The promise of monterrey: Meeting the millennium development goals

World Policy Journal

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 51-66

  Sharma, Shalendra D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 9944263322     PISSN: 07402775     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/07402775-2004-4007     Document Type: Review

References (25)

1. See William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).
2. Elsa Artadi and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "The Economic Tragedy of the 20th Century: Growth in Africa," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9865, 2003.
3. David Dollar and Aart Kraay, "Growth Is Good for the Poor," Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 7, no. 3 (2002), pp. 195-225.
4. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
5. John Kay, Culture and Prosperity: The Truth about Markets - Why Some Nations Are Rich But Most Remain Poor (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), p. 10.
6. World Bank, Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
7. See, for example, Jagdish Baghwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
8. Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan Kose, "Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries - Some Empirical Evidence," research paper (Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2003).
9. Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy and Its Discontents (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
10. Robert Barro, "Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries," Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 5 (March 2000), p. 209.
11. William Easterly and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112 (November 1997), pp. 1203-50.
12. The advocates of "new institutional economics" recognize that a good market economy requires not only "getting prices right" but also "getting property rights right" and "getting institutions right." This is because property rights and institutions generally set the rules that affect the behavior of economic agents. Institutions can be both formal and informal. Formal institutions include legal regulations and laws, while informal institutions are not legally codified. These include the norms, values, and "social capital" that are often embedded in societies. Institutions that support market transactions perform three functions: smoothing information asymmetries (that is, ensuring that all market participants have access to reliable information) and defining and enforcing property rights and contracts and regulating competition.
13. Mancur Olson, "Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich, and Others Poor," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 10, no. 2 (1996), p. 22.
14. Illiberal democracies deliberately combine the rhetoric of liberal democracy with illiberal rule. Thus, even when competitive multiparty elections are held - thereby qualifying the country as an "electoral" democracy - the day-to-day practices of the state are marked by overt coercion and abuse. For example, political freedoms and civil rights may be formally recognized, but they are imperfectly observed in practice.
15. Ravi Kanbur and Lyn Squire, "The Evolution of Thinking About Poverty: Exploring the Interactions," in Gerald M. Meier and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Frontiers of Development Economics: The Future in Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 193.
16. Shahua Chen and Yan Wang, "China's Growth and Poverty Reduction: Trends between 1900 and 1999," Policy Research Working Paper No. 2651 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001).
17. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
18. In September 2003, trade ministers gathered in Cancun, Mexico, for a WTO ministerial meeting to review progress and negotiate the next stages in the Doha Agenda. The Cancun Ministerial Conference was the Fifth Ministerial Conference to be held since the WTO was created on January 1, 1995. The ministerial conference is the organization's highest level decision-making body. It meets at least once every two years as required by the WTO'S charter. However, the WTO member countries were not able to agree on key issues such as agriculture, and the meeting ended without agreement.
19. Kevin Cleaver, "Rural Investment, Key to India's Growth," 2004, at http://web.worldbank.org/ wbsite/external/news/o.
20. Nancy Birdsall and Brian Deese, "Hard Currency," Washington Monthly, March 2004, pp. 1-2.
21. Nicholas Stern, A Strategy for Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002).
22. President Bush's goal to increase U.S. foreign aid to poor nations by $5 billion per year over current assistance levels is by far the largest proposed increase in U.S. foreign aid in several decades. MCA funds would be provided to developing countries as grants, not as traditional U.S. managed projects, and would be used to help build local governance capacity and project ownership.
23. Birdsall and Deese, "Hard Currency," p. 2.
24. The first option is to extend the "sunset clause" to give countries more time to qualify for the program. The second is to "grandfather" the 11 countries into the program. Under this option no new countries would be eligible for the HIPC Initiative, but when the 11 already identified eventually meet the entry criteria they would be allowed access to debt relief. The final option is to enforce the entry deadline as scheduled and consider alternative approaches to deal with the debt overhang in countries that would not have qualified for relief under the HIPC Initiative by then.
25. Global Monitoring Report 2004: Policies und Actions for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Related Outcomes, background paper (Washington, DC: World Bank, April 16, 2004).