Moral responsibility, determinism, and the ability to do otherwise

Journal of Ethics

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 341-350

  Van Inwagen, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

Compatibilism; Determinism; Free will; Harry G. Frankfurt; Moral responsibility; Principle of alternate possibilities

Indexed keywords

EID: 8644242018     PISSN: 13824554     EISSN: 15728609     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. Among the philosophers I have mentioned, only John Stuart Mill would have known the word "determinism," which was coined by Sir William Hamilton.
2. I believe it was Keith Lehrer who coined the term "compatibilism. "
3. But the need for them is very small, and they are almost always better avoided. As for "contra-causal freedom" and "freedom in the libertarian sense," they must be consigned to the dustbin of philosophical history. Unfortunately, the latter turns up with some frequency in current writings on free will. To my mind, seeing that the phrase "freedom in the libertarian sense" has no possible use is the pons asinorum of the problem of free will, for compatibilists and incompatibilists use "is able to do otherwise" in exactly the same sense. The reader who doubts this should consult my essay "When Is the Will Free?" Philosophical Perspectives Volume 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989), pp. 394-122 [reprinted in Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 219-238)]. This reader should consult particularly the long paragraph that runs from page 402 to page 404 (O'Connor, pp. 222-223) and begins "Before going further ⋯" I regard this paragraph as the single most important paragraph I have ever written about the free-will problem. I wish people would pay more attention to it.
4. Harry G. Frankfurt, "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities," The Journal of Philosophy LXVI (1969), pp. 829-839.
5. Reprinted in John Martin Fischer (ed.), Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 143-152.
6. More properly, the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.
7. Frankfurt, "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities," p. 829. In this principle, "could have" must not be taken to mean "might have"; it means "was able to." The ambiguity of "could have" - the "might have"/"was able to" ambiguity - has caused an immense amount of confusion in discussions of PAP and in discussions of the free will problem in general. Here is a pair of examples (adapted from Austin) that illustrates this ambiguity. "You could have exposed me this morning. For God's sake, watch what you're saying when you talk to the press." "You could have exposed me this morning. I want you to know that I'm grateful you didn't.
8. It is consistent with the way we have told the story that there was a time earlier than t at which Gunnar was able not to shoot Ridley. It should be obvious that a more elaborate example could have been constructed according to which there was no point in Gunnar's life at which he was able not to shoot Ridley.
9. Peter van Inwagen, "Ability and Responsibility," The Philosophical Review LXXXVII (1978), pp. 201-224. Reprinted in Fischer, pp. 153-173.
10. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1983. See pp. 161-182.
11. Harry G. Frankfurt, "What We Are Morally Responsible For," in Leigh S. Cauman, Isaac Levi, Charles Parsons, and Robert Schwartz (eds.), How Many Questions? Essays in Honor of Sydney Morgenbesser (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982).
12. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 286-295.
13. Fischer and Ravizza, p. 294.
14. See "Ability and Responsibility," or Chapter V of An Essay on Free Will.