-
1
-
-
9744285657
-
-
note
-
The text of the provisions (and their effective dates) is set forth in the Appendix to this article. Of the twenty-three provisions (some states have adopted more than one), only three expressly address private conduct. See ILL. CONST, art. I, § 17 (concerning employment and housing); LA. CONST, art. I, §12 (addressing public areas, accommodations, and facilities); MONT. CONST, art. II, § 4 (prohibiting discrimination on account of sex by the state or "any person, firm, corporation, or institution"). Although the Illinois provision has been cited in a few cases, see infra note 37 and accompanying text, neither the Louisiana provision nor the Montana provision has been cited in any state case involving sex discrimination. Two lower courts in Pennsylvania have held or implied that private action can be reached by the state equal rights amendment (PA. CONST, art. I, § 28). See Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393, 396 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (stating that "to invoke the provisions of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment we conclude that there is no requirement of state action as arguably found under the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution"), affd by an equally divided court, 563 A.2d 1390 (Pa. 1989); Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 494 A.2d 409, 412 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (stating in dictum that case holding state action to be necessary element for cause of action under Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, "no longer followed with respect to its analysis of the E.R.A.") (citing Murphy v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 422 A.2d 1097 (1980)). Both cases concerned insurance, a highly regulated business, and neither was approved by a majority opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Despite these rulings, it is premature, to state that the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment reaches private conduct generally.
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
84866185969
-
-
See, e.g., CAL. CONST, art. I, § 8 (included in 1879); UTAH CONST, art. IV, § 1 (included in 1896); WYO. CONST, art. 1, § 3 (included in 1890)
-
See, e.g., CAL. CONST, art. I, § 8 (included in 1879); UTAH CONST, art. IV, § 1 (included in 1896); WYO. CONST, art. 1, § 3 (included in 1890).
-
-
-
-
3
-
-
9744234322
-
-
note
-
The ERA provided in its entirety: Sec. 1. Equality of the rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex. Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. Sec. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification. SJ. Res. 8, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1971).
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
9744279659
-
-
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (declining to cast fifth vote to treat sex as suspect classification while ERA was pending before states)
-
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (declining to cast fifth vote to treat sex as suspect classification while ERA was pending before states).
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
9744225006
-
The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law
-
In researching this article, the author has checked every state court citation to each state's equal rights provision, examined virtually every in-state law review reference to that provision, read most of the principal law review articles discussing the Impact of state equal rights amendments, and, where the materials were available, reviewed the constitutional convention (or legislative) debates over the submission of each equal rights provision to the electorate. There are many law review articles that analyze either a particular state equal rights provision or a specific equal rights issue. See, e.g., Paul M. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1977) (analyzing impact of state equal rights amendments on domestic relations law). There are, however, relatively few articles that even attempt a general survey of the cases decided under all of the state provisions. See, e.g., Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984); Dawn-Marie Driscoll & Barbara J. Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1282 (1978); Beth Gammie, Note, State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123; Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, Gender Equality, States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV. 945 (1994); Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115 (1984-85); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell & Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977). Most of these articles are incomplete or out-of-date. The most comprehensive article, an annotation in the American Law Reports, now is almost twenty years old. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979). An excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant caselaw may be found in JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-97 (2d ed. 1996).
-
(1977)
Fam. L.Q.
, vol.11
, pp. 101
-
-
Kurtz, P.M.1
-
6
-
-
9744275888
-
Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments
-
In researching this article, the author has checked every state court citation to each state's equal rights provision, examined virtually every in-state law review reference to that provision, read most of the principal law review articles discussing the Impact of state equal rights amendments, and, where the materials were available, reviewed the constitutional convention (or legislative) debates over the submission of each equal rights provision to the electorate. There are many law review articles that analyze either a particular state equal rights provision or a specific equal rights issue. See, e.g., Paul M. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1977) (analyzing impact of state equal rights amendments on domestic relations law). There are, however, relatively few articles that even attempt a general survey of the cases decided under all of the state provisions. See, e.g., Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984); Dawn-Marie Driscoll & Barbara J. Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1282 (1978); Beth Gammie, Note, State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123; Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, Gender Equality, States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV. 945 (1994); Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115 (1984-85); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell & Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977). Most of these articles are incomplete or out-of-date. The most comprehensive article, an annotation in the American Law Reports, now is almost twenty years old. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979). An excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant caselaw may be found in JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-97 (2d ed. 1996).
-
(1984)
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
, vol.3
, pp. 144
-
-
Avner, J.1
-
7
-
-
9744245187
-
Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments
-
In researching this article, the author has checked every state court citation to each state's equal rights provision, examined virtually every in-state law review reference to that provision, read most of the principal law review articles discussing the Impact of state equal rights amendments, and, where the materials were available, reviewed the constitutional convention (or legislative) debates over the submission of each equal rights provision to the electorate. There are many law review articles that analyze either a particular state equal rights provision or a specific equal rights issue. See, e.g., Paul M. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1977) (analyzing impact of state equal rights amendments on domestic relations law). There are, however, relatively few articles that even attempt a general survey of the cases decided under all of the state provisions. See, e.g., Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984); Dawn-Marie Driscoll & Barbara J. Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1282 (1978); Beth Gammie, Note, State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123; Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, Gender Equality, States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV. 945 (1994); Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115 (1984-85); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell & Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977). Most of these articles are incomplete or out-of-date. The most comprehensive article, an annotation in the American Law Reports, now is almost twenty years old. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979). An excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant caselaw may be found in JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-97 (2d ed. 1996).
-
(1978)
Suffolk U. L. Rev.
, vol.12
, pp. 1282
-
-
Driscoll, D.-M.1
Rouse, B.J.2
-
8
-
-
9744228604
-
State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities
-
Note
-
In researching this article, the author has checked every state court citation to each state's equal rights provision, examined virtually every in-state law review reference to that provision, read most of the principal law review articles discussing the Impact of state equal rights amendments, and, where the materials were available, reviewed the constitutional convention (or legislative) debates over the submission of each equal rights provision to the electorate. There are many law review articles that analyze either a particular state equal rights provision or a specific equal rights issue. See, e.g., Paul M. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1977) (analyzing impact of state equal rights amendments on domestic relations law). There are, however, relatively few articles that even attempt a general survey of the cases decided under all of the state provisions. See, e.g., Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984); Dawn-Marie Driscoll & Barbara J. Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1282 (1978); Beth Gammie, Note, State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123; Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, Gender Equality, States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV. 945 (1994); Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115 (1984-85); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell & Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977). Most of these articles are incomplete or out-of-date. The most comprehensive article, an annotation in the American Law Reports, now is almost twenty years old. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979). An excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant caselaw may be found in JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-97 (2d ed. 1996).
-
(1989)
U. Ill. L. Rev.
, pp. 1123
-
-
Gammie, B.1
-
9
-
-
21344487868
-
Gender Equality, States as Laboratories
-
Note
-
In researching this article, the author has checked every state court citation to each state's equal rights provision, examined virtually every in-state law review reference to that provision, read most of the principal law review articles discussing the Impact of state equal rights amendments, and, where the materials were available, reviewed the constitutional convention (or legislative) debates over the submission of each equal rights provision to the electorate. There are many law review articles that analyze either a particular state equal rights provision or a specific equal rights issue. See, e.g., Paul M. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1977) (analyzing impact of state equal rights amendments on domestic relations law). There are, however, relatively few articles that even attempt a general survey of the cases decided under all of the state provisions. See, e.g., Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984); Dawn-Marie Driscoll & Barbara J. Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1282 (1978); Beth Gammie, Note, State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123; Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, Gender Equality, States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV. 945 (1994); Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115 (1984-85); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell & Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977). Most of these articles are incomplete or out-of-date. The most comprehensive article, an annotation in the American Law Reports, now is almost twenty years old. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979). An excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant caselaw may be found in JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-97 (2d ed. 1996).
-
(1994)
Va. L. Rev.
, vol.80
, pp. 945
-
-
Nunziato, D.C.1
-
10
-
-
9744281091
-
Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks
-
Note
-
In researching this article, the author has checked every state court citation to each state's equal rights provision, examined virtually every in-state law review reference to that provision, read most of the principal law review articles discussing the Impact of state equal rights amendments, and, where the materials were available, reviewed the constitutional convention (or legislative) debates over the submission of each equal rights provision to the electorate. There are many law review articles that analyze either a particular state equal rights provision or a specific equal rights issue. See, e.g., Paul M. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1977) (analyzing impact of state equal rights amendments on domestic relations law). There are, however, relatively few articles that even attempt a general survey of the cases decided under all of the state provisions. See, e.g., Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984); Dawn-Marie Driscoll & Barbara J. Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1282 (1978); Beth Gammie, Note, State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123; Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, Gender Equality, States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV. 945 (1994); Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115 (1984-85); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell & Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977). Most of these articles are incomplete or out-of-date. The most comprehensive article, an annotation in the American Law Reports, now is almost twenty years old. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979). An excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant caselaw may be found in JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-97 (2d ed. 1996).
-
(1984)
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
, vol.13
, pp. 115
-
-
Sherwin, E.A.1
-
11
-
-
9744232859
-
Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions
-
In researching this article, the author has checked every state court citation to each state's equal rights provision, examined virtually every in-state law review reference to that provision, read most of the principal law review articles discussing the Impact of state equal rights amendments, and, where the materials were available, reviewed the constitutional convention (or legislative) debates over the submission of each equal rights provision to the electorate. There are many law review articles that analyze either a particular state equal rights provision or a specific equal rights issue. See, e.g., Paul M. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1977) (analyzing impact of state equal rights amendments on domestic relations law). There are, however, relatively few articles that even attempt a general survey of the cases decided under all of the state provisions. See, e.g., Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984); Dawn-Marie Driscoll & Barbara J. Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1282 (1978); Beth Gammie, Note, State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123; Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, Gender Equality, States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV. 945 (1994); Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115 (1984-85); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell & Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977). Most of these articles are incomplete or out-of-date. The most comprehensive article, an annotation in the American Law Reports, now is almost twenty years old. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979). An excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant caselaw may be found in JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-97 (2d ed. 1996).
-
(1977)
Cal. L. Rev.
, vol.65
, pp. 1086
-
-
Treadwell, L.W.1
Page, N.W.2
-
12
-
-
9744226340
-
Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex
-
Annotation
-
In researching this article, the author has checked every state court citation to each state's equal rights provision, examined virtually every in-state law review reference to that provision, read most of the principal law review articles discussing the Impact of state equal rights amendments, and, where the materials were available, reviewed the constitutional convention (or legislative) debates over the submission of each equal rights provision to the electorate. There are many law review articles that analyze either a particular state equal rights provision or a specific equal rights issue. See, e.g., Paul M. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1977) (analyzing impact of state equal rights amendments on domestic relations law). There are, however, relatively few articles that even attempt a general survey of the cases decided under all of the state provisions. See, e.g., Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984); Dawn-Marie Driscoll & Barbara J. Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1282 (1978); Beth Gammie, Note, State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123; Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, Gender Equality, States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV. 945 (1994); Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115 (1984-85); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell & Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977). Most of these articles are incomplete or out-of-date. The most comprehensive article, an annotation in the American Law Reports, now is almost twenty years old. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979). An excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant caselaw may be found in JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-97 (2d ed. 1996).
-
(1979)
A.L.R.3d
, vol.90
, pp. 158
-
-
Hassman, P.E.1
-
13
-
-
0347823449
-
-
2d ed.
-
In researching this article, the author has checked every state court citation to each state's equal rights provision, examined virtually every in-state law review reference to that provision, read most of the principal law review articles discussing the Impact of state equal rights amendments, and, where the materials were available, reviewed the constitutional convention (or legislative) debates over the submission of each equal rights provision to the electorate. There are many law review articles that analyze either a particular state equal rights provision or a specific equal rights issue. See, e.g., Paul M. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1977) (analyzing impact of state equal rights amendments on domestic relations law). There are, however, relatively few articles that even attempt a general survey of the cases decided under all of the state provisions. See, e.g., Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984); Dawn-Marie Driscoll & Barbara J. Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1282 (1978); Beth Gammie, Note, State ERAs: Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123; Dawn C. Nunziato, Note, Gender Equality, States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV. 945 (1994); Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: Slate Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115 (1984-85); Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell & Nancy Wallace Page, Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977). Most of these articles are incomplete or out-of-date. The most comprehensive article, an annotation in the American Law Reports, now is almost twenty years old. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979). An excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant caselaw may be found in JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-97 (2d ed. 1996).
-
(1996)
State Constitutional Law
, pp. 145-197
-
-
Friesen, J.1
-
14
-
-
9744264824
-
-
Star Printing Co.
-
Both Utah and Wyoming conferred the right to vote upon women a full generation before the Federal Constitution was amended to provide the same right. See UTAH CONST, art. IV, §1 (1896); WYO. CONST, art. 6, § 1 (1890). Although both state constitutions also guaranteed equality of rights for men and women, see UTAH CONST, art. IV, § 1 (1896), WYO. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3, art. 6, § 1 (1890), the focus of the debates in both conventions was on female suffrage. See 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT SALT LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, To ADOPT A CONSTI-TUTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 420-91, 496-601, 679-767 (Star Printing Co. 1898); JOURNAL AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF WYOMING 344-59 (Daily Sun, Book & Job Printing, 1893). There was virtually no debate on either Article 1, Section 2 or Article 1, Section 3 of the Wyoming Constitution. See id. at 718-21, 723-29, 847-48.
-
(1898)
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on the Fourth Day of March, 1895, to Adopt a Consti TUTION for the State of Utah
, pp. 420-491
-
-
-
15
-
-
9744286898
-
-
Daily Sun, Book & Job Printing
-
Both Utah and Wyoming conferred the right to vote upon women a full generation before the Federal Constitution was amended to provide the same right. See UTAH CONST, art. IV, §1 (1896); WYO. CONST, art. 6, § 1 (1890). Although both state constitutions also guaranteed equality of rights for men and women, see UTAH CONST, art. IV, § 1 (1896), WYO. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3, art. 6, § 1 (1890), the focus of the debates in both conventions was on female suffrage. See 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT SALT LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, To ADOPT A CONSTI-TUTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 420-91, 496-601, 679-767 (Star Printing Co. 1898); JOURNAL AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF WYOMING 344-59 (Daily Sun, Book & Job Printing, 1893). There was virtually no debate on either Article 1, Section 2 or Article 1, Section 3 of the Wyoming Constitution. See id. at 718-21, 723-29, 847-48.
-
(1893)
Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming
, pp. 344-359
-
-
-
16
-
-
9744252963
-
-
5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DECEMBER 8,1969 - SEPTEMBER 3,1970, at 3669 (1972) [hereinafter SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION]. Surprisingly, when another delegate asked Ms. Nicholson if she could "give an example of a present [i.e., 1970] law [that] discriminates against one or the other of the sexes, either men or women," she replied that she could not. Id. at 3671. In the more than twenty-five years since the 1970 Illinois Constitution went into effect on July 1,1971, no statute, ordinance, school district policy, or judicial doctrine has been invalidated by an Illinois court on the grounds that it discriminated against women in favor of men. See generally, Paul Benjamin Linton & Ryan S. Joslin, The Illinois Equal Rights Provision at Twenty-Five: Has It Made a Difference?, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 275 (1997).
-
(1972)
Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention December 8,1969 - September 3,1970
, vol.5
, pp. 3669
-
-
-
17
-
-
9744244847
-
The Illinois Equal Rights Provision at Twenty-Five: Has It Made a Difference?
-
5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DECEMBER 8,1969 - SEPTEMBER 3,1970, at 3669 (1972) [hereinafter SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION]. Surprisingly, when another delegate asked Ms. Nicholson if she could "give an example of a present [i.e., 1970] law [that] discriminates against one or the other of the sexes, either men or women," she replied that she could not. Id. at 3671. In the more than twenty-five years since the 1970 Illinois Constitution went into effect on July 1,1971, no statute, ordinance, school district policy, or judicial doctrine has been invalidated by an Illinois court on the grounds that it discriminated against women in favor of men. See generally, Paul Benjamin Linton & Ryan S. Joslin, The Illinois Equal Rights Provision at Twenty-Five: Has It Made a Difference?, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 275 (1997).
-
(1997)
S. Ill. U. L.J.
, vol.21
, pp. 275
-
-
Linton, P.B.1
Joslin, R.S.2
-
18
-
-
9744258695
-
-
note
-
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 7, at 3675. Both Ms. Nicholson and Ms. Leahy overlooked an 1874 decision of the Supreme Court holding that women are "persons," as that term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment, and "citizens" of the United States and of the state in which they reside. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165 (1874).
-
-
-
-
19
-
-
9744227869
-
-
PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY, No. 6, at 2-3 (Aug. 29, 1973)
-
PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY, No. 6, at 2-3 (Aug. 29, 1973).
-
-
-
-
20
-
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9744222752
-
The Declaration of Rights
-
quoting testimony of Elsie J. Allen to Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections on April 6, 1973, in Baton Rouge, LA
-
Louis Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 LOY. L. REV. 9, 17 n.44 (1975) (quoting testimony of Elsie J. Allen to Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections on April 6, 1973, in Baton Rouge, LA).
-
(1975)
Loy. L. Rev.
, vol.21
, Issue.44
, pp. 9
-
-
Jenkins, L.1
-
21
-
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9744275885
-
The New Hampshire Equal Rights Amendment: A Powerful, Yet Rarely Invoked Anti-Discrimination Weapon
-
Mary K. Cabrera & Jared R. Green, The New Hampshire Equal Rights Amendment: A Powerful, Yet Rarely Invoked Anti-Discrimination Weapon, 33 N.H. BAR J. 496, 498 (1992) (quoting JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 151, 153 (1974)).
-
(1992)
N.H. Bar J.
, vol.33
, pp. 496
-
-
Cabrera, M.K.1
Green, J.R.2
-
22
-
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9744256873
-
-
Mary K. Cabrera & Jared R. Green, The New Hampshire Equal Rights Amendment: A Powerful, Yet Rarely Invoked Anti-Discrimination Weapon, 33 N.H. BAR J. 496, 498 (1992) (quoting JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 151, 153 (1974)).
-
(1974)
Journal of Constitutional Convention
, vol.151
, pp. 153
-
-
-
23
-
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9744232065
-
Is the Texas Equal Rights Amendment the Answer?
-
Note
-
Joan Harvill, Note, Is the Texas Equal Rights Amendment the Answer?, 15 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 127 (1974).
-
(1974)
S. Tex. L. Rev.
, vol.15
, pp. 111
-
-
Harvill, J.1
-
24
-
-
9744230550
-
-
Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817, 822 (Md. 1985)
-
Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817, 822 (Md. 1985).
-
-
-
-
25
-
-
9744277359
-
-
note
-
Pennsylvania: In Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, declared unconstitutional a former statute that allowed the payment of temporary alimony, attorney fees, and expenses to the wife in a divorce action, but not to the husband. Id. at 62. The court explained, as it is appropriate for the law where necessary to force the man to provide for the needs of a dependent wife, it must also provide a remedy for the man where circumstances justify an entry of support against the wife. In short, the right of support depends not upon the sex of the petitioner but rather upon need in view of the relative financial circumstances of the parties. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that: [t]he thrust of the Equal Rights Amendment [Article I, Section 27] is to insure equality of rights under the law and to eliminate sex as a basis for distinction. The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no longer a permissible factor in the determination of their legal rights and responsibilities. The law will not impose different benefits or different burdens upon the members of a society based on the fact that they may be man or woman. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851, 855 (Pa. 1974) (striking down discriminatory parole eligibility rules) ("sex may no longer be accepted as an exclusive classifying tool"). Pennsylvania, however, recognizes that real biological differences between the sexes may justify a disparity in treatment. See, e.g., Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare, 502 A.2d 114, 126 (Pa. 1985) (upholding restrictions on public funding of abortion). Washington: In Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975), the Washington Supreme Court held that the state equal rights amendment, Article XXXI, Section 1, was "intended to do more than repeat what was already contained in the otherwise governing constitutional provisions, federal and state, by which discrimination based on sex was permissible under the rational relationship and strict scrutiny tests" and absolutely prohibits discrimination based on sex. Id. at 889. In a footnote, however, the court acknowledged that three possible exceptions to this blanket rule would be "the regulation of cohabitation in sexual activity between unmarried persons; protection of fundamental rights of privacy; and dissimilar treatment on account of a characteristic unique to one's sex." Id. at 890 n.8. In Darrin, the court struck down a high school athletic association rule forbidding female high school students from playing on interscholastic football teams without regard to their individual abilities. Id. at 884; see also National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash. 1983) ("[t]he ERA absolutely prohibits discrimina-tion on the basis of sex and is not subject to even the narrow exceptions permitted under tradi-tional 'strict scrutiny'") (citing Darrin, 540 P.2d at 886); In re Welfare of Hauser, 548 P.2d 333, 337 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (stating Washington Equal Rights Amendment "is an absolute prohibition against discrimination based on sex") (quoting Darrin, 540 P.2d at 889).
-
-
-
-
26
-
-
9744222539
-
-
note
-
California: Although earlier California Supreme Court opinions appeared to adopt an "absolutist" po-sition on sex-based discrimination, see Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 533 (Cal. 1971) (striking down state statute forbidding women from tending bar); see also Matter of Maguire, 57 Cal. 604, 608 (1881) (plurality opinion) ("[t]here are no exceptions in [this] section [what is now art. I, § 8]"), a later opinion of the same court held that "[classifications predicated on gender are deemed suspect in California," Hardy v. Stumpf, 576 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Cal. 1978). In Hardy, the court upheld a requirement that applicants for a local police department be able to scale a smooth, six-foot wall, even though physical agility standards have a disproportionate impact on women. Id. at 1344; see also Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 563 P.2d 849, 855 (Cal. 1977) ("to pass muster under the California equal protection clause, a statutory classification founded upon the suspect category of sex must represent the narrowest and least restrictive means by which the objective can be achieved"). Connecticut: Daly v. DelPonte, 624 A.2d 876, 883 (Conn. 1993) (interpreting Article I, Section 21 of Connecticut Constitution). Hawaii: Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion) ("sex is a 'suspect category' for purposes of equal protection analysis under Article I, Section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution and [a law that discriminates on the basis of sex] is subject to the 'strict scrutiny' test") (remanding case to trial court for evidentiary hearing on issue of whether statutory prohibition of same sex marriages satisfied strict scrutiny standard); see also Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164, 1169 (Haw. 1978) (assuming, but not deciding, that strict scrutiny is applicable standard under Article I, Section 21, of Hawaii Constitution). Illinois: In People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. 1974), the Illinois Supreme Court, after considering the text of Article I, Section 18 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and reviewing the floor debate on Section 18, found "inescapable the conclusion that [Section 18] was intended to supplement and expand the guarantees of the equal protection provision of the [Illinois] Bill of Rights [Article I, Section 2] and requires us to hold that a classification based on sex is a 'suspect classification' which, to be held valid, must withstand 'strict judicial scrutiny.'" Id. at 101 (striking down former provision of Juvenile Court Act that allowed 17-year old males, but not 17-year old females, to be tried as adults for criminal offenses). Although there is a conflict in appellate decisions regarding the reach of Article I, Section 17 of the Illinois Constitution, which prohibits discrimination in employment and housing, compare Thakkar v. Wilson Enter., Inc., 458 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (finding Section 17 prohibits discrimination only in hiring and promotion, and not in firing or demotion), with Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (contra), and although a standard of review has not been articulated clearly, "it is clear that . . . the enumerated characteristics of race, creed, etc. [color, national ancestry and sex], should play no role in the treatment of employees by their employers," Rockford Mem'l Hosp. v. Department of Human Rights, 651 N.E.2d 649, 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (citing Ritzheimer, 527 N.E.2d at 1281), leave to appeal denied, 657 N.E.2d 638 (Ill. 1995). Maryland: Early Maryland cases quite clearly adopted an "absolutist" position, holding that Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights forbids all sex-based discrimination, without exception.
-
-
-
-
27
-
-
9744259446
-
-
State Dep't of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993) (quoting State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Alaska 1983))
-
State Dep't of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993) (quoting State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Alaska 1983)).
-
-
-
-
28
-
-
9744244172
-
-
note
-
Id. An early version of this standard was applied in Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1979). In Plas, the Alaska Supreme Court held that in view of the gender neutrality mandated in Article I, Section 3 of the Alaska State Constitution, a statute which prohibits soliciting or procuring for the purpose of prostitution could not be limited to women. Id. at 967-68. The court struck the language "by a female" from the statute, thereby making it gender neutral. Id. at 968. The court held that in assessing equal protection claims under the Alaska Constitution, it would "consider the purpose of the statute, the legitimacy of that purpose, the means used to accomplish the legislative objective, and 'then determine whether the means chosen substantially further the goals of the enactment.'" Id. (quoting State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978)).
-
-
-
-
29
-
-
9744221805
-
-
note
-
Under the federal standard, a classification based upon sex must be substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Colorado: Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1015 (Colo. 1982) (en bane) ("the State must show that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that it is substantially related to the achievement of those objectives") (interpreting Article II, Section 29 of the Colorado Constitution); see also Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 49 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (stating gender based classification must substantially relate to achieving important government objective); R. McG. v. J.W. 615 P.2d 666, 670 (Colo. 1980) (en bane) (holding discrimination between natural mothers and natural fathers not substantially related to important government interest). But see Civil Rights Comm'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358, 1363 (Colo. 1988) (en bane) (stating in dictum that Article H, Section 29 of the Colorado Constitution "prohibits unequal treatment based solely on circumstances of sex . . . and requires that legislative classifications based exclusively on sexual status receive the closest judicial scrutiny"). Louisiana: Pace v. State, 648 So. 2d 1302, 1305 (La. 1995) ("[w]hen a statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, it is presumed to deny the equal protection of the laws and to be unconstitutional unless the state or other advocate of the classification shows that the classification substantially furthers an important governmental objective") (citing Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1107-08 (La. 1985) (construing Article I, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution). Virginia: In Archer v. Mayes, 194 S.E.2d 707 (Va. 1973), the Virginia Supreme Court upheld statutes permitting women to opt out of jury duty because of their responsibilities in caring for children or disabled persons. Id. at 710. Plaintiffs alleged that "the statutory exemption discriminates against men and in favor of women [in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution] in that men who care for children sixteen years of age or younger or persons having mental or physical impairments are not permitted to claim exemption from jury duty." Id. at 709. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating, "[wjhere a statute is based on a reasonable classification that bears a rational relationship to the objective of the State . . . there is no impermissible discrimination under the Constitution of Virginia." Id. at 711. Ten years after Archer was decided, the Virginia Supreme Court revisited the standard of review. In Schilling v. Bedford City Memorial Hospital, Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983), the court held that the necessaries doctrine, which makes a husband responsible for family necessities, but does not impose such an obligation on the wife, contains a gender-based classification not substantially related to serving important government interests that therefore is unconstitutional. Id. at 907-08. Adopting the federal intermediate standard of review applicable to sex-based discrimination, the court stated that "for a sex-based classification to pass constitutional muster, it must serve an important governmental objective and be substantially related to the achievement of that objective." Id. at 907.
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
9744267378
-
-
note
-
Montana: Although the Montana Supreme Court has recognized that the United States Supreme Court has applied "intermediate scrutiny" to sex-based classifications, see Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Mont. 1986) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), for proposition that classification must be substantially related to important government objective); see also Arneson v. State, 864 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Mont. 1993) (restating intermediate scrutiny test but refusing to apply to age-based classification absent constitutionally based direc-tive), and has fashioned its own "middle-tier" test where specific directives in the Montana Constitution protect interests in education and welfare, see State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees of Sch. Dist. No. 1, 726 P.2d 801, 804-05 (Mont. 1986) (holding educational rights subject to constitutional protection thereby triggering "middle-tier" scrutiny); Deaconess Med. Ctr. of Billings, Inc. v. Department of Soc. & Rehabilitative Serv., 720 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Mont. 1986) (holding abridgement of welfare demands more than rational basis); Butte Community Union, 712 P.2d at 1313-14 (finding Article XII, Section 3(3) of the Montana Constitution mandates greater protection of welfare rights); see also In re Wood, 768 P.2d 1370, 1375 (Mont. 1989) (recognizing that Montana employs a three-tier equal protection analysis), it has not determined yet which level of scrutiny applies to sex-based classifications under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution, see McKamey v. State, 885 P.2d 515, 521 (Mont. 1994) (stating strict scrutiny applies to classifications based on race or national origin); Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 502 (Mont. 1989) (identifying race and national origin as suspect classes); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 744 P.2d 895, 897 (Mont. 1987); Oberg v. City of Billings, 674 P.2d 494, 495 (Mont. 1983) (identifying "wealth, race, nationality and alienage" as "[e]xamples of suspect criteria"). Nevertheless, although rights of persons under the state equal protection clause "may be greater than rights founded on the federal [equal protection] clause," Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 500 (Mont. 1985), the Montana Supreme Court "has consistently followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the equal protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions," In re Montana Pac. Oil & Gas Co., 614 P.2d 1045,1048 (Mont. 1980); see also In re C.H., 683 P.2d 931,938 (Mont. 1984) ("[t]he equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions are similar and provide generally equivalent but independent protec-tions") (citing Emery v. State, 580 P.2d 445, 449 (Mont. 1978)). This may suggest that the Montana Supreme Court will apply the federal intermediate scrutiny standard to sex-based classifications challenged under the Montana Equal Rights Amendment. New Mexico: Without discussing the possible impact of Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitu-tion on its analysis, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that "[classifications based on gender" trigger an intermediate or a heightened standard of review under which the State must "prove that the classification is substantially related to an important governmental interest." Marrujo v. New Mexico Highway Transp. Dep't, 887 P.2d 747, 751 (N.M. 1994) (citation omitted). Utah: Although an early decision of the Utah Supreme Court applied the rational-basis standard in interpreting Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, see Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Utah 1974) (upholding statute establishing different ages of majority for men and women), a more recent decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, observing that the Utah Supreme Court has not determined the standard of review yet, stated that the state standard is "at least as stringent as the [federal] equal protection intermediate review for gender discrimination," Estate of Scheller v. Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70, 76 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (preventing fathers from inheriting from illegitimate children, unless they have openly treated the children as their own, does not violate state or federal constitution). Wyoming: The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized the various equal protection standards that have been employed by the United States Supreme Court, but has not determined which standard applies to sex-based classifications under Article I, Sections 2 and 3, and Article VI, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution. See Johnson v. State Hearing Exam'rs Office, 838 P.2d 158,164-67 (Wyo. 1992) (discussing various standards).
-
-
-
-
31
-
-
9744257949
-
-
note
-
See People v. Barger, 550 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Colo. 1976) (holding rape statute passes constitutional muster); People v. Green, 514 P.2d 769, 771 (Colo. 1973) (holding rape statute does not violate equal protection as there is no specific gender classification); State v. Rivera, 612 P.2d 526, 529 (Haw. 1980) (stating rape statute does not violate equal protection where there is no classification based solely on gender); People v. Medrano, 321 N.E.2d 97,98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (finding compelling reason for gender classification in rape statute); State v. Fletcher, 341 So. 2d 340, 348 (La. 1976) (finding gender classification does not constitute invidious discrimination against men); Brooks v. State, 330 A.2d 670, 673 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (stating limitation of culpability to males constitutes a rational classification related to objective of statute); State v. Craig, 545 P.2d 649, 653 (Mont. 1976) (finding vast majority of rapes committed by men); Finley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (finding several states have rejected equal protection claims); State v. Young, 523 P.2d 946, 948 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (finding no authority supporting equal protection claim).
-
-
-
-
32
-
-
9744263904
-
-
note
-
See Rivera, 612 P.2d at 530 (finding statute based on physiological characteristics unique to males); Medrano, 321 N.E.2d at 98 (finding rape statute constitutional due to differing impact on male and female victims) (citing State v. Kelly, 526 P.2d 720, 723 (Ariz. 1974) (en banc)); Fletcher, 341 So. 2d at 348 (stating classification based on gender is reasonable because rape of females is social problem); Brooks, 330 A.2d at 673 (stating protection of females from rape is legitimate and essential legislative objective that justifies classification based on sex), cited with approval in Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817,822 n.3 (Md. 1985); Craig, 545 P.2d at 653 (finding vast majority of rapes committed by men); Finley, 527 S.W.2d at 556 (finding state has legitimate interest in preventing unwanted pregnancies and physical injury to women).
-
-
-
-
33
-
-
9744228606
-
-
note
-
See State v. Miller, 663 So. 2d 107, 109 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding equal protection issue well settled in state law); Exporte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (finding several states have upheld similar equal protection statutes); State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 141 (Utah 1978) (finding valid basis for laws tailored to protect young females). In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), the Supreme Court held that statutory rape statutes that make men alone criminally liable for the act of sexual intercourse do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 473.
-
-
-
-
34
-
-
9744249365
-
-
note
-
See, e.g., State v. Bell, 377 So. 2d 303, 306 (La. 1979) (emphasizing danger of pregnancy, harm to reproductive organs, and mental harm); Housekeeper, 588 P.2d at 141 (discussing illegitimate children as social problem).
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
9744249366
-
-
People v. Boyer, 349 N.E.2d 50, 51 (Ill. 1976)
-
People v. Boyer, 349 N.E.2d 50, 51 (Ill. 1976).
-
-
-
-
36
-
-
9744219572
-
-
Id. at 51-52
-
Id. at 51-52.
-
-
-
-
37
-
-
9744269874
-
-
Id. at 52; see also People v. Yocum, 361 N.E.2d 1369, 1369 (Ill. 1977) (relying on Boyer, 349 N.E. 2d at 50)
-
Id. at 52; see also People v. Yocum, 361 N.E.2d 1369, 1369 (Ill. 1977) (relying on Boyer, 349 N.E. 2d at 50).
-
-
-
-
38
-
-
9744250855
-
-
note
-
Compare Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966, 968 (Alaska 1979) (holding statute could not be limited to female prostitution), with State v. Tookes, 699 P.2d 983, 988 (Haw. 1985) (holding there was insufficient evidence of invidious discrimination), and State v. Hollins, 375 So. 2d 923, 923 (La. 1979) (findng gender classification reasonable in light of social problems caused by prostitution), and State v. Butler, 331 So. 2d 425, 430 (La. 1976) (finding prostitution presents major social problem), and State v. Devall, 302 So. 2d 909, 911 (La. 1974) (finding classification reasonable in light of social problems caused by prostitution); see also Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 207 (Mass. 1977) (holding gender-neutral prostitution statute could not be enforced only against female prostitutes unless Commonwealth could demonstrate a compelling interest requiring such a policy); Commonwealth v. An Unnamed Defendant, 492 N.E.2d 1184, 1187-88 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (affirming dismissal of prostitution charges where police department had informal policy of arresting only female prostitutes); State v. Sandoval, 649 P.2d 482, 487 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (holding prositution statute gender neutral). One difficulty with the result in Plas that the Alaska Supreme Court overlooked was that by striking the words "by a female" from the prostitution statute, the court was expanding, by judicial decision, the scope of a crime to include conduct that had not been deemed criminal by the legislature, in violation of a statute providing that conduct must be defined as criminal by statute in Alaska. See ALASKA STAT. §11.81.220 (Michie 1996).
-
-
-
-
39
-
-
9744277360
-
-
note
-
See Plas, 598 P.2d at 968 (finding males can be prostitutes); Hollins, 375 So. 2d at 923 (finding male prostitution not a social problem); Devall, 302 So. 2d at 913-14 (finding demand for women's sexual services was greater, leading to social problems).
-
-
-
-
40
-
-
9744281810
-
-
note
-
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 331 A.2d 193, 195 (Pa. 1975) (stating statute providing minimal sentences for men but not women violated state equal rights amendment); Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851, 856 (Pa. 1974) (finding sentencing scheme that made women eligible for parole immediately upon commencement of their sentences, but men not eligible until they had served their minimum sentences, violated equal rights amendment).
-
-
-
-
41
-
-
9744229883
-
-
People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974); Ex Parte Trahan, 591 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc)
-
People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974); Ex Parte Trahan, 591 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc).
-
-
-
-
42
-
-
9744225001
-
-
541 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
-
541 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
-
-
-
-
43
-
-
9744275886
-
-
Id. at 168
-
Id. at 168.
-
-
-
-
44
-
-
84866189851
-
-
Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164,1170 (Haw. 1978) (stating that "[w]e think it is clear that the directive takes into account a physical characteristic which is possessed uniquely by women visitors to the prison")
-
Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164,1170 (Haw. 1978) (stating that "[w]e think it is clear that the directive takes into account a physical characteristic which is possessed uniquely by women visitors to the prison").
-
-
-
-
45
-
-
9744229877
-
-
Wise v. Commonwealth, 690 A.2d 846 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997); Morris v. Collins, 916 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tex. App. 1995)
-
Wise v. Commonwealth, 690 A.2d 846 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997); Morris v. Collins, 916 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tex. App. 1995).
-
-
-
-
46
-
-
9744224237
-
-
Wise, 690 A.2d at 848-49; Morris, 916 S.W.2d at 528-29
-
Wise, 690 A.2d at 848-49; Morris, 916 S.W.2d at 528-29.
-
-
-
-
47
-
-
84866199453
-
-
See, e.g., ILL. CONST, art. I, § 17; MONT. CONST, art. II, § 4
-
See, e.g., ILL. CONST, art. I, § 17; MONT. CONST, art. II, § 4.
-
-
-
-
48
-
-
9744286895
-
-
note
-
Virtually all of the reported cases under Article I, Section 17 of the Illinois Constitution and its implementing legislation have involved either discriminatory acts of private employers or individual acts of sexual harassment by supervisors of public employees, and not sexually discriminatory policies or practices of the state, its units of local government, or school districts. But see School Dist. No. 175, St. Clair County, Ill. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 373 N.E.2d 447, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (finding that school district had refused to hire defendant primarily because of her sex). Although the Montana equal rights provision (Article II, Section 4) applies to private conduct, as well as to public law, see State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153, 156 (Mont. 1985) (finding that the Montana Constitution prohibits discrimination by both state and individual actors), it has not been invoked yet in any private sex discrimination cases.
-
-
-
-
49
-
-
9744239447
-
-
116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
-
116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
-
-
-
-
50
-
-
9744241967
-
-
Id. at 563
-
Id. at 563.
-
-
-
-
51
-
-
9744244846
-
-
Id. at 567
-
Id. at 567.
-
-
-
-
52
-
-
9744230548
-
-
Id.; but see Maryland State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs v. Kuhn, 312 A.2d 216, 220 (Md. 1973) (forbidding cosmetologists from cutting and shampooing men's hair in same manner as women's hair)
-
Id.; but see Maryland State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs v. Kuhn, 312 A.2d 216, 220 (Md. 1973) (forbidding cosmetologists from cutting and shampooing men's hair in same manner as women's hair).
-
-
-
-
53
-
-
9744281098
-
-
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 533 (Cal. 1971)
-
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 533 (Cal. 1971).
-
-
-
-
54
-
-
9744257645
-
-
Hardy v. Stumpf, 576 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Cal. 1978)
-
Hardy v. Stumpf, 576 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Cal. 1978).
-
-
-
-
55
-
-
9744261609
-
-
Ex parte Miller, 124 P. 427, 427-28 (Cal. 1912)
-
Ex parte Miller, 124 P. 427, 427-28 (Cal. 1912).
-
-
-
-
56
-
-
9744237922
-
-
note
-
See Vick v. Pioneer Oil Co., W. Div., 569 S.W.2d 631,634 (Tex. App. 1978) (finding that "[e]ven though the statutory provisions become operative by free choice, the statute does not offer a male the same opportunities as females to invoke its benefits").
-
-
-
-
57
-
-
9744269872
-
-
Allison-LeBlanc v. Department of Pub. Safety, 671 So. 2d 448, 452-53 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
-
Allison-LeBlanc v. Department of Pub. Safety, 671 So. 2d 448, 452-53 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
-
-
-
-
58
-
-
9744279656
-
-
563 P.2d 849 (Cal. 1977)
-
563 P.2d 849 (Cal. 1977).
-
-
-
-
59
-
-
9744257946
-
-
Id. at 849-50
-
Id. at 849-50.
-
-
-
-
60
-
-
9744258689
-
-
note
-
Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 531 P.2d 870, 871 (Utah 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975) (finding that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that unemployment compensation boards . . . must achieve legitimate state ends through more individualized means when basic human liberties are at stake").
-
-
-
-
61
-
-
9744277418
-
-
Hanson v. Hutt, 517 P.2d 599, 603 n.3 (Wash. 1974)
-
Hanson v. Hutt, 517 P.2d 599, 603 n.3 (Wash. 1974).
-
-
-
-
62
-
-
9744223499
-
-
Gilman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 369 A.2d 895, 896 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977)
-
Gilman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 369 A.2d 895, 896 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
-
-
-
-
63
-
-
9744230547
-
-
595 P.2d 970 (Wyo. 1979)
-
595 P.2d 970 (Wyo. 1979).
-
-
-
-
64
-
-
9744269873
-
-
Id. at 970-71
-
Id. at 970-71.
-
-
-
-
65
-
-
84866198424
-
-
Id. at 974; accord Montrose County Sch. Dist. v. Lambert, 826 P.2d 349, 352 (Colo. 1992) (noting that "[t]he separateness of spouses in Colorado is clearly established by Colorado's Equal Rights Amendment")
-
Id. at 974; accord Montrose County Sch. Dist. v. Lambert, 826 P.2d 349, 352 (Colo. 1992) (noting that "[t]he separateness of spouses in Colorado is clearly established by Colorado's Equal Rights Amendment").
-
-
-
-
66
-
-
9744257646
-
-
note
-
Compare Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 667 P.2d 1092,1102 (Wash. 1983) (upholding county set-aside program) (noting that "[a]s long as the law favoring one sex is intended solely to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination, it simply does not implicate the ERA"), with Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. State, 669 So. 2d 1185,1196 (La. 1996) (striking down set-aside program) (stating Article I, Section 3, of the Louisiana Constitution "absolutely prohibits any state law which discriminates on the basis of race"). In light of the Supreme Court's increasing hostility towards affirmative action programs, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications, including federal highway construction set-aside program), the future of government set-aside programs like the one upheld by the Washington Supreme Court in Pierce County is, to say the least, questionable.
-
-
-
-
67
-
-
9744265594
-
-
Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114, 118 (Pa. 1985)
-
Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114, 118 (Pa. 1985).
-
-
-
-
68
-
-
9744241593
-
-
Id. at 125 (citations omitted); see also Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 397 (Mass. 1981) (failing to decide case on basis of state equal rights amendment)
-
Id. at 125 (citations omitted); see also Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 397 (Mass. 1981) (failing to decide case on basis of state equal rights amendment).
-
-
-
-
69
-
-
9744282569
-
-
note
-
See Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (dictum) (invalidating funding limitations on other, non-constitutional grounds); see also Doe v. State, 579 A.2d 37, 39 n.4 (Conn. 1990) (finding no state constitutional basis for awarding attorney's fees and observing that Hyde Amendment does not violate women's due process or equal protection); Doe v. Heintz, 526 A.2d 1318, 1320 n.3 (Conn. 1987) (noting United States Supreme Court upheld con-stitutionality of early formulation of Hyde Amendment, which restricted to some federal funding of abortions, on equal protection grounds).
-
-
-
-
70
-
-
9744227097
-
-
Page v. Welfare Comm'r, 365 A.2d 1118, 1119 (Conn. 1976)
-
Page v. Welfare Comm'r, 365 A.2d 1118, 1119 (Conn. 1976).
-
-
-
-
71
-
-
9744233584
-
-
Maxwell v. Department of Soc. & Health Serv., 636 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)
-
Maxwell v. Department of Soc. & Health Serv., 636 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
-
-
-
-
72
-
-
0004071845
-
-
7th ed.
-
Phelps v. Bing, 316 N.E.2d 775, 776-77 (Ill. 1974). At common law, males of the age of fourteen or older and females of the age of twelve or over could contract a binding marriage. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 436 (7th ed. 1775). One commentator has speculated that "[a]though there is no historical evidence of the reasoning for the distinction between males and females, presumably it was based on assumptions about the ability to procreate." Kurtz, supra note 5, at 123. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Supreme Court struck down a statute establishing different ages at which men and women could purchase alcoholic beverages. Id. at 210.
-
(1775)
Commentaries on the Laws of England
, pp. 436
-
-
Blackstone, W.1
-
73
-
-
9744231292
-
-
Scanlon v. Crim, 500 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. App. 1973)
-
Scanlon v. Crim, 500 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. App. 1973).
-
-
-
-
74
-
-
9744227862
-
-
581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990)
-
581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
-
-
-
-
75
-
-
9744246713
-
-
Id. at 165-66
-
Id. at 165-66.
-
-
-
-
76
-
-
9744257947
-
-
Id. at 165
-
Id. at 165.
-
-
-
-
77
-
-
9744227098
-
-
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
-
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
-
-
-
-
78
-
-
9744227861
-
-
Id. at 1195
-
Id. at 1195.
-
-
-
-
79
-
-
9744276642
-
-
Id.; see also De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (failing to reach question under Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment)
-
Id.; see also De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (failing to reach question under Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment).
-
-
-
-
80
-
-
9744268125
-
-
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)
-
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
-
-
-
-
81
-
-
9744244162
-
-
Id. at 67
-
Id. at 67.
-
-
-
-
82
-
-
9744229163
-
-
Id. at 69 (Burns, J., concurring)
-
Id. at 69 (Burns, J., concurring).
-
-
-
-
83
-
-
9744247489
-
-
Id. at 70 (Heen, J., dissenting, joined by Hayashi, J.)
-
Id. at 70 (Heen, J., dissenting, joined by Hayashi, J.).
-
-
-
-
84
-
-
9744256129
-
-
Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996)
-
Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996).
-
-
-
-
85
-
-
9744245913
-
-
H.R. 117, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997)
-
H.R. 117, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997).
-
-
-
-
86
-
-
9744279654
-
-
note
-
In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. App. 1977) ("[t]o deny her this right [i.e., to revert to her maiden name] would be a violation of equal protection under the law by creating an invalid classification based on sex"); see also Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 492 A.2d 303, 306 (Md. 1985) (assuming without deciding that in making decision based upon child's best interest, court was prohibited by Article 46 of Maryland Declaration of Rights from relying upon any "right which a father had by prior custom or law to have a child bear his surname"); Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Mont. 1983) (stating that changing child's surname does not violate Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution); Hamby v. Jackson, 769 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that paternal or maternal preference for child's surname is improper).
-
-
-
-
87
-
-
9744230544
-
-
note
-
Craig v. Craig, 365 So. 2d 1298, 1301 (La. 1978); see also In re Ayers, 536 P.2d 610, 612 (Wash. 1975) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (questioning whether wife's legal duty to follow her husband to domicile of his choice survived adoption of state equal rights amendment).
-
-
-
-
88
-
-
9744242666
-
-
note
-
Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. App. 1978) (determining "domicile by operation of law, i.e., analogous to what was formerly that of a wife arising upon her marriage," court stated that cases decided prior to adoption of state equal rights amendment were "[o]f little value"); Kerr v. Kerr, 371 S.E.2d 30, 33 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) ("the outmoded expectation that a wife is expected to follow her husband's change of abode is no longer applicable").
-
-
-
-
89
-
-
9744250845
-
-
note
-
Phillips v. Nereaux, 357 So. 2d 813, 817-21 (La. Ct. App. 1978). In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), the Supreme Court struck down on equal protection gounds a former Louisiana statute that allowed husbands, but not their wives, to execute mortgages on jointly owned real estate without spousal consent. Id. at 456.
-
-
-
-
90
-
-
9744227094
-
-
Phillips, 357 So. 2d at 820
-
Phillips, 357 So. 2d at 820.
-
-
-
-
91
-
-
9744273074
-
-
note
-
In Pitts v. United States, 408 S.E.2d 901 (Va. 1991), the court discussed co-tenancy rights under the law: The common law recognized four co-tenancies, namely, a joint tenancy, a tenancy by the entirety, a tenancy in common, and a tenancy by coparcenary . . . . A joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety shared four essential characteristics, that is, unity of time, unity of title, unity of interest, and unity of possession. Although survivorship was a feature of both estates, they differed in other respects. [A] joint tenant [can] transfer his undivided share in the land to a third person and thereby convert the estate into a tenancy in common, . . . [b]ut because a husband and wife were considered a juristic person separate and distinct from the spouses themselves, . . . each owned the entire undivided estate as tenants by the entireties, and neither could sever the tenancy by alienating its interest during coverture. Id. at 903 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
-
-
-
-
92
-
-
9744281806
-
-
note
-
Butler v. Butler, 347 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. 1975) (adopting rule that "anytime either a husband or a wife contributes towards the purchase of entireties property their contribution is presumed to be a gift to the other"); see also In re Estate of Harrington, 648 P.2d 556, 576-77 (Wyo. 1982) (Brown, J., dissenting) ("[t]he presumption that the wife does not intend a gift is also based upon the proposition that under the common law the wife has no duty to support the husband, while the husband does have a duty to support the wife" and this presumption proba-bly contravenes the mandate of Article VI, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution that "male and female citizens are to enjoy equal rights under the law, including the right to protection by the laws").
-
-
-
-
93
-
-
9744286892
-
-
note
-
See DiFloridio v. DiFloridio, 331 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1975) (stating purpose of equal rights amendment was to eliminate sex as basis for distinction); Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 297 P.2d 213, 216 (Wyo. 1956)
-
-
-
-
94
-
-
9744258684
-
-
note
-
Bell v. Bell, 379 A.2d 419, 421 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (stating that in light of Maryland Equal Rights Amendment, courts cannot presume that husband is dominant figure in marriage); see also Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757, 761 (Md. Ct. Spec."App. 1978) (following Bell).
-
-
-
-
95
-
-
9744225000
-
-
440 P.2d 881 (Utah 1968)
-
440 P.2d 881 (Utah 1968).
-
-
-
-
96
-
-
9744227859
-
-
Id. at 882-83
-
Id. at 882-83.
-
-
-
-
97
-
-
9744255376
-
-
562 P.2d 614 (Utah 1977)
-
562 P.2d 614 (Utah 1977).
-
-
-
-
98
-
-
9744271619
-
-
Id. at 615-17
-
Id. at 615-17.
-
-
-
-
99
-
-
9744248220
-
-
See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 137-38 nn.123-29
-
See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 137-38 nn.123-29.
-
-
-
-
100
-
-
9744275882
-
-
See, e.g., Ellis v. Johnson, 260 S.W. 1010, 1012 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924)
-
See, e.g., Ellis v. Johnson, 260 S.W. 1010, 1012 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924).
-
-
-
-
101
-
-
9744230542
-
-
See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 138
-
See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 138.
-
-
-
-
102
-
-
9744229875
-
-
Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236, 238 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Harper v. Harper, 229 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Va. 1976) (applying rule without discussion of state equal rights provision)
-
Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236, 238 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Harper v. Harper, 229 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Va. 1976) (applying rule without discussion of state equal rights provision).
-
-
-
-
103
-
-
9744276637
-
-
note
-
In In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845 (Colo. 1975), the Colorado Supreme Court held that statistical evidence showing that, in the vast majority of cases, mothers were given custody of minor children did not, in and of itself, prove that courts improperly favored women over men in awarding custody in divorce proceedings in violation of Article II, Section 29 of the Colorado Constitution. The statistics did not indicate whether custody was contested or even desired by the fathers in any significant number of cases. Id. at 852; see also Menne v. Menne, 572 P.2d 472, 473 (Colo. 1977) (same). In Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 317 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974), the Illinois Appellate Court, citing Article I, Section 18 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, rejected the mother's claim that she had a "paramount claim to custody of a young child." Id. at 683-84. In a later case, the same court noted that "there is today no inflexible rule which requires that custody of children, especially of tender age, be vested in the mother." Marcus v. Marcus, 320 N.E.2d 581, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). Relying in part on Article I, Section 18, the court stated that "[e]quality of the sexes has entered this field." Id. "The fact that a mother is fit is only one facet of the situation and, standing by itself, does not authorize a denial of custody to the father, when this appears necessary because of other considerations." Id.; see also In re Custody of Switalla, 408 N.E.2d 1139, 1142-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Blonsky v. Blonsky, 405 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); In re Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214, 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Lane v. Lane 352 N.E.2d 19,22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). But see Masterson v. Masterson, 351 N.E.2d 888,889 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (applying tender-years doctrine); Huey v. Huey, 322 N.E.2d 560, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (applying the tender-years doctrine without consideration of the equal rights provision). In McAndrew v. McAndrew, 382 A.2d 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, overruling a prior opinion, held that "[a] parent is no longer presumed to be clothed with or to lack a particular attribute merely because that parent is male or female." Id. at 1086. In Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 368 A.2d 635 (Pa. 1977), a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing Article' I, Section 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, questioned: [T]he legitimacy of a doctrine that is predicated upon traditional Stereotypic roles of men and women in a marital union. Whether the tender years doctrine is employed to create a presumption which requires the male parent to overcome its effect by presenting compelling evidence of a particular nature . . . , or merely as a makeshift where the scales are relatively balanced, . . . such a view is offensive to the concept of the equality of the sexes which we have embraced as a constitutional principle within this jurisdiction. Id. at 639-40. A majority of the court endorsed this view in Ellerbe v. Hooks, 416 A.2d 512, 515 (Pa. 1980). In Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[w]e believe the time has come to discontinue our support. . . for the notion of gender-based preferences in child custody cases." Id. at 119 (overruling Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975)); see also In re Murray, 622 P.2d 1288, 1290-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (suggesting that the tender-years doctrine was not compatible with the state equal rights amendment).
-
-
-
-
104
-
-
9744277353
-
The New Doctrine of Necessaries in Virginia
-
Comment
-
Mark S. Brennan, Comment, The New Doctrine of Necessaries in Virginia, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 317 (1985).
-
(1985)
U. Rich. L. Rev.
, vol.19
, pp. 317
-
-
Brennan, M.S.1
-
105
-
-
9744244161
-
-
Id. at 318-19
-
Id. at 318-19.
-
-
-
-
106
-
-
9744263899
-
-
Id. at 319
-
Id. at 319.
-
-
-
-
107
-
-
9744278187
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
108
-
-
9744252197
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
109
-
-
9744257943
-
-
note
-
See County of Clearwater, Minn. v. Petrash, 598 P.2d 138, 139 n.l (Colo. 1979) (stating that under state equal rights amendment, both parents have a duty to support their children); In re Estate of McGloon, 548 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (modifying doctrine to impose reciprocal obligations upon both husbands and wives); Condore v. Prince George's County, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (Md. 1981) (abolishing necessaries doctrine); Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 1346-47 (N.H. 1995) (expanding necessaries doctrine to apply equally to all married individuals); Swidzinski v. Schultz, 493 A.2d 93, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (stating that equal rights amendment intended to equalize benefits and burdens between genders); Schilling v. Bedford City Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Va. 1983) (finding gender classification not substantially related to promoting prompt and efficient medical services).
-
-
-
-
110
-
-
9744233578
-
-
note
-
Yale Univ. Sch. of Med. v. Collier, 536 A.2d 588, 590 (Conn. 1988) (stating Section 20 of Connecticut Constitution "provides the constitutional underpinnings for contemporary departure from the primary duty of one spouse to the joint duty of each spouse to support his or her family"); Ducote v. Ducote, 331 So. 2d 133, 138 (La. Ct. App. 1976) ("the father and the mother are jointly obligated to support, maintain and educate their children"); Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (Md. 1977) ("[a]pplying the mandate of the E.R.A. to the case before us, we hold that the parental obligation for child support is not primarily an obligation of the father but is one shared by both parents"); Silvia v. Silvia, 400 N.E.2d 1330, 1332 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (finding gender-neutral child support statute was "fully consistent with the Equal Rights Amendment"); Commonwealth ex rel. Stein v. Stein, 406 A.2d 1381,1382-83 (Pa. 1974) (extending statutes affording wives but not husbands in rem support remedies to avoid constitutional issue); Kaper v. Kaper, 323 A.2d 222, 223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (state equal rights amendment admits no exception in area of domestic relations); Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex. App. 1975) (stating that parents have equal obligations in accordance with their abilities, to contribute to support and maintenance of children); Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. App. 1974) ("[i]f 'equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex', it must be presumed that the legislature intended that the duty of the spouse to support their [sic] minor children is equal"); Perkins v. Freeman, 501 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Tex. App. 1973) ("each spouse has the duty to support his or her minor children"), rev'd on other grounds, 518 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. 1974); accord White v. Adock, 666 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Tex. App. 1984); Ulrich v. Ulrich 652 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. App. 1983); Grandinetti v. Grandinetti, 600 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. App. 1980); Krempp v. Krempp, 590 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. App. 1979); Lipshy v. Lipshy, 525 S.W.2d 222, 227 (Tex. App. 1975) (stating under state equal rights amendment, "disparate earning capacities, business opportunities and ability . . . may justify the recovery of an attorney's fee by the husband rather than by the wife"); see also Smith v. Smith, 534 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (noting that the Washington Equal Rights Amendment "firmly requires equal responsibilities as well").
-
-
-
-
111
-
-
9744280367
-
-
note
-
See Coleman v. State, 377 A.2d 553, 554 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (reversing conviction on constitutional grounds); Commonwealth v. Baggs, 392 A.2d 720, 721-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (interpreting neglect statute to apply to women as well as men to avoid equal rights issue); accord Commonwealth v. Vagnoni, 416 A.2d 99, 100 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979); Commonwealth v. Rebovich, 406 A.2d 791,792-93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (interpreting statutory language as applicable to both genders); see also State v. Fuller, 377 So. 2d 335 (La. 1979) (deciding case under Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
-
-
-
-
112
-
-
9744253671
-
-
note
-
See Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418, 420-21 (La. 1979) (involving permanent alimony); Smith v. Smith, 382 So. 2d 972, 974 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (involving alimony pendente lite); Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 437 A.2d 247, 249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) ("[t]he effect of the adoption of Article 46 was not to remove from the law the obligation of a husband, when ordered by a court, to pay alimony to the wife but to add to the law the duty of a wife, when so ordered by a court, to pay alimony to the husband"); see also Tidler v. Tidler, 435 A.2d 489, 495 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (holding equal rights provision of Maryland Constitution commands court to consider assessment of attorney fees); Buckner v. Buckner, 415 A.2d 871, 872-73 (N.H. 1980) (interpreting divorce statute to allow alimony award to both husband and wife to avoid conflict with equal rights guarantee); Schaab v. Schaab, 531 P.2d 954, 957 (N.M. 1974) (finding equal rights amendment mandates "equal protection" of husband and wife in alimony disputes); Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1974) (noting that right of support depends upon relative financial circumstances of parties, not upon their sex). The Louisiana Court of Appeals held that a statute requiring a wife to live with her husband and "to follow him wherever he chooses to live" could not be invoked to deny the wife permanent alimony when she failed to move with her husband who was in the tugboat business. Crosby v. Crosby, 434 So. 2d 162, 163 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
-
-
-
-
113
-
-
9744267372
-
-
440 U.S. 268 (1979)
-
440 U.S. 268 (1979).
-
-
-
-
114
-
-
9744249356
-
-
note
-
"Consortium . . . can generally be defined to include the mutual right of the husband and wife to that affection, solace, comfort, companionship, society, assistance and sexual relations necessary to a successful marriage." Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978).
-
-
-
-
115
-
-
9744237185
-
-
note
-
See Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465 n.16 (Alaska 1974) ("[d]scrimination on the basis of sex in granting only the husband the right to sue for loss of consortium would . . . violate [Article I, Section 3 of] the Alaska Constitution"); Hopkins v. Blanco, 320 A.2d 139, 140 (Pa. 1974) ("if a husband may recover for loss of consortium, to deny the wife an equal right would be invalid under the Pennsylvania Constitution"); Miller v. Whittlesey, 562 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. App. 1978) (stating equal rights amendment "has modified the common law to such an extent that it would be improper to deny a cause of action based on the sex of the party bringing the action"), aff'd, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 n.5 (Tex. 1978) (failing to reach constitutional issue); Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Wash. 1980) ("judicial classification by sex [in common law rule allowing husband, but not wife, to sue for damages for loss of consortium due to the negligence of a third party] violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Washington's Equal Rights Amendment").
-
-
-
-
116
-
-
9744265592
-
-
648 P.2d 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)
-
648 P.2d 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
-
-
-
-
117
-
-
9744234312
-
-
Id. at 461
-
Id. at 461.
-
-
-
-
118
-
-
9744233579
-
-
note
-
Id. at 460 (citing Article 31, Section 1 of the Washington Constitution); see also Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 933 (Md. 1980) (same) ("[t]he common law cause of action for criminal conversation is a vestige of the past" and "cannot be reconciled with our commitment to equality of the sexes"); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 533 A.2d 1358, 1359 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (following Kline); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147, 152 (Pa. 1976) (abolishing tort of criminal conversation).
-
-
-
-
119
-
-
9744246711
-
-
note
-
Price v. Price, 718 S.W.2d 65, 66-67 (Tex. App. 1986) (Butts, J., dissenting from judgment affirming dismissal of wife's action against husband for negligently inflicted personal injuries).
-
-
-
-
120
-
-
9744258686
-
-
Id. at 69-71
-
Id. at 69-71.
-
-
-
-
121
-
-
9744283365
-
-
note
-
See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (Md. 1983) ("any ancient deprivation of rights based upon sex would contravene the basic law of this State"); Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1980) (interpreting Married Women's Act in light of state equal rights provision to allow a wife to sue her husband for intentionally inflicted personal injuries); see also Price, 718 S.W.2d at 67 (Butts, J., dissenting) (stating Texas Equal Rights Amendment "provides for sexual 'equality under the law'" and, together with statutes recognizing women's rights, "invalidate[s] the common law rationale for the fictional unity of the husband and the wife"). But see Steffa v. Stanley, 350 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) ("the bar against tort actions between spouses during coverture applies equally to male and female and cannot therefore be said to discriminate by denying or abridging [the wife's] rights on the basis of sex"); Smith v. Smith, 361 A.2d 756, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (holding state equal rights amendment did not require abrogation of interspousal tort immunity).
-
-
-
-
122
-
-
9744229162
-
-
Texas Woman's Univ. v. Chayklintaste, 521 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 530 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1975)
-
Texas Woman's Univ. v. Chayklintaste, 521 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 530 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1975).
-
-
-
-
123
-
-
9744278186
-
-
Futrell v. Ahrens, 540 P.2d 214, 218 (N.M. 1975)
-
Futrell v. Ahrens, 540 P.2d 214, 218 (N.M. 1975).
-
-
-
-
124
-
-
9744278920
-
-
note
-
Barber v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist., 901 S.W.2d 447, 447 (Tex. 1995); Mercer v. Board of Trustees, North Forest Indep. Sch. Dist., 538 S.W.2d 201, 206-07 (Tex. App. 1976); see also MacLean v. First Northwest Indus, of Am., 635 P.2d 683, 688 (Wash. 1981) (rejecting challenge to "ladies' night" price-ticketing practices at professional sporting events, stating that "[t]o decide important constitutional questions upon a complaint as sterile as this would be apt to erode public respect for the Equal Rights Amendment and deter rather than promote the serious goals for which it was adopted").
-
-
-
-
125
-
-
9744284903
-
-
393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979)
-
393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979).
-
-
-
-
126
-
-
9744241964
-
-
Id. at 296
-
Id. at 296.
-
-
-
-
127
-
-
9744240879
-
-
371 Op. Mass. 426, 427-28 (1977)
-
371 Op. Mass. 426, 427-28 (1977).
-
-
-
-
128
-
-
9744247488
-
-
540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975)
-
540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
-
-
-
-
129
-
-
9744250847
-
-
Id. at 893
-
Id. at 893.
-
-
-
-
130
-
-
9744237184
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
131
-
-
9744265593
-
-
Blair v. Washington State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379, 1382-83 (Wash. 1987)
-
Blair v. Washington State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379, 1382-83 (Wash. 1987).
-
-
-
-
132
-
-
9744225776
-
-
394 N.E.2d 855 (111. App. Ct. 1979)
-
394 N.E.2d 855 (111. App. Ct. 1979).
-
-
-
-
133
-
-
9744237920
-
-
Id. at 856
-
Id. at 856.
-
-
-
-
134
-
-
9744250848
-
-
Id. at 861
-
Id. at 861.
-
-
-
-
135
-
-
9744249358
-
-
Id. at 862
-
Id. at 862.
-
-
-
-
136
-
-
9744273857
-
-
Commonwealth ex rel. Packel v. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 843 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)
-
Commonwealth ex rel. Packel v. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 843 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
-
-
-
-
137
-
-
9744263134
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
138
-
-
9744222745
-
-
note
-
Lockwood v. Killian, 425 A.2d 909, 913-14 (Conn. 1979) (modifying trust to delete criteria based on race and sex); In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325, 1329 (N.H. 1990) (invoking doctrine of cy pres to reform terms of educational trusts administered by state actors to eliminate references to sex and religion); see also Ebitz v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 361 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Mass. 1977) (relying, in part, on state equal rights amendment to resolve ambiguity in eligibility criteria for scholarship fund to include women as well as men).
-
-
-
-
139
-
-
9744235027
-
-
note
-
Compare R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 672 (Colo. 1980) ("where [a] statutory scheme allows a natural mother to seek a judicial declaration of paternity in the natural father in connection with a child born to the natural mother during her marriage to another, the equal protection guarantee of the federal and state constitutions as well as the Colorado equal rights amendment require that a claiming natural father be accorded standing to file and proceed with his claim for a judicial declaration of paternity in himself with respect to a child born to the natural mother during her marriage to another"), and In re M.P.R., 723 P.2d 743, 744-45 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (following R. McG.), and Henderson v. Wietzikoski, 841 S.W.2d 101, 103-04 (Tex. App. 1992) (deciding case under state constitution only), with PBC v. DH, 483 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (Mass. 1985) (denying putative father adjudication of paternity of a child conceived by a woman while she was married to another man); and A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1222 (Wyo. 1982) (denying putative father adjudication of paternity of child born to woman while she was married to another man); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117-30 (1989) (rejecting procedural and substantive due process claims of adulterous putative father seeking hearing to establish paternity of child born to woman married to another man).
-
-
-
-
140
-
-
9744261605
-
-
note
-
A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d at 1225; see also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1978) ("That the child is the child of a particular woman is rarely difficult to prove. Proof of paternity, by contrast, frequently is difficult when the father is not part of a formal family unit. The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of a child. Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence of any ties to the mother. Indeed, the mother may not know who is responsible for a pregnancy.") (citations and internal quotation omitted); In re J.M., 590 So. 2d 565, 571-72 (La. 1991) ("The State has as great an interest in establishing maternity as paternity. However, because paternity is usually significantly more difficult to prove, we are not prepared to say that the statute [requiring blood testing] is unconstitutional because it addresses blood testing for paternity alone.").
-
-
-
-
141
-
-
9744236475
-
-
note
-
See Adoption of Walker, 360 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1976) ("The only differences between unwed fathers and unwed mothers are those based on sex. This is an impermissible basis for denying unwed fathers rights under the [Adoption] Act."); In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. 1987) (holding gender-based distinctions in Texas Family Code constitute discrimination). But see Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 641 (Utah 1990) (finding no due process violation of state equal rights amendment in not requiring consent of natural father to adoption of illegitimate child where father did not file acknowledgment of paternity with state health department) ("[E]ven if we were to accept the proposition that the Utah Constitution defines gender as an inherently suspect classification, defendant's claim would fail since 'the mere existence of a biological link' by itself has not been deemed to create a fundamental right in an unwed father to parent his illegitimate child."). The United States Supreme Court has held that a statute requiring the mother's consent to the adoption of a child born out of wedlock, but not the father's, violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 & n.16 (1979) (holding sex-based distinction between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers violates Fourteenth Amendment).
-
-
-
-
142
-
-
9744257644
-
-
725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1987)
-
725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1987).
-
-
-
-
143
-
-
9744224234
-
-
Id. at 698-99
-
Id. at 698-99.
-
-
-
-
144
-
-
9744232069
-
-
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1979)
-
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1979).
-
-
-
-
145
-
-
9744248605
-
-
Guard v. Jackson, 921 P.2d 544, 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
-
Guard v. Jackson, 921 P.2d 544, 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
-
-
-
-
146
-
-
9744238733
-
-
Estate of Scheller v. Pesetto, 783 P.2d 70, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
-
Estate of Scheller v. Pesetto, 783 P.2d 70, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
-
-
-
-
147
-
-
9744231286
-
-
note
-
Estate of Hicks, 675 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ill. 1996) (finding that challenged statute "is based upon the presumption that a particular parent will be involved or uninvolved in his illegitimate child's life simply because that parent happens to be a man or a woman"). 137. Nagle v. Wood, 423 A.2d 875, 878 (Conn. 1979); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770-73 (1977) (striking down Illinois statute providing that illegitimate child could inherit from father's estate only if parents intermarried and the father acknowledged paternity) (deciding case on equal protection grounds).
-
-
-
-
148
-
-
9744273076
-
-
Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Mass. 1980); see also Paquette v. Koscotas, 421 N.E.2d 483, 485 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (following Lowell)
-
Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Mass. 1980); see also Paquette v. Koscotas, 421 N.E.2d 483, 485 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (following Lowell).
-
-
-
-
149
-
-
9744245184
-
-
note
-
Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Utah 1974) ("[G]irls tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and mentally before boys, and . . . generally tend to marry earlier."), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
-
-
-
-
150
-
-
9744245911
-
-
482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984)
-
482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984).
-
-
-
-
151
-
-
9744224235
-
-
Id. at 543-44
-
Id. at 543-44.
-
-
-
-
152
-
-
9744253670
-
-
Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393, 398 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), aff'd per curiam, 563 A.2d 1390 (1989)
-
Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393, 398 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), aff'd per curiam, 563 A.2d 1390 (1989).
-
-
-
-
153
-
-
9744265591
-
-
McKinney v. State, 30 P. 293, 296-97 (Wyo. 1892)
-
McKinney v. State, 30 P. 293, 296-97 (Wyo. 1892).
-
-
-
-
154
-
-
84866197107
-
-
State v. Yazzie, 218 P.2d 482, 483 (Wyo. 1950) (holding that under equality provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, "women in Wyoming are men's equal before the law")
-
State v. Yazzie, 218 P.2d 482, 483 (Wyo. 1950) (holding that under equality provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, "women in Wyoming are men's equal before the law").
-
-
-
-
155
-
-
9744229161
-
-
note
-
Compare Archer v. Mayes, 194 S.E. 707, 711 (Va. 1973) (holding "opt-out" statutes are based on "a reasonable classification that bears a rational relationship to the objective of the State"), and Johnson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (holding statute allowing women with small children to be excused from jury duty does not violate state equal rights amendment), with State v. Machia, 449 A.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (stating in dictum that the failure to extend "opt-out" statute to both men and women would violate state constitution).
-
-
-
-
156
-
-
9744248600
-
-
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 127-28 (1994) (holding gender discrimination in peremptory strikes violates Equal Protection Clause)
-
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 127-28 (1994) (holding gender discrimination in peremptory strikes violates Equal Protection Clause).
-
-
-
-
157
-
-
9744262365
-
-
note
-
See People v. Lann, 633 N.E.2d 938, 951 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding gender-based classifications in jury selection unconstitutional); Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648, 650-51 (Md. 1993) (holding gender-based classifications in peremptory challenges violates Maryland law); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (Mass. 1979) (holding peremptory challenges to exclude members of discreet groups unconstitutional); State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40, 49 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding racial and gender discrimination in jury selection violates state law); State v. Burch, 830 P.2d 357, 362-63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding gender-based discrimination in jury selection violates state and federal law).
-
-
-
-
158
-
-
9744275880
-
-
533 So. 2d 1060 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
-
533 So. 2d 1060 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
-
-
-
-
159
-
-
9744254398
-
-
Id. at 1062-63
-
Id. at 1062-63.
-
-
-
-
160
-
-
9744286888
-
-
Carreras v. State, 936 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex. App. 1996); City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918, 920 (Wash. 1978)
-
Carreras v. State, 936 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex. App. 1996); City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918, 920 (Wash. 1978).
-
-
-
-
161
-
-
9744264820
-
-
note
-
See Occhino v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 329 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) ("classification reflects the judgment of the legislature that solicitation of [beer] has been a greater problem with respect to female employees than [male employees]"); State v. Corky, 458 So. 2d 904, 906 (La. 1984) ("[T]he legislative history of the B[ar]-drinking statute indicates that the practice of drinking by women in retail alcohol outlets was a serious problem."); De Francis v. City of Bossier, 322 So. 2d 333, 339 (La. Ct. App. 1975) ("[A]ppellant has not shown that solicitation of drinks by males constitutes a social evil of any significance."). But see Turner v. State, 474 A.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Md. 1984) (holding Maryland "female citizens" law unconstitutional).
-
-
-
-
162
-
-
9744265590
-
-
note
-
See Crownover v. Musick, 509 P.2d 497, 506 (Cal. 1973) (holding state law prohibiting female nudity in bar does not violate equal protection); Locker v. Kirby, 107 Cal. Rptr. 446, 450-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (upholding liquor control commission rule prohibiting licensees from employing or using topless waitresses on premises where liquor is sold); Dydyn v. Department of Liquor Control, 531 A.2d 170, 175 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding state liquor law does not violate equal protection); Messina v. State, 904 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App. 1995); MJR's Fare of Dallas v. City of Dallas, Inc., 792 S.W.2d 569, 575 (Tex. App. 1990) (rejecting challenge to zoning ordinance placing distance restrictions on sexually oriented business where ordinance required complete and opaque covering of areola of female breast but not imposing similar requirement on male performers). But see Williams v. City of Fort Worth, 782 S.W.2d 290, 297 (Tex. App. 1989) (holding ordinance was unconstitutional where defendant presented no evidence that prohibiting exposure of female, but not male, breast, was justified by physical differences between men and women).
-
-
-
-
163
-
-
9744252957
-
-
note
-
See Locker, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 450-51 (noting historical distinctions in perceptions of male and female breasts); Dydyn, 531 A.2d at 175 (noting societal and cultural perceptions of female breasts); Carreras, 936 S.W.2d at 730 (noting distinctions between society's perception of male and female breasts); MJR's Fare of Dallas, Inc., 792 S.W.2d at 575 (holding state law allows gender distinctions where physical characteristics require it); Buchanan, 584 P.2d at 920 (noting "real difference" between sexes with regard to breasts).
-
-
-
-
164
-
-
9744275881
-
-
Wheeler v. City of Rockford, 387 N.E.2d 358, 359 (111. App. Ct. 1979)
-
Wheeler v. City of Rockford, 387 N.E.2d 358, 359 (111. App. Ct. 1979).
-
-
-
-
165
-
-
9744283364
-
-
See Ex parte Maki, 133 P.2d 64, 66-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943)
-
See Ex parte Maki, 133 P.2d 64, 66-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943).
-
-
-
-
166
-
-
9744235024
-
-
Leo Kanowitz, 'Benign' Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1379, 1394 (1980)
-
Leo Kanowitz, 'Benign' Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1379, 1394 (1980).
-
-
-
-
167
-
-
9744229160
-
-
Treadwell & Page, supra note 5, at 1106. The experience in state courts in the twenty years since this article was published confirms this assessment
-
Treadwell & Page, supra note 5, at 1106. The experience in state courts in the twenty years since this article was published confirms this assessment.
-
-
-
-
168
-
-
9744244160
-
-
Id. at 1107
-
Id. at 1107.
-
-
-
-
169
-
-
9744276635
-
-
note
-
5 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) (mandating anti-discrimination policy in federal employment); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in personnel policies); 20 U.S.C. § 1221e(a) (1994) (mandating anti-discrimination policy in educational institutions receiving federal funds), id. § 1681 (prohibiting discrimination in education); 23 U.S.C. § 324 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in federal aid to highways); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), as amended by Equal Pay Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) (mandating equal pay); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, as amended by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, and Pregnancy Discrimination in Employment Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (prohibiting discrimination in public and private employment)); Public Works and Economic Development Act Amendments of 1971,42 U.S.C. § 3123 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in federallyfunded public works projects); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in sale or rental of housing).
-
-
-
-
170
-
-
9744227852
-
Some Reflections Prompted by Myra Bradwell's Hard Case That Made 'Bad Law,'
-
Bradwell v. State
-
Charles E. Corker, Bradwell v. State: Some Reflections Prompted by Myra Bradwell's Hard Case That Made 'Bad Law,' 53 WASH. L. REV. 215, 245 (1978).
-
(1978)
Wash. L. Rev.
, vol.53
, pp. 215
-
-
Corker, C.E.1
-
171
-
-
9744227090
-
-
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 7, at 3670
-
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 7, at 3670.
-
-
-
-
172
-
-
84866185967
-
-
An amendment in 1974 added protection for "race, creed, color, national or ethnic origin" to the original text.
-
An amendment in 1974 added protection for "race, creed, color, national or ethnic origin" to the original text.
-
-
-
-
173
-
-
84866197710
-
-
An amendment in 1984 added protection for "physical or mental disability."
-
An amendment in 1984 added protection for "physical or mental disability."
-
-
-
|