FORGIVENESS, MORAL REASSESSMENT, AND RECONCILIATION

Value Inquiry Book Series

Volumn 55, Issue , 1997, Pages 169-178

  Narayan, Uma ^a  

^a NONE

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Indexed keywords

EID: 85179379352     PISSN: 09298436     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/9789004493827_016     Document Type: Chapter

References (9)

1. Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (New York: bridge University Press, 1988), p. 16.
2. For a discussion of forms of moral anger, see Paul Hughes, "Moral Anger and the Concept of Forgiveness," unpublished manuscript, pp. 3-6.
3. 1 thus disagree with Norvin Richards 's analysis in "Forgiveness," Ethics, 99 (October 1988), pp. 77-97 .
4. See Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy, pp. 23-24.
5. Murphy says, "my ceasing to resent will not constitute forgiveness unless it is done for a moral reason. Forgiveness is not the overcoming of resentment simpliciter, it is rather this: to forego resentment on moral ground, " ibid.
6. Thus, I agree with Howard McGary that one might have what he calls "self-pertaining reasons" for forgiveness. See his "Forgiveness," American Philosophical Quarterly, 26:4 (October 1989), p. 26.
7. I thus disagree with Joram Graf Haber's contention that "In the absence of repentance forgivene ss amount s to little more than condonation," in his Forgiveness (Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), p. 90.
8. I will not undertake to distinguish forgiveness from other things with which it is often
9. confused-justification, excuse, pardon and mercy-since others have done a good job articulating these distinctions. For some of these distinctions, see Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy, and Haber, Forgiveness.