THE MANUMISSION OF HERMENEUTICS: THE SLAVE LAWS OF THE PENTATEUCH AS A CHALLENGE TO CONTEMPORARY PENTATEUCHAL THEORY

Vetus Testamentum, Supplements

Volumn 109, Issue , 2006, Pages 281-324

  Levinson, Bernard M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 85202647425     PISSN: 00835889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
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References (161)

1. th Congress of the International Organization for the Study of the Old Testament for the invitation to present a plenary lecture and for the generous hospitality in Leiden. Particular gratitude is extended to President Arie van der Kooij and to Secretary Konrad D. Jenner, with both of whom there were further valuable intellectual exchanges touching on the Peshitta and text-criticism. The Congresses are distinctive for the high level of dialogue that they facilitate. This article, which extensively reworks the original lecture, is dedicated to the memory of my beloved sister Barbara Frances Grimson, née Levinson, who died in Toronto of metastatic breast cancer on 9 June 2004, three days before her fortieth wedding anniversary, not yet age 65.
2. Pointedly beginning his attempt to challenge the standard model of the documentary hypothesis with a new approach to the altar law of Exod. 20:24 is J. Van Seters, A Law Book for the Diaspora: Revision in the Study of the Covenant Code (New York, 2003), pp. 8, 57–67.
3. For an analysis, see B.M. Levinson, “Is the Covenant Code an Exilic Composition? A Response to John Van Seters,” in J. Day (ed.), In Search of Pre-Exilic Israel: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar, JSOTSup 406 (London and New York, 2004), pp. 272–325.
4. Making this point on the importance of the Passover law to the larger question of the dating of the pentateuchal sources, see T. Veijola, “The History of Passover in the Light of Deuteronomy 16, 1–8,” Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische Rechtsgeschichte 2 (1996), pp. 53–75.
5. For alternative analyses of the literary history involved, see inter alia, B.M. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation (New York and Oxford, 1997), pp. 53–97
6. E. Otto, Das Deuteronomium: Politische Theologie und Rechtsreform in Juda und Assyrien, BZAW 284 (Berlin, 1999), pp. 324–340
7. Van Seters, Law Book for the Diaspora, pp. 162–171.
8. For the most sustained analysis of the literary relation of the manumission laws of D and CC in recent years, see N. Lohfink, “Fortschreibung? Zur Technik vom Rechtsrevisionen im deuteronomischen Bereich, erörtert an Deuteronomium 12, Ex 21,2–11 und Dtn 15,12–18,” in T. Veijola (ed.), Das Deuteronomium und seine Querbeziehungen, Schriften der Finnischen Exegetischen Gesellschaft 62 (Göttingen, 1996), pp. 133–181; reprinted in and cited according to idem, Studien zum Deuteronomium und zur deuteronomistischen Literatur, IV, SBAB 31 (Stuttgart, 2000), pp. 163–203.
9. This important study demonstrates the extent to which the manumission law in Deuteronomy can only be understood as a significant literary reworking of the law found in the Covenant Code. The article is overlooked in Van Seters, Law Book for the Diaspora (2003; published in late 2002). Lohfink develops important methodological criteria to distinguish the concept of Fortschreibung from alternative models of literary reworking.
10. This article draws on research in progress for my next book, Rethinking Revelation and Redaction: The Role of Intellectual Models within Biblical Studies (Oxford University Press). On the importance of grounding pentateuchal theory upon a firm analysis of biblical law, see idem, “Introduction,” in B.M. Levinson (ed.), Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development, JSOTSup 181 (Sheffield, 1994; reprint, London, 2005), pp. 9–14.
11. A. Kuenen, An Historico-critical Inquiry into the Origin and Composition of the Hexateuch, tr. P.H. Wicksteed, 2 vols. (London, 1886), 1.xxii.
12. Perhaps ironically, the first publication of this statement in conjunction with the volume was in English, in the Introduction prepared by the translator specifically for this publication, as he responds to recent developments in source-critical scholarship (see “Translator’s Preface,” vii). Wicksteed drew material for the Introduction from Kuenen’s publications in journals. The second Dutch edition of Kuenen’s three-volume work, published the following year, does not include this Introduction; see Abraham Kuenen, Historisch-critisch Onderzoek naar het Onstaan en de Verzameling van de Boeken des Ouden Verbonds, 3 vols. (Leiden, 1887).
13. On his significance, see A. Rofé, “Abraham Kuenen’s Contribution to the Study of the Pentateuch: A View from Israel,” in P.B. Dirkson and A. van der Kooij (eds.), Abraham Kuenen (1828–1891): His Major Contributions to the Study of the Old Testament, OTS 29 (Leiden, 1993), pp. 105–112.
14. A significant early challenge was posed by Carl Steuernagel, who denied the dependence of Deuteronomy’s manumission law upon that of the Covenant Code on the basis of the stipulations in Exod. 21:3–4 lacking correspondence in Deut. 15:12–18 (Das Deuteronomium, HAT I.3.1; 2d ed. [Göttingen, 1923], p. 110).
15. For a recent reflection of that same objection on linguistic grounds, overlooking the similarity to Steuernagel’s position, see W.S. Morrow, Scribing the Center: Organization and Redaction in Deuteronomy 14:1–17:13, SBLMS 49 (Atlanta, 1995), p. 116.
16. On both authors, and responding to the substantive issue, see Otto, Deuteronomium, p. 310 n. 467.
17. See Y. Kaufmann, Toledot ha-’emuna ha-yiśre’elit, 8 vols. in 4 (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1937–1956), 1.113–142, 201–203 (Hebrew)
18. abridged as The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile, tr. M. Greenberg (Chicago, 1960), p. 205.
19. R.P. Merendino, Das deuteronomische Gesetz: Eine literarkritische, gattungs- und überlieferungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Dt 12–26, BBB 31 (Bonn, 1969), pp. 401–402.
20. The sequence of marriage laws in The Laws of Eshnunna §§28–30 are reused and significantly expanded in the range of topics addressed by The Laws of Hammurabi §§128–136, which nonetheless still preserve the basic sequence and structure of their literary matrix. For a clear analysis, see B.L. Eichler, “Literary Structure in the Laws of Eshnunna,” in F. Rochberg-Halton (ed.), Language, Literature, and History: Philological and Historical Studies Presented to Erica Reiner, American Oriental Series 67 (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1987), p. 83.
21. Kaufmann’s view was much more nuanced than generally recognized. While arguing that P is pre-exilic, he concedes the exilic or post-exilic context for its incorporation into the Pentateuch, which is the main point. That distinction, whereby even for Kaufmann the literary impact of P is late, seems to have been lost sight of in the current disputes about the dating of this corpus. For all practical purposes, Kaufmann’s position is thus consistent, not inconsistent, with the more standard European account of the history of pentateuchal literature. On Kaufmann’s marginalization, see T. Krapf, Die Priesterschrift und die vorexilische Zeit: Yehezkel Kaufmanns vernachlässigter Beitrag zur Geschichte der biblischen Religion, OBO 119 (Freiburg and Göttingen, 1992)
22. Yehezkel Kaufmann: Ein Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg zur Theologie der Hebräischen Bibel, Studien zu Kirche und Israel 11 (Berlin, 1990).
23. Personal circumstances unfortunately made it impossible to accept a welcome invitation to contribute to M. Bar Asher et al. (eds.), Essays in Honor of Sara Japhet (Jerusalem, 2006), as I would otherwise have gladly done.
24. When I spent a year at the Hebrew University (1979–1980), it was with her that I first read Exodus in Hebrew. The class (whose focus was chs. 1–15) provided a model of graduate instruction that remains important for me, as was her generosity with her time. In this study, while disagreeing with the conclusions of an article that has long sustained my interest, I wish to express enduring gratitude for the critical reading skills that she helped hone, as well as for her kindness that year. See S. Japhet, “The Laws of Manumission of Slaves,” in I. Avishur and J. Blau (eds.), Studies in Bible and the Ancient Near East: Presented to Samuel E. Loewenstamm on his Seventieth Birthday, 2 vols. (Jerusalem, 1978), 2.231–249 (Hebrew; English abstract, 1.199–200)
25. translated and cited according to eadem, “The Relationship between the Legal Corpora in the Pentateuch in Light of Manumission Laws,” in S. Japhet (ed.), Studies in Bible, 1986, ScrHier 31 (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 63–89.
26. J. Weingreen, From Bible to Mishnah: The Continuity of Tradition (Manchester, 1976), pp. 132–134.
27. On the cuneiform background and biblical use of the protasis marker in question, see B.M. Levinson and M.M. Zahn, “Revelation Regained: The Hermeneutics of éë and íà in the Temple Scroll,” DSD 9 (2002), pp. 295–346.
28. Referring to the predominance of the third person formulation, A. Jepsen maintained: “Eine Ausnahme von dieser Regel findet sich nur [Exod.] 21,2, wo der MT lautet: äð÷ú éë; da die zweite Person in den Mischpatim immer Zeichen eines Einschubs oder einer Überarbeitung ist, darf man annehmen, dass auch hier der Satz begann: Öéà äð÷é éë” (Untersuchung zum Bundesbuch, BWANT 41 [Stuttgart, 1927], p. 56).
29. Albrecht Alt emended the text (a) to a third person verb in the imperfect and (b) to a formulation that would correspond with that of Deuteronomy’s manumission law: éë éøáò ùéà øëîé, “If a Hebrew man is sold.” See idem, Die Ursprünge des israelitischen Rechts (Leipzig, 1934)
30. reprinted in and cited according to idem, Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel (Munich, 1953) 1:278–332 (at 286–287).
31. This issue is treated extensively by Japhet, “Relationship between the Legal Corpora,” pp. 70–72. Note the astute challenge to the various emendations and their rationale provided by Van Seters, Law Book for the Diaspora, pp. 22–23 and 86–87 (there is a minor typo in the Hebrew on p. 86).
32. Japhet, “Relationship between the Legal Corpora,” p. 73 (emphasis added).
33. A semantic category confusion governs the point of departure for Japhet’s analysis and makes its conclusions all but inevitable. Japhet rejects Alt’s proposal, which was patterned after the nipál formulation of Deut. 15:12, because it employs a passive verb (n. 14 above). She insists that the literary structure of the casuistic laws of the Covenant Code does not permit such a reconstruction: “It should be emphasized that the verb employed in the opening conditional clause is always active” (ibid., p. 72). She restricts any “passive formulation” to the “continuation of the laws,” where they may occur only in secondary conditions or elaborations (p. 72 n. 26). Since the verb of Exod. 21:2a “must” originally have been active, she contends that the nipál verb in Deut. 15:12a could not derive from the protasis of the Covenant Code law precisely because it carries a passive meaning: “is sold” (eadem, “Relationship between the Legal Corpora,” p. 73). The nipál formulation in Lev. 25:39a thus provides the necessary “missing link” that explains the origin of the “passive” form at Deut. 15:12a. This line of reasoning must be questioned. The semantic bifurcation—active/passive—fails to do justice to the semantic range of the nipál stem. It is essential to distinguish between morphology (the nipál stem) and mood (active/passive). In effect, Japhet reduces the nipál conjugation to a passive. Her denial that there can be such verbs in the main condition of a casuistic law overlooks the protasis of the law of talion: íé!Öð#à eöpéé!ëå, “When two men struggle” (Exod. 21:22). The nipál form there expresses the reciprocal/reflexive idea that is the original semantic function of the conjugation; the passive represents a secondary development. Almost certainly at issue in the nipál verb at Deut. 15:12 (and thus in Alt’s proposal for Exod. 21:2) is self-indenture: not a passive but a reflexive use of the stem. This problem does not simply reside in the English translation. It also exists in the Hebrew original of the article: “—éáéè÷à éáéñô úîåòì” (“active, as opposed to passive”); similarly, the casuistic main protasis must be “ãéîú éáéè÷à” (“always active”); see eadem, “Laws of Manumission,” pp. 236, 237 (Hebrew; my translation).
34. Laws of Manumission, p. 69.
35. Shortly after the original Hebrew publication of Japhet’s article in 1978, a dissertation that closely follows its assumptions was prepared under the direction of Shalom Paul: A. Levy, Aspects of Bondage and Release in the Bible: Comparative Studies of Exodus 21:2–6, Leviticus 25:25–55, Deuteronomy 15:12–18 (Doctor of Hebrew Literature diss., Jewish Theological Seminary; reprint, Ann Arbor, 1981; in Hebrew). While the dissertation shows many places where the legal formulae of the manumission laws connect to cuneiform use, its source-critical arguments do not advance beyond those already made formidably by Japhet.
36. J. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3 (New York, 1991)
37. J. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3A (New York, 2000)
38. J. Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3B (New York, 2001).
39. Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, pp. 2254–2256.
40. Also defending the priority of the Holiness Code to Deuteronomy is J. Joosten, People and Land in the Holiness Code: An Exegetical Study of the Ideational Framework of the Law in Leviticus 17–26, VTSup 67 (Leiden, 1996). Note his self-consciousness in departing from the more commonly held European model as he dates the Holiness Code to the monarchical period: “These conclusions regarding the date of our corpus may seem hopelessly out of step with the mainstream of contemporary research” (p. 207). His focus is on articulating the conceptual system of the Holiness Code, not on systematic legal comparison as the basis for drawing diachronic conclusions.
41. G.C. Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery in Israel and the Ancient Near East, JSOTSup 141 (Sheffield, 1993), p. 344; similarly, p. 329.
42. G.C. Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery in Israel and the Ancient Near East ,1993, p. 343.
43. Astutely noting the inconsistency, see A. Schenker, “The Biblical Legislation on the Release of Slaves: the Road from Exodus to Leviticus,” in Recht und Kult im Alten Testament: Achtzehn Studien, OBO 172 (Freiburg and Göttingen, 2000), pp. 134–149 (at 134 n. 1).
44. “The Biblical Legislation on the Release of Slaves: the Road from Exodus to Leviticus,” in Recht und Kult im Alten Testament: Achtzehn Studien 2000, p. 344.
45. “The Biblical Legislation on the Release of Slaves: the Road from Exodus to Leviticus,” in Recht und Kult im Alten Testament: Achtzehn Studien 2000, p. 296.
46. J.G. McConville, Law and Theology in Deuteronomy, JSOTSup 33 (Sheffield, 1984). Both Chirichigno and McConville completed their dissertations under the tutelage of Gordon J. Wenham. A recent dissertation directed by Prof. Wenham reaches similar results. Henning Graf Reventlow observes (review of Pekka Pitkänen, Central Sanctuary and the Centralization of Worship in Ancient Israel: From the Settlement to the Building of Solomon’s Temple, Review of Biblical Literature [www.bookreviews.org; published 1/8/2005])
47. See the last sentence of the review by A.D.H. Mayes: “There may be much in Deuteronomy which is consistent with its self-presentation as a speech of Moses on the border of the land, but there is much that is not” (ExpT 96 [1985], pp. 370–371).
48. Reviews raising similar concerns include A.G. Auld, Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986), pp. 257–258
49. G. Braulik, Bib 67 (1986), pp. 423–427
50. J. Pons, Etudes théologiques et religieuses 61 (1986), pp. 583–584
51. B.M. Levinson, “McConville’s Law and Theology in Deuteronomy,” JQR 80 (1990), pp. 396–404
52. N. Lohfink, BZ 34 (1990), pp. 122–124.
53. Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, p. 356.
54. Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, p. 357, as the last sentence of the book.
55. Van Seters, Law Book for the Diaspora, especially pp. 82–95.
56. This work draws upon a series of earlier studies, including the one that is most relevant for the present purposes, his article on the manumission laws: Van Seters, “The Law of the Hebrew Slave,” ZAW 108 (1996), pp. 534–546.
57. “Cultic Laws in the Covenant Code and their Relationship to Deuteronomy and the Holiness Code,” in M. Vervenne (ed.), Studies in the Book of Exodus: Redaction—Reception—Interpretation, BETL 126 (Leuven, 1996), pp. 319–345.
58. This approach builds on his earlier work on narrative, which seeks to re-date the Yahwist to the post-exilic period, later than the Priestly source. To do so, he makes Deuteronomy the earliest source and eliminates the Elohist; see M. Vervenne, The Life of Moses: The Yahwist as Historian in Exodus-Numbers (Louisville, 1994).
59. As Van Seters’s fine review of the history of scholarship makes abundantly clear (Law Book for the Diaspora, pp. 8–18).
60. “Das Bundesbuch ist nicht Teil des jahwistischen Geschichtswerks gewesen, sondern nachträglich in die Sinaiperikope gelangt.” See C. Levin, “Das Deuteronomium und der Jahwist,” in R.G. Kratz and H. Spieckermann (eds.), Liebe und Gebot: Studien zum Deuteronomium: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Lothar Perlitt, FRLANT 190 (Göttingen, 2000), pp. 121–136 (at 127)
61. reprinted in C. Levin, Fortschreibungen: Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament, BZAW 316 (Berlin and New York, 2003), pp. 96–110.
62. See similarly the earlier statement in C. Levin, “Der Dekalog am Sinai,” VT 35 (1985), pp. 165–191 (at 180–181).
63. There is an additional dimension to the irony just mentioned. While making arguments that parallel those of Van Seters as regards both the late date of the Yahwist and the alleged dependence of the altar law of the Covenant Code (Exod. 20:24) upon Deuteronomy 12, even Levin maintains that the manumission law of the Covenant Code was almost certainly used as a source by the author of Deuteronomy. See Levin, “Das Deuteronomium und der Jahwist,” pp. 132–133.
64. Israel Knohl also maintains the priority of the Holiness Code to Deuteronomy. Since the manumission laws do not play any significant role in his analysis, and there is no discussion of the relation of Lev. 25:39–46 to the other pentateuchal legislation, his work is not addressed here. See Levin, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School (Minneapolis, 1995), p. 122.
65. The relation of Jeremiah 34 to the pentateuchal manumission laws is the subject of one of the chapters in Rethinking Revelation and Redaction.
66. Van Seters, “Law of the Hebrew Slave,” p. 540. This statement from the 1996 article is repeated verbatim in idem, Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 87.
67. Sharply challenging Van Seters on this point, describing the text as a speech act or as analogous to formulations like, “The president was elected,” see E. Otto, Das Deuteronomium: Politische Theologie und Rechtsreform in Juda und Assyrien, BZAW 284 (Berlin, 1999), pp. 303–311.
68. Otto challenges Van Seters’s reading of Exod. 21:2 (“Hebrew Slave”) at p. 305 n. 451.
69. He repeats and extends that challenge, at points verbatim, in his “Exkurs: Das Deuteronomium als Quelle des Bundesbuches? Zu einer These von John Van Seters,” in Gottes Recht als Menschenrecht: Rechts- und literaturhistorische Studien zum Deuteronomium, BZAR 2 (Wiesbaden, 2002), pp. 20–24.
70. Van Seters responds to the challenge (Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 191 n. 28; and p. 193 n. 54). The debate between the two of them does not allow for resolution in its present terms. Neither adduces textual evidence; each seems simply to restate his position.
71. Tannaitic midrashic exegesis read the phrase éøáò ãáò as do moderns: as an absolute noun with an accompanying attributive adjective: “a Hebrew slave.” While discussing the law’s application (whether it applied to Jews or non-Jews; the nature of the slavery involved, etc.), however, the text entertains the possibility that the phrase might be construed as a construct (as is morphologically possible). In that case, the gentilic adjective would become the nomen rectum. Thus construed, the biblical idiom is then “translated” into the syntax of Rabbinic Hebrew as: éøáò ìù åãáò, “the slave of a Hebrew” or, literally, “his slave: [namely, one] belonging to a Hebrew.” (To express a genitive, Rabbinic Hebrew prefers this construction, using the anticipatory pronominal suffix plus a relative clause, over the classical biblical construct). Here the protasis would apply to someone already a slave prior to purchase. In the rabbinic understanding, the slave addressed by the law would be a “Canaanite slave”: a non-Israelite held by an Israelite owner. As a consequence, sabbatical and other legislation associated with manumission would then also apply to non-Israelites. This analysis of the protasis is rejected. For convenient text and translation, see J.Z. Lauterbach, Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1935), 3.3.
72. On the proleptic designation of the slave, see N.P. Lemche, “‘The Hebrew Slave’: Comments on the Slave Law Ex. xxi 2–11,” VT 25 (1975), pp. 129–144 (135)
73. Åke Viberg, Symbols of Law: A Contextual Analysis of Legal Symbolic Acts in the Old Testament, CB 34 (Stockholm, 1992), p. 84
74. ȟuzma riksātiša la iškun sinništum šî ul aššat, “If a man marries a wife but does not draw up a formal contract for her, she is not a wife.” (See M. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopatamia and Asia Minor, 2d ed., SBLWAW 6 [Atlanta, 1987], p. 104.) Unlike Hebrew, Akkadian lexically distinguishes between the descriptive gender term, aššatum, for “woman,” and the legal status of sinništum, “wife.” Yet the female specified in the law’s protasis, given the technical use of the verb, is proleptically defined as the man’s legal sinništum, “wife.” The hypothesis proposed by Van Seters for Exod. 21:2 would require this woman to have already been a wife (and then also, by implication, someone else’s wife). Rather, the woman is defined as a legal wife through the contractual assumptions of the protasis. If there is consummation but no contract, there is no legal marriage and the woman’s status reverts to aššatum. The protasis here establishes the legal condition using contractual language. Similar assumptions are evident in LH §7, where the protasis postulates a purchase agreement, and whose apodosis specifies that the condition of a legal purchase is a valid contract. Without such a contract, the proleptic language of “purchase” used in the protasis is redefined to designate the purchaser as instead šarrāq, “a thief,” and, as such, subject to capital punishment. Ironically, Van Seters might have actually made a more successful argument to defend his position in light of LH §§278–280. There, however, the premise of the laws is the legal principle of restoration of the status quo ante. That same principle applies to Exod. 21:2–7.
75. The slave concludes indenture with the same legal status as he entered it (so Exod. 21:3); he must therefore have entered as he is to exit: éùôçì, “free.” See B.M. Levinson, “The ‘Effected Object’ in Contractual Legal Language: The Semantics of ‘If You Purchase a Hebrew Slave’ (Exod. xxi 2),” VT 56 (2006), in press.
76. Van Seters, Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 84.
77. Van Seters, Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 90.
78. Challenging Van Seters on this point, see B.S. Jackson, “Revolution in Biblical Law: Some Reflections on the Role of Theory in Methodology,” JSS 50 (2005), pp. 83–116.
79. Elsewhere Jackson articulates the structural relationship between the two slavery paragraphs of the Covenant Code and explains the legal rationale for distinct protocols based upon gender. See idem, “Some Literary Features of the Mishpatim,” in M. Augustin and K.-D. Schunck (eds.), Wünschet Jerusalem Frieden: Collected Communications to the XIIth Congress of the International Organization for the Study of the Old Testament, Jerusalem 1986, Beiträge zur Erforschung des Alten Testaments und des antiken Judentums 13 (Frankfurt, 1988), pp. 235–242
80. idem, “Biblical Laws of Slavery: A Comparative Approach,” in L. Archer (ed.), Slavery and Other Forms of Unfree Labor (London and New York, 1988), pp. 86–101 (pp. 93–94)
81. L. Archer, Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law, JSOTSup 314 (Sheffield, 2000), pp. 193–197
82. idem, Wisdom-Laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1–22:16 (Oxford, 2006), ch.3 (in press).
83. Here and elsewhere, vocalized citations of the Old Testament in Hebrew employ Hebrew Scriptures for Windows © 1993–1999 Payne Loving Trust. The Septuagint is cited according to Greek Old Testament for Windows version 2.3 © 1992–1997 Payne Loving Trust. The fonts Hebraica II, New Jerusalem, and Symbol Greek II are available from Linguist’s Software, Inc., P.O. Box 580, Edmonds, WA 98020–0580, www.linguistsoftware.com. The font Bwhebb is copyright 1994–2002 BibleWorks, LLC, P.O. Box 6158, Norfolk, VA 23508.
84. Figure 1 builds on the valuable model provided by Lohfink, “Fortschreibung” (n. 3 above), p. 188. For further analysis of the binary legal logic and the legal syntax, see Levinson and Zahn, “Revelation Regained” (n. 13 above), pp. 314–315.
85. Van Seters, “Law of the Hebrew Slave,” p. 535 = Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 83.
86. Van Seters, “Law of the Hebrew Slave,” p. 535 = Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 83.
87. Van Seters, “Law of the Hebrew Slave,” p. 536 = Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 83.
88. More normally, Van Seters emphasizes the extent to which the author of the Covenant Code used Hammurabi’s Code as a direct literary model for the casuistic laws (Law Book for the Diaspora, pp. 45, 56–57, 95–99, 125–127, 173–175). Indeed, “For J, Moses is the Jewish Hammurabi” (p. 57). Given that primary literary influence upon the casuistic laws of the Covenant Code, for the very first of those laws, the law of manumission, to “stand outside the rest of the casuistic corpus because it owes nothing directly to the Hammurabi Code” (p. 99) calls attention to itself as an anomaly within the explanatory model. In fairness, Van Seters attempts to address this issue and points it out himself, stressing that the Yahwist was free to draw upon all of the legal sources at his disposal, including D, H, and Hammurabi (p. 125).
89. Making a similar point about the lack of economy in the explanatory model, see D.P. Wright, Review of A Law Book for the Diaspora: Revision in the Study of the Covenant Code, by John Van Seters, JAOS 124 (2004), pp. 129–131.
90. Note also his systematic analysis of the literary influence of Hammurabi’s Code upon the Covenant Code, arguing for the Neo-Assyrian period as the most logical context to account for this influence: Wright D.P., “The Laws of Hammurabi as a Source for the Covenant Collection (Exodus 20:23–23:19),” MAARAV 10 (2003), pp. 11–87.
91. Van Seters, Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 85.
92. The tabular presentation and alignment with the MT for comparative purposes are mine. Making a similar point that “Van Seters takes no account of awkwardness in the language” of Deut. 15:17b, see Jackson, “Revolution in Biblical Law,” pp. 83–116. Jackson draws valuable attention to similar features in comparative legal history.
93. The particle óà occurs 121 times in the Old Testament (including óàå and the form with interrogative h). None of the other attestations is found within biblical law or a conventional legal statement. The eight citations in Leviticus 26, as the concluding chapter of the Holiness Code, reinforce this point. They do not occur in an actual law but in a rhetorical context, the first-person divine speech of God, as an intensifier, as he describes the sanctions for breach of the covenant. Perhaps the closest analogy to the case at hand (Deut. 15:17b) is the divine insistence that the survivors shall languish because of their own iniquities but also (óàå) because of the iniquities of their ancestors (Lev. 25:39). In both cases, the syntactical structure is: óàå+preposition+noun/construct phrase with pronominal suffix+imperfect verb. The invocation of trans-generational punishment here represents an escalation and intensification. The particle rhetorically stresses the extension of the action in the preceding clause to an otherwise unexpected recipient. The particle in Deut. 15:7b seems to function similarly. (The full list of citations follows: Gen. 3:1; 18:13, 23, 24; 40:16; Lev. 26:16, 24, 28, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44; Num. 16:14; Deut. 2:11, 20; 15:17; 31:27; 33:3, 20, 28; Judg. 5:29; 1Sam. 2:7; 14:30; 21:6; 23:3; 2Sam. 4:11; 16:11; 20:14; 1Kgs. 8:27; 2Kgs. 2:14; 5:13; Isa. 26:8, 9, 11; 33:2; 35:2; 40:24; 41:10, 23, 26; 42:13; 43:7, 19; 44:15–16, 19; 45:21; 46:7, 11; 48:12, 13, 15; Ezek. 14:21; 15:5; 23:40; Amos 2:11; Hab. 2:5, 15; Ps. 16:6, 7, 9; 18:49; 44:10; 58:3; 65:14; 68:9, 17, 19; 74:16; 77:17, 18; 89:6, 12, 22, 28, 44; 93:1; 96:10; 108:2; 119:3; 135:17; Job 4:19; 6:27; 9:14; 14:3; 15:4, 16; 19:4; 25:6; 32:10, 17; 34:12, 17; 35:14; 36:16, 29; 37:1, 11; 40:8; Prov. 9:2; 11:31; 15:11; 17:7; 19:7, 10; 21:27; 22:19; 23:28; Cant. 1:16; Eccl. 2:9; Esth. 5:12; Neh. 2:18; 9:18; 13:15; 1Chr. 8:32; 9:38; 16:30; 2Chr. 6:18; 12:5; 32:15.)
94. T. Muraoka, Emphatic Words and Structures in Biblical Hebrew (Jerusalem and Leiden, 1985), p. 141.
95. Van Seters, Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 85.
96. The formulation of Deut. 15:17b represents a variation of the more standard formula for drawing an exegetical analogy, äùòú ïë. On the latter formula and its uses, see M. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1988), pp. 177–184. I disagree, however, with Fishbane’s analysis of Deuteronomy’s manumission law. He regards those parts of the text addressing the female slave (the reference in the protasis of v. 12; as well as 15:17b) as interpolations to an original text centered only on the male slave (p. 211 n. 99). Fishbane is troubled that v. 18a returns to the male reference, and does not directly continue v. 17b. While removing the ostensibly intrusive matter creates a grammatically more consistent text, that approach overlooks the revisionist intent of the law as a whole, whose larger coherence lies in its concern to revise the protocols of Exod. 21:2–6, 7–11. Fishbane’s approach allows that intent only to operate in the secondary expansion. In so doing, he separates the revision of gender protocols from the extent to which the rest of the law also extensively revises its source.
97. See W.A. Meeks et al. (eds.), The HarperCollins Study Bible: New Revised Standard Version, NRSV text, 1989 (San Francisco, 1993), p. 293.
98. 12 is also a pointed one, which would hardly have been made, unless some material modification of the law of Ex. had been intended by it.” So, incisively, S.R. Driver, Deuteronomy, ICC, 3d ed. (Edinburgh, 1901), p. 182. Similarly in the most recent commentary: “Die breite Formulierung . . . ist als eine bewusste dtn Erweiterung der Vorlage (Ex 21,2) anzusehen, weshalb kein Anlass besteht, deren zweiten Teil (‘oder eine Hebräerin’) als sekundär zu beseitigen.” See T. Veijola, Das 5. Buch Mose: Deuteronomium, ATD 8.1 (Göttingen, 2004), p. 319.
99. The reconstructions of Deut. 15:12a that remove “or a female Hebrew” from the protasis as secondary are untenable. They miss the intentionality of the pointed comment, which is one of the main points of the law as a whole. Scholars make the deletion for one or both of the following two reasons: (a) the verse’s syntactical inconsistency; (b) with reference to the formulation of Jer. 34:14a, where the ostensible citation of this law refers only to the male slave. However, that ostensible citation more likely represents simplification of the formulation in Deuteronomy rather than a basis for reconstructing any Vorlage. Moreover, the fact that the author of Jer. 34:14a is interpreting Deuteronomic law and reformulating it rather than preserving any possible actual source is also clear from the very beginning of the verse, which exegetically joins the time formula for remission of debts in the sabbatical, “At the end of seven years” (Deut. 15:1), to the continuation of the manumission law (Deut. 15:12). At issue here is something much closer to midrash halakha than the preservation of any earlier form of the Deuteronomic text. Contra M. David, “The Manumission of Slaves under Zedekiah,” OTS 5 (1948), pp. 63–79 (at pp. 72–73)
100. R.P. Merendino, Das deuteronomische Gesetz: Eine literarkritische, gattungsund überlieferungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Dt 12–26, BBB 31 (Bonn, 1969), p. 113 (deleting the reference to both male and female)
101. I. Cardellini, Die biblischen “Sklaven”-Gesetze im Lichte des keilschriftlichen Sklavenrechts: Ein Beitrag zur Tradition, Überlieferung und Redaktion der alttestamentlichen Rechtstexte, BBB 55 (Königstein, 1981), pp. 272–276, 318
102. M. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1988), p. 211 n. 99
103. here overlooking the significance of his astute analysis, S. Chavel, “‘Let My People Go!’ Emancipation, Revelation, and Scribal Activity in Jeremiah 34:8–14,” JSOT 76 (1997), pp. 71–95 (at pp. 90–91)
104. S. Lal Wijesinghe, Jeremiah 34,8–22: Structure, and Redactional History of the Masoretic Text and of the Septuagint Hebrew Vorlage, Logos 37.1–2 (Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1999), p. 92.
105. In his otherwise very astute analysis of the manumission law, Lohfink overlooks the significance of this annotation and does not discuss Deut. 15:17b at all. The larger perspective that he brings, however, is very much on target: “Die zweite Hälfte der Bundesbuchvorlage ist ausgelassen, mit massiven Konsequenzen für die Aussage des Gesetzes selbst” (“Fortschreibung” [n. 3 above], p. 190).
106. The older view that household deities are at issue, which has also been argued on the basis of Nuzi material, is unlikely in light of the evidence of the cuneiform legal collections, and the technical use of the corresponding Akkadian formula to denote a judicial oath. See Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation, pp. 111–112.
107. Noted by Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, p. 2256.
108. M. Weinfeld notes that the use of the term, with the attendant idea of a “Master/Slave” relationship, conflicts with the “brother” ethos of Deuteronomy (Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School [Oxford, 1972], p. 283). Lohfink is particularly alert to the significance of the rejection of the term as pointing to the intentionality of the literary reworking. He shows that the term is attested elsewhere in the legal corpus (Deut. 23:16) and was therefore at hand in the author’s vocabulary. The non-attestation specifically in the context of Deut. 15:12–18 points to the author’s conscious suppression of it from the source in his reworking of the law (“Fortschreibung,” p. 194).
109. See Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, pp. 2252–2253.
110. Milgrom (Leviticus 23–27, pp. 2254–2256) identifies a number of points where H revises the Covenant Code’s manumission law. However, he sees that revision taking place prior to and without any influence from D which, he maintains, in turn revises H. In my analysis, H responds to both CC and D.
111. Note however that D sharply restricts the use of the substantive ãáò to two contexts: (a) the formula for permanent indenture, íìåò ãáò, “perpetual slave” (Deut. 15:17a); (b) the motive clause given manumission, “for you were a slave in the land of Egypt” (Deut. 15:15). In its restricted use of the substantive, Deuteronomy never refers to the normal contractual laborer as a “slave”: it rejects that terminology and that association. It already construes the relationship as self-indenture, whereby the Israelite maintains his or her autonomy, and is not reduced to the status of chattel or commodity. Deuteronomy’s appeal to conscience and to salvation history in the motive clause (v. 15) is theologically elaborated by the powerful affirmation of the Holiness Code, “For my slaves are they” (Lev. 25:42). It now justifies a complete rejection of slavery as an institution that can legitimately apply to Israel.
112. The use here must be distinguished from the bet pretii, which is also found with the same verb. In the latter construction, the preposition indicates the price, literal or metaphorical, for which a person works (Gen. 29:18, 20, 25; cf. 30:26; 31:41; Hos. 12:13 [12]; Ezek. 29:20). In this case, there is a different construction that is distinctive. The combination of qal verb with prepositional b becomes functionally a causative, semantically equivalent to the hipíl form of the same verb. It means “to make to work” or, with a human subject, “to enslave” (see Exod. 1:14; Lev. 25:39, 46; Deut. 15:19; 21:3 [puál]; Isa. 14:3 [puál]; Jer. 22:13; 25:14; 27:7; 30:8; 34:9–10; Ezek. 34:27). Clearly recognizing the two distinct uses and providing further literature, see H. Ringgren et al., s.v. “ãáò 'ābad,” TWAT 5 (1986), pp. 982–1011 (pp. 988–989) = TDOT 10 (1999), pp. 376–405 (at p. 382).
113. See also A.W. Streane, The Double Text of Jeremiah (Massoretic and Alexandrian) Compared Together with an Appendix on the Old Latin Evidence (Cambridge and London, 1896), p. 182.
114. Once this issue is recognized, it begins to help clarify some of the difficulties in the reception of MT Jer. 34:9–10, which is the subject of a separate study. This key semantic issue was surprisingly overlooked by Ingrid Riesener, Der Stamm ãáò im Alten Testament: Eine Wortuntersuchung unter Berücksichtigung neuerer sprachwissenschaftlicher Methoden, BZAW 149 (Berlin and New York, 1979).
115. The reapplication of the older law to the non-Israelite population is distinguished by the use of the second-person plural (Lev. 25:44b–46bα). Verse 44a, in the singular, provides a transition from the preceding verse, which is also singular. The reference to äîàå ãáò, the male slave and the female slave (Lev. 25:44b), remain in the singular form, which in each case indicates the class. The singular absolute tags the legal subjects of the two manumission laws in the Covenant Code that govern the ãáò (Exod. 21:2–6) and the äîà (Exod. 21:7–11) respectively.
116. Milgrom describes “[t]he otherwise unbalancing and superfluous mēhem tiqnû lays stress on ‘from them’ (the non-Israelites), implying but not from Israelites” (Leviticus 23–26, p. 2228). On the next page, he repeats this analysis but adds that the same word “is also required for the chiastic structure.” The analysis of the awkwardness of the syntax and of its function in making a sharp distinction between two sets of legal protocol is astute (on the latter point, see also Ibn Ezra ad loc.). However, the suggestion that the word was added simply to complete a chiasm suggests Milgrom’s own awkwardness with so forced an explanation. The technical use of the word to gloss and redefine the source text provides a more robust explanation of the syntax.
117. Deuteronomy’s idiom for permanent indenture has a different formulation, employing a construct noun phrase, íìåò ãáò, “permanent slave” (Deut. 15:17a), rather than the verbal construction shared by Exod. 21:5 and Lev. 25:46. On that basis, the formulation in Lev. 25:46 cannot be derived from Deut. 15:17a.
118. The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments, Revised Standard Version (New York, 1952), p. 106 (emphasis added).
119. Gen. 47:11; Lev. 14:34; 25:45, 46; Num. 27:4; 32:5, 22, 29; Deut. 32:49; Ezek. 44:28; 45:5, 8.
120. This includes any orthography of íìåò, whether spelled plene or lene.
121. The twenty-two construct forms of äæçà occur in the following idioms: øáMúf%ç#à (five times: Gen. 23:4, 9, 20; 49:30; 50:13); åéú&á# à úf%ç#à (once: Lev. 25:41); õWàä úf%ç#à (once: Lev. 27:24); äì#ç ð úf%ç#à (twice: Num. 27:7; 32:32); ìàT"×ééð" a úf%ç#à (twice: Num. 35:8; Josh. 21:41); äåäé úf%ç# à õWà (once: Josh. 22:19); øé!òä úf%ç#à (six times: Ezek. 45:6, 7 [bis]; 48:20, 21, 22); íiå"ìä úf%ç#à (once: Ezek. 48:22); and íìÇò úf%ç#à (three times: Gen. 17:8; 48:4; Lev. 25:34).
122. The suffixal form accounts for the remaining thirty-two of the fifty-four attestations of the inflected noun. Strikingly, six of those suffixal forms occur in this chapter (Lev. 25:13, 24, 25, 28, 33 [bis]).
123. Portions of the analysis in this section draw upon Bernard M. Levinson, “The Birth of the Lemma: The Restrictive Reinterpretation of the Covenant Code’s Manumission Law by the Holiness Code (Lev 25:44–46),” JBL 124:4 (2005), pp. 617–639.
124. The Septuagint text follows J.W. Wevers (ed.), Leviticus, Septuaginta II.2 (Göttingen, 1986), pp. 275 and 278. The translation is my own.
125. J.W. Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of Leviticus, SBLSCSS 44 (Atlanta, 1997), p. 429.
126. “This is followed in MT by åãáòú íäá ‘you may enslave them,’ but this is omitted by LXX, possibly as not quite fitting in the context. After all, the verse speaks of passing such on as an inheritance to one’s children, and the clause seems intrusive. It is also possible that the translator overlooked the clause, since åãáòú íäá is followed by a coordinate á phrase íëéçàáå, i.e. it may have been a simple case of parablepsis” (ibid.).
127. Similar issues arise in Classical scholarship. Until the second decade of the twentieth century, a similar failure to recognize a technical idiom led editors of standard editions of Catullus to present a line in one of his poems as: Emathiae tutamen opis, carissime nato, “Guardian of the Emathian treasure, most dear to the son.” Among other difficulties, that rendering left the reference to the “son” unexplained and dangling. A.E. Housman first demonstrated that opis was not the genitive of a common noun, “resources” or “treasure” but rather a proper noun: an epithet applied to Emathia, well known from Homer but previously unrecognized here. With that recognition, the need to repunctuate became obvious and the line began to make sense: Emathiae tutamen, Opis carissime nato, “Emathia’s guardian, most dear to the son of Ops.” The elegant solution is now universally accepted. See A.E. Housman, “Catvllus LXIV 324,” The Classical Quarterly 9 (1915), pp. 229–230
128. and, for the correct translation, G. Lee, The Poems of Catullus (Oxford and New York, 1990), p. 99 (emphasis added). Many thanks to my Latinist colleague Stephen C. Smith for this analogy.
129. Note that “in aeternum” modifies “possidebitis”: et hereditario iure transmittetis ad posteros ac possidebitis in aeternum fratres autem vestros filios Israhel ne opprimatis per potentiam (Lev. 25:46). See B. Fischer et al. (eds.), Biblia Sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem, 2 vols., 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1975), 1.172.
130. Thus, “zum Eigentum für immer; die sollt ihr Sklaven sein lassen” (see Die Bibel nach der Übersetzung Martin Luthers: mit Meisterwerken aus dem Zeitalter der Reformation [Text according to the revised edition of 1984; Stuttgart, 2000], p. 108 [emphasis added]). Similarly, “dauerndes Eigentum” (Einheitsübersetzung der Heiligen Schrift [Stuttgart, 1980], p. 133).
131. The RSV renders “to inherit as a possession for ever” and thereby ironically departs from the correct translation provided by its model in the KJV, which had followed the MT punctuation. This also applies to the NRSV. Although it does not render íìòì, it begins the next clause incorrectly with íäá: “These may you treat as slaves” (see HarperCollins Study Bible, p. 193). Most recently: “pour qu’ils les possèdent à titre de propriété perpétuelle. Vous les aurez pour esclaves” (La Bible de Jérusalem: la sainte Bible traduite en français sous la direction de l’Ecole biblique de Jérusalem, 2d ed., [Paris, 1994], p. 156).
132. The NJPSV also assimilates the two distinct formulae, translating them both all but identically: íìåò úæçà, “holding for all time” (Lev. 25:34) and, as if equivalent, íìòì äæçà, “property for all time” (Lev. 25:46; see Tanakh The Holy Scriptures: The New JPS Translation According to the Traditional Hebrew Text [Philadelphia, 1988], p. 197).
133. The similarity between the two formulae is also assumed by B.A. Levine, even as he notes that the correct technical legal formula is found only in v. 34 (Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary [Philadelphia, 1989], p. 178). Milgrom distinguishes between the two formulae in terms of their application to Levitical land (v. 34) or to slaves as chattel that can be inherited (Leviticus 23–27, p. 2230). He still assumes, however, that the two words represent a single phrase in each case. That v. 46 represents a completely different construction is overlooked. A similar issue arises in the exceptionally literate new translation by R. Alter, who also renders, “to inherit a holding forever” (Lev. 25:46; see Tanakh, The Five Books of Moses: A Translation with Commentary [New York, 2004], p. 659).
134. By far the most effective is the often overlooked version by the Semiticist Theophile Meek: “You may make permanent slaves of them.” See idem, “Leviticus,” in J.M. Powis Smith, E.J. Goodspeed et al. (eds.), The Complete Bible: An American Translation, (Chicago, 1939), pp. 90–117 (at p. 115). Meek’s translation permits recognition of the connection between this text and the formula for permanent indenture in the Covenant Code’s manumission law, which he renders: “he shall then be his slave permanently” (Exod. 21:6; p. 70).
135. Several other recent translations also recognize the syntax correctly. Thus the NIV (1984) ad loc. (“and can make them slaves for life”); The Revised English Bible with the Apocrypha (Oxford and Cambridge, 1989), p. 106, which renders: “you may use them as slaves permanently”; and the NET Bible (New English Translation): “You may enslave them perpetually” (2d beta version; http://www.bible.org/netbible/index. htm).
136. Recognizing the syntax correctly are Karl Elliger, Leviticus, HAT 4 (Tübingen, 1966), p. 337
137. A. Ruwe, “Heiligkeitgesetz” und “Priesterschrift”: Literaturgeschichtliche und rechtssystematische Untersuchungen zu Leviticus 17,1–26,2, FAT 26 (Tübingen, 1999), p. 342. Neither addresses the different traditions of translation and punctuation of the verse, or the other issues under discussion here.
138. In the Hebrew original of the article, the syntagm is cited as “‘íìåòì äæçà’” (sic) in reference to the chattel status of the foreign slaves. Japhet explicitly punctuates the consonantal text, adding a comma to clarify her parsing of the syntax, as: “úùøì åãáòú íäá,íìòì äæçà” (see Japhet, “Laws of Manumission of Slaves,” pp. 245, 240 [Hebrew]). In neither case is there a note to indicate that the departure from the MT is intentional. The same misunderstanding recurs in the English translation of the article: “a possession forever” and “to inherit as a possession forever; you may make slaves of them” (eadem, “Relationship between the Legal Corpora,” pp. 84 and 76; emphasis added).
139. Van Seters, “Hebrew Slave,” p. 538 = Law Book for the Diaspora, p. 84 (emphasis added).
140. See Meir Sternberg, Hebrews between Cultures: Group Portraits and National Literature (Bloomington, 1998), p. 437: “to inherit as a holding forever. Them you may enslave.”
141. Milgrom, following NJPSV, renders “property for all time” (Leviticus 23–27, pp. 2148, 2217–2218, and 2230–2231). Milgrom recognizes that his translation and exegesis conflicts at this point with the punctuation of the MT. On that basis, he calls for an emendation of that punctuation, to shift the disjunctive accent back (Leviticus 23–26, p. 2231). In making that proposal, he precludes recognition of the textual reworking of the formula from the Covenant Code, an issue that he is elsewhere alert to.
142. With a different focus, note E. Otto, “Innerbiblische Exegese im Heiligkeitsgesetz Levitikus 17–26,” in H.-J. Fabry and H.-W. Jüngling (eds.), Levitikus als Buch, BBB 119 (Berlin, 1999), pp. 125–196.
143. The term äæçà (Lev. 25:34) provides evidence for the dating of Leviticus 25 in the early Persian period, as the repatriated community sought to legitimate their claim to the land theologically. See B.A. Levine, “Late Language in the Priestly Source: Some Literary and Historical Observations,” in Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of Jewish Studies (Jerusalem, 1983), pp. 69–82.
144. Ibn Ezra cites the talmudic discussion of the verse at Qiddušin 22b, which specifies that it applies to the “Canaanite slave.” Noting that there were not supposed to be Canaanites remaining in the land following the conquest, he finds it hard to conceive to whom the law might apply. Referring to the authorities cited in the Talmud, he allows: “possibly they knew the true meaning of these verses to be other than their literal meaning—for our understanding is feeble compared to theirs” see Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra, in A. Weiser [ed.], Commentary on the Torah, 3 vols., [ Jerusalem, 1977] 3.98 [Hebrew]
145. J.F. Shachter, The Commentary of Abraham ibn Ezra on the Pentateuch, vol. 3, Leviticus [Hoboken, N.J., 1986], pp. 154–155). From an historical point of view, that insight already applies very appropriately to the period of the late monarchy. It applies much more so to the period of the Exile and post-exilic Yehud.
146. It is hard to imagine the reverse direction of literary influence: that Exod. 21:2a was realigned from third person to second person under the influence of Lev. 25:44. Such a move would only call attention to itself as intrusive, given the contextual expectation of the third person in the Covenant Code.
147. That the common terminology suggests “direkte Beeinflussung” is recognized by K. Grünwaldt, Das Heiligkeitsgesetz Leviticus 17–26: Ursprungliche Gestalt, Tradition und Theologie, BZAW 271 (Berlin and New York, 1999), p. 330. Grünwaldt provides an excellent analysis of the extent to which Lev. 25:39–43 (his reconstruction of the law’s original layer) reworks and transforms both Deut. 15:12–18 and Exod. 21:2–6 (pp. 329–330; and 333).
148. Contra Japhet (followed by Milgrom), who sees the centrality of the øéëù in H as opposed to its lack of importance in D as evidence that D adopted the idea from H (Japhet, “Relationship between the Legal Corpora,” pp. 82–84; and Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, p. 2254). Japhet claims that the very comparison of slave labor with that of a hired hand is incompatible with D’s conception, which allows for permanent bondage. But the point in D is not so much to equate the slave with a hired laborer (as in H) as it is to urge alacrity in compliance with the law by emphasizing the economic benefit of slave labor to the owner.
149. The eighteen attestations in the legal corpus are Deut. 15:2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12; 17:15; 19:18, 19; 22:1–4; 23:20, 21; 25:3. The plural is attested ten times in the legal corpus (Deut. 15:7; 17:15, 20; 18:2, 15, 18; 20:8; 24:7, 15).
150. Specifically, êéçà, “your brother,” in reference to a fellow Israelite occurs outside of Deuteronomy only in Lev. 19:17; 25:25, 35, 36, 39, 47! See L. Perlitt, “‘Ein einzig Volk von Brüdern’: Zur deuteronomistischen Herkunft der biblischen Bezeichnung ‘Bruder’,” in D. Lührmann and G. Strecker (eds.), Kirche: Festschrift für Günther Bornkamm zum 75. Geburtstag (Tübingen, 1980), pp. 27–52; reprinted in and cited according to idem, Deuteronomium-Studien, FAT 8 (Tübingen, 1994), pp. 50–73 (at 67).
151. Ibid., p. 69. Joosten cites the challenge posed by Perlitt and S.A. Kaufman (see n. 105 below) to Japhet’s analysis. He does not engage the respective arguments, however, one way or the other. The dating of the manumission law of the Holiness Code (Lev. 25:39–46) relative to its parallels in other biblical legal sources plays no role in his argument that the Holiness Code is pre-Deuteronomic (Joosten, People and Land in the Holiness Code, p. 11). It might have provided a clear case for developing methodological controls.
152. On the use and history of this protasis marker in biblical law, see Levinson and Zahn, “Revelation Regained” (n. 13 above), pp. 295–346.
153. Deut. 12:20, 21, 29; 13:2, 7, 13; 14:24; 15:7, 12, 13, 16, 21; 17:2, 8, 14; 18:6, 9, 21; 19:1, 11, 16; 20:1, 10, 19; 21:1, 10, 15, 18, 22; 22:6, 8, 13, 22, 23, 28; 23:10, 11, 22, 23, 25, 26; 24:1, 3b, 5, 7, 10, 19, 20, 21; 25:5, 11; 26:12.
154. Three instances introduce the land grant formula (“when you enter the land . . .”): Lev. 19:23; 23:10; 25:2. The other occurrences are Lev. 19:5, 33; 20:9; 22:29; 25:14, 20, 25, 35, 39, 47. On the anomalous, redundant marking of the conditional at Lev. 20:9, see S. Chavel, “At the Boundary of Textual and Literary Criticisms: The Case of éë in Lev. 20:9,” Textus 20 (2000), pp. 61–70; and Levinson and Zahn, “Revelation Regained,” pp. 333–334.
155. See S.A. Kaufman, “Deuteronomy 15 and Recent Research on the Dating of P,” in N. Lohfink (ed.), Das Deuteronomium: Entstehung, Gestalt, und Botschaft, BETL 68 (Leuven, 1985), pp. 273–276 (at 275). He gives as examples Deut. 15:19; 17:2, 8; 21:1; 22:6, 22; 24:7.
156. Note also idem, “A Reconstruction of the Social Welfare Systems of Ancient Israel,” in W.B. Barrick and J.R. Spencer (eds.), In the Shelter of Elyon: Essays on Ancient Palestinian Life and Literature in Honor of G.W. Ahlström, JSOTSup 31 (Sheffield, 1984), pp. 277–286. The critique of Japhet’s position in the recent dissertation by J.H. Hamilton adds little to that of Kaufman, whom he cites; see idem, Social Justice and Deuteronomy: The Case of Deuteronomy 15, SBLDS 136 (Atlanta, 1992), pp. 76–80. While the author identifies a series of interesting issues in the text of Deuteronomy 15, by working only synchronically and assuming an oral audience for the text, he restricts far too narrowly the options available to answer his own thoughtful questions.
157. Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, p. 2255 (my clarifications added).
158. Incisively, Grünwaldt: “Lev 25,39–43 beabsichtigt nicht weniger als die Abschaffung der Schuldsklaverei von Israeliten bei Israelitien. Hier liegt das revolutionär Neue in der Schuldnergesetzgebung des Heiligkeitsgesetzes” (Heiligkeitsgesetz Leviticus 17–26, p. 330).
159. Making a similar argument in relation to Exodus 13, see M.M. Zahn, “Reexamining Empirical Models: The Case of Exodus 13,” in E. Otto and R. Achenbach (eds.), Das Deuteronomium zwischen Pentateuch und Deuteronomistischen Geschichtswerk, FRLANT 206 (Göttingen, 2004), pp. 36–55.
160. Given this precedent, the position of Adrian Schenker, which uses the identical language, is open to some question: “My purpose is to show that the jubilee of Leviticus 25 does not supersede the earlier biblical legislation on slaves, but implies them and completes them.” See M.M. Zahn, “The Biblical Legislation on the Release of Slaves: The Road from Exodus to Leviticus,” in Recht und Kult im Alten Testament: Achtzehn Studien, OBO 172 (Freiburg and Göttingen, 2000), pp. 134–149 (at p. 134; similarly, p. 146).
161. Eckart Otto sees Deuteronomy’s relation to the Covenant Code in similar terms. Identifying the problems with this approach, see Joachim Schaper, “Rereading the Law: Inner-Biblical Exegesis of Divine Oracles in Ezekiel 44 and Isaiah 56,” in B.M. Levinson and E. Otto, with W. Dietrich (eds.), Recht und Ethik im Alten Testament, ATM 13 (Münster, 2004), pp. 125–144 (at pp. 138–144).