Stalnaker and Indexical Belief

Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker

Volumn , Issue , 2023, Pages 204-221

  Perry, John ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 85195339938     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (24)

1. Castañeda, H. (1966), ‘ ‘‘He’’: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness’, Ratio 8:130–57.
2. Castañeda, H. (1967), ‘Indicators and Quasi-Indicators’, American Philosophical Quarterly 4:85–100.
3. Castañeda, H. (1968a), ‘On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others’, Journal of Philosophy 65:439–56.
4. Castañeda, H. (1968b), ‘On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I’, in Akten des XIX Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie: 260–6.
5. Crimmins, M. (1992), Talk About Beliefs (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books).
6. Crimmins, M and J. Perry (1989), ‘The Prince and the Phonebooth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs’, Journal of Philosophy 86: 685–711; reprinted in (Perry 2000, 207–32).
7. Frege, Gottlob (1918/1967), ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’, in Philosophical Logic edited by. P. F. Strawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 17–38). This translation, by A. M. and M. Quinton, originally appeared in Mind 65 (1956): 289–311. The original, ‘Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung’, appeared in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I (1918): 58–77.
8. Frege, Gottlob (1980), Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, edited by G. Gabriel et al., translated by H. Kaal, abridged from the German edition by B. McGuinness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
9. Israel, D., and J. Perry (1990), ‘What is Information?’, in Information, Language and Cognition, edited by P. Hanson (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press: 1–19).
10. Israel, D., and J. Perry (1991) ‘Information and Architecture’. In J. Barwise, J. Gawron, G. Plotkin and S. Tutiya (eds.), Situation Theory and Its Applications, vol. 2 (Stanford: CSLI Publications :147–160).
11. Kaplan, D. (1989), Demonstratives, in Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (eds.) Themes From Kaplan (New York: Oxford University Press: 481–563).
12. Lewis, D. (1979), ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, Philosophical Review 88: 513–43.
13. Perry, J. (1977), ‘Frege on Demonstratives’, Philosophical Review 86: 474–97; reprinted in Perry (2000: 1–26).
14. Perry, J (1979), ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Noûs 13: 3–21; reprinted in Perry (2000: 27–44).
15. Perry, J (1980a), ‘Belief and Acceptance’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 533–42; reprinted in Perry (2000: 533–42).
16. Perry, J (1980b) ‘A Problem about Continued Belief ’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 317–22; reprinted in Perry (2000: 57–76).
17. Perry, J (1988) ‘Cognitive Significance and NewTheories of Reference’, Noûs, 22:1–18; reprinted in Perry (2000: 189–206).
18. Perry, J (2001) Reference and Reflexivity (Stanford: CSLI Publications).
19. Perry, J, D. Israel and S. Tutiya (1993) ‘Executions, Motivations and Accomplishments’, The Philosophical Review 201: 515–40.
20. Quine, W. (1966), ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, in Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House: 183–94).
21. Reichenbach, H. (1947) §50, ‘Token-reflexive Words’, in Elements of Symbolic Logic (New York: The Free Press), 284ff.
22. Russell, B. (1912), Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 284ff.
23. Stalnaker, R. (1981), ‘Indexical Belief ’, Synthése 49:129–51; reprinted in Stalnaker (1999: 130–49).
24. Stalnaker, R (1984), Inquiry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT/Bradford Books).