The coming of game theory

Theory and Decision

Volumn 56, Issue 1-2, 2004, Pages 1-18

  Gambarelli, Gianfranco ^a   Owen, Guillermo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERGAMO   (Italy)

^b NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; History

Indexed keywords

CROPS; DECISION MAKING; HISTORY; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; PERSONNEL; STATISTICAL METHODS; WAREHOUSES;

GENESIS; PHARAOH'S GRAIN; POLLING DATA; SPEEDING MOTORISTS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 9144225471     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-004-5629-3     Document Type: Review

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