Self-defence against the innocent

Journal of Applied Philosophy

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 145-155

  Clark, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 8644264277     PISSN: 02643758     EISSN: 14685930     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5930.00149     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Robert F. Schopp (1994) Self-defense in JULES COLEMAN and ALLEN BUCHANAN (eds.) In Harm’s Way (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 269.
2. George Fletcher (1978) Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston Little Brown), p. 862
3. Judith Jarvis Thomson (1991) Self-defense, Philosophy and Public Affairs 20
4. Jeff Mcmahan (1994) Self-defense and the problem of the innocent attacker, Ethics 104, and
5. Schopp, Self-defense and the problem of the innocent attacker, Ethics 104
6. G. E. M. Anscombe (1981) Mr Truman’s Degree, reprinted in her Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. 3 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), quoted by Thomson, in fn. 14 on p. 303.
7. Thomson, Mr Truman’s Degree, reprinted in her Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. 3 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), quoted by Thomson, in fn. 14 on p. 303.
8. Thomson, Mr Truman’s Degree, reprinted in her Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. 3 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), quoted by Thomson, in fn. 14 on, p. 307.
9. Suzanne Uniacke (1994) Permissible Killing (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp. 180–181.
10. Uniacke, Permissible Killing (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp. 180–181.
11. Uniacke, Permissible Killing (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 209.
12. Pace Thomson and others (see references in McMahan, Permissible Killing., fn 45, p. 282).
13. Richard Norman (1995) Ethics, Killing and War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 132. He seems to have forgotten those cases in which Victim mistakenly believes there is a forced choice.
14. Michael Oksuka (1994) Killing the innocent in self-defense, Philosophy and Public Affairs 23. In Otsuka’s view such an agent acts at her own risk by engaging in dangerous activity, placing her ‘moral immunity [from being killed] on the line’. Blameless though she is, her action proceeds from her own character, not from factors beyond her control as in the case of Innocent Aggressor and Innocent Threat. In English law (Williams (Gladstone) (1984) 78 Cr. App. R. 276), unlike many other common law jurisdictions, the victim has a defence if he believes his life is at risk, whether the belief is reasonable or not. It is a matter for the jury, however, whether his response is proportionate.
15. Otsuka, Killing the innocent in self-defense, Philosophy and Public Affairs 23. In Otsuka’s view such an agent acts at her own risk by engaging in dangerous activity, placing her ‘moral immunity [from being killed] on the line’. Blameless though she is, her action proceeds from her own character, not from factors beyond her control as in the case of Innocent Aggressor and Innocent Threat. In English law (Williams (Gladstone) (1984) 78 Cr. App. R. 276), unlike many other common law jurisdictions, the victim has a defence if he believes his life is at risk, whether the belief is reasonable or not. It is a matter for the jury, however, whether his response is proportionate, pp. 84–5.
16. Warren S. Quinn (1989) Actions, intentions and consequences: the doctrine of doing and allowing, The Philosophical Review 98, p. 309. On the use of the principle of initial liability
17. Michael Clark (1995) Sacrificing one for the sake of many, Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, pp. 189–200.
18. J. C. Smith (1989) Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (London: Stevens & Sons), p. 73.
19. Philippa Foot (1978) The problem of abortion and the principle of double effect, p. 29, in her Virtues and Vices (Oxford, Basil Blackwell).
20. Thomson, The problem of abortion and the principle of double effect, pp. 289–292.
21. Norman, The problem of abortion and the principle of double effect, p. 125. He calls this a case of ‘innocent threat’, but I think it would be wrong to assimilate it to Innocent Threat above, since it is the gang who are threatening to kill me, not the passer-by.
22. Pace Thomson, The problem of abortion and the principle of double effect. p. 292.
23. Christopher Boorse and Roy A. Sorensen (1988) Ducking harm, Journal of Philosophy 85, pp. 115–134.
24. McMahan, Ducking harm, Journal of Philosophy, p. 288.
25. Thomson, Ducking harm, Journal of Philosophy, p. 285.
26. Frances M. Kamm (1987) The insanity defense, innocent threats, and limited alternatives, Criminal Justice Ethics 6, p. 64.
27. Barbara Herman (1993) pp. 129–131 of Murder and mayhem, reprinted in her book The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press). ‘In stopping aggression with force, I am asserting my status as a rational agent. It is an act of self-respect.’ Presumably, on this view self-defence would be not merely permissible but morally desirable.
28. Thomson, Murder and mayhem, reprinted in her book The Practice of Moral Judgment, p. 286, for example.