Yes, But . . . One More Thing: Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the European Stability Mechanism

German Law Journal

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 53-74

  Schneider, Karsten ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85178067230     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200001711     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Matthias Ruffert, Die europäische Schuldenkrise vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht—Anmerkungen zum Urteil vom 7. September 2011, 46 EUROPARECHT 842, 842 (2011).
2. Frank Schorkopf, “Startet die Maschinen”—Das ESM-Urteil des BVerfG vom 12. 9. 2012, 31 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 1273, 1273 (2012); Christian Tomuschat, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 12.09.2012—BvR 1390/122—u.a.—Verhinderung der Ratifikation von ESM-Vertrag und Fiskalpakt überwiegend erfolglos, 127 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 1431, 1431 (2012).
3. 3 European Council Conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2011, Annex II, 21 [hereinafter European Council Conclusions of March 2011]
4. 7 See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), art. 32 (5), 34, and 35 (1), Feb. 2, 2012 [hereinafter ESM treaty].
5. 9 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BVR 2134/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVERFGE 155 (Ger.) [hereinafter Maastricht case].
6. 14 This extent of review is, however, already known from other constellations. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BVQ 5/77, Oct. 16, 1977, 46 BVERFGE 160, 194 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BVR 617/84, May 30, 1984, 67 BVERFGE 149, 151 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG - Federal Constitutional Court], 1 BVQ 19/04, June 23, 2004, 111 BVERFGE 147, 153 (Ger.).
7. 15 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG], art. 38 (1) (“Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal, and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience.”).
8. 18 The ESM standard of review can be found at ESM case (Ger.), supra note 2, at paras. 209–28. Identical wordings can be found at Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at paras. 120–32: see paras. 210/121–22, 211/124, 212/125, 213/127, 214/128, 216/131, 216/135, 217/132, 219/137, 219/129, 220/129, and 224/104.
9. 19 Four (out of five) headnotes of the judgment address the “budgetary responsibility” (No. 1, 2, 3 and 5). See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at paras. 96–102 and 121–32.
10. 21 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BVE 2/08, Oct. 30, 2009, 123 BVERFGE 267, 340 (Ger.) [hereinafter Lisbon case].
11. 28 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BVR 2661/06, July 6, 2010, 126 BVERFGE 286 (Ger.) [hereinafter Honeywell case].
12. 39 The most interesting omission in the history of the Court’s dissenting opinions would still be represented by dissenting Justice Zeidler’s opinion “I do not agree.”, see 77 BVERFGE 167 (Ger.)
13. 46 The Greece Bailout judgment also calls these mechanisms “irreversible processes” or “automatic effects”, see Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at paras. 127, 136–37.
14. Applications for the Issue of Temporary Injunctions to Prevent the Ratification of the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact Unsuccessful for the Most Part (Sept. 12, 2012) (which does not mention article 136 (3) TFEU).
15. 50 See Christian Tomuschat, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 12.09.2012—BvR 1390/122—u.a.—Verhinderung der Ratifikation von ESM-Vertrag und Fiskalpakt überwiegend erfolglos, 127 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 1431, 1433 (2012) (which does not notice this omission).
16. 52 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
17. 57 For example the fact that the interconnection of the capital markets has greatly increased or the effects of economic contagion, which the payment default of one state in the monetary union has on the other Member States.
18. 58 Such as “When I choose A, second actor will choose Y, when I choose B, second actor will choose Z.”
19. 62 That is to say that the mere legal possibility of implementing such a scheme in the future suffices to change the present framework.
20. 64 In fact, the problem of the Greece Bailout case has exactly been this kind of collateral.
21. 71 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat products, WT DS26/AB/R, para. 187. (Jan 16, 1998).