Challenges to nuclear stability south asia

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 59-74

  Hassan Khan, Feroz ^a  

^a SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 9144253014     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736700308436917     Document Type: Article

References (49)

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3. Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
4. Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997).
5. Waheguru Pal Siddhu and Jing-Dong Yuan, Cooperative Monitoringfor Confidence Building: A Case Study of Sino-Indian Border Areas, Occasional Paper No. 13 (Albuquerque, NM: Cooperative Monitoring Center, SandiaNational Laboratories, 1999)
6. Dr. Shirin Tahir-Kheli at a conference on “Minimum Nuclear Deterrence,” sponsored by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Mauritius, June 20,2000
7. Pervez Musharraf, “Address at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,” Washington, DC, February 12,2002.
8. Jessica Stem and Gregory Koblentz, “Preventing Unauthorized Access to and Use of Nuclear Materials and Weapons: Lessons from the United States and Former Soviet Union,” paper delivered to the Stanford University Conference on Preventing Nuclear War In South Asia, Bangkok, Thailand, August 4-7,2001.
9. Jaswant Singh, the former Indian Minister of External Affairs, stated that parity is not essential for deterrence.
10. Rajesh Basrur, “India’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrence: the December 13 Crisis,” unpublished manuscript, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 2002, p. 2.
11. Michael Quinlan, interview by author, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 19, 2000
12. Michael Quinlan, “How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence?” Survival 42 (Winter 2000-01), p. 148.
13. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). Sagan cites several Cold War-era near misses and dangerous practices during both the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and at other times.
14. James J. Wirtz, “Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War,” in T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 142.
15. Robert S Litwak, “The New Calculus of Pre-emption,” Survival 44, (Winter 2002-03), p. 54.
16. Waheguru Pal, Singh Sidhu, “India’s Nuclear Use Doctrine,” in Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 132-134
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23. Raj Chengappa, who claims that India upgraded the alert status of four Prithvi missiles and at least one Agni during the Kargil crisis.
24. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace. Similarly, Bruce Riedal, former Deputy National Security Advisor in the Clinton administration, has asserted that President Clinton confronted the Pakistani Prime Minister during a Blair House meeting with the assertion that Pakistani missiles had been armed with nuclear warheads. Pakistan did not take such actions, according to the personal knowledge of this author. During the “Compound Crisis” of2001-2002, it is not known if India or Pakistan did anything to change the status of their nuclear forces.
25. George Fernandes to the “2nd International Conference on Asian Security in the 21st Century,” Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, New Dehli, January 24-25,2000;
26. VR Malik, Indian Army Chief of Staff, that “Limited war can erupt anytime.” See Times of India (New Delhi), January 6, 2000.
27. Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001)
28. Rajesh Basrur, “Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture,” Journal of Peace Research 38 (March, pp. 181-98).
29. Michael Quinlan, “How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence?” pp. 149-150.
30. Abdul Sattar, Address to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, June 15 2001, .
31. Maj. Gen, Ashok Krishna, “Deployment of India’s Armed Forces along the International Border (IB), the Line of Control (LoC) and at Sea,” July 8, 2002,
32. Stephen Smith, U.S. Army, “Assessing the Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear War between India and Pakistan,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December 2002, .
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35. Gaurav Kampani, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies for elaboration of this point.
36. Posen.P., Indadvertant Escalation, p. 2.
37. Smith, “Assessing the Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear War.”
38. V. R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation,”pp. 83-98.
39. Morten H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley & Sons,1963), p. 2.
40. Paul Bracken, “Delegation of Nuclear Command Authority,” in Carter, Steinbruner and Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations.
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43. Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Stability-lnstability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, Stimson Center Report No. 38 (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001), p. 51
44. Neil Joeck, “Nuclear Relations In South Asia,” in Joseph Cirincione, ed., Repairing the Regime, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).
45. Stephen R Cohen, Moving Forward in South Asia, Policy Brief No. 81, (Washington, t)C: (The Brookings Institution, May 2001).
46. Rafi-uz Zaman Khan, India and Pakistan: Can NRRC Help to Strengthen Peace? Occasional Paper No. 49. (Washington, DC): Henry L. Stimson Center
47. http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pubs.cfm?ID=69
48. Kurt M. Campbell, “The Future of Military Diplomacy in US-Soviet Relations,” in Alexander George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder; CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 525.
49. David Albright, “Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Complex: Thought-Piece for the South Asia Working Group,” paper delivered to the Stanley Foundation conference on “US Strategies for Regional Security,” Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton, VA, October 25-27,2001.