57-83. Other contemporary advocates of strategic air power include Jason B. Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the Present," Airpower Journal 7, no. 4 (winter 1993): 4-15; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine," Airpower Journal 6, no. 1 (spring 1992): 24-31 . Those who stress the decisive role of strategic air power in Desert Storm include Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), esp. 188-200; John F. Jones, "Guilio Douhet Vindicated: Desert Storm 1991," Naval War College Review 45, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 97-101; Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Pawer Doctrinal Lessons for Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, 1992).
6. For the core statement of this argument see John A. Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in The Future of Air Pewer in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ed. Richard H. Schultz Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1992), 57-83. Other contemporary advocates of strategic air power include Jason B. Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the Present," Airpower Journal 7, no. 4 (winter 1993): 4-15; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine," Airpower Journal 6, no. 1 (spring 1992): 24-31 . Those who stress the decisive role of strategic air power in Desert Storm include Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), esp. 188-200; John F. Jones, "Guilio Douhet Vindicated: Desert Storm 1991," Naval War College Review 45, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 97-101; Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Pawer Doctrinal Lessons for Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, 1992).
7. The clearest call for the air force to conduct power projection by relying on strategic bombing is found in former Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach - Global Pawer (Washington, D.C: Department of the Air Force, June 1991 ). For a diverse debate on the role of air power in American grand strategy, see Schultz and Pfaltzgraff, The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War.
8. The clearest call for the air force to conduct power projection by relying on strategic bombing is found in former Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach - Global Pawer (Washington, D.C: Department of the Air Force, June 1991 ). For a diverse debate on the role of air power in American grand strategy, see Schultz and Pfaltzgraff, The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War.
9. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York Dell, 1992); Robert Scales, Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993); Bernard E. Trainor, "Air Power in the Gulf War. Did It Really Succeed?" Strategic Review (winter 1994): 66-68; and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994).
10. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York Dell, 1992); Robert Scales, Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993); Bernard E. Trainor, "Air Power in the Gulf War. Did It Really Succeed?" Strategic Review (winter 1994): 66-68; and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994).
11. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York Dell, 1992); Robert Scales, Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993); Bernard E. Trainor, "Air Power in the Gulf War. Did It Really Succeed?" Strategic Review (winter 1994): 66-68; and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994).
12. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York Dell, 1992); Robert Scales, Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993); Bernard E. Trainor, "Air Power in the Gulf War. Did It Really Succeed?" Strategic Review (winter 1994): 66-68; and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994).
13. For a detailed discussion of the effectiveness of various coercive air strategies, see Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
14. Air superiority is sometimes named as a separate air strategy, but it is not All coercive air strategies require command of the air, because aircraft cannot systematically place bombs on any target set if air operations encounter strong opposition from enemy forces. Thus, air superiority is not a separate coercive air strategy, but rather a necessary step in the pursuit of all three coercive air strategies. Accordingly, the central question in air strategy has been what to attack once air superiority has been achieved. The need to attain air superiority is sometimes used to justify wider strategic air operations, but in fact there is little overlap between the requirements of air superiority and strategic targets. The key air superiority targets are the enemy's long-range air search radars (and airborne early-warning aircraft, if they have them). Destroying national-level command and control, electric power, and oil while failing to knock out the radars does little to reduce the danger to friendly aircraft Once the enemy's air search assets are blind, however, the combination of advanced sensors and precision-guided air-to-air missiles can make it impossible to continue to contest the air if they fly, they die. In the Gulf War, Coalition aircraft shot down thirty-six Iraqi jets against one air-to-air loss. In 1982, in Lebanon, the Israelis shot down eighty-five Syrian MiGs against two losses
15. For evidence about the poor record of punishment and risk strategies, see Pape, Bombing to Win. See also, James M. Mackintosh, The War and Mental Health in England (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1944); Richard Titmus, Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO, 1950); Max Seydewitz, Civil Life in Wartime Germany (New York Viking, 1945); The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1947), 230-37; and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Strategic Attack of National Electric Systems" (Maxwell Air Force Base: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993).
16. For evidence about the poor record of punishment and risk strategies, see Pape, Bombing to Win. See also, James M. Mackintosh, The War and Mental Health in England (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1944); Richard Titmus, Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO, 1950); Max Seydewitz, Civil Life in Wartime Germany (New York Viking, 1945); The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1947), 230-37; and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Strategic Attack of National Electric Systems" (Maxwell Air Force Base: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993).
17. For evidence about the poor record of punishment and risk strategies, see Pape, Bombing to Win. See also, James M. Mackintosh, The War and Mental Health in England (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1944); Richard Titmus, Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO, 1950); Max Seydewitz, Civil Life in Wartime Germany (New York Viking, 1945); The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1947), 230-37; and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Strategic Attack of National Electric Systems" (Maxwell Air Force Base: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993).
18. For evidence about the poor record of punishment and risk strategies, see Pape, Bombing to Win. See also, James M. Mackintosh, The War and Mental Health in England (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1944); Richard Titmus, Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO, 1950); Max Seydewitz, Civil Life in Wartime Germany (New York Viking, 1945); The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1947), 230-37; and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Strategic Attack of National Electric Systems" (Maxwell Air Force Base: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993).
19. For evidence about the poor record of punishment and risk strategies, see Pape, Bombing to Win. See also, James M. Mackintosh, The War and Mental Health in England (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1944); Richard Titmus, Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO, 1950); Max Seydewitz, Civil Life in Wartime Germany (New York Viking, 1945); The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1947), 230-37; and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Strategic Attack of National Electric Systems" (Maxwell Air Force Base: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993).
20. For evidence about the poor record of punishment and risk strategies, see Pape, Bombing to Win. See also, James M. Mackintosh, The War and Mental Health in England (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1944); Richard Titmus, Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO, 1950); Max Seydewitz, Civil Life in Wartime Germany (New York Viking, 1945); The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1947), 230-37; and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Strategic Attack of National Electric Systems" (Maxwell Air Force Base: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993).
21. Strategic bombing is inherently harder than interdiction, requiring longer range, more expensive bombers, and more extensive air defense suppression, refueling and other support This is why strategic bombers generally cost more than ten times tactical aircraft of the same era, a ratio that may be increasing for today's generation. For cost comparisons of the B-17 to tactical aircraft in the Second World War and the B-2 to the A-10 today, see Wesley Fran Craven and James Lea Gate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948), vol. 6, 360;
22. and, Northrop Corporations, B-2 Stealth Bomber 1992 Fact Book (September 1992).
23. Although strategic bombing of Germany reduced ball-bearing production by 70 percent, Germans adjusted by curtailing nonessential (especially civilian) uses and by redesigning equipment to use fewer bearings. Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 2, 686, 699, 703-4.
24. The only war economy seriously disrupted by air attack was that of a nearly defeated Germany in February 1945, but this was done largely by massive numbers of tactical aircraft, which could blanket the German rail and road networks because the Allies had advanced so far that Germany itself had become the combat theater.
25. Of course, the likelihood that strategic air power can actually reduce the costs of defeating the enemy on the battlefield is declining as the cost of strategic bombers rises. B-2 stealth bombers cost approximately 600 million dollars each, if the United States buys more than 20 or the equivalent of some 10,000 very good laser-guided bombs or Maverick precision-guided missiles, roughly two thirds of the number of PGMs fired in the Gulf War.
26. Ground support is sometimes effective against guerrillas, while interdiction generally is not.
27. Foremost is Col. John A. Warden III, one of the principal architects of the strategic air campaign against Iraq and the commander from 1992 to 1995 of the Air Command and Staff College, the air force's school for promising mid-level officers. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 57-82. Others include Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis"; Edward Mann, "One Target; One Bomb: Is the Principle of Mass Dead?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 1 (spring 1993): 35-43; Buster C. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations," Airpower Journal 7', no. 2 (summer 1993): 4-10; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "Towards a New Airpower Lexicon - or - Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 2 (summer 1993): 39-48.
28. Foremost is Col. John A. Warden III, one of the principal architects of the strategic air campaign against Iraq and the commander from 1992 to 1995 of the Air Command and Staff College, the air force's school for promising mid-level officers. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 57-82. Others include Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis"; Edward Mann, "One Target; One Bomb: Is the Principle of Mass Dead?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 1 (spring 1993): 35-43; Buster C. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations," Airpower Journal 7', no. 2 (summer 1993): 4-10; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "Towards a New Airpower Lexicon - or - Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 2 (summer 1993): 39-48.
29. Foremost is Col. John A. Warden III, one of the principal architects of the strategic air campaign against Iraq and the commander from 1992 to 1995 of the Air Command and Staff College, the air force's school for promising mid-level officers. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 57-82. Others include Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis"; Edward Mann, "One Target; One Bomb: Is the Principle of Mass Dead?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 1 (spring 1993): 35-43; Buster C. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations," Airpower Journal 7', no. 2 (summer 1993): 4-10; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "Towards a New Airpower Lexicon - or - Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 2 (summer 1993): 39-48.
30. Foremost is Col. John A. Warden III, one of the principal architects of the strategic air campaign against Iraq and the commander from 1992 to 1995 of the Air Command and Staff College, the air force's school for promising mid-level officers. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 57-82. Others include Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis"; Edward Mann, "One Target; One Bomb: Is the Principle of Mass Dead?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 1 (spring 1993): 35-43; Buster C. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations," Airpower Journal 7', no. 2 (summer 1993): 4-10; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "Towards a New Airpower Lexicon - or - Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 2 (summer 1993): 39-48.
31. Foremost is Col. John A. Warden III, one of the principal architects of the strategic air campaign against Iraq and the commander from 1992 to 1995 of the Air Command and Staff College, the air force's school for promising mid-level officers. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 57-82. Others include Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis"; Edward Mann, "One Target; One Bomb: Is the Principle of Mass Dead?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 1 (spring 1993): 35-43; Buster C. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations," Airpower Journal 7', no. 2 (summer 1993): 4-10; and Phillip S. Meilinger, "Towards a New Airpower Lexicon - or - Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone?" Airpower Journal 7, no. 2 (summer 1993): 39-48.
32. Strategic air power advocates also maintain that the American public has not only a low tolerance for casualties, but also a low tolerance for protracted operations of any kind or even for enemy casualties. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons," 8. As a result, in future conflicts the United States may not have the political staying power to wait for theater air attack to clear the way for ground forces. Recent evidence does not support this argument. Despite concerns before the start of Desert Storm that there would pressure to terminate the air war after just a few days, it was in fact continued for thirty-nine days until Iraq's ground forces were decimated. There was no public outcry when it was reported immediately after the war that over 100,000 Iraqi troops had been killed, nor did estimates that 100,000 more Iraqis would die if sanctions were not lifted quickly generate noticeable public pressure against sanctions. Some B-2 advocates also contend that long-range bombers are needed because future crises will occur unpredictably, with little warning and no time to deploy ground and tactical air forces to the conflict region. Christopher J. Bowie, The New Calculus: Analysing Airpower's Cbanging Role in Joint Theater Campaigns (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993). In principle, the argument need not favor strategic attack over theater air missions. In practice, however, no one has shown that the large, slow-flying B-2 can survive the difficult-to-predict air defenses accompanying enemy ground forces, and so it is likely to be used in a strategic attack role even if purchased for another mission.
33. Strategic air power advocates also maintain that the American public has not only a low tolerance for casualties, but also a low tolerance for protracted operations of any kind or even for enemy casualties. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons," 8. As a result, in future conflicts the United States may not have the political staying power to wait for theater air attack to clear the way for ground forces. Recent evidence does not support this argument. Despite concerns before the start of Desert Storm that there would pressure to terminate the air war after just a few days, it was in fact continued for thirty-nine days until Iraq's ground forces were decimated. There was no public outcry when it was reported immediately after the war that over 100,000 Iraqi troops had been killed, nor did estimates that 100,000 more Iraqis would die if sanctions were not lifted quickly generate noticeable public pressure against sanctions. Some B-2 advocates also contend that long-range bombers are needed because future crises will occur unpredictably, with little warning and no time to deploy ground and tactical air forces to the conflict region. Christopher J. Bowie, The New Calculus: Analysing Airpower's Cbanging Role in Joint Theater Campaigns (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993). In principle, the argument need not favor strategic attack over theater air missions. In practice, however, no one has shown that the large, slow-flying B-2 can survive the difficult-to-predict air defenses accompanying enemy ground forces, and so it is likely to be used in a strategic attack role even if purchased for another mission.
34. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 66, 65-66, 64. Warden makes clear (p. 64) that the purpose of taking down the economy is not denial: "Note that destruction of the power system may have little short-term effect at the front - if there is a front."
35. Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Strategic Attack of National Electrical Systems" (Maxwell AFB: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993). In Iraq, the groups that revolted - the Kurds in the North and the Shi'ites in the South - did so because of long-standing grievances against oppression by Hussein's Sunni-dominated regime, not because of sudden economic deprivation.
36. PGMs are thought of as increasing the destructiveness of conventional war because they are much more effective against military and certain economic targets. The most devastating way to attack civilians, however, is with incendiary bombs, which need not be guided because they work by starting massive firestorms, not by destroying individual houses one by one.
37. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 72.
38. Interviews by William Arkin, quoted in "Defeat of Iraq Sparks Debate on Which Air Role Was Crucial," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 January 1992, 62-63.
39. In addition, most plants were restruck from two to five times each because imagery could not confirm levels of damage. Gulf War Air Power Survey, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), pt 2, 298, 306.
40. Walid Doleh et al., "Electrical Facilities Survey," in International Study Team, Health and Welfare in Iraq after the Gulf Crisis: An It-depth Assessment (October 1991), 1.
41. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 65. See also Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis"; and Dennis Drew, "Hyperwar." These ideas are spreading beyond the U.S. Air Force. See, for example, Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons For Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1992), 170.
42. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 65. See also Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis"; and Dennis Drew, "Hyperwar." These ideas are spreading beyond the U.S. Air Force. See, for example, Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons For Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1992), 170.
43. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 65. See also Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis"; and Dennis Drew, "Hyperwar." These ideas are spreading beyond the U.S. Air Force. See, for example, Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons For Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1992), 170.
44. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," 65. See also Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis"; and Dennis Drew, "Hyperwar." These ideas are spreading beyond the U.S. Air Force. See, for example, Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons For Australia (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1992), 170.
45. PGMs are sometimes said to be essential for destroying hardened targets such as command bunkers. During Desert Storm the United States developed a 5,000-pound laser-guided bomb to destroy a bunker that 2000-pound LGBs could not penetrate. The advantage of PGMs, however, is accuracy, not penetration. An equally heavy dumb bomb can destroy the same targets provided a direct hit is achieved. While this may require dropping considerably more bombs, it is still feasible if the number of such targets is small This is not to say that PGMs are not desirable for counter-C31 missions. They require fewer sorties, which can be important if air resources are very limited, and they cause far less collateral damage.
46. Arkin, "Defeat of Iraq Sparks Debate," 62.
47. For an argument that Russia's assassination of Dudayev would not end Chechnya's independence movement, see Robert A. Pape, "A Surgical Strike that Could Backfire," New York Times, 27 April 1996.
48. Cheap, mobile, and flexible communications technology is proliferating throughout the Third World. Fiber-optic land lines which can handle thousands of channels can be dispensed from a reel mounted on the back of a truck. The average per capita GDP of countries launching cellular telephone networks has fallen from $14,500 in 1979-82 to about $1,500 today and a projected $600 in 1998. In 1994 the command system of the Rwandan Patriotic Front was based on mobile cellular phones. "Survey of Telecommunications," Economist, 23 October 1993).
49. Arkin, "Defeat of Iraq Sparks Debate," 62.
50. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons," 4. An F/A-18 E/F costs $60 million, plus $111 million in 20-year operating costs. Assuming that it flies 100 combat missions over its lifetime and that it drops 4 LGBs per mission, the aircraft alone costs $43,000 per bomb dropped. Northrop Corporation, B-2 Stealth Bomber 1992 Fact Book.
51. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons," 4. An F/A-18 E/F costs $60 million, plus $111 million in 20-year operating costs. Assuming that it flies 100 combat missions over its lifetime and that it drops 4 LGBs per mission, the aircraft alone costs $43,000 per bomb dropped. Northrop Corporation, B-2 Stealth Bomber 1992 Fact Book.
52. These figures exclude some 2,000 anti-radiation missiles. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Performance in Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: GPO., April 1991).
53. "One does not conduct an attack against industry or infrastructure because of the effect it might or might not have on field forces. Rather, one undertakes such an attack for its direct effect on national leaders and commanders who must assess the cost of rebuilding, the effect on the state's economic position in the postwar period, the internal political effect on their own survival, and the cost versus the potential gain from continuing the war." Warden "Employing Air Power," 67-68.
54. States rarely voluntarily initiate conflicts that they expect to become wars of attrition. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
55. In fact, Egypt and Syria suffered these losses against a non-PGM-equipped opponent; had Israel fielded PGMs on a large scale, their losses would have been even higher. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House, 1982), 341; and Frank Gervasi, Thunder over the Mediterranean (New York: McKay, 1975), 406-7. Although these were both desert wars, terrain makes less difference to the destructiveness of PGMs than to which types of PGMs inflict the damage. In close terrain, in which small ground units are harder to detect, air-launched PGMs would do less damage while ground-launched ones would do more. An analysis of aircraft losses would show the same patterns as do tanks, although terrain makes no difference.
56. In fact, Egypt and Syria suffered these losses against a non-PGM-equipped opponent; had Israel fielded PGMs on a large scale, their losses would have been even higher. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House, 1982), 341; and Frank Gervasi, Thunder over the Mediterranean (New York: McKay, 1975), 406-7. Although these were both desert wars, terrain makes less difference to the destructiveness of PGMs than to which types of PGMs inflict the damage. In close terrain, in which small ground units are harder to detect, air-launched PGMs would do less damage while ground-launched ones would do more. An analysis of aircraft losses would show the same patterns as do tanks, although terrain makes no difference.
57. Approximately 1,000 Merkava tanks were produced between 1977 and 1993. Christopher Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1993-94 (Alexandria: Jane's Information Group, 1993), 58-59.
58. At the indicated loss rates above, Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq would have lost their entire tank inventories, including reserves and obsolete models, in 180, 35, 28, and 78 days respectively. Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 182-83.
59. U.S. M1 main battle tank production has averaged 70 per month since January 1984. The U.K. Challenger 2 production will be thirty per year through 1998. France's Leopard 2 production has averaged 300 per year since 1982. Russian T-80 production is estimated at 2,000 per year from 1983 to 1993. Foss, Jane's, 1993-94, 11, 41, 93, and 110.
60. Although some actual or potential global powers, such as Germany, Japan, and India, do not possess them today, it is impossible to imagine a scenario involving a major war between the United States and one of these countries in which the opponent did not possess strategic nuclear weapons.
61. On routes by which conventional conflicts can inadvertently lead to nuclear conflict, see Barry Posen, Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
62. Many other types of theater targets, such as towed artillery, trucks, and unhardened communications sites and depots are vulnerable to near misses. Thus, although easier to hit with PGMs, attacking them with unguided munitions is feasible.
63. During the Gulf War, the Coalition launched approximately 9,500 PGMs of types commonly used against armored vehicles, and destroyed 2,500 tanks and APCs. This yields a kill rate of 26%, although since we cannot be sure either that none of these weapons was used against any other target types or that all the tank and APC kills were due to PGMs, the true rate may be either higher or lower.
64. Of course, PGMs may some day be cheaply countered. For a history of competition between offensive and defensive weapons that shows that each new advance tends to trigger counter-measures, see Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb: The Evolution of the Weapons and Tactics of Warfare (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).
65. Tran Van Tra, Concluding the 30 Years War (Ho Chi Minh City, 1982), 6, 33, 34. For a more detailed discussion on coercive air power in the Vietnam War, see Pape, Bombing to Win, 174-210.
66. Tran Van Tra, Concluding the 30 Years War (Ho Chi Minh City, 1982), 6, 33, 34. For a more detailed discussion on coercive air power in the Vietnam War, see Pape, Bombing to Win, 174-210.
67. "Primakov on Gulf Diplomacy," FBIS-SOV-91-048,12 March 1991, 24. Quotations in the original.
68. For a more detailed analysis of the use of air power against Iraq, see Pape, Bombing to Win, 211-53.