Creating a United States-Mexico political double helix: The Mexican government's proposed dual nationality amendment

Stanford Journal of International Law

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 119-145

  Chavez, Pablo Lizarraga ^a,b  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 9444236903     PISSN: 07315082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (192)

1. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1453, 1459 & n.24 (1995). Means-tested programs are public benefit programs in which the eligibility for or the amount of benefits to be received (or both) by an individual, household, or family unit, are determined on the basis of income, resources, or financial need of the individual, household, or unit. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 4,104th Cong. §403 (1995).
2. For example, in one recent poll asking, "Do you favor or oppose allowing legal immigrants who are not American citizens to receive welfare benefits?" 69% of the respondents answered that they opposed such a policy. See CBS News/New York Times Poll, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OPINION RES., available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (national telephone survey of 1166 adults from Aug. 3, 1996 to Aug. 5, 1996).
3. Dan Stein, executive director of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), which claims 75,000 members, echoed the feelings of many U.S. citizens in a recent newspaper article when he asked: "Why should [the United States] extend benefits to non-Americans when there isn't enough money for public education and health care, and our taxes keep going up?" David Josar, Push For Citizenship Soars, DET. NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996, at A1. Indeed, according to a poll conducted by Roper and commissioned by Negative Population Growth, Inc., a nonprofit group opposed to the current level of immigration into the United States, 79% of U.S. citizens would like immigration rates scaled back while one-fifth of those polled supported a freeze on all immigration, whether legal or illegal. See Michelle Mittelstadt, Poll: Let in Fewer Immigrants, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 18, 1996, at A4. The National Immigration Forum (NIF), a pro-immigration group, questioned these results because the poll lumps legal and illegal immigration into one category and asks "largely uninformed" respondents to specify a permissible number of immigrants. See id. (quoting Frank Sharry, NIF's executive director). Nevertheless, the poll's results were recently confirmed by an ABC NevislWashington Post poll which indicated that 61% of Americans support a five-year freeze on legal immigration to the United States. See ABC News/Washington Post Poll, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OPINION RES., available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (national telephone interview of 1514 adults conducted from Aug. 1, 1996 to Aug. 9, 1996). But see Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Noncitizens' Access to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475 (1995) (arguing that, although immigration is a problem, the extent of negative consequences of immigration on the United States has been exaggerated by the government and by voters).
4. Dan Stein, executive director of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), which claims 75,000 members, echoed the feelings of many U.S. citizens in a recent newspaper article when he asked: "Why should [the United States] extend benefits to non-Americans when there isn't enough money for public education and health care, and our taxes keep going up?" David Josar, Push For Citizenship Soars, DET. NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996, at A1. Indeed, according to a poll conducted by Roper and commissioned by Negative Population Growth, Inc., a nonprofit group opposed to the current level of immigration into the United States, 79% of U.S. citizens would like immigration rates scaled back while one-fifth of those polled supported a freeze on all immigration, whether legal or illegal. See Michelle Mittelstadt, Poll: Let in Fewer Immigrants, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 18, 1996, at A4. The National Immigration Forum (NIF), a pro-immigration group, questioned these results because the poll lumps legal and illegal immigration into one category and asks "largely uninformed" respondents to specify a permissible number of immigrants. See id. (quoting Frank Sharry, NIF's executive director). Nevertheless, the poll's results were recently confirmed by an ABC NevislWashington Post poll which indicated that 61% of Americans support a five-year freeze on legal immigration to the United States. See ABC News/Washington Post Poll, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OPINION RES., available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (national telephone interview of 1514 adults conducted from Aug. 1, 1996 to Aug. 9, 1996). But see Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Noncitizens' Access to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475 (1995) (arguing that, although immigration is a problem, the extent of negative consequences of immigration on the United States has been exaggerated by the government and by voters).
5. Dan Stein, executive director of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), which claims 75,000 members, echoed the feelings of many U.S. citizens in a recent newspaper article when he asked: "Why should [the United States] extend benefits to non-Americans when there isn't enough money for public education and health care, and our taxes keep going up?" David Josar, Push For Citizenship Soars, DET. NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996, at A1. Indeed, according to a poll conducted by Roper and commissioned by Negative Population Growth, Inc., a nonprofit group opposed to the current level of immigration into the United States, 79% of U.S. citizens would like immigration rates scaled back while one-fifth of those polled supported a freeze on all immigration, whether legal or illegal. See Michelle Mittelstadt, Poll: Let in Fewer Immigrants, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 18, 1996, at A4. The National Immigration Forum (NIF), a pro-immigration group, questioned these results because the poll lumps legal and illegal immigration into one category and asks "largely uninformed" respondents to specify a permissible number of immigrants. See id. (quoting Frank Sharry, NIF's executive director). Nevertheless, the poll's results were recently confirmed by an ABC NevislWashington Post poll which indicated that 61% of Americans support a five-year freeze on legal immigration to the United States. See ABC News/Washington Post Poll, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OPINION RES., available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (national telephone interview of 1514 adults conducted from Aug. 1, 1996 to Aug. 9, 1996). But see Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Noncitizens' Access to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475 (1995) (arguing that, although immigration is a problem, the extent of negative consequences of immigration on the United States has been exaggerated by the government and by voters).
6. Dan Stein, executive director of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), which claims 75,000 members, echoed the feelings of many U.S. citizens in a recent newspaper article when he asked: "Why should [the United States] extend benefits to non-Americans when there isn't enough money for public education and health care, and our taxes keep going up?" David Josar, Push For Citizenship Soars, DET. NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996, at A1. Indeed, according to a poll conducted by Roper and commissioned by Negative Population Growth, Inc., a nonprofit group opposed to the current level of immigration into the United States, 79% of U.S. citizens would like immigration rates scaled back while one-fifth of those polled supported a freeze on all immigration, whether legal or illegal. See Michelle Mittelstadt, Poll: Let in Fewer Immigrants, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 18, 1996, at A4. The National Immigration Forum (NIF), a pro-immigration group, questioned these results because the poll lumps legal and illegal immigration into one category and asks "largely uninformed" respondents to specify a permissible number of immigrants. See id. (quoting Frank Sharry, NIF's executive director). Nevertheless, the poll's results were recently confirmed by an ABC NevislWashington Post poll which indicated that 61% of Americans support a five-year freeze on legal immigration to the United States. See ABC News/Washington Post Poll, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OPINION RES., available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (national telephone interview of 1514 adults conducted from Aug. 1, 1996 to Aug. 9, 1996). But see Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Noncitizens' Access to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475 (1995) (arguing that, although immigration is a problem, the extent of negative consequences of immigration on the United States has been exaggerated by the government and by voters).
7. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. Note that a congressional measure to limit benefits to noncitizens is unlikely to be restrained by U.S. courts since the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to regulate the ebb and flow of immigrants in the United States and to grant or deny government benefits to immigrants. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976) (holding that Congress, which has broad power over immigration and naturalization, has no constitutional duty to provide noncitizens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens).
8. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
10. See Andrés Resilias, Discutirá Congreso sobre doble nacionalidad, REFORMA, Nov. 9, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; The Idea of a Double Nationality Gains Strength, LA PALOMA, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 1. Mexico is primarily governed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has maintained control of the presidency and of both houses of the Mexican Congress for almost 70 years. The Mexican Congress is also comprised of three other parties: the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD), the National Action Party (PAN), and - in the Chamber of Deputies only - the Workers' Party (PT). Mexican confidence in the passage of the DNA was highlighted by Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs José Angel Gurría, who recently stated that the government will probably allow dual nationality to Mexican nationals living abroad. Joel Millman, Following the Immigrants, FORBES, Jan. 1, 1996, at 38. This assertion was recently corroborated by leaders of Mexico's legislature. See Dulce Ruiz de Chávez, Discuten otorgamiento de doble nacionalidad, LA Jornada, Aug. 31, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; see also infra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
11. See Andrés Resilias, Discutirá Congreso sobre doble nacionalidad, REFORMA, Nov. 9, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; The Idea of a Double Nationality Gains Strength, LA PALOMA, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 1. Mexico is primarily governed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has maintained control of the presidency and of both houses of the Mexican Congress for almost 70 years. The Mexican Congress is also comprised of three other parties: the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD), the National Action Party (PAN), and - in the Chamber of Deputies only - the Workers' Party (PT). Mexican confidence in the passage of the DNA was highlighted by Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs José Angel Gurría, who recently stated that the government will probably allow dual nationality to Mexican nationals living abroad. Joel Millman, Following the Immigrants, FORBES, Jan. 1, 1996, at 38. This assertion was recently corroborated by leaders of Mexico's legislature. See Dulce Ruiz de Chávez, Discuten otorgamiento de doble nacionalidad, LA Jornada, Aug. 31, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; see also infra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
12. See Andrés Resilias, Discutirá Congreso sobre doble nacionalidad, REFORMA, Nov. 9, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; The Idea of a Double Nationality Gains Strength, LA PALOMA, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 1. Mexico is primarily governed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has maintained control of the presidency and of both houses of the Mexican Congress for almost 70 years. The Mexican Congress is also comprised of three other parties: the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD), the National Action Party (PAN), and - in the Chamber of Deputies only - the Workers' Party (PT). Mexican confidence in the passage of the DNA was highlighted by Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs José Angel Gurría, who recently stated that the government will probably allow dual nationality to Mexican nationals living abroad. Joel Millman, Following the Immigrants, FORBES, Jan. 1, 1996, at 38. This assertion was recently corroborated by leaders of Mexico's legislature. See Dulce Ruiz de Chávez, Discuten otorgamiento de doble nacionalidad, LA Jornada, Aug. 31, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; see also infra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
13. See Andrés Resilias, Discutirá Congreso sobre doble nacionalidad, REFORMA, Nov. 9, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; The Idea of a Double Nationality Gains Strength, LA PALOMA, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 1. Mexico is primarily governed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has maintained control of the presidency and of both houses of the Mexican Congress for almost 70 years. The Mexican Congress is also comprised of three other parties: the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD), the National Action Party (PAN), and - in the Chamber of Deputies only - the Workers' Party (PT). Mexican confidence in the passage of the DNA was highlighted by Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs José Angel Gurría, who recently stated that the government will probably allow dual nationality to Mexican nationals living abroad. Joel Millman, Following the Immigrants, FORBES, Jan. 1, 1996, at 38. This assertion was recently corroborated by leaders of Mexico's legislature. See Dulce Ruiz de Chávez, Discuten otorgamiento de doble nacionalidad, LA Jornada, Aug. 31, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; see also infra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
14. Several Latin American countries, such as Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Guatemala, have recently approved constitutional amendments to allow their citizens to retain home citizenship when they acquire second citizenship. See Ecuador; Stuck, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1995, at 42; see also, e.g., Adoptan doble nacionalidad, EL NORTH, Oct. 11, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database. Other countries, including Britain, France, and Israel, allow dual nationality for citizens living overseas. See generally Major Andrew D. Stewart, Dual Nationality: Etes-Vous Francais?, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1991, available in WESTLAW, JLR Database (discussing the potential problems posed by France's dual nationality laws).
15. Several Latin American countries, such as Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Guatemala, have recently approved constitutional amendments to allow their citizens to retain home citizenship when they acquire second citizenship. See Ecuador; Stuck, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1995, at 42; see also, e.g., Adoptan doble nacionalidad, EL NORTH, Oct. 11, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database. Other countries, including Britain, France, and Israel, allow dual nationality for citizens living overseas. See generally Major Andrew D. Stewart, Dual Nationality: Etes-Vous Francais?, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1991, available in WESTLAW, JLR Database (discussing the potential problems posed by France's dual nationality laws).
16. Several Latin American countries, such as Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Guatemala, have recently approved constitutional amendments to allow their citizens to retain home citizenship when they acquire second citizenship. See Ecuador; Stuck, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1995, at 42; see also, e.g., Adoptan doble nacionalidad, EL NORTH, Oct. 11, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database. Other countries, including Britain, France, and Israel, allow dual nationality for citizens living overseas. See generally Major Andrew D. Stewart, Dual Nationality: Etes-Vous Francais?, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1991, available in WESTLAW, JLR Database (discussing the potential problems posed by France's dual nationality laws).
17. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [CONST.] tit. I, ch. II, art. 30.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See LEY DE NACIONALIDAD [LAW OF NATIONALITY], art. 14, D.O. 21 de junio de 1993. The residency requirements are waived for foreigners whose offspring are Mexican citizens by birth; foreigners who are from a Latin American or an Iberian country (i.e., Spain and Portugal); and foreigners who are married to Mexican nationals and reside in Mexico. See id. arts. 15-16.
21. See CONST, tit. I, ch. IV, art. 34.
22. See id. art. 35.
23. See id. art. 36.
24. See id.
25. See id. art. 37. A Mexican citizen also loses her nationality when she accepts a foreign country's title of nobility; when she resides for five continuous years in her home foreign country if she is a Mexican national by naturalization; when she passes herself off in any public document as a foreigner if she is a naturalized Mexican; or when she obtains and uses a foreign passport. See id. The wording in Article 37 is very interesting and implies that Mexican nationals by birth may obtain foreign passports and documents, and that the restrictions on passing oneself off in any public document as a foreigner, and on obtaining and using a foreign passport, only nullifies the Mexican nationality of Mexicans by naturalization. See Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Sanchez-Monreal, No. A-1268450, 1964 BIA LEXIS 54; 10 I. & N. Dec. 630 (Mar. 3, 1964) (ruling that a conational of the United States and Mexico at birth who later purchased a house in Mexico in the border/coastline restricted area did not by so doing voluntarily seek or claim Mexican nationality in the absence of a showing he represented himself to be a Mexican or knew that the ownership must be based upon his being a Mexican citizen).
26. See LAW OF NATIONALITY, art. 22.
27. See id. Because of the "essential to gaining or maintaining employment" provision, it could be argued that the Mexican Constitution's nationality provisions do not need to be amended, since "essential" could be interpreted broadly and thereby cover most Mexicans who migrate to the United States for work and naturalize in order to secure their employment in the United States.
28. See LAW OF NATIONALITY, art. 12.
29. See id.
30. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 255 n.2 (1980) (providing a sample of the certificate that must be filled out by Mexican conationals wishing to renounce their foreign nationality).
31. See Cercana la aprobacio"n de la doble nacionalidad: Carrillo Castro, NOTIMEX, Apr. 16, 1995 (visited Nov. 14, 1996) . The amendment was first proposed about a decade ago during discussions among U.S. groups involved with Latino citizenship and politics, according to Antonio Gonzales, president of the Southwest Voter Registration Project, and José Angel Pescador, Mexico's consul general to Los Angeles. See Arthur Golden, Our Crowded Planet: Mexico Slows Growth, More Families Opting for Fewer Children, Cutting Forecasts of Population Gain, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 29, 1994, at A1; see also Georgie Anne Geyer, Mexico's Cynical Push for Adoption of Dual Nationality, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1995, at 19.
32. See Cercana la aprobacio"n de la doble nacionalidad: Carrillo Castro, NOTIMEX, Apr. 16, 1995 (visited Nov. 14, 1996) . The amendment was first proposed about a decade ago during discussions among U.S. groups involved with Latino citizenship and politics, according to Antonio Gonzales, president of the Southwest Voter Registration Project, and José Angel Pescador, Mexico's consul general to Los Angeles. See Arthur Golden, Our Crowded Planet: Mexico Slows Growth, More Families Opting for Fewer Children, Cutting Forecasts of Population Gain, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 29, 1994, at A1; see also Georgie Anne Geyer, Mexico's Cynical Push for Adoption of Dual Nationality, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1995, at 19.
33. See Cercana la aprobacio"n de la doble nacionalidad: Carrillo Castro, NOTIMEX, Apr. 16, 1995 (visited Nov. 14, 1996) . The amendment was first proposed about a decade ago during discussions among U.S. groups involved with Latino citizenship and politics, according to Antonio Gonzales, president of the Southwest Voter Registration Project, and José Angel Pescador, Mexico's consul general to Los Angeles. See Arthur Golden, Our Crowded Planet: Mexico Slows Growth, More Families Opting for Fewer Children, Cutting Forecasts of Population Gain, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 29, 1994, at A1; see also Georgie Anne Geyer, Mexico's Cynical Push for Adoption of Dual Nationality, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1995, at 19.
34. See Se pronuncian PRI, PAN, PRD, y PT en favor de la doble nacionalidad, NOTIMEX, Apr. 25, 1995 (visited Nov. 14, 1996) .
35. Condenan partidos de oposición la político antimigratoria de Clinton, NOTIMEX, May 8, 1996 (visited Nov. 14, 1996) (quoting PAN Senator José Ramon Medina Padilla) (trans. by author).
36. See Miguel Angel Juárez, Próximo, doble nacionalidad, REFORMA, Nov. 21, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database [hereinafter Próxima].
37. See Ismael Romero, Seguirían siendo mexicanos quienes decidan adoptar otra nacionalidad, LA JORNADA, Dec. 4, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database. According to the Mexican Constitution, legislation can originate in either the executive or legislative branch.
38. See id.
39. CONST. art. 135. One influential Mexican senator recently asserted that the DNA votes would be postponed until 1997 to avoid political conflict with the United States during an election year. See Miguel A. Juárez, Militarizatión es para combatir a narcotraficantes, EL NORTE, Jan. 23, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database [hereinafter Militarizatión]; Breves: Estudian doble nacionalidad, REFORMA, Aug. 17, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database.
40. CONST. art. 135. One influential Mexican senator recently asserted that the DNA votes would be postponed until 1997 to avoid political conflict with the United States during an election year. See Miguel A. Juárez, Militarizatión es para combatir a narcotraficantes, EL NORTE, Jan. 23, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database [hereinafter Militarizatión]; Breves: Estudian doble nacionalidad, REFORMA, Aug. 17, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database.
41. According to the Mexican government, if dual citizenship were granted, Mexican cocitizens in the United States could vote in Mexican elections at special booths in Mexican consulates or other Mexican public offices in the United States. See The Idea of a Double Nationality Gains Strength, supra note 7, at 1. The Algerian presidential elections of 1995, during which tens of thousands of Algerian conationals residing in France crammed Algerian consulates and several were injured, should motivate advocates of dual citizenship to plan the logistics of Mexican voting by conationals in the United States carefully. See France to Review Dual Nationality for Algerians, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Nov. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
42. According to the Mexican government, if dual citizenship were granted, Mexican cocitizens in the United States could vote in Mexican elections at special booths in Mexican consulates or other Mexican public offices in the United States. See The Idea of a Double Nationality Gains Strength, supra note 7, at 1. The Algerian presidential elections of 1995, during which tens of thousands of Algerian conationals residing in France crammed Algerian consulates and several were injured, should motivate advocates of dual citizenship to plan the logistics of Mexican voting by conationals in the United States carefully. See France to Review Dual Nationality for Algerians, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Nov. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
43. One likely exception to this prohibition would be employees of Mexican embassies and consulates.
44. See José Ureña, Proyecto para que mexicanos en el extranjero conserven su ciudadania, LA JORNADA, Apr. 5, 1995, at 4.
45. See Philip True, Mexico's New Voting Process Considered a Challenge, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 6, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database. One might reasonably conclude that the Mexican government's grant of voting power to Mexican citizens living abroad would make the debate over nationality versus citizenship in the DNA moot. However, since the passage of the constitutional amendment to allow Mexican citizens abroad to vote, the PRI has continued to back a dual nationality amendment. See Ruiz de Chávez, supra note 7. This continued support for a DNA, as opposed to a dual citizenship amendment, suggests that the Mexican government will exclude conationals from those eligible to vote abroad. In other words, Mexican citizens living abroad could vote in Mexico's presidential elections while out of the country, but would forfeit that right upon acquisition of a second citizenship.
46. See Juárez, Militarización, supra note 29.
47. See David Aponte, SRE: no podrian obtener la doble nacionalidad militares policias, LA JORNADA, July 7, 1995, at 12.
48. Interestingly, the proposed constitutional language does not state explicitly that Mexican conationals living abroad will be denied the right to vote in Mexican elections. Instead, it states that Mexicans by birth (meaning Mexican nationals by birth) will not lose their nationality upon acquisition of a second citizenship. However, Mexican nationality only qualifies an individual for Mexican citizenship, and having the former does not, without more, grant an individual the latter.
49. The proposed amendments to Article 32 would forbid conationals from holding the office of senator, deputy, governor, assemblyperson, supreme court justice, magistrate, or president of the republic. See Próxima, supra note 26. The amendments to Article 32 would also prohibit conationals from serving in the Mexican army during times of peace or in the Mexican navy or air force at any time. See id. Note that if enacted, the DNA would likely affect certain law, codes, and regulations that currently restrict employment in several general areas considered essential to Mexico's well-being to Mexican citizens only. See, e.g., LEY DE LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [LAW OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS], ch. II, art. 9, 29 de junio de 1992, D.O. (requiring that the president of the national Commission of Human Rights possess Mexican citizenship). These areas of Mexican law may require changes if the DNA is approved in a form allowing conationality but not cocitizenship. See Romero, supra note 27 (providing a list of the laws and regulations that might be amended upon passage of the DNA).
50. Jorge A. Cornejo & Alberto Espinosa, Rechazan académicos la propuesta de implantar la doble nacionalidad, LA JORNADA, Nov. 27, 1995, at 3.
51. This complaint was echoed last year by Mexican-Americans in Chicago who, in addition, declared that dual nationality without dual citizenship is a limited solution to the political problems of Mexican-Americans. See Rechazan mexicano-estadunidenses [sic] el plan sobre la doble nacionalidad, LA JORNADA, Apr. 15, 1995, at 12. Though the claim of several levels of citizenship may be true in Mexico, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that there is only one level of U.S. citizenship, regardless of whether a U.S. citizen possesses other citizenship as well. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964).
52. See Juárez, Militarizatión, supra note 29.
53. See Comejo & Espinosa, supra note 38, at 3.
54. The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly deny noncitizens the right to vote. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, § 3, cl. 1, § 4, cl. 1; art. II, § 1, cl. 2; amend. XV; amend. XIX. Noncitizens are nonetheless prohibited from participating in federal public elections. See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993) (discussing the view that the Constitution neither forbids nor compels noncitizen suffrage).
55. See George J. Church, Mexico's Troubles Are Our Troubles, TIME, Mar. 6, 1995, at 34.
56. See John Ward Anderson, As Peso Slips, Mexicans Fear a Repeat of 1994's Economic Crisis, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1996, at A19.
57. See Golden, supra note 23, at A1 (noting that, though Mexico's population growth has slowed, the country remains the eleventh most populous nation on the planet and has a labor market that cannot support its population growth). According to Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), Mexico's 1995 population was approximately 91.1 million. See Mark Fineman, Population of Mexico Doubled in 28 Years, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at A6.
58. From December 1994 to May 1995, for instance, the Mexican unemployment rate nearly doubled from 3.6% to 6.6%. See Unemployment Nearly Doubles to 6.6%, EL FINANCIERO INT'L EDITION, July 24-30, 1995, at 4. However, Mexico's unemployment rate is much higher than official government statistics indicate. According to Pilar Ochoa, an economics researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the Mexican government has tried "to hide the real magnitude of Mexico's unemployment problem" by counting as unemployed only those members of the 36.6 million of the economically active population who work less than one hour per week. Ochoa estimates that approximately one-half of the economically active population in Mexico is "un- or under-employed" while one-third of the economically active population is unemployed. According to Ochoa, of the other 18 million who are employed, approximately half work in the informal sector. See Report Accuses Gov't of Fudging Jobless Figures, EL FINANCIERO INT'L EDITION, Nov. 27-Dec. 3, 1995, at 4. According to press reports, Mexican government officials have acknowledged that the measurement is not an accurate reflection of the unemployment picture. See Unemployment Nearly Doubles to 6.6%, supra, at 4.
59. From December 1994 to May 1995, for instance, the Mexican unemployment rate nearly doubled from 3.6% to 6.6%. See Unemployment Nearly Doubles to 6.6%, EL FINANCIERO INT'L EDITION, July 24-30, 1995, at 4. However, Mexico's unemployment rate is much higher than official government statistics indicate. According to Pilar Ochoa, an economics researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the Mexican government has tried "to hide the real magnitude of Mexico's unemployment problem" by counting as unemployed only those members of the 36.6 million of the economically active population who work less than one hour per week. Ochoa estimates that approximately one-half of the economically active population in Mexico is "un- or under-employed" while one-third of the economically active population is unemployed. According to Ochoa, of the other 18 million who are employed, approximately half work in the informal sector. See Report Accuses Gov't of Fudging Jobless Figures, EL FINANCIERO INT'L EDITION, Nov. 27-Dec. 3, 1995, at 4. According to press reports, Mexican government officials have acknowledged that the measurement is not an accurate reflection of the unemployment picture. See Unemployment Nearly Doubles to 6.6%, supra, at 4.
60. From December 1994 to May 1995, for instance, the Mexican unemployment rate nearly doubled from 3.6% to 6.6%. See Unemployment Nearly Doubles to 6.6%, EL FINANCIERO INT'L EDITION, July 24-30, 1995, at 4. However, Mexico's unemployment rate is much higher than official government statistics indicate. According to Pilar Ochoa, an economics researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the Mexican government has tried "to hide the real magnitude of Mexico's unemployment problem" by counting as unemployed only those members of the 36.6 million of the economically active population who work less than one hour per week. Ochoa estimates that approximately one-half of the economically active population in Mexico is "un- or under-employed" while one-third of the economically active population is unemployed. According to Ochoa, of the other 18 million who are employed, approximately half work in the informal sector. See Report Accuses Gov't of Fudging Jobless Figures, EL FINANCIERO INT'L EDITION, Nov. 27-Dec. 3, 1995, at 4. According to press reports, Mexican government officials have acknowledged that the measurement is not an accurate reflection of the unemployment picture. See Unemployment Nearly Doubles to 6.6%, supra, at 4.
61. A recent study by researchers at the University of Texas at Austin and the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington demonstrates that "even a small downturn in Mexico's economy can result in a significant increase in illegal immigration across the U.S. border." Illegal Immigration Found Sensitive to Mexico Economy, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 16, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database ("When Mexico has a recession, it's not just a trickle of individuals attempting to get across the border, it's a flood."). The Border Patrol made 358, 194 undocumented immigrant arrests along the U.S.-Mexico border in the first quarter of 1995 compared to 276, 325 in the first quarter of 1994. It is generally assumed that for every illegal immigrant arrested at the border, anywhere from two to ten illegal immigrants successfully enter the United States. See Immigration: Tucson or Bust, ECONOMIST, May 20, 1995, at 29. In El Paso, Texas, the Border Patrol reported a 72% drop in illegal immigrant arrests between 1993 and 1994. In the first quarter of 1995, after the Mexican peso collapsed, the number of arrests increased by one-third. See id.
62. A recent study by researchers at the University of Texas at Austin and the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington demonstrates that "even a small downturn in Mexico's economy can result in a significant increase in illegal immigration across the U.S. border." Illegal Immigration Found Sensitive to Mexico Economy, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 16, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database ("When Mexico has a recession, it's not just a trickle of individuals attempting to get across the border, it's a flood."). The Border Patrol made 358, 194 undocumented immigrant arrests along the U.S.-Mexico border in the first quarter of 1995 compared to 276, 325 in the first quarter of 1994. It is generally assumed that for every illegal immigrant arrested at the border, anywhere from two to ten illegal immigrants successfully enter the United States. See Immigration: Tucson or Bust, ECONOMIST, May 20, 1995, at 29. In El Paso, Texas, the Border Patrol reported a 72% drop in illegal immigrant arrests between 1993 and 1994. In the first quarter of 1995, after the Mexican peso collapsed, the number of arrests increased by one-third. See id.
63. Estimates of remittances from Mexicans in the United States to Mexico range from $3.2 billion to $5 billion per year. See, e.g., Ana Maria Argonés, Nuevos lenguages en torno a la migración, LA JORNADA, Apr. 19, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; Richard Estrada, Dual-Citizenship Concerns Overstated by Americans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 26, 1995, at A23. According to the Mexican government, remittances to the Mexican state of Zacatecas alone total approximately $500 million per year. See Bernardo Mendéz Lugo, Zacatecans from California Send More That [sic] Half Billion Dollars Annually to Their State, LA PALOMA, May-June 1995, at 1. About $800 million is remitted to the state of Guanajuato. See Matt Moffett, Political Vacuum: As Mexico's Leader Cedes Some Authority, Power Scramble Begins, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1996, at A6.
64. Estimates of remittances from Mexicans in the United States to Mexico range from $3.2 billion to $5 billion per year. See, e.g., Ana Maria Argonés, Nuevos lenguages en torno a la migración, LA JORNADA, Apr. 19, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; Richard Estrada, Dual-Citizenship Concerns Overstated by Americans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 26, 1995, at A23. According to the Mexican government, remittances to the Mexican state of Zacatecas alone total approximately $500 million per year. See Bernardo Mendéz Lugo, Zacatecans from California Send More That [sic] Half Billion Dollars Annually to Their State, LA PALOMA, May-June 1995, at 1. About $800 million is remitted to the state of Guanajuato. See Matt Moffett, Political Vacuum: As Mexico's Leader Cedes Some Authority, Power Scramble Begins, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1996, at A6.
65. Estimates of remittances from Mexicans in the United States to Mexico range from $3.2 billion to $5 billion per year. See, e.g., Ana Maria Argonés, Nuevos lenguages en torno a la migración, LA JORNADA, Apr. 19, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; Richard Estrada, Dual-Citizenship Concerns Overstated by Americans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 26, 1995, at A23. According to the Mexican government, remittances to the Mexican state of Zacatecas alone total approximately $500 million per year. See Bernardo Mendéz Lugo, Zacatecans from California Send More That [sic] Half Billion Dollars Annually to Their State, LA PALOMA, May-June 1995, at 1. About $800 million is remitted to the state of Guanajuato. See Matt Moffett, Political Vacuum: As Mexico's Leader Cedes Some Authority, Power Scramble Begins, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1996, at A6.
66. Estimates of remittances from Mexicans in the United States to Mexico range from $3.2 billion to $5 billion per year. See, e.g., Ana Maria Argonés, Nuevos lenguages en torno a la migración, LA JORNADA, Apr. 19, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; Richard Estrada, Dual-Citizenship Concerns Overstated by Americans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 26, 1995, at A23. According to the Mexican government, remittances to the Mexican state of Zacatecas alone total approximately $500 million per year. See Bernardo Mendéz Lugo, Zacatecans from California Send More That [sic] Half Billion Dollars Annually to Their State, LA PALOMA, May-June 1995, at 1. About $800 million is remitted to the state of Guanajuato. See Matt Moffett, Political Vacuum: As Mexico's Leader Cedes Some Authority, Power Scramble Begins, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1996, at A6.
67. During the first five months after the December 1994 devaluation, the Mexican minimum wage lost 15.3% of its real value and could buy only 40% of the "basic basket" of consumer goods. From January 1, 1995 to May 1, 1995, the Mexican minimum wage rose only 12% while Mexico's inflation climbed 23% and the cost of the basic basket of goods rose 32%. See Workers Lose 15.3% of Buying Power, EL FINANCIERO INT'L EDITION, July 3-9, 1995, at 4 (citing a study of Mexican purchasing power by the UNAM). Other indicators of Mexican consumers' reduced buying power appeared in retail sales statistics. For example, in April 1995, retail sales in Mexico's principal cities (Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey) were down 32.7% in real terms as compared to the same month in 1994. See Consumers Are Not Buying, Sales Slow, EL FRNANCIERO INT'L EDITION, June 26-July 2, 1995, at 5 (citing statistics from the INEGI).
68. During the first five months after the December 1994 devaluation, the Mexican minimum wage lost 15.3% of its real value and could buy only 40% of the "basic basket" of consumer goods. From January 1, 1995 to May 1, 1995, the Mexican minimum wage rose only 12% while Mexico's inflation climbed 23% and the cost of the basic basket of goods rose 32%. See Workers Lose 15.3% of Buying Power, EL FINANCIERO INT'L EDITION, July 3-9, 1995, at 4 (citing a study of Mexican purchasing power by the UNAM). Other indicators of Mexican consumers' reduced buying power appeared in retail sales statistics. For example, in April 1995, retail sales in Mexico's principal cities (Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey) were down 32.7% in real terms as compared to the same month in 1994. See Consumers Are Not Buying, Sales Slow, EL FRNANCIERO INT'L EDITION, June 26-July 2, 1995, at 5 (citing statistics from the INEGI).
69. See U.S. Growth at Near-Halt, CINCINNATI POST, July 28, 1995, at B7.
70. See Robert Reinhold, The American Dream Is Not True, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 16, 1994, at 12.
71. See, e.g., Patrick Lee, UCLA Study Sees California Regaining Job Employment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1995, at D1.
72. See James E. Garcia, Crux of Immigration Debate: The Economics of Us vs. Them. AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 18, 1996, at D1.
73. Proposition 187, the so-called "Save Our State" (SOS) initiative, denies illegal immigrants access to public education, health care, social services, and law enforcement. See Keith Bradsher et al., The 1994 Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at B11; see also Minty S. Chung, Proposition 187: A Beginner's Tour Through a Recurring Nightmare, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 267 (1995) (providing a succinct and thorough look at Proposition 187 and the history leading up to the measure). Note that Proposition 187 was recently ruled partially unconstitutional by a federal judge. See League of Latino American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding Proposition 187 largely unconstitutional and specifically ruling that undocumented immigrants cannot be questioned about their immigration status when applying to attend public elementary and secondary schools or to receive health and welfare benefits, but that illegal immigrants can be denied higher education benefits).
74. Proposition 187, the so-called "Save Our State" (SOS) initiative, denies illegal immigrants access to public education, health care, social services, and law enforcement. See Keith Bradsher et al., The 1994 Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at B11; see also Minty S. Chung, Proposition 187: A Beginner's Tour Through a Recurring Nightmare, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 267 (1995) (providing a succinct and thorough look at Proposition 187 and the history leading up to the measure). Note that Proposition 187 was recently ruled partially unconstitutional by a federal judge. See League of Latino American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding Proposition 187 largely unconstitutional and specifically ruling that undocumented immigrants cannot be questioned about their immigration status when applying to attend public elementary and secondary schools or to receive health and welfare benefits, but that illegal immigrants can be denied higher education benefits).
75. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 400-32 (1995). Though President Clinton vetoed the bill on February 6, 1996, the House incorporated much of H.R. 4's language into H.R. 2202, the Immigration in the National Interest Act, which it approved by a 333 to 87 vote on March 21, 1996 (the bill has not yet been approved by the full Congress).
76. See Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995, H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. §§ 600-632 (1995) (approved by the House 333-87 on Mar. 21, 1996, but not yet approved by the full Congress).
77. 58 See William Branigin, INS Mustering Forces on Southwestern Border, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at A23; Patrick J. McDonnell & Sebastian Rotella, Military, Police to Aid in New Push by Border Patrol, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at A1. In response to the Clinton Administration's announcement of military reinforcements for the Border Patrol, several Mexican legislators called for intervention by the United Nations and the Organization of American States to stop the United States from putting military personnel along the U.S.-Mexico border. See Alicia Ortiz, Piden que la ONU medie en frontera, EL NORTE, Jan. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database. Shortly thereafter, then-U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry indicated to Mexican Ambassador to the United States Jesús Silva Herzog that the militarization of the border is an attempt to curb drug trafficking and not to stop illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. See Juárez, Militarización, supra note 29.
78. 58 See William Branigin, INS Mustering Forces on Southwestern Border, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at A23; Patrick J. McDonnell & Sebastian Rotella, Military, Police to Aid in New Push by Border Patrol, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at A1. In response to the Clinton Administration's announcement of military reinforcements for the Border Patrol, several Mexican legislators called for intervention by the United Nations and the Organization of American States to stop the United States from putting military personnel along the U.S.-Mexico border. See Alicia Ortiz, Piden que la ONU medie en frontera, EL NORTE, Jan. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database. Shortly thereafter, then-U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry indicated to Mexican Ambassador to the United States Jesús Silva Herzog that the militarization of the border is an attempt to curb drug trafficking and not to stop illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. See Juárez, Militarización, supra note 29.
79. 58 See William Branigin, INS Mustering Forces on Southwestern Border, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at A23; Patrick J. McDonnell & Sebastian Rotella, Military, Police to Aid in New Push by Border Patrol, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at A1. In response to the Clinton Administration's announcement of military reinforcements for the Border Patrol, several Mexican legislators called for intervention by the United Nations and the Organization of American States to stop the United States from putting military personnel along the U.S.-Mexico border. See Alicia Ortiz, Piden que la ONU medie en frontera, EL NORTE, Jan. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database. Shortly thereafter, then-U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry indicated to Mexican Ambassador to the United States Jesús Silva Herzog that the militarization of the border is an attempt to curb drug trafficking and not to stop illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. See Juárez, Militarización, supra note 29.
80. 58 See William Branigin, INS Mustering Forces on Southwestern Border, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at A23; Patrick J. McDonnell & Sebastian Rotella, Military, Police to Aid in New Push by Border Patrol, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at A1. In response to the Clinton Administration's announcement of military reinforcements for the Border Patrol, several Mexican legislators called for intervention by the United Nations and the Organization of American States to stop the United States from putting military personnel along the U.S.-Mexico border. See Alicia Ortiz, Piden que la ONU medie en frontera, EL NORTE, Jan. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database. Shortly thereafter, then-U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry indicated to Mexican Ambassador to the United States Jesús Silva Herzog that the militarization of the border is an attempt to curb drug trafficking and not to stop illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. See Juárez, Militarización, supra note 29.
81. 58 See William Branigin, INS Mustering Forces on Southwestern Border, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at A23; Patrick J. McDonnell & Sebastian Rotella, Military, Police to Aid in New Push by Border Patrol, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at A1. In response to the Clinton Administration's announcement of military reinforcements for the Border Patrol, several Mexican legislators called for intervention by the United Nations and the Organization of American States to stop the United States from putting military personnel along the U.S.-Mexico border. See Alicia Ortiz, Piden que la ONU medie en frontera, EL NORTE, Jan. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database. Shortly thereafter, then-U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry indicated to Mexican Ambassador to the United States Jesús Silva Herzog that the militarization of the border is an attempt to curb drug trafficking and not to stop illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. See Juárez, Militarización, supra note 29.
82. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
83. See Dang Milbank, Welfare-Overhaul Legislation, Devised by Republicans, Is Signed by President, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1996, at A3; The White House: Statement by the President - Law H.R. 3734, M2 PRESSWIRE, Aug. 23, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
84. See Dang Milbank, Welfare-Overhaul Legislation, Devised by Republicans, Is Signed by President, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1996, at A3; The White House: Statement by the President - Law H.R. 3734, M2 PRESSWIRE, Aug. 23, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
85. UNAM Professor of Political Science Jorge Castañeda's analysis of Central American countries' attitudes toward their repatriated citizens sheds light on the likely Mexican attitude towards Mexicans returning from the United States to Mexico: "The last thing they want to face is the prospect of vast numbers of returnees clamoring for jobs, land, services and repatriations - and, worse, a potentially destabilizing voice in politics." See Jorge G. Castãeda, U.S. Policy Shifts Wake Up the Neighbors, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at B5.
86. This analysis is consistent with the conclusions reached by Professor Rodolfo de la Garza, vice-president of the Tomas Rivera Center, an Austin, Texas-based Hispanic think tank. See Estrada, supra note 48, at A23.
87. See La doble nacionalidad protegerá a mexicanos en EU: senadores, NOTIMEX, Apr. 23, 1995 (on file with author and with the Stanford Journal of International Law). Indeed, within the past year, the Mexican government has increased its efforts to protect Mexican nationals in the United States. For example, José Angel Pescador Osuna, the Mexican Consul in Los Angeles, recently announced that the Mexican government will fund a program designed to give free legal advice to Mexican citizens in the United States. The program is run by the Mexican-American Bar Association in Los Angeles and provides each client up to eight hours of free legal advice. See Debe ampliarse la protección a migrantes: Pescador Osuna, LA JORNADA, Dec. 1, 1995, at 14.
88. See La doble nacionalidad protegerá a mexicanos en EU: senadores, NOTIMEX, Apr. 23, 1995 (on file with author and with the Stanford Journal of International Law). Indeed, within the past year, the Mexican government has increased its efforts to protect Mexican nationals in the United States. For example, José Angel Pescador Osuna, the Mexican Consul in Los Angeles, recently announced that the Mexican government will fund a program designed to give free legal advice to Mexican citizens in the United States. The program is run by the Mexican-American Bar Association in Los Angeles and provides each client up to eight hours of free legal advice. See Debe ampliarse la protección a migrantes: Pescador Osuna, LA JORNADA, Dec. 1, 1995, at 14.
89. In fact, the Mexican government's assertion of human rights motivations loses credibility when its own record on human rights is examined. See, e.g., Dianne Sous, Mexico Has Its Own Border 'Nightmare,' WALL ST. J., May 1, 1996, at A11 (describing human rights abuses committed by Mexican authorities against Central American illegal immigrants to Mexico); Craig Torres, Mexico Hard-Liner, in Massacre Probe, Plans to Take Leave, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1996, at A8 (detailing allegations of government involvement in peasant massacres in the Mexican state of Guerrero).
90. In fact, the Mexican government's assertion of human rights motivations loses credibility when its own record on human rights is examined. See, e.g., Dianne Sous, Mexico Has Its Own Border 'Nightmare,' WALL ST. J., May 1, 1996, at A11 (describing human rights abuses committed by Mexican authorities against Central American illegal immigrants to Mexico); Craig Torres, Mexico Hard-Liner, in Massacre Probe, Plans to Take Leave, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1996, at A8 (detailing allegations of government involvement in peasant massacres in the Mexican state of Guerrero).
91. See DAVID HEER, UNDOCUMENTED MEXICANS IN THE UNTIED STATES 194 (1990).
92. See ROBERT A. PASTOR & JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA, LIMITS TO FRIENDSHIP: THE UNTTED STATES AND MEXICO 316 (1988); see also Patrick J. McDonnell, Mexico Rebukes Wilson over Immigrant Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at A6 (responding to California Governor Pete Wilson's request in a letter on Aug. 30, 1993, that then-Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari help seal the border against illegal entries, then-Mexican Foreign Relations Secretary Fernando Solana stated that to do so would violate the Mexican Constitution: "The proposal you make that Mexico help impede the flow of persons toward our border is unacceptable.").
93. See ROBERT A. PASTOR & JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA, LIMITS TO FRIENDSHIP: THE UNTTED STATES AND MEXICO 316 (1988); see also Patrick J. McDonnell, Mexico Rebukes Wilson over Immigrant Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at A6 (responding to California Governor Pete Wilson's request in a letter on Aug. 30, 1993, that then-Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari help seal the border against illegal entries, then-Mexican Foreign Relations Secretary Fernando Solana stated that to do so would violate the Mexican Constitution: "The proposal you make that Mexico help impede the flow of persons toward our border is unacceptable.").
94. See Frank Trejo, Mexican Immigrants Lobby for 'Dual Citizenship,' DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
95. A recent survey of Latin American permanent residents and citizens of the
96. A recent survey of Latin American permanent residents and citizens of the United States, entitled the National Latino Immigration Survey (NLIS), indicates that over 77% of Mexican legal permanent residents of the U.S. eligible for U.S. citizenship had not chosen to acquire U.S. citizenship as of the time they were surveyed. See HARRY PACHON & LOUIS DESIPIO, NEW AMERICANS BY CHOICE 65 (1994). Even with the Clinton Administration's recent push for increased naturalization by legal residents of the United States, reports indicate that the number of Mexicans naturalizing still remains below that of other immigrant groups. See, e.g., Carolyn Jung, Citizenship Classes Inundated, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept 16, 1996, at 1A (reporting that while the number of Vietnamese-Americans in citizenship classes held by Catholic Charities of Santa Clara County, California, "has skyrocketed 100% in the past month," the number of Latinos, which likely includes mostly Mexican-Americans, has increased by 50%). Nonetheless, if current trends continue, the Mexican government may decide that the DNA is an unnecessary step, since many of those Mexican-Americans it wishes would naturalize will have already done so. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) created approximately two to five million permanent legal Mexican residents of the United States, and some estimates indicate that up to seven million Mexicans are permanent U.S. residents eligible for naturalization. See Frank Trejo, Citizenship Campaign Targets 10 Million Immigrants, DALLAS MORNTNG NEWS, Mar. 16, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; see also Louis Freedberg, Citizenship Wave Surprises INS, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1995, at A1 (stating that more than 3 million permanent residents are eligible for citizenship under the IRCA); Jenifer Mena, INS to Encourage Legal Residents to Become Citizens, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 17, 1994, at 30 (putting the figure at 2.5 million).
97. A recent survey of Latin American permanent residents and citizens of the United States, entitled the National Latino Immigration Survey (NLIS), indicates that over 77% of Mexican legal permanent residents of the U.S. eligible for U.S. citizenship had not chosen to acquire U.S. citizenship as of the time they were surveyed. See HARRY PACHON & LOUIS DESIPIO, NEW AMERICANS BY CHOICE 65 (1994). Even with the Clinton Administration's recent push for increased naturalization by legal residents of the United States, reports indicate that the number of Mexicans naturalizing still remains below that of other immigrant groups. See, e.g., Carolyn Jung, Citizenship Classes Inundated, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept 16, 1996, at 1A (reporting that while the number of Vietnamese-Americans in citizenship classes held by Catholic Charities of Santa Clara County, California, "has skyrocketed 100% in the past month," the number of Latinos, which likely includes mostly Mexican-Americans, has increased by 50%). Nonetheless, if current trends continue, the Mexican government may decide that the DNA is an unnecessary step, since many of those Mexican-Americans it wishes would naturalize will have already done so. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) created approximately two to five million permanent legal Mexican residents of the United States, and some estimates indicate that up to seven million Mexicans are permanent U.S. residents eligible for naturalization. See Frank Trejo, Citizenship Campaign Targets 10 Million Immigrants, DALLAS MORNTNG NEWS, Mar. 16, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; see also Louis Freedberg, Citizenship Wave Surprises INS, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1995, at A1 (stating that more than 3 million permanent residents are eligible for citizenship under the IRCA); Jenifer Mena, INS to Encourage Legal Residents to Become Citizens, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 17, 1994, at 30 (putting the figure at 2.5 million).
98. A recent survey of Latin American permanent residents and citizens of the United States, entitled the National Latino Immigration Survey (NLIS), indicates that over 77% of Mexican legal permanent residents of the U.S. eligible for U.S. citizenship had not chosen to acquire U.S. citizenship as of the time they were surveyed. See HARRY PACHON & LOUIS DESIPIO, NEW AMERICANS BY CHOICE 65 (1994). Even with the Clinton Administration's recent push for increased naturalization by legal residents of the United States, reports indicate that the number of Mexicans naturalizing still remains below that of other immigrant groups. See, e.g., Carolyn Jung, Citizenship Classes Inundated, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept 16, 1996, at 1A (reporting that while the number of Vietnamese-Americans in citizenship classes held by Catholic Charities of Santa Clara County, California, "has skyrocketed 100% in the past month," the number of Latinos, which likely includes mostly Mexican-Americans, has increased by 50%). Nonetheless, if current trends continue, the Mexican government may decide that the DNA is an unnecessary step, since many of those Mexican-Americans it wishes would naturalize will have already done so. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) created approximately two to five million permanent legal Mexican residents of the United States, and some estimates indicate that up to seven million Mexicans are permanent U.S. residents eligible for naturalization. See Frank Trejo, Citizenship Campaign Targets 10 Million Immigrants, DALLAS MORNTNG NEWS, Mar. 16, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; see also Louis Freedberg, Citizenship Wave Surprises INS, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1995, at A1 (stating that more than 3 million permanent residents are eligible for citizenship under the IRCA); Jenifer Mena, INS to Encourage Legal Residents to Become Citizens, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 17, 1994, at 30 (putting the figure at 2.5 million).
99. A recent survey of Latin American permanent residents and citizens of the United States, entitled the National Latino Immigration Survey (NLIS), indicates that over 77% of Mexican legal permanent residents of the U.S. eligible for U.S. citizenship had not chosen to acquire U.S. citizenship as of the time they were surveyed. See HARRY PACHON & LOUIS DESIPIO, NEW AMERICANS BY CHOICE 65 (1994). Even with the Clinton Administration's recent push for increased naturalization by legal residents of the United States, reports indicate that the number of Mexicans naturalizing still remains below that of other immigrant groups. See, e.g., Carolyn Jung, Citizenship Classes Inundated, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept 16, 1996, at 1A (reporting that while the number of Vietnamese-Americans in citizenship classes held by Catholic Charities of Santa Clara County, California, "has skyrocketed 100% in the past month," the number of Latinos, which likely includes mostly Mexican-Americans, has increased by 50%). Nonetheless, if current trends continue, the Mexican government may decide that the DNA is an unnecessary step, since many of those Mexican-Americans it wishes would naturalize will have already done so. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) created approximately two to five million permanent legal Mexican residents of the United States, and some estimates indicate that up to seven million Mexicans are permanent U.S. residents eligible for naturalization. See Frank Trejo, Citizenship Campaign Targets 10 Million Immigrants, DALLAS MORNTNG NEWS, Mar. 16, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; see also Louis Freedberg, Citizenship Wave Surprises INS, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1995, at A1 (stating that more than 3 million permanent residents are eligible for citizenship under the IRCA); Jenifer Mena, INS to Encourage Legal Residents to Become Citizens, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 17, 1994, at 30 (putting the figure at 2.5 million).
100. Indeed, during that period, Mexicans constituted the fourth least likely national group to naturalize to U.S. citizenship behind Italians (15.7%), Germans (13.9%), and Canadians (12.9%). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1993 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 130 (1994) [hereinafter INS 1993 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
101. See PACHON & DESIPIO, supra note 68, at 100.
102. Robert Rodriguez & Patrisia Gonzales, Cultural Idea for Citizenship Is Catching On, FRESNO BEE, May 15, 1995, at B5; see also Andrew Downie, Why Mexico Can't Forget, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database ("For generations, Mexican governments refused to consider the concept [of dual nationality], believing one must devote oneself solely to [Mexico, a] fiercely nationalistic nation."). According to a 1995 survey, 24% of Mexican residents of the United States would feel disloyal to Mexico if they acquired U.S. citizenship. See Pide la CMDH que enmienda sea retroactiva, REFORMA, Dec. 11, 1995, at 17, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database.
103. Robert Rodriguez & Patrisia Gonzales, Cultural Idea for Citizenship Is Catching On, FRESNO BEE, May 15, 1995, at B5; see also Andrew Downie, Why Mexico Can't Forget, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database ("For generations, Mexican governments refused to consider the concept [of dual nationality], believing one must devote oneself solely to [Mexico, a] fiercely nationalistic nation."). According to a 1995 survey, 24% of Mexican residents of the United States would feel disloyal to Mexico if they acquired U.S. citizenship. See Pide la CMDH que enmienda sea retroactiva, REFORMA, Dec. 11, 1995, at 17, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database.
104. Robert Rodriguez & Patrisia Gonzales, Cultural Idea for Citizenship Is Catching On, FRESNO BEE, May 15, 1995, at B5; see also Andrew Downie, Why Mexico Can't Forget, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database ("For generations, Mexican governments refused to consider the concept [of dual nationality], believing one must devote oneself solely to [Mexico, a] fiercely nationalistic nation."). According to a 1995 survey, 24% of Mexican residents of the United States would feel disloyal to Mexico if they acquired U.S. citizenship. See Pide la CMDH que enmienda sea retroactiva, REFORMA, Dec. 11, 1995, at 17, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database.
105. According to the NLIS, over one-fifth of Mexican permanent residents of the United States highlighted their desire to keep land in Mexico as a "very important" reason for not seeking U.S. citizenship. See PACHON & DESIPIO, supra note 68, at 100.
106. See CONST, tit. I, ch. I, art. 27. According to the Mexican Consul General in Los Angeles, "at least 25% of the Mexicans eligible for U.S. citizenship own real estate within the [border/shoreline restricted areas]." Arthur Golden, Mexico Encourages U.S. Citizenship, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIE., July 1, 1995, at A1.
107. The fear Mexican residents of the United States have of returning to Mexico is probably overstated. A recent national survey of Latin American immigrants indicated that over 98% of the Mexican legal residents and naturalized Mexican citizens in the United States planned to remain in the United States permanently. Over 84% of the respondents believed that "life was better" in the United States than in Mexico. See PACHON & DESIPIO, supra note 68, at 90-91. The Mexican government has denied that the_ DNA is an invitation by the Mexican government for Mexican residents of the United States to naturalize as U.S. citizens. See Aponte, supra note 35, at 12.
108. See Rodriguez & Gonzales, supra note 71, at B5.
109. In addition to the DNA, the Mexican government is also strengthening its efforts to create a "home away from home" for Mexican residents of the United States by providing them with legal assistance, cultural events, and business advice. In an interview with the San Diego Union-Tribune, Mexico's Foreign Minister José Angel Gurria summarized the Mexican government's efforts to strengthen its relations with Mexicans living in the United States: We have a network of 40-odd consulates and we are opening more. . . . The [protection of Mexican nationals in the U.S.] must be discharged however, with an attitude of full cooperation with local authorities and strict adherence to local laws and regulations. . . . The whole idea is to work with the community, to work with the authorities in order to solve the problems. Secretariá de Relaciones Exteriores, Entrevista concedida por el Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, José Angel Gúrria, al diario estadounidense San Diego Union-Tribune, y publicada en su edición de agosto 13, 1995 (visited Nov. 19, 1996) . This effort is in line with the fourth of the Mexican government's five most important foreign policy goals: strengthening the ties between Mexico and Mexicans living abroad. See José Angel Gurría, Palabras del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, José Angel Gurria, al comparecer ante el Senado de la República, Dec. 13, 1995 (visited Nov. 19, 1996).
110. In addition to the DNA, the Mexican government is also strengthening its efforts to create a "home away from home" for Mexican residents of the United States by providing them with legal assistance, cultural events, and business advice. In an interview with the San Diego Union-Tribune, Mexico's Foreign Minister José Angel Gurria summarized the Mexican government's efforts to strengthen its relations with Mexicans living in the United States: We have a network of 40-odd consulates and we are opening more. . . . The [protection of Mexican nationals in the U.S.] must be discharged however, with an attitude of full cooperation with local authorities and strict adherence to local laws and regulations. . . . The whole idea is to work with the community, to work with the authorities in order to solve the problems. Secretariá de Relaciones Exteriores, Entrevista concedida por el Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, José Angel Gúrria, al diario estadounidense San Diego Union-Tribune, y publicada en su edición de agosto 13, 1995 (visited Nov. 19, 1996) . This effort is in line with the fourth of the Mexican government's five most important foreign policy goals: strengthening the ties between Mexico and Mexicans living abroad. See José Angel Gurría, Palabras del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, José Angel Gurria, al comparecer ante el Senado de la República, Dec. 13, 1995 (visited Nov. 19, 1996).
111. See PACHON & DESIPIO, supra note 68, at 100. Note that even if the DNA is approved, U.S. law dictates that "a dual national is never entitled to invoke the protection or assistance of one of the two countries while within the other country." U.S. v. Matheson, 400 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 809, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 823. The proposed reforms to the Mexican Constitution contain a similar provision amending Article 37 to establish that, while on Mexican territory, a Mexican citizen possessing a second nationality shall not be able to invoke the diplomatic protection of the country in which she possesses a second nationality. See Próxima, supra note 26.
112. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down a regulation issued by the Civil Service Commission which barred resident aliens from jobs in the federal Civil Service, though the ban would not necessarily have been invalid if established directly by the President or by Congress); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (ruling that states may not prevent resident aliens from practicing law); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that states cannot deny welfare benefits to aliens). But see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 680-87 (1991) (indicating that several state laws prohibiting legal residents from holding state government positions have been upheld by the Supreme Court, and discussing Congress' virtually plenary power to address immigrant-related issues as it wishes); see also PACHON & DESIPIO, supra note 68, at 6 (discussing noncitizens' ineligibility for elective office, jury duty, and other benefits).
113. See David Aponte, SRE: Casi 7 millones de mexicanos elegibles para ser ciudadanos de EU, LA JORNADA, Apr. 30, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database (citing documents obtained from Mexico's Secretariat of Foreign Relations).
114. "Residents" and "legal residents" will be used passim when referring to immigrants lawfully admitted for permanent residence under federal U.S. immigration law, or "lawful permanent residents." See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1994) [hereinafter INA]. Legal residents of the United States must maintain residence in the United States, present proper documentation upon reentry to the United States, file income tax returns, and register with the Selective Service System; this last requirement applies only to 18 to 25 year-old male legal residents. See Olivia T. Ibarra, Maintaining Residence and Citizen Issues, 486 PLI/Lrr 95 (1993).
115. See note 42, supra. The U.S. policy of prohibiting legal residents from voting has been challenged by several authors including Mexican scholar Jorge Castañeda. See Jorge G. Castañeda, Mexico and California: The Paradox of Tolerance and Democratization, in THE MEXICAN SHOCK 13, 30 (1995).
116. Indeed, the Mexican government's current attempts to forge closer ties with Mexican-Americans is a sharp policy reversal which comes "after decades in which successive [Mexican] governments either ignored Mexican expatriates [in the United States] or referred to them as pochos, or cultural traitors." Sam Dillon, Mexico Woos U.S. Mexicans, Proposing Dual Nationality, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995, at 10.
117. See Symposium, Comments by Manuel Romero: American Dream Immigrant Reality, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 139, 139 n.1 (Winter 1994) (indicating support for the NAFTA by the Latino Caucus, which counts such influential groups as the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) among its members); see also, e.g., Debra Beachy, Mexico Targets Hispanic-Owned Firms to Push Treaty, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; Gracie G. Saenz & Domingo A. Garcia, Advance Free Trade, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 16, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database. But see James R. Owen, U.S. Hispanics Ambivalent on Free-Trade Pact, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Sept. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (indicating Mexican-American ambivalence over the NAFTA, especially among Mexican-American labor groups). President Zedillo advocated the creation of a Mexican-American lobby with "political influence similar to that of American Jews" in a 1995 speech delivered to Mexican-American politicians in Dallas, Texas. Dillon, supra note 82, at 10.
118. See Symposium, Comments by Manuel Romero: American Dream Immigrant Reality, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 139, 139 n.1 (Winter 1994) (indicating support for the NAFTA by the Latino Caucus, which counts such influential groups as the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) among its members); see also, e.g., Debra Beachy, Mexico Targets Hispanic-Owned Firms to Push Treaty, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; Gracie G. Saenz & Domingo A. Garcia, Advance Free Trade, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 16, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database. But see James R. Owen, U.S. Hispanics Ambivalent on Free-Trade Pact, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Sept. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (indicating Mexican-American ambivalence over the NAFTA, especially among Mexican-American labor groups). President Zedillo advocated the creation of a Mexican-American lobby with "political influence similar to that of American Jews" in a 1995 speech delivered to Mexican-American politicians in Dallas, Texas. Dillon, supra note 82, at 10.
119. See Symposium, Comments by Manuel Romero: American Dream Immigrant Reality, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 139, 139 n.1 (Winter 1994) (indicating support for the NAFTA by the Latino Caucus, which counts such influential groups as the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) among its members); see also, e.g., Debra Beachy, Mexico Targets Hispanic-Owned Firms to Push Treaty, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; Gracie G. Saenz & Domingo A. Garcia, Advance Free Trade, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 16, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database. But see James R. Owen, U.S. Hispanics Ambivalent on Free-Trade Pact, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Sept. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (indicating Mexican-American ambivalence over the NAFTA, especially among Mexican-American labor groups). President Zedillo advocated the creation of a Mexican-American lobby with "political influence similar to that of American Jews" in a 1995 speech delivered to Mexican-American politicians in Dallas, Texas. Dillon, supra note 82, at 10.
120. See Symposium, Comments by Manuel Romero: American Dream Immigrant Reality, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 139, 139 n.1 (Winter 1994) (indicating support for the NAFTA by the Latino Caucus, which counts such influential groups as the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) among its members); see also, e.g., Debra Beachy, Mexico Targets Hispanic-Owned Firms to Push Treaty, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; Gracie G. Saenz & Domingo A. Garcia, Advance Free Trade, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 16, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database. But see James R. Owen, U.S. Hispanics Ambivalent on Free-Trade Pact, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Sept. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (indicating Mexican-American ambivalence over the NAFTA, especially among Mexican-American labor groups). President Zedillo advocated the creation of a Mexican-American lobby with "political influence similar to that of American Jews" in a 1995 speech delivered to Mexican-American politicians in Dallas, Texas. Dillon, supra note 82, at 10.
121. One surprising example of the Mexican government's efforts to strengthen ties between Mexican-Americans and Mexico is the 1995 intervention by Mexican trade officials on behalf of 235 Hispanic former employees of Sprint Corp. The officials intervened after Sprint shut down a San Francisco telemarketing unit and fired the Hispanic employees as they were preparing to vote on whether to join the Communications Workers of America (CWA). Mexican trade officials took the case to the U.S. Department of Labor under the authority of the NAFTA's labor side agreement, which allows signatories to scrutinize the enforcement of one another's labor laws. The agreement was designed primarily to let the United States monitor the treatment of workers in Mexico. Francisco Hemandez Juárez, president of the Mexican telephone workers union, which persuaded the Mexican government to act on the Sprint workers' behalf, said his organization got involved in part because the fired workers were mostly Mexican immigrants "who hadn't received much attention from U.S. unions." Leon E. Wynter, Union in Mexico Aids U.S. Workers via NAFTA, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1995, at B1. Other efforts by the Mexican government to strengthen ties between Mexico and Mexican-Americans include literacy classes for Mexican lettuce pickers in the United States, business advice for Mexican-American entrepreneurs, and soccer leagues for Mexican-American youths. See Alfred Corchado, Zedillo Seeking Closer Ties with Mexican-Americans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 8, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
122. One surprising example of the Mexican government's efforts to strengthen ties between Mexican-Americans and Mexico is the 1995 intervention by Mexican trade officials on behalf of 235 Hispanic former employees of Sprint Corp. The officials intervened after Sprint shut down a San Francisco telemarketing unit and fired the Hispanic employees as they were preparing to vote on whether to join the Communications Workers of America (CWA). Mexican trade officials took the case to the U.S. Department of Labor under the authority of the NAFTA's labor side agreement, which allows signatories to scrutinize the enforcement of one another's labor laws. The agreement was designed primarily to let the United States monitor the treatment of workers in Mexico. Francisco Hemandez Juárez, president of the Mexican telephone workers union, which persuaded the Mexican government to act on the Sprint workers' behalf, said his organization got involved in part because the fired workers were mostly Mexican immigrants "who hadn't received much attention from U.S. unions." Leon E. Wynter, Union in Mexico Aids U.S. Workers via NAFTA, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1995, at B1. Other efforts by the Mexican government to strengthen ties between Mexico and Mexican-Americans include literacy classes for Mexican lettuce pickers in the United States, business advice for Mexican-American entrepreneurs, and soccer leagues for Mexican-American youths. See Alfred Corchado, Zedillo Seeking Closer Ties with Mexican-Americans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 8, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
123. See Mark Fineman, Mexican Congress Drafting Dual-Nationality Amendment, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1995, at A8 (citing "several U.S. analysts" who suspect Mexico's hidden agenda in supporting the DNA is influencing U.S. elections in Mexico's favor). But see El proyecto de doble ciudadanía no tiene fines politicos en EU, LA JORNADA, Dec. 11, 1995, at 7 (quoting Mexican Foreign Secretary José Angel Gurŕa who stated that Mexico's dual nationality initiative is not an effort to influence U.S. elections or U.S. relations with Mexico).
124. See Mark Fineman, Mexican Congress Drafting Dual-Nationality Amendment, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1995, at A8 (citing "several U.S. analysts" who suspect Mexico's hidden agenda in supporting the DNA is influencing U.S. elections in Mexico's favor). But see El proyecto de doble ciudadanía no tiene fines politicos en EU, LA JORNADA, Dec. 11, 1995, at 7 (quoting Mexican Foreign Secretary José Angel Gurŕa who stated that Mexico's dual nationality initiative is not an effort to influence U.S. elections or U.S. relations with Mexico).
125. See Trejo, supra note 68.
126. See Teresa Puente, Mexicans Here Back Dual Nationality Plan; Increased Political Vote Is the Goal, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1995, at 2.
127. See id. (quoting Daniel Solis, executive director of the United Neighborhood Association of Chicago, which registers immigrants for citizenship).
128. According to Charles Wheeler, director of the National Immigration Law Center, recent immigrants often dislike the next wave of immigrants and many join the Republican party, which is more closely aligned with anti-immigrant sentiment than the Democratic party: "They say, 'We're aboard the boat. Pull up the ladders.'" Arthur Golden, Mexico Encourages U.S. Citizenship, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jul.1, 1995, at Al. But see Samuel Francis, Maybe Mexico Just Wants a Couple Old Provinces Back, WASH. TIMES, June 20, 1995, at A19 (quoting sociologist Jorge Bustamante, who stated in an interview that "Mexican-Americans tend to vote Democratic"). It is difficult to see if the above two sources are actually contradictory since the Golden article only states that all recent immigrants-and not specifically Mexican immigrants - are anti-immigrant. Meanwhile, the Francis piece discusses only Mexican-Americans, who may or may not be recent immigrants. The two articles do, however, high-light the difficulty of pinpointing exactly where Mexican-Americans will stand on immigration in future years. As one commentator recently observed, "[The DNA] will not ensure that everybody will apply for citizenship, that they will vote, that they will vote along the lines of what we in Mexico would prefer, let alone what the government would prefer. " Mark Fineman, Mexican Citizens May Gain Right to Dual Nationality, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at A1 (quoting sociologist Jorge Bustamante).
129. According to Charles Wheeler, director of the National Immigration Law Center, recent immigrants often dislike the next wave of immigrants and many join the Republican party, which is more closely aligned with anti-immigrant sentiment than the Democratic party: "They say, 'We're aboard the boat. Pull up the ladders.'" Arthur Golden, Mexico Encourages U.S. Citizenship, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jul.1, 1995, at Al. But see Samuel Francis, Maybe Mexico Just Wants a Couple Old Provinces Back, WASH. TIMES, June 20, 1995, at A19 (quoting sociologist Jorge Bustamante, who stated in an interview that "Mexican-Americans tend to vote Democratic"). It is difficult to see if the above two sources are actually contradictory since the Golden article only states that all recent immigrants-and not specifically Mexican immigrants - are anti-immigrant. Meanwhile, the Francis piece discusses only Mexican-Americans, who may or may not be recent immigrants. The two articles do, however, high-light the difficulty of pinpointing exactly where Mexican-Americans will stand on immigration in future years. As one commentator recently observed, "[The DNA] will not ensure that everybody will apply for citizenship, that they will vote, that they will vote along the lines of what we in Mexico would prefer, let alone what the government would prefer. " Mark Fineman, Mexican Citizens May Gain Right to Dual Nationality, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at A1 (quoting sociologist Jorge Bustamante).
130. According to Charles Wheeler, director of the National Immigration Law Center, recent immigrants often dislike the next wave of immigrants and many join the Republican party, which is more closely aligned with anti-immigrant sentiment than the Democratic party: "They say, 'We're aboard the boat. Pull up the ladders.'" Arthur Golden, Mexico Encourages U.S. Citizenship, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jul.1, 1995, at Al. But see Samuel Francis, Maybe Mexico Just Wants a Couple Old Provinces Back, WASH. TIMES, June 20, 1995, at A19 (quoting sociologist Jorge Bustamante, who stated in an interview that "Mexican-Americans tend to vote Democratic"). It is difficult to see if the above two sources are actually contradictory since the Golden article only states that all recent immigrants-and not specifically Mexican immigrants - are anti-immigrant. Meanwhile, the Francis piece discusses only Mexican-Americans, who may or may not be recent immigrants. The two articles do, however, high-light the difficulty of pinpointing exactly where Mexican-Americans will stand on immigration in future years. As one commentator recently observed, "[The DNA] will not ensure that everybody will apply for citizenship, that they will vote, that they will vote along the lines of what we in Mexico would prefer, let alone what the government would prefer. " Mark Fineman, Mexican Citizens May Gain Right to Dual Nationality, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at A1 (quoting sociologist Jorge Bustamante).
131. See Howard LaFranchi, Mexico Offers Retort to US Anti-Immigrant Moves, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 7, 1995, at 1. This poll presents the possibility that Mexican-American votes might vary by the Mexican-American individual's state of residence. The poll's results are consistent with a 1983 poll of Hispanic citizens conducted by Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart and Republican pollster V. Lance Tarrance which found that 63% of Hispanic citizens wanted major funding increases for Border Patrol efforts to stop illegal immigration to the United States; 66% of Hispanic citizens favored penalties and fines for employers who hired illegal immigrants; and only 12% of Hispanic citizens felt that the United States should admit higher levels of legal immigrants from Mexico. See RICHARD D. LAMM & GARY IMHOFF, THE IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB: THE FRAGMENTING OF AMERICA 17-18 (1990) (on file with author and with the Stanford Journal of International Law). However, these polls are often misleading and should be looked at very carefully. For example, the definition of "Hispanic" in the Hart and Tarrance poll could be questioned for its accuracy in portraying Mexican-American opinions.
132. See Howard LaFranchi, Mexico Offers Retort to US Anti-Immigrant Moves, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 7, 1995, at 1. This poll presents the possibility that Mexican-American votes might vary by the Mexican-American individual's state of residence. The poll's results are consistent with a 1983 poll of Hispanic citizens conducted by Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart and Republican pollster V. Lance Tarrance which found that 63% of Hispanic citizens wanted major funding increases for Border Patrol efforts to stop illegal immigration to the United States; 66% of Hispanic citizens favored penalties and fines for employers who hired illegal immigrants; and only 12% of Hispanic citizens felt that the United States should admit higher levels of legal immigrants from Mexico. See RICHARD D. LAMM & GARY IMHOFF, THE IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB: THE FRAGMENTING OF AMERICA 17-18 (1990) (on file with author and with the Stanford Journal of International Law). However, these polls are often misleading and should be looked at very carefully. For example, the definition of "Hispanic" in the Hart and Tarrance poll could be questioned for its accuracy in portraying Mexican-American opinions.
133. See Verne G. Kopytoff, Hispanic Agents Face Hurdles on Border Patrol, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1996, at A24.
134. See Citizenship Debate: "I Will Never Stop Being Mexican," L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1995, at B7.
135. See Dillon, supra note 82, at 10.
136. This section assumes that U.S. law on dual nationality remains as it was as of the time this Note was edited, and that the Mexican DNA will only have the effect of allowing dual U.S.-Mexican nationality and will not change the Mexican Constitution in any other way.
137. See Fineman, supra note 85, at A1.
138. See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (1996).
139. See Pide la CMDH que enmienda sea retroactiva, supra note 71, at 17. According to the Mexican consulate in San Francisco, this would probably be done in the United States through consular offices where U.S. citizens wishing to acquire Mexican nationality would fill out a form making such a request.
140. See CONST, art. 30 (stating that individuals born to one or more Mexican parents outside of Mexico are considered Mexicans by birth).
141. Of the approximately 23 million Hispanics in the United States, over 64%, or 14.6 million, are Mexican-Americans, a figure estimated to increase significantly by the year 2000. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1995 POPULATION PROFILES OF THE UNITED STATES 8, 46-47 (1995) [hereinafter POPULATION PROFILES OF THE UNITED STATES]. For a full description of how Mexican nationality is currently reacquired, see Recuperatión de la Nacionalidad, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (on file with the author and available by request via any Mexican consular office).
142. See Romero, supra note 27.
143. See LAW OF NATIONALITY, art. 17. Whether this provision would change, would be enforced, or even could be enforced, is, as yet, undetermined.
144. See id.
145. See Simone Tan, Note, Dual Nationality in France and the United States, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 447, 464 (1992). For example, a person whose French great-grandparents lived in France 50 years ago will still be considered a French citizen although this person has never set foot on French territory.
146. See id.
147. See CODE DE LA NATIONALITÉ [CODE OF NATIONALITY], Loi no. 93-933 du 22 juillet 1993, art. 18 (amending Article 58 to include this provision) (trans. by author).
148. According to PAN Senator Norberto Corella Gil Samaniego, though double nationality is not yet legal, hundreds of thousands of Mexican citizens possess it illicitly. See Difieren partidos sobre expulsión, REFORMA, Jan. 18, 1996, at 4, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; see also Castañeda, supra note 61, at B5; Newal Templin, North of the Border, Doctors and Lawyers are Picking Broccoli, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1996, at A5 (pointing out that many Mexicans who do not reside in the United States attain legal U.S. working papers via their parents' U.S. citizenship, which is then passed on to them).
149. According to PAN Senator Norberto Corella Gil Samaniego, though double nationality is not yet legal, hundreds of thousands of Mexican citizens possess it illicitly. See Difieren partidos sobre expulsión, REFORMA, Jan. 18, 1996, at 4, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database; see also Castañeda, supra note 61, at B5; Newal Templin, North of the Border, Doctors and Lawyers are Picking Broccoli, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1996, at A5 (pointing out that many Mexicans who do not reside in the United States attain legal U.S. working papers via their parents' U.S. citizenship, which is then passed on to them).
150. 401 U.S. 815, 815 (1971).
151. See id. at 815. In other words, while citizenship by birth in the United States or via naturalization in the United States (jus soli) is constitutionally based, U.S. citizenship is granted to the children of U.S. citizens abroad at the discretion of Congress (under the principle of jus sanguinis).
152. See INA § 301(a)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1994); § 301(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(d) (1994); § 301(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994).
153. See Aclaró el SIN que estados unidos si acepta la doble nacionalidad, NOTIMEX, May 1, 1995 (visited Nov. 20, 1996) .
154. See Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L. J. 42, at 53 & n.55 (1995).
155. See. e.g., Testimony of Dan Stein, Executive Director, Federation for American Immigration Reform, Concerning Naturalization Practices and American Citizenship Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Oct. 22, 1996, Federal Document Clearing House Inc., available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database (indicating opposition to the United States' allowing dual nationality); Testimony of Douglas Klusmeyer, Ph.D., Editor, Stanford Humanities Review, Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Oct. 22, 1996 (signaling support for Mexican dual nationality).
156. See Dillon, supra note 82, at 10.
157. See, e.g., Geyer, supra note 23, at 19. But see, e.g., Estrada, supra note 48, at A23.
158. See Marian Nash, Loss of Nationality: Expatriating Statute and Administrative Standard of Evidence, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 601 (1993); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET, DUAL NATIONALITY, in H. Ansgar Kelly, Dual Nationality, the Myth of Election, and a Kinder, Gentler State Department, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 421, 459 (1991/1992) ("[T]he U.S. government does not endorse dual nationality as a matter of policy.") [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET]; cf. Carlos Guerra, More Mexicans May Seek Citizenship in United States, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 30, 1995, at A13 ("'If you ask INS about becoming a dual citizen, they'll try to discourage you but if you tell them you are one, they'll say it is alright [sic].'"). There is no mention in U.S. law of whether dual nationality automatically disqualifies U.S. citizens from holding certain government positions. However, the Department of Energy (DOE), Office for Nonprouferation and National Security, has established in its Rules and Regulations that dual nationality is of great concern when granting authorization for access to classified materials or special nuclear materials, though such status "has not been and will not necessarily be a bar to obtaining access authorization." 59 Fed. Reg. 130 (1994) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 710). Other DOE offices have similar criteria. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 234 (1993) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 710) (proposed Dec. 8, 1993); see generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 1049-50 (1992) (providing a summary of the legal treatment in the United States of dual nationality).
159. See Marian Nash, Loss of Nationality: Expatriating Statute and Administrative Standard of Evidence, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 601 (1993); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET, DUAL NATIONALITY, in H. Ansgar Kelly, Dual Nationality, the Myth of Election, and a Kinder, Gentler State Department, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 421, 459 (1991/1992) ("[T]he U.S. government does not endorse dual nationality as a matter of policy.") [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET]; cf. Carlos Guerra, More Mexicans May Seek Citizenship in United States, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 30, 1995, at A13 ("'If you ask INS about becoming a dual citizen, they'll try to discourage you but if you tell them you are one, they'll say it is alright [sic].'"). There is no mention in U.S. law of whether dual nationality automatically disqualifies U.S. citizens from holding certain government positions. However, the Department of Energy (DOE), Office for Nonprouferation and National Security, has established in its Rules and Regulations that dual nationality is of great concern when granting authorization for access to classified materials or special nuclear materials, though such status "has not been and will not necessarily be a bar to obtaining access authorization." 59 Fed. Reg. 130 (1994) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 710). Other DOE offices have similar criteria. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 234 (1993) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 710) (proposed Dec. 8, 1993); see generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 1049-50 (1992) (providing a summary of the legal treatment in the United States of dual nationality).
160. See Marian Nash, Loss of Nationality: Expatriating Statute and Administrative Standard of Evidence, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 601 (1993); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET, DUAL NATIONALITY, in H. Ansgar Kelly, Dual Nationality, the Myth of Election, and a Kinder, Gentler State Department, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 421, 459 (1991/1992) ("[T]he U.S. government does not endorse dual nationality as a matter of policy.") [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET]; cf. Carlos Guerra, More Mexicans May Seek Citizenship in United States, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 30, 1995, at A13 ("'If you ask INS about becoming a dual citizen, they'll try to discourage you but if you tell them you are one, they'll say it is alright [sic].'"). There is no mention in U.S. law of whether dual nationality automatically disqualifies U.S. citizens from holding certain government positions. However, the Department of Energy (DOE), Office for Nonprouferation and National Security, has established in its Rules and Regulations that dual nationality is of great concern when granting authorization for access to classified materials or special nuclear materials, though such status "has not been and will not necessarily be a bar to obtaining access authorization." 59 Fed. Reg. 130 (1994) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 710). Other DOE offices have similar criteria. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 234 (1993) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 710) (proposed Dec. 8, 1993); see generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 1049-50 (1992) (providing a summary of the legal treatment in the United States of dual nationality).
161. See Marian Nash, Loss of Nationality: Expatriating Statute and Administrative Standard of Evidence, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 601 (1993); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET, DUAL NATIONALITY, in H. Ansgar Kelly, Dual Nationality, the Myth of Election, and a Kinder, Gentler State Department, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 421, 459 (1991/1992) ("[T]he U.S. government does not endorse dual nationality as a matter of policy.") [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET]; cf. Carlos Guerra, More Mexicans May Seek Citizenship in United States, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 30, 1995, at A13 ("'If you ask INS about becoming a dual citizen, they'll try to discourage you but if you tell them you are one, they'll say it is alright [sic].'"). There is no mention in U.S. law of whether dual nationality automatically disqualifies U.S. citizens from holding certain government positions. However, the Department of Energy (DOE), Office for Nonprouferation and National Security, has established in its Rules and Regulations that dual nationality is of great concern when granting authorization for access to classified materials or special nuclear materials, though such status "has not been and will not necessarily be a bar to obtaining access authorization." 59 Fed. Reg. 130 (1994) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 710). Other DOE offices have similar criteria. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 234 (1993) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 710) (proposed Dec. 8, 1993); see generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 1049-50 (1992) (providing a summary of the legal treatment in the United States of dual nationality).
162. [D]ual nationality, [is] a status long recognized in the law. The concept of dual citizenship recognizes that a person may have and exercise rights of nationality in two countries and be subject to the responsibilities of both." Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 723 (1951) (footnote and citation omitted). As the Kawakita language indicates, the terms "nationality" and "citizenship" are often used interchangeably in U.S. case law. U.S. statutory law also blurs the line between citizenship and nationality. See, e.g., INA § 101(a)(22) ("The term 'national of the United States' means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States."). Indeed, the only numerically significant category of noncitizen nationals are natives of American Samoa and the Swains Islands. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 115, at 1011.
163. Note that throughout, the gender of each parent is interchangeable because nationality and citizenship laws in both the United States and Mexico are gender-neutral.
164. See LAW OF NATIONALITY, art. 12 ("[A] Mexican[] by birth whom another state claims as its own national, may opt for Mexican or foreign nationality, upon reaching the age of consent.") (trans. by author).
165. "Dual nationality . . . is the unavoidable consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries. One who becomes a citizen of this country by reason of birth retains it, even though by the law of another country he is also a citizen of it." Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 734 (citation omitted).
166. See INA § 349(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1994). A conational child born in the United States would be immune to revocation of her U.S. citizenship until she reaches the age of eighteen. However, if current proposals to deny U.S. citizenship to the U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants are approved, then such a child would be eligible only for Mexican citizenship.
167. See id.
168. This could be a common scenario given that many Mexican-Americans are under 18 years of age. According to the Census Bureau, in 1993, "29.6% of Hispanics were under 15 years old, compared with 20.4% of non-Hispanic Whites." POPULATION PROFILES OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 99, at 46 (noting also that the median age for Mexican-Americans is 24.6 years - the lowest median age among Hispanic subgroups).
169. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a); see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that a country's citizen has the "constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship").
170. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 270 (1980) (holding that the government must prove by a preponderance of evidence that an individual whose citizenship status is in doubt voluntarily intended by his statements or actions to relinquish citizenship).
171. 126 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ADVICE ABOUT POSSIBLE Loss OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL NATIONALITY 460 (1995) [hereinafter ADVICE]. According to the State Department, [w]hen such cases come to the attention of a U.S. consular officer, the person concerned will be asked to complete a questionnaire to ascertain his or her intent toward U.S. citizenship. Unless the person affirmatively asserts in the questionnaire that it was his or her intention to relinquish U.S. citizenship, the consular officer will certify that it was not the person's intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship and, consequently, find that the person has retained U.S. citizenship. Id. at 462. This policy is consistent with the Eastern District of New York's ruling in Kahane v. Shultz that a U.S. citizen's declaration of intent to retain her U.S. citizenship was sufficient to preserve that citizenship, even when made simultaneously with the commission of an act made expatriating by statute. See 653 F. Supp. 1486, 1493 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (ruling that a U.S. citizen who naturalized to Spanish citizenship by swearing fidelity to the King of Spain and renouncing his U.S. citizenship before a Spanish official, but who continued to behave in a manner consistent with U.S. citizenship, did not demonstrate intent to relinquish his U.S. citizenship and therefore retained that citizenship); see generally T.W. Cousens, Annotation, Expatriation by Foreign Naturalization or by-Taking Oath of Allegiance to a Foreign State, 15 A.L.R.2d 550 (1951) (discussing the history of U.S. treatment of dual nationality and the general consonance of current approaches in the United States toward dual nationality with early American and British approaches).
172. See ADVICE, supra note 126, at 462.
173. See Testimony of Dan Stein, supra note 112.
174. Note that there is an issue of notice involved here. That is, the U.S. government would probably have to make efforts to inform the relevant public of such an administrative change.
175. "[A dual citizen or national] can under certain circumstances be deprived of his American citizenship through the operation of a treaty or an act of Congress . . . ." Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734 (1951). Some countries have already explicitly opposed dual citizenship. For example, in 1963, member states of the Council of Europe concluded the Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, which aimed to deter the rise of dual nationalities by providing that nationals of member states would lose their nationality upon acquisition of a new nationality in another member state. However, as of 1985, only nine of the 21 member states of the Council of Europe have ratified it. See Testimony of Douglas Klusmeyer, supra note 112.
176. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1964) ("We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the Constitution is that only the 'natural born' citizen is eligible to be President.").
177. This possibility is suggested indirectly by Interpreter Releases: "To a certain extent, countries have sought to curtail problems of dual citizenship by treaty. Thus, two countries will often agree that the naturalization of their nationals in either country will be recognized as terminating the nationals' original nationality." Dual Citizenship: A Brief Review, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 16 (Jan. 3, 1994).
178. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 831 (1971) (discussing Congress' plenary power to impose upon persons wishing to naturalize conditions precedent to U.S. citizenship); see also supra text accompanying notes 107-108.
179. See Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Foreword, in PACHON & DESIPIO, supra note 68, at ix.
180. See Testimony of Dan Stein, supra note 112. Stein testified: Years from now, we may look back at the Mexican Government's willingness to allow dual nationality for its northern migrants as the beginning of the creation of a "nation within a nation.". . . Many new immigrants [already] seem to believe that the United States is "occupied Mexico," and are taught this now not only in Mexico but in many American schools. Over time, with [the DNA], the distinctions between the border regions could disappear with a significant section of the electorate of the view that the border with Mexico "really doesn't matter." Id.
181. Of course, as implied in Part III (discussing the Mexican government's motivations for backing the DNA), undocumented Mexican immigrants in the United States might benefit indirectly from conationality if U.S.-Mexican dual nationals exercised their political power in the United States on behalf of their undocumented compatriots.
182. See Castafieda, supra note 61, (noting that Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Switzerland all grant foreigners the right to vote in elections for municipal and state legislators).
183. See Lawrence Abramson, United States Loss of Citizenship Law After Terrazas: Decisions of the Board of Appellate Review, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. & POL. 829, 877 (1984).
184. See Guerra, supra note 115, at A13.
185. see Patrick J. McDonnell & Mark Fineman, Mexico Poised to OK Dual Nationality Law, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
186. See Miguel Pérez, Aprueban los diputados la doble nacionalidad, REFORMA, Dec. 11, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database (pointing out that the sole dissenting vote was entered by a PRD deputy). See Appendices A and B for the relevant constitutional articles before and after the DNA's passage.
187. See Carolyn Jung, U.S. Impact if Mexico Approves Law, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 12, 1996, at 6A.
188. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
189. See id.
190. See Mark Fineman, Mexican Congress OKs Dual Nationality, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 11, 1996, at 1A.
191. See CONST. tit. VIII, art. 135.
192. See Adolfo Sánchez Venegas, La doble nacionalidad implicara reformar 70 leyes secundarias: Gómez Villamteva, Dec. 31, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Paperslat Database (stating that Mexico's Law of Nationality, Law of Foreign Investment, and Law Regulating the Stock Market will be among the laws requiring revision).