The Challenge of Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans: Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies

European Yearbook of Minority Issues

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 89-107

  Bieber, Florian ^a  

^a European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85200755325     PISSN: 15707865     EISSN: 22116117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/221161104X00066     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 from 1999 provides for the international administration in post-war Kosovo, but does not spell out the details of governance in the region.
2. This approach can be best described as a 'strategy', as it is less focused on particular institutional arrangements, as consociationalism, but rather at integrative policies. Unlike consociationalism, it is also primarily concerned with conflict reduction.
3. Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, 1996),34-45.
4. Similarly, some of the cantons have been losing their exclusivity to one group due to the constitutional changes and refugee returns.
5. This term (together with complex consociation) has been introduced by Brendan O'Leary to denote consociational arrangements which include additional features (self-determination, dispute resolution, peace agreement, external intervention and other distinct ethnic governance strategies such as integration, territorial autonomy or arbitration) to Lijpharts' four basic aspects. Brendan O'Leary, "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments" in Sid Noel (ed.), From Power Sharing to Democracy:Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (Montreal and Kingston, 2005, forthcoming).
6. Indeed, the following discussion refers to definitions and experiences in power-sharing beyond the region.
7. Vanessa Pupavac, "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslaviás Multiethnic Rights Approach and the Politicisation of Ethnicity"5(2) Human Rights Law Review (2000), 3-8.
8. Neven Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The End of a Legacy (London, 2003), 39-40.
9. As Brendan O'Leary points out, there are also authoritarian consociations. Whether this category applies to communist-era Bosnia-Herzegovina is doubtful, as the republic was governed essentially by the same elite who 'happened' to belong to different ethnic groups.
10. United States Institute of Peace (USIP), "Bosniás Next Five Years. Dayton and Beyond," Special Report, 3 November 2003, 6.
11. Florian Bieber, "Governing Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina," in Kinga Gal (ed.), Minority Governance in Europe (Budapest, 2002), 319-37, at 336-7.
12. Farimah Daftary,"Conflict Resolution in FYR Macedonia: Power-Sharing or 'Civic Approach'?", 4 Helsinki Monitor (2001), 291-312, at 304-5.
13. For a schematic overview of the different institutional arrangements, see Annex.
14. This always includes all constitutent nations (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) and in some cases also the less-well-defined group of'Others'.
15. Leon Malazogu and Ilir Dugolli, Reforming the Electoral System of Kosova (Prishtina, 2003),15-7.
16. Peter Harris and Ben Reilly, Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (Stockholm,1998),200.
17. Zoran Pajic, "The Role of Institutions in Peace Building" in Zarko Papic (ed.), International Support Policies to SEE Countries-Lessons (Not) Learned in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo, 2001), 30-43.
18. In Kosovo the Serb enclaves and the northern part of the region under Serb control constitute de facto autonomies.
19. Framework Agreement, Art. 1(2) (2001).
20. Roberto Belloni, "Dubious Democracy by Fiat" Transitions, 20 August 2003.
21. European Stability Initiative (ESI), The Other Macedonian Conflict, 20 February 2002.
22. Norbert Mappes-Niediek, Balkan-Mafia. Staaten in der Hand des Yerbrechens-Eine Cefahr jùr Europa (Berlin, 2003).
23. David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking DemocracyAfterDayton (London, Sterling, VA,1999).
24. Gerald Knaus and Helix Martin, "Travails of the European Raj,"13(3) Journal of Democracy (2003), 60-74.
25. International Crisis Group (ICG), The Wages of Sin.: Confronting Bosniás Republika Srpska, 8 October 2001. The International Crisis Group has somewhat modified its position more recently, describing the nationalist parties as "a natural and legitimate phenomenon in BiH", while recommending to the international community "that there is no need to fear pushing them to the limit, especially by attacking their illicit sources of financial power and powers of patronage". ICG, Bosniás Nationalist Governments: PaddyAshdown and the Paradoxes of State Building, 22 July 2003, iii.
26. Ljubco Georgievski, "Tezi za opstanok na Makedonskata nacija i drzava" [Thesis for the Survival of the Macedonian Nation and State], Dnevnik,18 April 2003.
27. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing", The New York Times, 19 April 1999
28. Thomas L. Friedman, "Bosnia, Sort Of", The New York Times, 26 January 2001.
29. Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (London, 2002)
30. P. H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, "Macedonia: End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End?" Parameters (2002), 96-111.
31. Dejan Jovic, "Fear of Becoming Minority as a Motivator of Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia", 5(1/2) Balkanologie (2001), 21-36.
32. See for example, Georgievski, "Tezi za opstanok..."; Branislav Krstic, Kosovo izmedu istorijskog i ethnickogprava [Kosovo between Historical and Ethnic Rights], (Belgrade, 1994).
33. The arguments and their function in the mobilization for ethnic conflict are discussed in detail in Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence. Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, 2002)
34. Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds. The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, London, 2001)
35. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflicts (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1985),141-81.
36. See for example, Ivan Lovrenovic,"Daytonski nacisti" [Dayton Nazis], Dani,10 October 2003. This view can be heard in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia, while in Kosovo the severity of the divisions has made such a position more rare.
37. Martin Woker, "Bosniens steinige Staatsbildung", Neue Zuricher Zeitung, 8 August 2003.
38. Thomas W. Simon, "The Injustice of Procedural Democracy" in Dzemal Sokolovic and Florian Bieber (eds.), Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Aldershot, 2001),11-28.
39. Here I mean not necessarily the salience of this identity, which can change rather rapidly, but the relationship between group identities, e.g. while it might be possible for individual Serbs to become Bosniaks, such a change en masseis highly unlikely.
40. The constitution contained some discriminatory articles, such as introducing Serbian written with the Cyrillic alphabet as the official language, Constitution of the Serb Republic, Art. 7 (1992).
41. One of the few exceptions is Apartheid South Africa.
42. Many countries have a symbolic association of the state with the dominant nation in the preamble. Although of high symbolic importance, it does not translate into discrimination or exclusion in the governance of the countryperse.
43. Jovic, "Fear of Becoming Minority...". ".
44. European Commission, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stabilization and Association Report (2002) 163, 4 April 2003.
45. This metaphor was chosen by Muhamed Filipovic in eacplaining the concept of a 3rd Bosnian Republic, which would supersede the current Dayton Bosnia. Personal communication with Muhamed Filipovic, Sarajevo, February 2003.
46. Constitution of Lebanon, Art. 95 (1926).
47. Sammy Smooha, "Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict Management in Ethnically Divided Societies," 8(4) Nations and Nationalism (2002), 423-31.
48. Arend Lijphart, Democracy. A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, London, 1977),149-50.
49. Christophe Solioz and Svebor Dizdarevic (eds.), Ownership Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Contributions on the International Dimensions of Democratization in the Balkans (Baden-Baden, 2003).
50. Florian Bieber, "Institutionalizing Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia: Domestic vs. Internationally Driven Processes of Institutional (Re-)Design", 2(2) The Global Review of Ethnopolitics (2003), 3-16,12.
51. Daftary, "Conflict Resolution in FYR Macedonia...".
52. Vladimir Jovanovski and Lirim Dulovi, A New Battlefield," Institute for War and Peace Reporting (ed.), Ohrid and Beyond A Cross-Ethnic Investigation into the Macedonian Crisis, (London,2002),67.
53. In Northern Ireland, the referendum did not prevent the rise of spoilers, partly the result of the subsequent peace process itself and partly the result of the divided Unionist camp during the referendum.
54. Florian Bieber, "Balancing Political Participation and Minority Rights: The Experience of the former Yugoslavia", in Andreas Klein et al. (eds.), Minorities in Democracy (Skopje, 2003), 37-44.
55. PR=Proportional Representation, S=Serbs, B=Bosniaks, C=Croats, A=Albanians, M=Macedonians, T=Turks, V=Vlachs, O=Others.