Did time inconsistency contribute to the great inflation? Evidence from the FOMC transcripts

Economics and Politics

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 233-251

  Chappell Jr , Henry W ^a   McGregor, Rob Roy ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC PLANNING; ECONOMIC POLICY; INFLATION;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES; WESTERN HEMISPHERE; WORLD;

EID: 8644224025     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00139.x     Document Type: Article

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