Uses of Russia: The role of Russia in the modern Polish national identity

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 595-627

  Zarycki, Tomasz ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW   (Poland)

Author keywords

Cultural capital; Poland; Polish national identity; Polish Russian relations; Russia

Indexed keywords

EID: 8844231045     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325404269758     Document Type: Review

References (60)

1. I prefer not to use the terms "myth" and "stereotype" in the present article as, at least in the common understanding, they seem to imply erroneousness of the analyzed believes. Consequently, their use may suggest superiority of the author over "naive" subjects, discourse of whom is analyzed. Meanwhile, the main aim of the article is interpretation of the mechanism of use of certain ideas rather that assessment of their rightness.
2. See, for example, Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Prizel's study of evolution of Polish national identity discusses in detail the revolutionary change in Polish perceptions of its role in the East that took place after the Second World War.
3. As a Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS) survey from July 2002 shows, 45 percent of respondents considered introduction of visas for Russians (as well as Byelorussians and Ukrainians) as beneficial for Poland, while 30 percent considered them as harmful. However, in all border regions, a majority of respondents considered visas harmful. Wizy dla naszych wschodnich sa̧siadów i problem Kaliningradu. Komunikat z badań BS/134/2002 (Warszawa: Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, August 2002).
4. Tomasz Zarycki, "Politics in the Periphery: the Interpretation of Political Cleavages in Poland in Their Historical and International Context," Europe-Asia Studies 52:5(2000): 851-73.
5. Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the other: "The East" in European Identity Formation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 143-60. The chapter "Making Regions: Central Europe" appeared earlier as Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as Central Europe's Constituting Other," East European Politics and Societies 7 (Spring 1993): 349-69.
6. Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the other: "The East" in European Identity Formation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 143-60. The chapter "Making Regions: Central Europe" appeared earlier as Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as Central Europe's Constituting Other," East European Politics and Societies 7 (Spring 1993): 349-69.
7. E.g., Bogdan Wojciszke and Wiesław Baryła, "Polacy jako uczestnicy kultury narzekania," in Jerzy Bralczyk, Katarzyba Mosiołek-Kłosińska, eds., Zmiany publicznych zwyczajów jȩzykowych (Warszawa: Rada Jȩzyka Polskiego przy Prezydium PAN, 2001), 45-64.
8. Joanna Kurczewska, "What Is Likely to Happen to Polish Collective Consciousness after Accession to the European Union?" Polish Sociological Review 1:141(2003): 83-92.
9. Prizel in his National Identity reconstructs the story of Polish attempts to overcome the imperial complex, which includes the crucial role of the Paris-based journal Kultura and in particular the writings of Ludwik Mieroszewski. As Prizel points out, if compared to the pre-war period or the Russian mainstream political discourse, contemporary Poland can be considered as largely devoid of earlier imperial dreams.
10. Ewa Thompson, Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism (Westport: Greenwood, 2000)
11. Czesław Miłosz, "Literatura polska," Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 December 2001.
12. Neumann, Uses of the Other, 103.
13. Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment (London: Verso, 1994).
14. Neumann, Uses of the other, 102.
15. See, e.g., Bohdan Jałowiecki, "Przestrzeń historyczna, regionalizm, regionalizacja," in Bohdan Jalowiecki, ed., Oblicza polskich regionów (Warszawa: Europejski Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego UW, 1996), 10-44.
16. See, e.g., Marek S, Szczepański, "Regionalizm górnośałski w świadomości społecznej. Socjologiczne studium przypadku," in Maria W. Wanatowicz, ed., Regionalizm a separatyzm-historia i współczesność Śla̧sk na tle innych obszarów (Katowice: Wydawnictwa. Uniwersytetu Sla̧skiego, 1995), 45-66.
17. A good example is the figure of Sokrates Starynkiewicz, a Russian mayor of Warsaw from 1875 to 1892, who is remembered as a person of exceptional integrity and great merits in modernization of the city infrastructure. Starynkiewicz is probably the only Russian official to be honored with the name of a street or square in Warsaw.
18. Krzysztof Kłopotowski, "Program dla P.," Rzeczpospolita, 10 November 2003.
19. Marian Zdziechowski, "Wpływy rosyjskie na duszȩ polska̧, duszȩ polska̧." in Andrzej de Lazari, ed., Dusza polska i rosyjska. Od Adama Mickiewicza i Aleksandra Puszkina do Czesława Miłosza i Aleksandra Sołżenicyna (Warszawa: PISM, 2004), 151-76.
20. Janusz Tazbir, "O czym siȩ pisać nie godziło," Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 December 2003.
21. "Lobbing za cyrylica̧," Gazeta Stołeczna/Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 December 2000.
22. See http://www.uw.edu.pl/en.php/history/1870e.html/.
23. See http://www.uw.edu.pl/pl.php/wczoraj/historia/poczet.html/.
24. Polish interest in the war in distant Chechnya seems to be a particularly good illustration of the key role of Russia in the Polish national identity. Widespread support for the small Muslim nation in the Caucasus may be contrasted with almost universal ignorance about the much closer former Yugoslavia and lack of clear sympathies for any of the parts involved in the conflict in the region. The support for the Chechens has, however, been decreasing in recent years. As a CBOS survey shows, it has dropped from 48 percent in January 2000 to 26 percent in November 2002. Still, however, only 9 percent support the Russian side in the conflict and 6 percent consider the Chechens to be responsible for the outbreak of the war (33 percent blame the Russians). Zmiana opinii o konflikcie rosyjsko-czeczeńskim. Komunikat z badań. BS/218/2002 (Warszawa: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, December 2002).
25. Gazeta Polska 16 (1996), quoted by Prokop, "Mit Rosji w dzisiejszej Polsce," 189.
26. Andrzej Nowak, "The Russo-Polish Historical Confrontation," Sarmatian Review, 1 (January 1997), http://www.ruf.rice.edu/sarmatia/197/Nowak. html/.
27. Paweł Boski, "Rosjanie i stosunki z nimi w ocenie Polaków," in Michał Dobroczyński ed., Polacy i Rosjanie. Czynniki zbliżenia (Warszawa-Toruń: Centrum Badań Wschodnich Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 1998), 111-26.
28. In a more recent survey conducted in May 2001 by CBOS, 19 percent of respondents saw any major threats to Poland's security. Among them, 64 percent (that is, 12 percent of all) considered Russia as their main source, 35 percent Germany, and 11 percent Belarus. At the same time, 68 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that "during the coming 5-10 years Russia will be trying to regain its influences in our part of Europe." Sytuacja Polski na arenie miȩdzynarodowej (Warszawa: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, June 2001).
29. See, for example, Janusz Tazbir, Polskie przedmurze chrzé sciańskiej Europy. Mity a rzeczywistość historyczna (Warszawa: Interpress, 1987).
30. Neumann, Uses of the Other, 81.
31. Janusz Tazbir, "My, Europianie," Gazeta Wyborcza, 31 December 1996.
32. Nowak, "The Russo-Polish Historical Confrontation."
33. Nowak, "The Russo-Polish Historical Confrontation." See also Andrzej Nowak, Polacy, Rosjanie i Biesy (Kraków: Arcana, 1998), 152; or Andrzej Nowak, Polska i Trzy Rosje. Studium polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego (do kwietnia 1920 roku) (Kraków: Arkana, 2001), 133.
34. Nowak, "The Russo-Polish Historical Confrontation." See also Andrzej Nowak, Polacy, Rosjanie i Biesy (Kraków: Arcana, 1998), 152; or Andrzej Nowak, Polska i Trzy Rosje. Studium polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego (do kwietnia 1920 roku) (Kraków: Arkana, 2001), 133.
35. Nowak, "The Russo-Polish Historical Confrontation." See also Andrzej Nowak, Polacy, Rosjanie i Biesy (Kraków: Arcana, 1998), 152; or Andrzej Nowak, Polska i Trzy Rosje. Studium polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego (do kwietnia 1920 roku) (Kraków: Arkana, 2001), 133.
36. Jacek Borkowicz, "Ambiwalencja sa̧siedztwa. Rosjanie w polskich oczach-perspektywa historyczna," in Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, Monika Zuchniak, and Paweł Kowal, eds., Polacy i Rosjanie. 100 kluczowych pojeć (Warszawa: Centrum Stosunków Miédzynarodowych, Biblioteka "Wiȩzi," 2002), 51-77.
37. Jan Prokop, "Mit Rosji w dzisiejszej Polsce," in Maria Bobrownicka, Lucjan Suchanek, and Franciszek Ziejka, eds., Współ cześni Słowianie wobec własnych tradycji i mitów. Sympozjum w Castel Gandolfo 19-20 sierpnia 1996 (Kraków: Universitas, 1997), 183-93.
38. Nowak, "The Russo-Polish Historical Confrontation."
39. E.g., Bohdan Cywiński, "Europa w poszukiwaniu duszy. Jaka wspólnota?" Rzeczpospolita, 4 October 2003.
40. Tazbir, "My, Europianie."
41. Nowak, "The Russo-Polish Historical Confrontation."
42. I b i d.
43. I b i d.
44. I b i d.
45. Sławomir Popowski, "Polski honor, rosyjska dusza," Rzeczpospolita, 8 February 2003.
46. See, e.g., Jacek Cichocki, Marek A. Cichocki, and Paweł Kowal, "Polska a wymiar wschodni UE," in Paweł Kowal, ed., "Wymiar wschodni" UE-szansa czy idée fixe polskiej polityki? (Warszawa: Centrum Stosunków Miȩdzynarodowych, 2002), 8-14.
47. Neumann, Uses of the Other, 93.
48. Jerzy Czapski, The Inhuman Land (London: Chatto and Windus, 1951).
49. Mariusz Wilk, The Journals of a White Sea Wolf (London: Harvill Presse, 2003).
50. See http://www.kresy.co.uk/intro.html/.
51. "Rosja u progu XXI wieku. Z Richardem Pipesem rozmawia A.W. Pawluczuk," Rzeczpospolita, 18 March 1995.
52. Andrzej Walicki, "Rosja Putina a polityka polska," Przegla̧d, 23 February 2004.
53. In a CBOS, survey conducted in May 2001, 9 percent of respondents wanted to see improvement of the political relations with Russia as the main priority of the Polish foreign policy (surprisingly, only 8 percent saw the United States as the main priority, while 32 percent opted for the EU). Among Sojusz Lewicy Demorkatycznej (SLD; Democratic Left Alliance) Party electorate, some 15 percent wanted to see improvement of relations with Russia as the main priority, compared to 6 percent in the Platforma Obywatelska (PO; Citizen's Platform) electorate and 2 percent among the Akacja Wyborcza "Solidarnoś ć" (AWS; Electoral Action "Solidarity") voters. As far as the economic relations were concerned, 21 percent of SLD voters considered Russia a priority (compared to 11 percent among PO supporters and 4 percent in the AWS electorate). Poża̧dane kierunki polskiej polityki zagranicznej (Warszawa: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, June 2001).
54. Sławomir Popowski, "Przez różowe okulary," Rzeczpospolita, 13 March 2004.
55. Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelényi, and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists. The New Ruling Elites in Eastern Europe (London: Verso, 1998).
56. E.g., Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in John G. Richardson, ed., Handbook of Theory and Research for Sociology of Education (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 241-58.
57. Mark Ashley, "Nations as Victims: Nationalist Politics and the Framing of Politics" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 2001).
58. One could remind in this context that during the 2000 presidential campaign, broadcasting of a private video showing president Kwaśniewski and his aides making fun of the Pope was supposed to destroy Kwaśniewski's chances for reelection but actually had a very restricted effect on his high popularity. See, e.g., Frances Millard, "The Presidential Election in Poland, October 2000," Electoral Studies 21 (2002): 257-363.
59. See my earlier paper: Tomasz Zarycki, "Cultural Capital and the Political Role of the Intelligentsia in Poland, " Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19:4(December 2003): 91-108.
60. Prizel, National Identity, 172.