Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-440

  Rorty, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 85199533319     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (185)

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185. Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York, 1975), p. 33