Violence and economic agendas in civil wars: Some policy implications

Millenium

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 795-818

  Berdal, Mats ^a   Keen, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000676563     PISSN: 03058298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/03058298970260030401     Document Type: Article

References (105)

1. General peace agreements reached in the first half of the decade include those for Angola (the Bicesse Peace Accords signed in Lisbon in May 1991 and supplemented by the Protocol of Lusaka in November 1994), Cambodia (Paris Peace Accord signed in October 1991), EI Salvador (signed at Chapultepec in January 1992), Mozambique (signed in Rome in October 1992), Bosnia-Herzegovina (initialled at Dayton and signed in Paris 1995), and, finally, Guatemala (the Peace Accord for Guatemala signed in Oslo in December 1996).
2. United Nations, 'Signing of the Angola Protocol', United Nations (UN) document, S/PRST/1994/70, 21 November 1994 (New York, NY: United Nations, 1994).
3. For an upbeat assessment of the United Nations in Cambodia, see Shirley Lithgow, 'Cambodia', in Kevin P. Clements and Robin Ward (ed.), Building International Community: Cooperatingfor Peace Case Studies (Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1994), especially pp. 52-55. Yasushi Akashi approvingly quotes Madeleine Albright's reference to the achievement of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as a 'shining example'. See Yasushi Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', International Peacekeeping (Vol. 1, No. 2, 1994), p. 210.
4. For an upbeat assessment of the United Nations in Cambodia, see Shirley Lithgow, 'Cambodia', in Kevin P. Clements and Robin Ward (ed.), Building International Community: Cooperatingfor Peace Case Studies (Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1994), especially pp. 52-55. Yasushi Akashi approvingly quotes Madeleine Albright's reference to the achievement of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as a 'shining example'. See Yasushi Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', International Peacekeeping (Vol. 1, No. 2, 1994), p. 210.
5. For a view of contemporary civil wars as a process of breakdown and resulting anarchy, see Robert Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', The Atlantic Monthly (Vol. 273, No. 2, 1994), pp. 44-76. For a critique, see David Keen, 'Organised Chaos: Not the New World Order We Ordered', The World Today (Vol. 52, No. 1, 1996), pp. 24-27.
6. For a view of contemporary civil wars as a process of breakdown and resulting anarchy, see Robert Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', The Atlantic Monthly (Vol. 273, No. 2, 1994), pp. 44-76. For a critique, see David Keen, 'Organised Chaos: Not the New World Order We Ordered', The World Today (Vol. 52, No. 1, 1996), pp. 24-27.
7. Although Boswell maintained that the irrationality of war was 'admitted by almost all men', he had (of passing interest in terms of the argument and some of the evidence presented in this article) come across two people who did not share this view. One was a 'Scotch Highlander' whose 'attention [was] so eagerly fixed on the advantage which accrued to his clan from the 'trade of war', that he could think of it only as good'. The other was a 'tragick poet'. James Boswell, 'On War', in The Oxford Book of Essays, ed. J. Gross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991 [1777]), p. 99.
8. 'Horror Story', The Economist, 21 November 1992, p. 49.
9. United Nations, 'From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador', Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, Annex to S/25500, 1 April 1993, (1.)E. (New York, NY: United Nations, 1993).
10. In the words of Kaplan, 'physical aggression is part of being human. Only when people attain a certain economic, educational, and cultural standard is this trait tranquillised'. Kaplan, op. cit., in note 4, pp. 72-73.
11. For a useful overview, with telling examples, of both approaches see Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 26-27. Although in both cases the stress is on the irrationality of war, the policy implications differ radically. Among those who have most firmly opposed intervention in internal conflicts in the 1990s, references have often been made to the intractability of conflicts driven by 'ancient hatreds'. Ibid., p. 27. Advocates of more intervention, on the other hand, have frequently argued that conflicting parties, through negotiations, workshops and third-party mediation, can be brought to realise that their true interests lie in non-violent solutions. Kevin P. Clements, 'Introduction', in Clements and Ward, op. cit., in note 3, pp. 1-26.
12. For a useful overview, with telling examples, of both approaches see Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 26-27. Although in both cases the stress is on the irrationality of war, the policy implications differ radically. Among those who have most firmly opposed intervention in internal conflicts in the 1990s, references have often been made to the intractability of conflicts driven by 'ancient hatreds'. Ibid., p. 27. Advocates of more intervention, on the other hand, have frequently argued that conflicting parties, through negotiations, workshops and third-party mediation, can be brought to realise that their true interests lie in non-violent solutions. Kevin P. Clements, 'Introduction', in Clements and Ward, op. cit., in note 3, pp. 1-26.
13. For a useful overview, with telling examples, of both approaches see Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 26-27. Although in both cases the stress is on the irrationality of war, the policy implications differ radically. Among those who have most firmly opposed intervention in internal conflicts in the 1990s, references have often been made to the intractability of conflicts driven by 'ancient hatreds'. Ibid., p. 27. Advocates of more intervention, on the other hand, have frequently argued that conflicting parties, through negotiations, workshops and third-party mediation, can be brought to realise that their true interests lie in non-violent solutions. Kevin P. Clements, 'Introduction', in Clements and Ward, op. cit., in note 3, pp. 1-26.
14. Even in the absence of economic motives, the resort to war may still be the most 'rational' means to achieve a particular end. One example would be the decision by President Milan Kučan and other Slovene leaders to opt for war with the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) backed by Serbia in June 1991. Of European attempts to mediate in the developing crisis at this point, Laura Silber and Allan Little have written, 'they [the EU troika sent to mediate three days after the war had broken out] behaved as though all they had to do was to persuade the belligerents of the folly of war. They failed to recognise that, in some circumstances, the resort to war was far from irrational. It was, for President Kučan's Government on that fateful night, a profoundly rational decision, and indeed the only, way to achieve what they wanted'. Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books and BBC Books, 1995), p. 175.
15. See, for example, Stephen Ellis, 'Liberia 1989-1994: A Study in Ethnic and Spiritual Violence', African Affairs (Vol. 94, No, 375, 1995), and David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in South-western Sudan, 1983-89 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
16. See, for example, Stephen Ellis, 'Liberia 1989-1994: A Study in Ethnic and Spiritual Violence', African Affairs (Vol. 94, No, 375, 1995), and David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in South-western Sudan, 1983-89 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
17. For a good example, see David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964).
18. See African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: African Rights, 1995). More generally on the reasons why elites and political leaders may be reluctant to end fighting during civil war, see Charles King, 'Ending Civil Wars', Adelphi Paper 308, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 30-33.
19. See African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: African Rights, 1995). More generally on the reasons why elites and political leaders may be reluctant to end fighting during civil war, see Charles King, 'Ending Civil Wars', Adelphi Paper 308, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 30-33.
20. See David Keen, 'The Economics of Civil War', Adelphi Paper, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, forthcoming).
21. This is certainly not to suggest that the interaction between economic agendas and political processes has escaped the attention of all analysts. It is worth mentioning, in particular, the work of Susan Woodward who, in her excellent study of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, emphasises the economic background and context within which the process of political competition and disintegration took place. See Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
22. David Keen, 'When War Itself Is Privatised', The Times Literary Supplement, 29 December 1995, pp. 13-14.
23. Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain-forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), and Robert Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York, NY: Random House, 1996), Chapter 2.
24. Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain-forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), and Robert Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York, NY: Random House, 1996), Chapter 2.
25. This section is based largely on field work by David Keen in Sierra Leone in June and July 1995.
26. See David Shearer and Alice Jay, International Crisis Group Report on Sierra Leone (London: International Crisis Group, Chatham House, 1996).
27. William Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); David Keen, The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: War and Aid in Sierra Leone (London: James Currey, 1998, forthcoming); and Mark Bradbury, Rebels Without a Cause? An Exploratory Report on the Conflict in Sierra Leone (London: Care, 1995).
28. William Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); David Keen, The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: War and Aid in Sierra Leone (London: James Currey, 1998, forthcoming); and Mark Bradbury, Rebels Without a Cause? An Exploratory Report on the Conflict in Sierra Leone (London: Care, 1995).
29. William Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); David Keen, The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: War and Aid in Sierra Leone (London: James Currey, 1998, forthcoming); and Mark Bradbury, Rebels Without a Cause? An Exploratory Report on the Conflict in Sierra Leone (London: Care, 1995).
30. See, for example, Von Jutta Lietsch, 'Bruch mit Pol Pot: In Kambodscha Wächst die Hoffnung auf Frieden', Die Zeit, 13 September 1996, p. 7.
31. On the close links between the Thai military and the Khmer Rouge in the border area, see William Shawcross, Cambodia 's New Deal (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), pp. 47-49. Shawcross cites a UN report in 1993 according to which 'the Thai military [for the past twelve years] have exerted a mafia-like control....The border zone has been a goldmine for them' (p. 48). While the inability of the civilian government in Bangkok to control the activities of the Thai military along the border is well-documented, reports suggest that senior members of the Government in Bangkok have also benefited from illegal logging activity. See 'Thai Prime Minister (Chavalit Yongchaiyudh) Denies Role in Cambodia Logging Row', Reuters World Service, 20 January 1997. For a detailed investigation into illegal logging activity, the close ties between the Khmer Rouge and the Thai military, and the collusion between the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian government, see Global Witness, Forests, Famine and War: The Key to Cambodia's Future, A Briefing Document by Global Witness (London: Global Witness, 9 March 1995).
32. On the close links between the Thai military and the Khmer Rouge in the border area, see William Shawcross, Cambodia 's New Deal (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), pp. 47-49. Shawcross cites a UN report in 1993 according to which 'the Thai military [for the past twelve years] have exerted a mafia-like control....The border zone has been a goldmine for them' (p. 48). While the inability of the civilian government in Bangkok to control the activities of the Thai military along the border is well-documented, reports suggest that senior members of the Government in Bangkok have also benefited from illegal logging activity. See 'Thai Prime Minister (Chavalit Yongchaiyudh) Denies Role in Cambodia Logging Row', Reuters World Service, 20 January 1997. For a detailed investigation into illegal logging activity, the close ties between the Khmer Rouge and the Thai military, and the collusion between the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian government, see Global Witness, Forests, Famine and War: The Key to Cambodia's Future, A Briefing Document by Global Witness (London: Global Witness, 9 March 1995).
33. On the close links between the Thai military and the Khmer Rouge in the border area, see William Shawcross, Cambodia 's New Deal (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), pp. 47-49. Shawcross cites a UN report in 1993 according to which 'the Thai military [for the past twelve years] have exerted a mafia-like control....The border zone has been a goldmine for them' (p. 48). While the inability of the civilian government in Bangkok to control the activities of the Thai military along the border is well-documented, reports suggest that senior members of the Government in Bangkok have also benefited from illegal logging activity. See 'Thai Prime Minister (Chavalit Yongchaiyudh) Denies Role in Cambodia Logging Row', Reuters World Service, 20 January 1997. For a detailed investigation into illegal logging activity, the close ties between the Khmer Rouge and the Thai military, and the collusion between the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian government, see Global Witness, Forests, Famine and War: The Key to Cambodia's Future, A Briefing Document by Global Witness (London: Global Witness, 9 March 1995).
34. 'Cambodia's Wood-fired War', The Economist, 16 June 1995, p. 35. The estimate is based on the research done by Global Witness. Fore more detail, see Global Witness, 'Thai-Khmer Rouge Links, and the Illegal Trade in Cambodia's Timber', Evidence Collected January-May 1995 (London: Global Witness, 1995).
35. 'Cambodia's Wood-fired War', The Economist, 16 June 1995, p. 35. The estimate is based on the research done by Global Witness. Fore more detail, see Global Witness, 'Thai-Khmer Rouge Links, and the Illegal Trade in Cambodia's Timber', Evidence Collected January-May 1995 (London: Global Witness, 1995).
36. Shawcross, op. cit., in note 22, p. 48. In spite of the decision to close the border in December 1996, well-founded concerns have been expressed about the continued commitment of the Thai military not to engage in any further clandestine logging activity. See, for example, Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Clearance of Thailand in Logging Dispute is Questioned by Some', The Washington Post, 16 February 1997, p. 32. See also Global Witness, 'Logging Anarchy Continues Despite Border Closure', Press Release, 3 March 1997 (London: Global Witness, 1997).
37. Shawcross, op. cit., in note 22, p. 48. In spite of the decision to close the border in December 1996, well-founded concerns have been expressed about the continued commitment of the Thai military not to engage in any further clandestine logging activity. See, for example, Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Clearance of Thailand in Logging Dispute is Questioned by Some', The Washington Post, 16 February 1997, p. 32. See also Global Witness, 'Logging Anarchy Continues Despite Border Closure', Press Release, 3 March 1997 (London: Global Witness, 1997).
38. Shawcross, op. cit., in note 22, p. 48. In spite of the decision to close the border in December 1996, well-founded concerns have been expressed about the continued commitment of the Thai military not to engage in any further clandestine logging activity. See, for example, Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Clearance of Thailand in Logging Dispute is Questioned by Some', The Washington Post, 16 February 1997, p. 32. See also Global Witness, 'Logging Anarchy Continues Despite Border Closure', Press Release, 3 March 1997 (London: Global Witness, 1997).
39. Environmental groups, such as Global Witness, have estimated that about half of the hardwood forest in Cambodia has disappeared over the last 20 years as a result of large-scale and indiscriminate logging. The logging activity continues and most of it is done illegally. In 1995, the legal limit for how much timber may be cut down annually was 300,000 cubic metres. By contrast, illegal logging has been estimated about 1.7 million cubic metres per year. See Khatharya Um, 'Cambodia in 1995: The Year of Transition', Asian Survey (Vol. 36, No. 1, 1995), p. 78. For estimates of the continuing discrepancy between illegally generated and legitimate timber revenues, see also Mark Lioi, 'Cambodia: Plenty of Logging, Few Revenues', Cambodia Today, 20 June 1997.
40. Environmental groups, such as Global Witness, have estimated that about half of the hardwood forest in Cambodia has disappeared over the last 20 years as a result of large-scale and indiscriminate logging. The logging activity continues and most of it is done illegally. In 1995, the legal limit for how much timber may be cut down annually was 300,000 cubic metres. By contrast, illegal logging has been estimated about 1.7 million cubic metres per year. See Khatharya Um, 'Cambodia in 1995: The Year of Transition', Asian Survey (Vol. 36, No. 1, 1995), p. 78. For estimates of the continuing discrepancy between illegally generated and legitimate timber revenues, see also Mark Lioi, 'Cambodia: Plenty of Logging, Few Revenues', Cambodia Today, 20 June 1997.
41. Ted Bardacke, 'IMF Warning to Cambodia', Financial Times, 24 October 1996, p. 6.
42. 'Cambodia: Logging On', The Economist, US Edition, 22 February 1997, pp. 74-75. This deal, which came to be known as the 'million metre' deal, was a source of particular concern to the IMF, since 'there was no provision for the resulting revenue in the national budget'. See Brian Mertens, 'Activists at Loggerheads With Timber Traders', Asian Business (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1997), pp. 10-11. Global Witness has played a major role in revealing the degree of illegal logging in Cambodia since 1993, including the 'million metre' deal. The group has painstakingly collected evidence that leaves no doubt about the degree of collusion between various parties. See Global Witness, op. cit., in note 22. See also Global Witness, Corruption, War and Forest Policy: The Unsustainable Exploitation of Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, February 1996); Global Witness, A Tug of War: The Struggle to Protect Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, March 1997); and Global Witness, Cambodia, Where Money Grows on Trees: Continuing Abuses of Cambodia's Forest Policy, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, October 1996).
43. 'Cambodia: Logging On', The Economist, US Edition, 22 February 1997, pp. 74-75. This deal, which came to be known as the 'million metre' deal, was a source of particular concern to the IMF, since 'there was no provision for the resulting revenue in the national budget'. See Brian Mertens, 'Activists at Loggerheads With Timber Traders', Asian Business (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1997), pp. 10-11. Global Witness has played a major role in revealing the degree of illegal logging in Cambodia since 1993, including the 'million metre' deal. The group has painstakingly collected evidence that leaves no doubt about the degree of collusion between various parties. See Global Witness, op. cit., in note 22. See also Global Witness, Corruption, War and Forest Policy: The Unsustainable Exploitation of Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, February 1996); Global Witness, A Tug of War: The Struggle to Protect Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, March 1997); and Global Witness, Cambodia, Where Money Grows on Trees: Continuing Abuses of Cambodia's Forest Policy, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, October 1996).
44. 'Cambodia: Logging On', The Economist, US Edition, 22 February 1997, pp. 74-75. This deal, which came to be known as the 'million metre' deal, was a source of particular concern to the IMF, since 'there was no provision for the resulting revenue in the national budget'. See Brian Mertens, 'Activists at Loggerheads With Timber Traders', Asian Business (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1997), pp. 10-11. Global Witness has played a major role in revealing the degree of illegal logging in Cambodia since 1993, including the 'million metre' deal. The group has painstakingly collected evidence that leaves no doubt about the degree of collusion between various parties. See Global Witness, op. cit., in note 22. See also Global Witness, Corruption, War and Forest Policy: The Unsustainable Exploitation of Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, February 1996); Global Witness, A Tug of War: The Struggle to Protect Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, March 1997); and Global Witness, Cambodia, Where Money Grows on Trees: Continuing Abuses of Cambodia's Forest Policy, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, October 1996).
45. 'Cambodia: Logging On', The Economist, US Edition, 22 February 1997, pp. 74-75. This deal, which came to be known as the 'million metre' deal, was a source of particular concern to the IMF, since 'there was no provision for the resulting revenue in the national budget'. See Brian Mertens, 'Activists at Loggerheads With Timber Traders', Asian Business (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1997), pp. 10-11. Global Witness has played a major role in revealing the degree of illegal logging in Cambodia since 1993, including the 'million metre' deal. The group has painstakingly collected evidence that leaves no doubt about the degree of collusion between various parties. See Global Witness, op. cit., in note 22. See also Global Witness, Corruption, War and Forest Policy: The Unsustainable Exploitation of Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, February 1996); Global Witness, A Tug of War: The Struggle to Protect Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, March 1997); and Global Witness, Cambodia, Where Money Grows on Trees: Continuing Abuses of Cambodia's Forest Policy, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, October 1996).
46. 'Cambodia: Logging On', The Economist, US Edition, 22 February 1997, pp. 74-75. This deal, which came to be known as the 'million metre' deal, was a source of particular concern to the IMF, since 'there was no provision for the resulting revenue in the national budget'. See Brian Mertens, 'Activists at Loggerheads With Timber Traders', Asian Business (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1997), pp. 10-11. Global Witness has played a major role in revealing the degree of illegal logging in Cambodia since 1993, including the 'million metre' deal. The group has painstakingly collected evidence that leaves no doubt about the degree of collusion between various parties. See Global Witness, op. cit., in note 22. See also Global Witness, Corruption, War and Forest Policy: The Unsustainable Exploitation of Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, February 1996); Global Witness, A Tug of War: The Struggle to Protect Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, March 1997); and Global Witness, Cambodia, Where Money Grows on Trees: Continuing Abuses of Cambodia's Forest Policy, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, October 1996).
47. 'Cambodia: Logging On', The Economist, US Edition, 22 February 1997, pp. 74-75. This deal, which came to be known as the 'million metre' deal, was a source of particular concern to the IMF, since 'there was no provision for the resulting revenue in the national budget'. See Brian Mertens, 'Activists at Loggerheads With Timber Traders', Asian Business (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1997), pp. 10-11. Global Witness has played a major role in revealing the degree of illegal logging in Cambodia since 1993, including the 'million metre' deal. The group has painstakingly collected evidence that leaves no doubt about the degree of collusion between various parties. See Global Witness, op. cit., in note 22. See also Global Witness, Corruption, War and Forest Policy: The Unsustainable Exploitation of Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, February 1996); Global Witness, A Tug of War: The Struggle to Protect Cambodia's Forests, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, March 1997); and Global Witness, Cambodia, Where Money Grows on Trees: Continuing Abuses of Cambodia's Forest Policy, Briefing Document (London: Global Witness, October 1996).
48. The Economist, op. cit., in note 23, p. 35. Global Witness has since documented the existence of a secret 'parallel military budget' generated from illegal involvement by the armed forces in logging activity. See Global Witness, A Tug of War, op. cit., in note 27, p. 4.
49. The Economist, op. cit., in note 23, p. 35. Global Witness has since documented the existence of a secret 'parallel military budget' generated from illegal involvement by the armed forces in logging activity. See Global Witness, A Tug of War, op. cit., in note 27, p. 4.
50. The Economist, op. cit., in note 23.
51. See Um, op. cit., in note 25, p. 82.
52. Global Witness, op. cit., in note 22, p. 12.
53. William Shawcross, 'Tragedy in Cambodia', The New York Review of Books, 14 November 1996, pp. 43-44.
54. Anonymous Phnom Penh businessman, quoted in Victor Mallet, 'Cambodia Let Down by Democracy', Financial Times. 9-10 July 1994, p. 4.
55. Ung Bun Ang, quoted in Michael W. Doyle, 'Peacebuilding in Cambodia', IPA Policy Briefing Series (New York, NY: International Peace Academy, December 1996), p. 7. See also Andrew Nette, 'Profits Lie Behind Change of Attitude to Khmer Rouge', South China Morning Post, 18 September 1996, p. 14.
56. Ung Bun Ang, quoted in Michael W. Doyle, 'Peacebuilding in Cambodia', IPA Policy Briefing Series (New York, NY: International Peace Academy, December 1996), p. 7. See also Andrew Nette, 'Profits Lie Behind Change of Attitude to Khmer Rouge', South China Morning Post, 18 September 1996, p. 14.
57. Pierre P. Lizée, 'Cambodia in 1996: Of Tigers, Crocodiles and Doves', Asian Survey (Vol. 37, No. 1, 1997), pp. 67-68. Assessing the significance of Ieng Sary's defection, Global Witness concluded, in October 1996, that both the Cambodian and Thai governments, as well as Thai logging companies, 'almost certainly consider "liberalisation" of areas under Ieng Sary's control as an excuse to hasten timber exports', and that Ieng Sary himself probably 'considered this factor when he split from Pol Pot, as the 135,000m of "stockpiled" timber under his control is worth upwards of US$47.5 million'. See Global Witness, Cambodia, Where Money Grows on Trees, op. cit., in note 27, p. 6.
58. Pierre P. Lizée, 'Cambodia in 1996: Of Tigers, Crocodiles and Doves', Asian Survey (Vol. 37, No. 1, 1997), pp. 67-68. Assessing the significance of Ieng Sary's defection, Global Witness concluded, in October 1996, that both the Cambodian and Thai governments, as well as Thai logging companies, 'almost certainly consider "liberalisation" of areas under Ieng Sary's control as an excuse to hasten timber exports', and that Ieng Sary himself probably 'considered this factor when he split from Pol Pot, as the 135,000m of "stockpiled" timber under his control is worth upwards of US$47.5 million'. See Global Witness, Cambodia, Where Money Grows on Trees, op. cit., in note 27, p. 6.
59. Keen, op. cit., in note 11, and Ataul Karim, Mark Duffield, et al., OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan): A Review (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, July 1996).
60. Keen, op. cit., in note 11, and Ataul Karim, Mark Duffield, et al., OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan): A Review (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, July 1996).
61. Ben Barber, 'Feeding Refugees, or War? The Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid', Foreign Affairs (Vol. 76, No. 4, 1997), p. 8. See also the excellent discussions in François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin (ed.), Économie des Guerres Civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996).
62. Ben Barber, 'Feeding Refugees, or War? The Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid', Foreign Affairs (Vol. 76, No. 4, 1997), p. 8. See also the excellent discussions in François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin (ed.), Économie des Guerres Civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996).
63. Countries in which comprehensive and partial disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes have been launched include Namibia, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, Bosnia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Cambodia. For a fuller discussion see, Mats Berdal, 'Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars', Adelphi Paper 303, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1996).
64. The relationship between civilian and military elites is often very close, with both groups often sharing a common interest in preserving a socio-economic order (and political economy of conflict) that brings them major economic benefits.
65. For an excellent study of developments since 1994, see Keith Somerville, 'Angola - Groping Towards Peace or Slipping Back Towards War?', in William Gutteridge and J.E. Spence (eds.), Violence in Southern Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 11-39.
66. Alex Vines, 'Angola and Mozambique: The Aftermath of Conflict', Conflict Studies 280 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995), pp. 13-14.
67. Anonymous businessman, quoted in ibid., p. 14. Similarly, during the civil war in Sierra Leone, unarmed civilians living in coffee-, cocoa-, and diamond-rich districts have been targeted by both rebel and government forces, none of which have seemed keen to end the fighting, let alone to disarm and demobilise its fighters. Keen, op. cit., in note 16, pp. 13-14.
68. Anonymous businessman, quoted in ibid., p. 14. Similarly, during the civil war in Sierra Leone, unarmed civilians living in coffee-, cocoa-, and diamond-rich districts have been targeted by both rebel and government forces, none of which have seemed keen to end the fighting, let alone to disarm and demobilise its fighters. Keen, op. cit., in note 16, pp. 13-14.
69. 'Land Conflict Looms in El Salvador', International Peacekeeping News (Vol. 1, No. 10, 1995), p. 19.
70. United Nations, 'Report of the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups in El Salvador', Annex to S/1994/989,22 October 1994 (New York, NY: United Nations, 1994), p. 15.
71. Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, 'Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador', Global Governance (Vol. 1, No. 2 1995), pp. 195-96.
72. Ibid., p. 195. The point is also made in the excellent comparative study of the UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. The peace process was 'never intended to directly redress El Salvador's deep social inequities - for example, patterns of land ownership'. Michael Doyle, Ian Johnston, and Robert Orr, 'Introduction', in Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr (eds.), Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 15. See also, Edelberto Torres-Rivas, 'Insurrection and Civil War in El Salvador', in Doyle, Johnston, and Orr (eds.), op. cit., in note 46, pp. 209-226.
73. Ibid., p. 195. The point is also made in the excellent comparative study of the UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. The peace process was 'never intended to directly redress El Salvador's deep social inequities - for example, patterns of land ownership'. Michael Doyle, Ian Johnston, and Robert Orr, 'Introduction', in Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr (eds.), Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 15. See also, Edelberto Torres-Rivas, 'Insurrection and Civil War in El Salvador', in Doyle, Johnston, and Orr (eds.), op. cit., in note 46, pp. 209-226.
74. Ibid., p. 195. The point is also made in the excellent comparative study of the UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. The peace process was 'never intended to directly redress El Salvador's deep social inequities - for example, patterns of land ownership'. Michael Doyle, Ian Johnston, and Robert Orr, 'Introduction', in Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr (eds.), Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 15. See also, Edelberto Torres-Rivas, 'Insurrection and Civil War in El Salvador', in Doyle, Johnston, and Orr (eds.), op. cit., in note 46, pp. 209-226.
75. 'Guatemala: Military & Politics', Caribbean and Central America Report, RC-97-06, 15 July 1997, p. 2.
76. Larry Rohter, 'Guatemalans Negotiating Future Role of Military', New York Times, 27 August 1995, p. 6.
77. See Caribbean and Central America Report, op. cit., in note 47, p. 2.
78. Gwi-yeop Son (United Nations Development Program [UNDP] Somalia) 'Donor Response to Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Horn of Africa', Seminar Report, 11 September 1995 (Bonn: International Resource Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa (IRG) and the Bonn International Centre for Conversion [BICC], 1995), p. 3.
79. Jonathan Miller, 'Criminal Gun Rules 'Free' Cambodia', Financial Times, 1 November 1994, p. 5.
80. Ibid.
81. Keen, op. cit., in note 16, p. 13. See also Chris McGreal, 'Liberia Pays High Price for Peace', The Guardian, 13 February 1995, p. 9.
82. Keen, op. cit., in note 16, p. 13. See also Chris McGreal, 'Liberia Pays High Price for Peace', The Guardian, 13 February 1995, p. 9.
83. 'Angola's Old Foes', The New York Times, 16 December 1991, quoted in The World Bank, Demobilisation and Reintegration Africa of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Case Studies, Report No. IDP-130, Africa Regional Series (Washington, DC: The World Bank, October 1993), p. 24.
84. 'Angola's Old Foes', The New York Times, 16 December 1991, quoted in The World Bank, Demobilisation and Reintegration Africa of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Case Studies, Report No. IDP-130, Africa Regional Series (Washington, DC: The World Bank, October 1993), p. 24.
85. Ibid.
86. Nicole Ball with Tammy Halevy, Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community, Policy Essay No. 18 (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
87. See Human Rights Watch, The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations, Report by Human Rights Watch (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, June 1993).
88. In terms of outside involvement, both donors and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have been reluctant to finance security-sector reform. In part, this stems from the lack of a proper institutional counterpart with which to plan and negotiate reform. Guerrilla movements pose a special problem in this respect. At the same time, governments receiving outside assistance have themselves often resisted attempts to restructure the security sector, ostensibly on the grounds that it infringes on their sovereign authority in a key area of government. In reality, however, such reform also threatens to undermine their traditional levers of power and influence in society.
89. This is especially true of intelligence organs, whether civilian or military. On the attempts to legislate and define the future role of the secret services in post-Apartheid South Africa, see Kevin A. O'Brien, 'South Africa's New Intelligence Environment', in Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt (eds.), About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence (Johannesburg: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995), pp. 170-91.
90. 'Crackdown on Military Crime', Latin America Monitor (Vol. 11, No. 8, 1994), p. 9.
91. Ibid.
92. United Nations, 'Report of the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups in El Salvador', Annex to S/1994/989, 22 October 1994 (New York, NY: United Nations, 1994), p. 56, paragraph 10.
93. Ibid.
94. See Asia Watch, Political Control, Human Rights, and the UN Mission in Cambodia, Report by Asia Watch, a Division of Human Rights Watch, (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, September 1992). For similar concerns about the persistence of old power structures in El Salvador, see Americas Watch, Peace and Human Rights: Successes and Shortcomings of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), Report by Americas Watch, a Division of Human Rights Watch (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, September 1992).
95. See Asia Watch, Political Control, Human Rights, and the UN Mission in Cambodia, Report by Asia Watch, a Division of Human Rights Watch, (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, September 1992). For similar concerns about the persistence of old power structures in El Salvador, see Americas Watch, Peace and Human Rights: Successes and Shortcomings of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), Report by Americas Watch, a Division of Human Rights Watch (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, September 1992).
96. Nick Cummings-Bruce, 'Drugs Invade Cambodia's Wild Frontier', The Guardian, 27 March 1996, p. 14. According to this report, the Khmer Rouge has also been selling weapons in exchange for heroin to rebels in Northeast Burma, illustrating how economic motives can also fuel conflict across a region.
97. The Economist, op. cit., in note 23, p. 35.
98. Robert D'A Henderson, 'South African Intelligence under Dc Klerk', in Cilliers and Reichardt (eds.), op. cit., in note 58, p. 159. Henderson is sceptical about the ability of the legitimate authorities to fully 'isolate and control continuing "Third Force" violence'. Ibid., p. 165.
99. Robert D'A Henderson, 'South African Intelligence under Dc Klerk', in Cilliers and Reichardt (eds.), op. cit., in note 58, p. 159. Henderson is sceptical about the ability of the legitimate authorities to fully 'isolate and control continuing "Third Force" violence'. Ibid., p. 165.
100. On 'Third Force' activities in the Angolan conflict, see 'The Pretoria Axis', Africa Confidential (Vol. 34, No. 3, 5 February 1993), p. 4, and 'Angola: The Toothless Watchdogs', Africa Confidential (Vol. 34, No. 5, 5 March 1993), pp. 2-3.
101. On 'Third Force' activities in the Angolan conflict, see 'The Pretoria Axis', Africa Confidential (Vol. 34, No. 3, 5 February 1993), p. 4, and 'Angola: The Toothless Watchdogs', Africa Confidential (Vol. 34, No. 5, 5 March 1993), pp. 2-3.
102. For an elaboration of some of these suggestions, see Ball, op. cit., in note 56, and Berdal, op. cit., in note 38.
103. For an elaboration of some of these suggestions, see Ball, op. cit., in note 56, and Berdal, op. cit., in note 38.
104. For lessons drawn by Amnesty International, see Amnesty International, 'Sierra Leone: Towards a Future Founded on Human Rights', Amnesty International Report 25 September 1996 (London: Amnesty International, 1996), p. 6.
105. Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. xiv.