Mind A Brief Introduction

Mind a Brief Introduction

Volumn , Issue , 2024, Pages 1-224

  Searle, John R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85198919197     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (85)

1. Descartes, R., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. J. Collingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, vol. II, especially Meditations on First Philosophy, Second Meditation 16–23, and Sixth Meditation, 50–62, Objections and Replies, especially Author’s Replies to the Fourth Set of Objections 154–162.
2. Armstrong, D. M., The Mind-Body Problem, An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.
3. Churchland, P. M., Matter and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
4. Heil, J., Philosophy of Mind, London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
5. Jacquette, D., Philosophy of Mind, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994.
6. Kim, J., The Philosophy of Mind, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
7. Lyons, W., Matters of the Mind, New York: Routledge, 2001.
8. Block, N., ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
9. Chalmers, D., ed., Philosophy of Mind, Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
10. Heil, J., ed., Philosophy of Mind, A Guide and Anthology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
11. Lycan, W., ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1990.
12. O’Connor, T., and D. Robb, eds. Philosophy of Mind, Contemporary Readings, London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
13. Rosenthal, D. M., ed., The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
14. Armstrong, D. M., A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge, 1993.
15. Block, N., “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. IX, ed. C. Wade Savage, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261–325, reprinted in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
16. Borst, C., ed., The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1970.
17. Churchland, P. M., “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” in Rosenthal, D., ed., The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford Univer­sity Press, 1991, 601–612.
18. Crane, T., The Mechanical Mind, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2003.
19. Davidson, D., “Mental Events,” in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, 207–227.
20. Feigl, H., “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical,’” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, eds. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.
21. Haugeland, J., ed., Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelli­gence, Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, MIT Press, 1982.
22. Hempel, C., “The Logical Analysis of Psychology” in Block ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
23. Lewis, D., “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications” and “Mad Pain and Martian Pain” both in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
24. McDermott, D. V., Mind and Mechanism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
25. Nagel, T., “Armstrong on the Mind,” in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
26. Place, U. T., “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” British Journal of Psychology, vol. 47, pt. 1 (1956) 44–50.
27. Putnam, P., “The Nature of Mental States” in Block, ed., Readings in Philos­ophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
28. Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson, 1949.
29. Smart, J. J. C., “Sensations and Brain Processes,” in Rosenthal, D., ed., The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, 169–176.
30. Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
31. Turing, A., “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind, vol. 59 (1950): 433–460.
32. Block, N., “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philoso­phy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, vol. 9 (1978): 261–325. Reprinted in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 268–305.
33. Jackson, F., “What Mary Didn’t Know,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 83 (1986): 291–295; also “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” in Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32 (1986): 127–136.
34. Kripke, S. A., Naming and Necessity, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, excerpts in Chalmers, D. ed., Philosophy of Mind, Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 329–332.
35. McGinn, C., “Anomalous Monism and Kripke’s Cartesian Intuitions,” in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 156–158.
36. Nagel, T., “Armstrong on the Mind,” in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 200–206.
37. Nagel, T., The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
38. Nagel, T., “What Is It Like to be a Bat?,” in Philosophical Review, vol. 83 (1974): 435–450, reprinted in Chalmers, ed., The Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
39. Searle, J. R., “Minds, Brains and Programs,” in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980), 417–424, reprinted in O’Connor, T. and D. Robb, Philosophy of Mind, Contemporary Readings, London: Routledge, 2003, 332–352.
40. Searle, J. R., Minds, Brains and Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer­sity Press, 1984.
41. Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
42. Chalmers, D., The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
43. Dennett, D., Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little Brown, 1991.
44. McGinn, C., The Problem of Consciousness: Essays toward a Resolution, Cambridge MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991.
45. Nagel, T., The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
46. O’Shaughnessy, B., Consciousness and the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
47. Searle, J. R., The Mystery of Consciousness, New York: New York Review of Books, 1997.
48. Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
49. Siewert, C., The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton: Princeton Univer­sity Press, 1998.
50. Tye, M., Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
51. Block, N., O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, eds., The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
52. Crick, F., The Astonishing Hypothesis, New York: Scribner’s, 1994.
53. Damasio, A. R., The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1999.
54. Edelman, G., The Remembered Present, New York: Basic Books, 1989.
55. Llinas, R., I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
56. Searle, J. R., “Consciousness,” in Annual Review of Neuroscience, vol. 23, 2000, reprinted in Searle, J. R., Consciousness and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. (This article contains an extensive bibliography of current neurobiological research on consciousness.)
57. Kock, C., The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach, Englewood, CO: Roberts and Co., 2004.
58. Burge, T., “Individualism and the Mental,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, 1979.
59. Fodor, J., “Meaning and the World Order,” in Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, chap. 4, 1988, reprinted in O’Connor, T., and D. Robb, eds., Philosophy of Mind, Contemporary Readings, London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
60. Putnam, H., “The Meaning of Meaning,” in Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Gunderson, K., ed., Minnesota Readings in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975, 131–193.
61. Searle, J. R., Intentionality, An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
62. Davidson, D., “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” in Essays on Actions and Events, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
63. Heil, J., and A. Mele, eds., Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
64. Kim, J., Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Causation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
65. Searle, J. R., Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
66. Watson, G., ed., Free Will, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
67. Kane, R., The Significance of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
68. Slimansky, S., Free Will and Illusion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
69. Wolf, S., Freedom within Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
70. Wegner, D. N., The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.
71. Searle, J. R., Rationality in Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
72. Freud, S., 1912, “A Note on The Unconscious in Psychoanalysis,” in Collected Papers, vol. 4, J. Riviere, trans., New York: Basic Books, 1959, 22–29.
73. Freud, S., 1915, “The Unconscious,” in Collected Papers, vol. 4, J. Riviere, trans., New York: Basic Books, 1959, 98–136.
74. Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, chap. 7.
75. Searle, J. R., Rationality in Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
76. The classic attack on realist theories of perception is in Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge, Dancy, J., ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
77. Berkeley, G., Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Tur-bayne, C., ed., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1985.
78. Ayer, A. J., The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, London: Macmillan, 1953.
79. Austin, J. L., Sense and Sensibilia, Warnock, G. J., ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
80. Searle, J. R., Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, chap. 2.
81. Selby-Bigge, L. A., ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951, Book I, Part IV, section VI, of personal identity, 251–263, as well as the Appendix, 623–939.
82. Locke’s conception is to be found in his Essay Concerning Human Under­standing, London: Routledge, 1894, especially chap. 27, “Of Identity and Diversity.”
83. Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
84. Searle, J. R., Rationality in Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, especially chap. 3.
85. Perry, J., ed., Personal Identity, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975.