Conditional-Assertion Theories of Conditionals

Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker

Volumn , Issue , 2023, Pages 148-163

  Lycan, William G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85195337783     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (35)

1. Adams, E.W. (1965). ‘The Logic of Conditionals’, Inquiry 8: 166–97.
2. Appiah, A. (1985). Assertion and Conditionals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Austin, J. L. (1961). ‘Ifs and Cans’, in Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Barker, S. J. (1995). ‘Towards a Pragmatic Theory of ‘‘If ’’’, Philosophical Studies 79: 185–211.
5. Belnap, N. (1970). ‘Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification’, Noûs 4: 1–12.
6. Bennett, J. (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Blackburn, S. (1995). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
9. Davis, W. (1979). ‘Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals’, Philosophical Review 88: 544–64.
10. Davis, W. (1983). ‘Weak and Strong Conditionals’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 57–71.
11. DeRose, K., and R. Grandy (1999). ‘Conditional Assertions and ‘‘Biscuit’’ Conditionals’, Noûs 23: 405–20.
12. Dummett, M. (1973). Frege: The Philosophy of Language. London:Duckworth.
13. Edgington, D. (1986). ‘Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?,’’ Critica 18: 3–30.
14. Edgington, D (1995). ‘On Conditionals’, Mind 104: 235–329.
15. Edgington, D (2003). ‘William G. Lycan’s Real Conditionals: Comments by Dorothy Edgington’, (Delivered at an ‘Author Meets Critics’ session on Lycan (2001), APA Central Division meetings.)
16. Gibbard, A. (1981). ‘Two Recent Theories of Conditionals’, in Harper, Stalnaker and Pearce (1981).
17. Gibbard, A (1992). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
18. Goodman, N. (1947). ‘The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals’, Journal of Philosophy 44: 113–28.
19. Harper, W., R. Stalnaker, and G. Pearce (eds.) (1981). Ifs. Dordrecht:D. Reidel.
20. Jackson, F. (1979). ‘On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals’, Philosophical Review 88: 565–89.
21. Jackson, F (1987). Conditionals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
22. Jeffrey, R. (1963). ‘On Indeterminate Conditionals’, Philosophical Studies 14: 37–43.
23. Kratzer, A. (1986). ‘Conditionals’, in Papers from the Parasession on Pragmatics and Grammatical Theory, Twenty-Second Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. Chicago: University of Chicago.
24. Kremer, M. (1987). ‘‘‘If ’’ Is Unambiguous’, Noûs 21: 199–217.
25. Lewis, D. K. (1973). Counterfactuals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
26. Lycan, W. G. (1984a). ‘A Syntactically Motivated Theory of Conditionals’, in P. French, T. E. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. IX: Causation and Causal Theories.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
27. Lycan, W. G (1984b). Logical Form in Natural Language. Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press.
28. Lycan, W. G (2001). Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
29. Quine, W. V. (1950). Methods of Logic. NewYork:Holt.
30. Quine, W. V (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge: MIT Press.
31. Stalnaker, R. (1968). ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph, 2, Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
32. Stalnaker, R (1975). ‘Indicative Conditionals’, Philosophia 5: 269–86; reprinted in Harper, Stalnaker and Pearce (1981).
33. Stalnaker, R (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge: Bradford Books/MITPress.
34. von Wright, G. H. (1957). ‘On Conditionals’, in Logical Studies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
35. Woods, M. (1997). Conditionals, ed. David Wiggins and with a Commentary by Dorothy Edgington. Oxford: Oxford University Press.