Garden-variety liberals: Discovering eden in Levinas and Locke

Polity

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 117-139

  McDaniel, Robb A ^a  

^a MIDDLE TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 8844229611     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235430     Document Type: Article

References (107)

1. In my search, I can find only one work where Levinas refers to Locke: his youthful dissertation on Husserl's phenomenology, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. Andre Orianne (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 104, 146. Levinas mentions Locke twice, briefly, in a way that merely recites Husserl's critique of British empiricism, but with no direct reference to Locke's own works. Locke's political writings, as opposed to his epistemological ones, do not even merit indirect allusion.
2. J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 233. Pocock develops this view of the political importance of time in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). See also Karl Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, v. T, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); and Joshua Foa Dienstag, Dancing in Chains: Narrative and Memory in Political Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
3. J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 233. Pocock develops this view of the political importance of time in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). See also Karl Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, v. T, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); and Joshua Foa Dienstag, Dancing in Chains: Narrative and Memory in Political Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
4. J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 233. Pocock develops this view of the political importance of time in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). See also Karl Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, v. T, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); and Joshua Foa Dienstag, Dancing in Chains: Narrative and Memory in Political Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
5. J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 233. Pocock develops this view of the political importance of time in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). See also Karl Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, v. T, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); and Joshua Foa Dienstag, Dancing in Chains: Narrative and Memory in Political Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
6. J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 233. Pocock develops this view of the political importance of time in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). See also Karl Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, v. T, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); and Joshua Foa Dienstag, Dancing in Chains: Narrative and Memory in Political Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
7. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), 95.
8. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), 95.
9. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 177. Subsequent citations to this text will be given in parentheses as OB.
10. Emmanuel Levinas, Outside the Subject, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).
11. Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1996); Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Derrida, in his own reading of Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) ties him to the metaphysical tradition from Kant to Heidegger. Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 83-105; and Richard A. Cohen, "Translator's Introduction," in Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), make strong cases for Levinas as a post-Hegelian dialectician, one whose thought tends toward the denial of synthesis. My reading may come closest to that of Alain Renaut, The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity, trans. M.B. DeBevoise and Franklin Phillip (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), who interprets Levinas as a failed attempt within the modern history of individualism to create an ethic of "subjectivity." Although I disagree with parts of Renaut's interpretation (particularly with respect to the monadic self), I am sympathetic to his larger concern for moral autonomy. I am also more interested than Renaut in situating Levinas within a liberal framework of temporality.
12. Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1996); Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Derrida, in his own reading of Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) ties him to the metaphysical tradition from Kant to Heidegger. Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 83-105; and Richard A. Cohen, "Translator's Introduction," in Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), make strong cases for Levinas as a post-Hegelian dialectician, one whose thought tends toward the denial of synthesis. My reading may come closest to that of Alain Renaut, The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity, trans. M.B. DeBevoise and Franklin Phillip (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), who interprets Levinas as a failed attempt within the modern history of individualism to create an ethic of "subjectivity." Although I disagree with parts of Renaut's interpretation (particularly with respect to the monadic self), I am sympathetic to his larger concern for moral autonomy. I am also more interested than Renaut in situating Levinas within a liberal framework of temporality.
13. Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1996); Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Derrida, in his own reading of Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) ties him to the metaphysical tradition from Kant to Heidegger. Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 83-105; and Richard A. Cohen, "Translator's Introduction," in Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), make strong cases for Levinas as a post-Hegelian dialectician, one whose thought tends toward the denial of synthesis. My reading may come closest to that of Alain Renaut, The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity, trans. M.B. DeBevoise and Franklin Phillip (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), who interprets Levinas as a failed attempt within the modern history of individualism to create an ethic of "subjectivity." Although I disagree with parts of Renaut's interpretation (particularly with respect to the monadic self), I am sympathetic to his larger concern for moral autonomy. I am also more interested than Renaut in situating Levinas within a liberal framework of temporality.
14. Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1996); Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Derrida, in his own reading of Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) ties him to the metaphysical tradition from Kant to Heidegger. Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 83-105; and Richard A. Cohen, "Translator's Introduction," in Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), make strong cases for Levinas as a post-Hegelian dialectician, one whose thought tends toward the denial of synthesis. My reading may come closest to that of Alain Renaut, The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity, trans. M.B. DeBevoise and Franklin Phillip (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), who interprets Levinas as a failed attempt within the modern history of individualism to create an ethic of "subjectivity." Although I disagree with parts of Renaut's interpretation (particularly with respect to the monadic self), I am sympathetic to his larger concern for moral autonomy. I am also more interested than Renaut in situating Levinas within a liberal framework of temporality.
15. Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1996); Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Derrida, in his own reading of Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) ties him to the metaphysical tradition from Kant to Heidegger. Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 83-105; and Richard A. Cohen, "Translator's Introduction," in Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), make strong cases for Levinas as a post-Hegelian dialectician, one whose thought tends toward the denial of synthesis. My reading may come closest to that of Alain Renaut, The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity, trans. M.B. DeBevoise and Franklin Phillip (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), who interprets Levinas as a failed attempt within the modern history of individualism to create an ethic of "subjectivity." Although I disagree with parts of Renaut's interpretation (particularly with respect to the monadic self), I am sympathetic to his larger concern for moral autonomy. I am also more interested than Renaut in situating Levinas within a liberal framework of temporality.
16. Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1996); Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Derrida, in his own reading of Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) ties him to the metaphysical tradition from Kant to Heidegger. Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 83-105; and Richard A. Cohen, "Translator's Introduction," in Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), make strong cases for Levinas as a post-Hegelian dialectician, one whose thought tends toward the denial of synthesis. My reading may come closest to that of Alain Renaut, The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity, trans. M.B. DeBevoise and Franklin Phillip (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), who interprets Levinas as a failed attempt within the modern history of individualism to create an ethic of "subjectivity." Although I disagree with parts of Renaut's interpretation (particularly with respect to the monadic self), I am sympathetic to his larger concern for moral autonomy. I am also more interested than Renaut in situating Levinas within a liberal framework of temporality.
17. Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1996); Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Derrida, in his own reading of Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) ties him to the metaphysical tradition from Kant to Heidegger. Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 83-105; and Richard A. Cohen, "Translator's Introduction," in Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), make strong cases for Levinas as a post-Hegelian dialectician, one whose thought tends toward the denial of synthesis. My reading may come closest to that of Alain Renaut, The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity, trans. M.B. DeBevoise and Franklin Phillip (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), who interprets Levinas as a failed attempt within the modern history of individualism to create an ethic of "subjectivity." Although I disagree with parts of Renaut's interpretation (particularly with respect to the monadic self), I am sympathetic to his larger concern for moral autonomy. I am also more interested than Renaut in situating Levinas within a liberal framework of temporality.
18. Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1996); Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Derrida, in his own reading of Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) ties him to the metaphysical tradition from Kant to Heidegger. Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas's Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 83-105; and Richard A. Cohen, "Translator's Introduction," in Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), make strong cases for Levinas as a post-Hegelian dialectician, one whose thought tends toward the denial of synthesis. My reading may come closest to that of Alain Renaut, The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity, trans. M.B. DeBevoise and Franklin Phillip (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), who interprets Levinas as a failed attempt within the modern history of individualism to create an ethic of "subjectivity." Although I disagree with parts of Renaut's interpretation (particularly with respect to the monadic self), I am sympathetic to his larger concern for moral autonomy. I am also more interested than Renaut in situating Levinas within a liberal framework of temporality.
19. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman, 1993). Subsequent citations in the text will be abbreviated as: T, 1 § 15.
20. Peter Laslett, "Introduction," in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 12-14.
21. Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed. Johann P. Sommerville (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
22. Philip Vogt, "Locke, Eden and Two States of Nature: The Fortunate Fall Revisited," Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1997): 524, for example, has detailed the logical consistency between the two. He describes Locke's Adam as "a noble, if anxious, rebel" whose struggle to reconstitute the law of nature despite the fallibility of human reason represents the tragic vitality of the human race. Vogt develops this vision in critique of John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government' (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), but it should be noted that Dunn has done much to reveal the importance of religion in Locke's political thought. Both readings are miles away from Leo Strauss's claim that "the assumption of a state of nature . . . is wholly alien to the Bible," Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 215. Strauss's strong view of incompatibility makes the error of conflating atheism with heterodoxy.
23. Philip Vogt, "Locke, Eden and Two States of Nature: The Fortunate Fall Revisited," Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1997): 524, for example, has detailed the logical consistency between the two. He describes Locke's Adam as "a noble, if anxious, rebel" whose struggle to reconstitute the law of nature despite the fallibility of human reason represents the tragic vitality of the human race. Vogt develops this vision in critique of John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government' (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), but it should be noted that Dunn has done much to reveal the importance of religion in Locke's political thought. Both readings are miles away from Leo Strauss's claim that "the assumption of a state of nature . . . is wholly alien to the Bible," Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 215. Strauss's strong view of incompatibility makes the error of conflating atheism with heterodoxy.
24. Philip Vogt, "Locke, Eden and Two States of Nature: The Fortunate Fall Revisited," Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1997): 524, for example, has detailed the logical consistency between the two. He describes Locke's Adam as "a noble, if anxious, rebel" whose struggle to reconstitute the law of nature despite the fallibility of human reason represents the tragic vitality of the human race. Vogt develops this vision in critique of John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government' (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), but it should be noted that Dunn has done much to reveal the importance of religion in Locke's political thought. Both readings are miles away from Leo Strauss's claim that "the assumption of a state of nature . . . is wholly alien to the Bible," Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 215. Strauss's strong view of incompatibility makes the error of conflating atheism with heterodoxy.
25. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
26. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
27. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
28. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
29. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
30. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
31. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
32. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
33. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
34. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
35. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
36. The relative individuality and sociality of Locke's natural man is frequently debated in the Locke literature. Individualist interpretations often tie Locke to capitalist modes of appropriation, for good or ill, and emphasize his positive connection to Hobbes. See Strauss, Natural Right and History; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of John Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). One exception, John Dunn, in The Political Thought of John Locke; and in Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), reads Locke's individualism as fundamentally Puritan. By contrast, social interpretations lend to focus more on Locke's common "rights to subsistence" and the moral restraints imposed by natural law: Laslett, "Introduction"; Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 898-915; and "Locke's Political Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226-51; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mark Goldie, "Introduction," in Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman 1993).
37. Laslett, "Introduction," 72-74.
38. Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," 905.
39. See Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, 41.
40. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 131 ff.
41. Dunn, Locke, 47.
42. See Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," 910-11; Dienstag, Dancing in Chains.
43. See Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction," 910-11; Dienstag, Dancing in Chains.
44. This is a point made by Vogt, "Locke, Eden and Two States of Nature," when describing Adam's fortunate fall. Understood in these terms, the state of nature is different from the Hobbesian version described by Pocock as "ahistorical and logically timeless. . .a movement out of time, followed by a return to politics and history." Nonetheless, Pocock discerns that even in Hobbes such a notion depends upon a "prophetic God"; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 370.
45. This is a point made by Vogt, "Locke, Eden and Two States of Nature," when describing Adam's fortunate fall. Understood in these terms, the state of nature is different from the Hobbesian version described by Pocock as "ahistorical and logically timeless. . .a movement out of time, followed by a return to politics and history." Nonetheless, Pocock discerns that even in Hobbes such a notion depends upon a "prophetic God"; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 370.
46. This is a point made by Vogt, "Locke, Eden and Two States of Nature," when describing Adam's fortunate fall. Understood in these terms, the state of nature is different from the Hobbesian version described by Pocock as "ahistorical and logically timeless. . .a movement out of time, followed by a return to politics and history." Nonetheless, Pocock discerns that even in Hobbes such a notion depends upon a "prophetic God"; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 370.
47. See Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 197-220; Laslett, "Introduction," 79-89; Dunn, Locke, 28-31, 60ff.
48. See Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 197-220; Laslett, "Introduction," 79-89; Dunn, Locke, 28-31, 60ff.
49. See Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 197-220; Laslett, "Introduction," 79-89; Dunn, Locke, 28-31, 60ff.
50. Laslett, "Introduction," 86; Cf. Tully, A Discourse on Property, 7-8.
51. Laslett, "Introduction," 86; Cf. Tully, A Discourse on Property, 7-8.
52. Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 163.
53. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 94-96.
54. Emmanuel Levinas, "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism," Critical Inquiry 17 (1990): 63.
55. Levinas, "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,"66.
56. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 120-21, 220. Subsequent citations in the text will appear as Tl; cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 34-45.
57. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 120-21, 220. Subsequent citations in the text will appear as Tl; cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 34-45.
58. See also Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 28-37; Levinas, Outside the Subject, 154-7.
59. See also Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 28-37; Levinas, Outside the Subject, 154-7.
60. Despite an acknowledged debt, Levinas's treatment of "intentionality" differs from that of Husserl, who pioneered such analysis by proclaiming that all consciousness is "consciousness of." See Tl, 122-27; OB, 63-68; Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1985) 28-33; Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) 291-92; Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press 1993), 14-16. Levinas makes two major departures from Husserl which require note. First, Levinas does not take consciousness or the theoretical to be primary. Instead, his analysis of consciousness emerges only from an examination of "sensibility" which undergirds experience of the world. Second, Levinas argues that some contents of intentional consciousness cannot be fully captured - they overflow consciousness, or are partly a consciousness of absence rather than of presence. Before we think the world we feel it, and even when we do think it, we cannot always think it adequately. The insufficiency of thought is crucial to Levinas's analyses of both sociality and divinity.
61. Despite an acknowledged debt, Levinas's treatment of "intentionality" differs from that of Husserl, who pioneered such analysis by proclaiming that all consciousness is "consciousness of." See Tl, 122-27; OB, 63-68; Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1985) 28-33; Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) 291-92; Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press 1993), 14-16. Levinas makes two major departures from Husserl which require note. First, Levinas does not take consciousness or the theoretical to be primary. Instead, his analysis of consciousness emerges only from an examination of "sensibility" which undergirds experience of the world. Second, Levinas argues that some contents of intentional consciousness cannot be fully captured - they overflow consciousness, or are partly a consciousness of absence rather than of presence. Before we think the world we feel it, and even when we do think it, we cannot always think it adequately. The insufficiency of thought is crucial to Levinas's analyses of both sociality and divinity.
62. Despite an acknowledged debt, Levinas's treatment of "intentionality" differs from that of Husserl, who pioneered such analysis by proclaiming that all consciousness is "consciousness of." See Tl, 122-27; OB, 63-68; Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1985) 28-33; Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) 291-92; Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press 1993), 14-16. Levinas makes two major departures from Husserl which require note. First, Levinas does not take consciousness or the theoretical to be primary. Instead, his analysis of consciousness emerges only from an examination of "sensibility" which undergirds experience of the world. Second, Levinas argues that some contents of intentional consciousness cannot be fully captured - they overflow consciousness, or are partly a consciousness of absence rather than of presence. Before we think the world we feel it, and even when we do think it, we cannot always think it adequately. The insufficiency of thought is crucial to Levinas's analyses of both sociality and divinity.
63. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 95-102.
64. In his later work, particularly Otherwise than Being, Levinas shows less concern for the good of nourishment, although he continues to speak of it (OB, 72-73). His later analyses have a more existential feel, insofar as they focus on the self in its persecution, obsession, and infinite guilt, and locate goodness rigorously beyond the being of the world (OB, 101-29). Since both moments of goodness (worldly and other-worldly) are present throughout, this is primarily a shift in emphasis.
65. This duality of experience should not be confused with the traditional mind-body problem in modern philosophy. While Levinas's distinction between representation and life explains how such a split could come to be seen as a problem, his derivation of consciousness from body and time is designed as a materialist solution to the problem of dualism. Consciousness and sensibility are not "separate," but are different modalities of the body. While Levinas is not an empiricist, there are dear affinities between Levinas's sensuous approach to mind-body relations and Locke's own.
66. Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 65.
67. Emmanuel Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite," in Peperzak, To the Other, 88-105.
68. Levinas, Time and the Other, 42; cf. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 57-60.
69. Levinas, Time and the Other, 42; cf. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 57-60.
70. In Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 34-35, he explains this socially necessary individuality in terms of Adam and Eve: "Eve heard the divine word. As an interlocutor of God, woman can no longer lose this dignity, and according to a bold saying of the sages, even on the level of her biological existence she always greets her masculine partner face to face. . . . If woman completes man, she does not complete him as a part completes another into a whole but, as it were, as two totalities complete one another. . . . For the Jews, separated existence will be worth more than the initial union." The moral egalitarianism and individualism of this passage appears close to Locke's own Eden. It should be noted, however, that both accept a practical, if not ontological, subordination of woman to man.
71. Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 28.
72. Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 45.
73. Emmanuel Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas," interview by Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, Alison Ainley, trans. Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright, in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988), 177-78; Levinas, Outside the Subject, 116-25.
74. Emmanuel Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas," interview by Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, Alison Ainley, trans. Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright, in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988), 177-78; Levinas, Outside the Subject, 116-25.
75. Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, eds. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 2-10; Emmanuel Levinas, The Levmas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Cambridge, MA: Oxford University Press, 1989), 75-87; Tl, 42-48.
76. Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, eds. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 2-10; Emmanuel Levinas, The Levmas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Cambridge, MA: Oxford University Press, 1989), 75-87; Tl, 42-48.
77. Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, eds. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 2-10; Emmanuel Levinas, The Levmas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Cambridge, MA: Oxford University Press, 1989), 75-87; T1, 42-48.
78. Peperzak, To the Other, 145-46.
79. Levinas, Outside the Subject, 141.
80. Theodore de Boer, "An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy," in Face to Face with Levinas, ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986), 97, explains this elevation of the Other beyond understanding in terms of the distinct functions of the linguistic sign. To "understand" the Other qua interlocutor would be to confuse the thematic function of signs (their giving of meaning to objects) and the vocative function of signs (their performative appeal to other human beings). Of course, one could thematize this vocative function, but only in terms that reduce interlocutors to the status of objects - hence obscuring the different role that each plays linguistically. Levinas contests the primacy of thematization in the linguistic sign. It is only the vocative appeal that makes thematization possible.
81. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 120-21; Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality," 173.
82. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 120-21; Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality," 173.
83. See also Emmanuel Levinas, "On the Trail of the Other," Philosophy Today 10 (1966): 39; and Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite," 113-14. Levinas can be compared here with Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses: 1) both distinguish limited "natural" need from unlimited social need; 2) both explain this in terms of simple satisfaction and the emergence of language; 3) both conceive reason as a movement of the passions in the effort to forestall death; and 4) both anchor obligation in primordial sensibility or compassion rather than in reason as self-preservation. While they may agree on these epistemological points, they differ greatly over the status of political society and the individual, where Levinas remains closer to Locke.
84. See also Emmanuel Levinas, "On the Trail of the Other," Philosophy Today 10 (1966): 39; and Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite," 113-14. Levinas can be compared here with Rousseau, The
85. Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 88-89.
86. Levinas contrasts the "anarchic" to the philosophic search for arche: origin or principle. Because responsibility to and for the Other is a precondition for reason, it must be understood as anarchic. While this might seem to make responsibility a more profound arche, a principle of principles, Levinas rejects this explanation: "anarchy is not disorder as opposed to order. . . . Disorder is but another order, and what is diffuse is thematizable" (OB, 101). He distinguishes his anarchic view of responsibility from that of "the moral philosophers of sentiment" for whom benevolence is a "natural" inclination. In associating nature with reason, being, essence, etc., Levinas renders responsibility "unnatural" - the good beyond being; Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 183. Where the "moral sense" school defines right in terms of beauty, Levinas's ethics is ugly and anti-aesthetic, quite probably a recoil from Nietzsche's amoral aestheticism. This should make apparent the problem in the misguided reconciliation of Levinas and Nietzsche in John Caputo's Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993). As Dienstag has shown in Dancing in Chains, Locke himself eschewed the aesthetic approach to political or moral judgment.
87. Levinas contrasts the "anarchic" to the philosophic search for arche: origin or principle. Because responsibility to and for the Other is a precondition for reason, it must be understood as anarchic. While this might seem to make responsibility a more profound arche, a principle of principles, Levinas rejects this explanation: "anarchy is not disorder as opposed to order. . . . Disorder is but another order, and what is diffuse is thematizable" (OB, 101). He distinguishes his anarchic view of responsibility from that of "the moral philosophers of sentiment" for whom benevolence is a "natural" inclination. In associating nature with reason, being, essence, etc., Levinas renders responsibility "unnatural" - the good beyond being; Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 183. Where the "moral sense" school defines right in terms of beauty, Levinas's ethics is ugly and anti-aesthetic, quite probably a recoil from Nietzsche's amoral aestheticism. This should make apparent the problem in the misguided reconciliation of Levinas and Nietzsche in John Caputo's Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993). As Dienstag has shown in Dancing in Chains, Locke himself eschewed the aesthetic approach to political or moral judgment.
88. Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 206-7.
89. Interestingly, although Levinas ignores Locke, he invokes Hobbes as a symbol of tyranny, the great theorist of "original war and egoism"; Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 91; cf. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 273-74.
90. Interestingly, although Levinas ignores Locke, he invokes Hobbes as a symbol of tyranny, the great theorist of "original war and egoism"; Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 91; cf. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 273-74.
91. Cf. Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 84. Late in his career, he criticizes "eschatology" as implying a happy end where man is present with God; Emmanuel Levinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas," interview by Richard Kearney, in face to Face with Levinas, ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986), 23, 30. He seems to forget his own earlier employment of "eschatology" in a different meaning - as the encounter with non-presence. The face itself is neither present nor a possibility, since the Other is neither present to consciousness nor a possibility of my freedom. The Other is the trace of an alternate time (a "diachrony") and calls my freedom into question.
92. Cf. Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 84. Late in his career, he criticizes "eschatology" as implying a happy end where man is present with God; Emmanuel Levinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas," interview by Richard Kearney, in face to Face with Levinas, ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986), 23, 30. He seems to forget his own earlier employment of "eschatology" in a different meaning - as the encounter with non-presence. The face itself is neither present nor a possibility, since the Other is neither present to consciousness nor a possibility of my freedom. The Other is the trace of an alternate time (a "diachrony") and calls my freedom into question.
93. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 113-14; cf. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 204.
94. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 113-14; cf. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 204.
95. Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 32; Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 219-26; Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), 81-83.
96. Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 32; Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 219-26; Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), 81-83.
97. Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 32; Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 219-26; Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), 81-83.
98. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), 14.
99. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
100. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 238.
101. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 190-297; Levinas, Difficult Freedom; Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings; Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans. Gary D. Mole (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994); Emmanuel Levinas, In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).
102. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 190-297; Levinas, Difficult Freedom; Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings; Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans. Gary D. Mole (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994); Emmanuel Levinas, In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).
103. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 190-297; Levinas, Difficult Freedom; Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings; Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans. Gary D. Mole (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994); Emmanuel Levinas, In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).
104. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 190-297; Levinas, Difficult Freedom; Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings; Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans. Gary D. Mole (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994); Emmanuel Levinas, In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).
105. Not surprisingly, Levinas is less concerned with anarchic critique when Israel is at issue. Although he is typically gracious when speaking of the Palestinians, he also slips into apologism when pushed on Israeli injustice: Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 292-94; Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, 51-69; Levinas, Beyond the Verse, xvii. Although understandable in context, this does help show to what extent Levinas is of two minds about political justice.
106. Not surprisingly, Levinas is less concerned with anarchic critique when Israel is at issue. Although he is typically gracious when speaking of the Palestinians, he also slips into apologism when pushed on Israeli injustice: Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 292-94; Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, 51-69; Levinas, Beyond the Verse, xvii. Although understandable in context, this does help show to what extent Levinas is of two minds about political justice.
107. Not surprisingly, Levinas is less concerned with anarchic critique when Israel is at issue. Although he is typically gracious when speaking of the Palestinians, he also slips into apologism when pushed on Israeli injustice: Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 292-94; Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, 51-69; Levinas, Beyond the Verse, xvii. Although understandable in context, this does help show to what extent Levinas is of two minds about political justice.