Information power: Strategy, geopolitics, and the fifth dimension

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 2-3, 1999, Pages 137-157

  Lonsdale, David J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HULL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 9744251732     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402399908437758     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. Walter B. Wriston, 'Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy', Foreign Affairs 76/5 (Sept./Oct. 1997) p. 172 of pp. 172-82.
2. The following works variously include some of these ideas: Martin Libicki, 'The Emerging Primacy of Information', Orbis 40/2 (Spring 1996) pp.261-76; Michael Vlahos, 'The War after Byte City', The Washington Quarterly 20/2 (Spring 1997) pp.39-72; Jessica T. Mathews, 'Power Shift', Foreign Affairs 76/1 (Jan./Feb. 1997) pp.50-66.
3. The following works variously include some of these ideas: Martin Libicki, 'The Emerging Primacy of Information', Orbis 40/2 (Spring 1996) pp.261-76; Michael Vlahos, 'The War after Byte City', The Washington Quarterly 20/2 (Spring 1997) pp.39-72; Jessica T. Mathews, 'Power Shift', Foreign Affairs 76/1 (Jan./Feb. 1997) pp.50-66.
4. The following works variously include some of these ideas: Martin Libicki, 'The Emerging Primacy of Information', Orbis 40/2 (Spring 1996) pp.261-76; Michael Vlahos, 'The War after Byte City', The Washington Quarterly 20/2 (Spring 1997) pp.39-72; Jessica T. Mathews, 'Power Shift', Foreign Affairs 76/1 (Jan./Feb. 1997) pp.50-66.
5. Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality [1919] (NY: Norton 1962). Ciro Zoppo also notes that geography, technology and power politics are intrinsically related. See Ciro E. Zoppo, 'Classical Geopolitics and Beyond', in idem and Charles Zorgbibe (eds.) On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear (NATO ASI Series, Dordrect: Nijhoff 1985).
6. Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality [1919] (NY: Norton 1962). Ciro Zoppo also notes that geography, technology and power politics are intrinsically related. See Ciro E. Zoppo, 'Classical Geopolitics and Beyond', in idem and Charles Zorgbibe (eds.) On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear (NATO ASI Series, Dordrect: Nijhoff 1985).
7. The Midland Ocean was to comprise a strategic reserve in North America, an aerodrome in Britain, and a beachhead in France. The similarity of this concept to NATO is interesting.
8. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air [1921] (London: Faber 1943).
9. For an exploration into the means-ends relationship, good places to start are, Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: David Campbell 1993), and also Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century (NY: Simon & Schuster 1990).
10. For an exploration into the means-ends relationship, good places to start are, Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: David Campbell 1993), and also Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century (NY: Simon & Schuster 1990).
11. Laurie Brettingham, Royal Air Force Beam Benders No.80 (Signals) Wing 1940-1945 (Leicester: Midland Publishing 1997).
12. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-war: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (London: Little, Brown 1994)..
13. Libicki, 'Emerging Primacy' (note 2) p.274.
14. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age', Foreign Affairs 77/5 (Sept./Oct. 1998) pp.81-94.
15. History reveals a number of cases in which the other dimensions have been expanded or contracted. To take land as an example, cases can be found which show limited examples of both expansion and contraction of this dimension. During the siege of the island city Tyre in 333-332 BC, Alexander the Great constructed a 200-foot wide mole between the coast and the city. This enabled Alexander's land forces to attack the city directly. See Arther Ferrill, The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great (London: Thames & Hudson 1985) pp.204-5. In 1672, the Dutch responded to the French invasion by opening the dikes to flood the land, and thereby hold back the invaders. See Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (London: Pimlico 1991) p.59. These two examples show an expansion and contraction of the land environment respectively. In a less direct sense, the submarine environment could be expanded - in a strategically useful manner - through the development of vessels which can withstand higher hull pressures. This of course is not an expansion of the environment itself, it is rather an expansion of man's exploitation of it. Nevertheless, it is an expansion.
16. History reveals a number of cases in which the other dimensions have been expanded or contracted. To take land as an example, cases can be found which show limited examples of both expansion and contraction of this dimension. During the siege of the island city Tyre in 333-332 BC, Alexander the Great constructed a 200-foot wide mole between the coast and the city. This enabled Alexander's land forces to attack the city directly. See Arther Ferrill, The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great (London: Thames & Hudson 1985) pp.204-5. In 1672, the Dutch responded to the French invasion by opening the dikes to flood the land, and thereby hold back the invaders. See Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (London: Pimlico 1991) p.59. These two examples show an expansion and contraction of the land environment respectively. In a less direct sense, the submarine environment could be expanded - in a strategically useful manner - through the development of vessels which can withstand higher hull pressures. This of course is not an expansion of the environment itself, it is rather an expansion of man's exploitation of it. Nevertheless, it is an expansion.
17. As Georgetown University computer science professor Dorothy Denning notes, 'The problem is that the technology leaps ahead of the security, and that's going to be with us forever'. See John Carlin, 'The Netizen: A Farewell to Arms', Wired 5/5 (May 1997).
18. Libicki, 'Emerging Primacy' (note 2).
19. David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1966) p.165.
20. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands [1983] (London: Pan Books 1997)pp.300-1.
21. See Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes (London: Bantam Books 1995).
22. Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, 2nd ed. (London: Little, Brown 1994) p.419. For a full account of the campaign in Burma, see Slim's excellent account: Field-Marshal the Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Cassell 1956).
23. Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, 2nd ed. (London: Little, Brown 1994) p.419. For a full account of the campaign in Burma, see Slim's excellent account: Field-Marshal the Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Cassell 1956).
24. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (trans, by Samuel B. Griffith) (London: OUP 1971).
25. See Martin C. Libicki, 'Technology and Warfare', in Patrick M. Cronin (ed.) 2015: Power and Progress, http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/books/2015/chap4.html See also Stacey Evers, 'US Navy Seeks Fast Track to Revolution', Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 Nov. 1997, pp.55-9.
26. See Martin C. Libicki, 'Technology and Warfare', in Patrick M. Cronin (ed.) 2015: Power and Progress, http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/books/2015/chap4.html See also Stacey Evers, 'US Navy Seeks Fast Track to Revolution', Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 Nov. 1997, pp.55-9.
27. Douhet (note 5) p.83.
28. Ibid. p.34.
29. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, Green 1919) p.77.
30. Ibid, p.89, and Col. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Future Warfare Series, Vol.3, (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brasseys 1989) p.130. A good analysis regarding the refinement of the command of the sea concept can be found in Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MO: Naval Institute Press 1990) esp. pp.12-13.
31. Ibid, p.89, and Col. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Future Warfare Series, Vol.3, (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brasseys 1989) p.130. A good analysis regarding the refinement of the command of the sea concept can be found in Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MO: Naval Institute Press 1990) esp. pp.12-13.
32. Ibid, p.89, and Col. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Future Warfare Series, Vol.3, (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brasseys 1989) p.130. A good analysis regarding the refinement of the command of the sea concept can be found in Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MO: Naval Institute Press 1990) esp. pp.12-13.
33. A useful distinction between the Global Information Environment (GIE) and the Military Information Environment (MIE) is outlined in FM 100-6: Information Operations. See Col. M.D. Starry and Lt. Col. C.W. Arneson Jr, 'FM 100-6: Information Operations', Military Review 76/6 (Nov./Dec. 1996) pp.3-15.
34. George I. Seffers, 'Army War Game Reveals Power of Commercial Data', Defense News, 22-28 Sept. 1997, p.44. See also Starry and Arneson (note 24).
35. George I. Seffers, 'Army War Game Reveals Power of Commercial Data', Defense News, 22-28 Sept. 1997, p.44. See also Starry and Arneson (note 24).
36. Joseph S. Nye Jr and William A. Owens, 'America's Information Edge', Foreign Affairs 75/2 (March/April 1996) p.24 of pp.20-36.
37. See Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1993) p.439.
38. This last point is not designed to suggest that information was the decisive factor in the conflict. Although it was an important element of the victory, other factors played their part. War is a very complex activity, and to succeed in war requires competence in many areas.
39. Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (NY: Free Press 1992) p.12.
40. This exploitation of sea power by the Tamil separatists has led Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga to announce an upgrade of the Sri Lankan Navy. See 'Sri Lanka says navy will be upgraded to combat Tigers', Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 Nov. 1997, p.5.
41. Chris O'Malley, 'Information Warriors of the 609th: Air Force's 609th Information Warfare Squadron', http://www.infowar.com/mil_c4i/mil_c4i_100397a.html-ssi.
42. See Bill Gertz, 'Pentagon Fortifying Computer Networks to Block Hackers', http://www.washtimes.com/nation/nation/.html. 17 April 1998.
43. For a discussion of counter-insurgency in the information age, see A.J. Baddeley, 'Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the Information Age', paper prepared for the BISA Annual Conference, 15-17 Dec. 1997, Univ. of Leeds. Martin Libicki also discusses the potential of providing allies with information as a means of intervention. See Libicki, 'Emerging Primacy of Information' (note 2) esp. pp.266-8. Post-heroic warfare is discussed in Edward N. Luttwak, 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', Foreign Affairs 75/4 (July/Aug.1996) pp.33-44.
44. For a discussion of counter-insurgency in the information age, see A.J. Baddeley, 'Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the Information Age', paper prepared for the BISA Annual Conference, 15-17 Dec. 1997, Univ. of Leeds. Martin Libicki also discusses the potential of providing allies with information as a means of intervention. See Libicki, 'Emerging Primacy of Information' (note 2) esp. pp.266-8. Post-heroic warfare is discussed in Edward N. Luttwak, 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', Foreign Affairs 75/4 (July/Aug.1996) pp.33-44.
45. For a discussion of counter-insurgency in the information age, see A.J. Baddeley, 'Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the Information Age', paper prepared for the BISA Annual Conference, 15-17 Dec. 1997, Univ. of Leeds. Martin Libicki also discusses the potential of providing allies with information as a means of intervention. See Libicki, 'Emerging Primacy of Information' (note 2) esp. pp.266-8. Post-heroic warfare is discussed in Edward N. Luttwak, 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', Foreign Affairs 75/4 (July/Aug.1996) pp.33-44.
46. Barbara Starr, 'Wargames highlight US vulnerability in space', Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 Oct. 1997, p. 17.
47. Libicki, 'Emerging Primacy' (note 2) p.268.
48. W.J.P. Robins, 'Information Age Operations', RUSI Journal 142/3 (June 1997) p.40 of pp.37-41.
49. Libicki, 'Emerging Primacy' (note 2).
50. In Book 1, Ch.1, Clausewitz states that to force the enemy to do your will, you must: 'either make him literally defenseless or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable'. An acknowledged information dominance is one way to make such a situation probable. Clausewitz (note 6) p.85.
51. See Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security in the Electronic Age, 2nd ed. (NY: Thunder's Mouth Press 1996) esp. Ch.9, 'Chipping: Silicon-Based Malicious Software'.
52. Ryan Henry and C. Edward Peartree, 'Assessing 'Byte City': An Insightful or Misleading Vision?', Washington Quarterly 20/2 (Spring 1997) p.77 of pp.73-8.
53. Keohane and Nye (note 10) p.90.
54. This is a point stressed in Richard Szafranski and Martin C. Libicki, '... Or Go Down in Flame? Toward an Airpower Manifesto for the Twenty-first Century', Airpower Journal 10/3 (Fall 1996) pp.65-77.
55. See Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (NY: Free Press 1989).
56. See Clausewitz (note 6) Book 1, Ch.7.
57. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP 1987).
58. Wriston (note 1) p. 172.
59. See Mathews.
60. Albert Wohlstetter, 'Illusions of Distance', Foreign Affairs 46/2 (Jan. 1968) pp.242-55.
61. Desmond Ball, 'Modern Technology and Geopolitics', in Zoppo and Zorgbibe, On Geopolitics (note 3) p.175.
62. Libicki, 'Emerging Primacy' (note 2) p.261.
63. Ball (note 49) p. 187.
64. See Ashton B. Carter, 'Assessing Command System Vulnerability', and 'Sources of Error and Uncertainty', in Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (eds.) Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington DC: Brookings 1987) pp.555-610, 611-39.
65. Gray, Leverage of Sea Power (note 29) p.4.
66. See Colin S. Gray, 'A Rejoinder by Colin S. Gray', Orbis 40/2 (Spring 1996) pp.274-76.
67. Wohlstetter (note48) p.246.
68. See Keohane and Nye (note 10) pp.88 and 94.