What’s Epistemology for? The Case for Neopragmatism in Normative Metaepistemology

Epistemology Futures

Volumn , Issue , 2023, Pages 26-47

  Weinberg, Jonathan M ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 85195358860     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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