Uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium in infinite-time affine-quadratic differential games

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 1996, Pages 751-765

  Lockwood, Ben ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Affine quadratic dynamic games; Feedback nash equilibrium; Markov perfect equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030147120     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1889(95)00873-X     Document Type: Article

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