A RIGHT TO LIFE IN ARMED CONFLICTS? THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Israel Yearbook on Human Rights

Volumn 37, Issue , 2007, Pages 115-163

  Gaggioli, Gloria ^a,b   Kolb, Robert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEUCHÂTEL   (Switzerland)

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EID: 85174926566     PISSN: 03335925     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/9789047423485_006     Document Type: Chapter

References (105)

1. Like persons killed in the conduct of hostilities. In fact, in this article, we will not look at the right to life of persons in the power of the State (e.g., a person under arrest) but we will rather concentrate on the right to life of persons killed while not in the power of the State (e.g., in armed clashes) because it is in these situations that HRL and IHL are often held to be contradictory.
2. See B. Conforti, "L'Interaction des Normes Internationales Relatives à la Protection des Droits de Y Homme", in Société Française Pour le Droit International, Colloque de Strasbourg, La Protection des Droits de l'Homme et l'Evolution du Droit international 124 (1998); For the American system, see H. Tigoudja, "L'Autonomie du Droit Applicable par la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de l'Homme: en Marge d'Arrêts et Avis Consultatifs Récents", 13/49 Rev. Trimestrielle des Droits de l'Homme 84 (2002).
3. See B. Conforti, "L'Interaction des Normes Internationales Relatives à la Protection des Droits de Y Homme", in Société Française Pour le Droit International, Colloque de Strasbourg, La Protection des Droits de l'Homme et l'Evolution du Droit international 124 (1998); For the American system, see H. Tigoudja, "L'Autonomie du Droit Applicable par la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de l'Homme: en Marge d'Arrêts et Avis Consultatifs Récents", 13/49 Rev. Trimestrielle des Droits de l'Homme 84 (2002).
4. See R. Kolb, "Aspects Historiques de la Relation Entre le Droit International Humanitaire et les Droits de l'Homme", 37 Canadian Y.B. MIL. 67-69 (1999).
5. It is not necessary here to draw up a list of the innumerable authors accepting that HRL applies in time of armed conflict. It is however interesting to note that Volume 1 of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, which dates back to 1971, was indeed partially devoted to the applicability of HRL in warfare.
6. See M. Sassòli, "La Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme et les Conflits Armés", in Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law 710 (2007).
7. Art. 15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 [ECHR]; Art. 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [ICCPR]; Art. 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [ACHR]. However, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [ACHPR] does not include such a provision. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights [ACommHPR] held that therefore no derogation was possible. See Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés v. Chad, ACommHPR, No. 74/92, Annual Activity Report 1995-1996, para. 21.
8. See J. Frowein, "The Relationship between Human Rights Regimes and Regimes of Belligerent Occupation", 28 Israel Y.B. Hum. Rts. 2 (1998). See also General Comment No. 29 on States of Emergency, Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR/C/21/ Rev. 1/Add. 11 (2001), para. 3.
9. in fact, most of the HRL treaties contain a jurisdictional limitation. See Art. 2(1) ICCPR; Art. 1 ECHR; Art. 1(1) ACHR. On that point, see the famous case Bankovic et ai v. Belgium and 16 other States, [2001] European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] (decision as to the admissibility).
10. See Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] I.C.J. Rep., para. 25; Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, [2004] I.C.J Rep., para. 106.
11. The Security Council often called upon States to respect HRL and IHL in times of armed conflicts. It did so in resolutions concerning conflicts (see e.g., S/RES/1565 (2004), para. 19 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; S/RES/1297 (2000), para. 8 on the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia), and also in thematic resolutions dedicated to the protection of civilians in armed conflicts (see e.g., S/RES/1265 (1999), para. 7 of the Preamble and para. 4).
12. See e.g., G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts, 1970.
13. See Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, [1981] Human Rights Committee [HRC/, No. 59/79; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, [1981] HRC, No. 56/79; Montero v. Uruguay, [1983] HRC, No. 106/81; Cyprus v. Turkey, [1978] EComHR, App. No. 8007/77; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] ECtHR; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1996] ECtHR; Cyprus v. Turkey, [2001] ECtHR
14. See Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, [1981] Human Rights Committee [HRC/, No. 59/79; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, [1981] HRC, No. 56/79; Montero v. Uruguay, [1983] HRC, No. 106/81; Cyprus v. Turkey, [1978] EComHR, App. No. 8007/77; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] ECtHR; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1996] ECtHR; Cyprus v. Turkey, [2001] ECtHR
15. See Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, [1981] Human Rights Committee [HRC/, No. 59/79; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, [1981] HRC, No. 56/79; Montero v. Uruguay, [1983] HRC, No. 106/81; Cyprus v. Turkey, [1978] EComHR, App. No. 8007/77; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] ECtHR; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1996] ECtHR; Cyprus v. Turkey, [2001] ECtHR
16. See Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, [1981] Human Rights Committee [HRC/, No. 59/79; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, [1981] HRC, No. 56/79; Montero v. Uruguay, [1983] HRC, No. 106/81; Cyprus v. Turkey, [1978] EComHR, App. No. 8007/77; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] ECtHR; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1996] ECtHR; Cyprus v. Turkey, [2001] ECtHR
17. See Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, [1981] Human Rights Committee [HRC/, No. 59/79; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, [1981] HRC, No. 56/79; Montero v. Uruguay, [1983] HRC, No. 106/81; Cyprus v. Turkey, [1978] EComHR, App. No. 8007/77; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] ECtHR; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1996] ECtHR; Cyprus v. Turkey, [2001] ECtHR
18. See Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, [1981] Human Rights Committee [HRC/, No. 59/79; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, [1981] HRC, No. 56/79; Montero v. Uruguay, [1983] HRC, No. 106/81; Cyprus v. Turkey, [1978] EComHR, App. No. 8007/77; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] ECtHR; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1996] ECtHR; Cyprus v. Turkey, [2001] ECtHR
19. See Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, [1981] Human Rights Committee [HRC/, No. 59/79; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, [1981] HRC, No. 56/79; Montero v. Uruguay, [1983] HRC, No. 106/81; Cyprus v. Turkey, [1978] EComHR, App. No. 8007/77; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] ECtHR; Loizidou v. Turkey, [1996] ECtHR; Cyprus v. Turkey, [2001] ECtHR
20. See K. Watkin, "Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict", 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 24 (2004).
21. A. Lindroos, "Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis", 74 Nordic J. Intl. L. 42 (2005); R. O'Keefe, "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A Commentary", 37 Rev. Beige de Droit Int'l 135 (2004); Report of the Expert Meeting on the Right to Life in Armed Conflicts and Situations of Occupation, organised by the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law (UCIHL), Geneva, 1-2 Sept. 2005, at 10 and 19.
22. A. Lindroos, "Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis", 74 Nordic J. Intl. L. 42 (2005); R. O'Keefe, "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A Commentary", 37 Rev. Beige de Droit Int'l 135 (2004); Report of the Expert Meeting on the Right to Life in Armed Conflicts and Situations of Occupation, organised by the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law (UCIHL), Geneva, 1-2 Sept. 2005, at 10 and 19.
23. A. Lindroos, "Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis", 74 Nordic J. Intl. L. 42 (2005); R. O'Keefe, "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A Commentary", 37 Rev. Beige de Droit Int'l 135 (2004); Report of the Expert Meeting on the Right to Life in Armed Conflicts and Situations of Occupation, organised by the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law (UCIHL), Geneva, 1-2 Sept. 2005, at 10 and 19.
24. See M.J. Dennis, "Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation", 99 A.J.I.L. 139 (2005); H.-J. Heintze, "On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law", 856 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 796 et seq. (2004); W. Karl, "Treaties, Conflicts Between", IV Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 937 (Elsevier, 2000). See also International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Regimes: Interplay in Situations of Violence, Summary Report Prepared by the ICRC of the XXVIIth Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law organised by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy in Cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland, Nov. 2003, at 9.
25. See M.J. Dennis, "Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation", 99 A.J.I.L. 139 (2005); H.-J. Heintze, "On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law", 856 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 796 et seq. (2004); W. Karl, "Treaties, Conflicts Between", IV Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 937 (Elsevier, 2000). See also International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Regimes: Interplay in Situations of Violence, Summary Report Prepared by the ICRC of the XXVIIth Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law organised by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy in Cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland, Nov. 2003, at 9.
26. See M.J. Dennis, "Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation", 99 A.J.I.L. 139 (2005); H.-J. Heintze, "On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law", 856 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 796 et seq. (2004); W. Karl, "Treaties, Conflicts Between", IV Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 937 (Elsevier, 2000). See also International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Regimes: Interplay in Situations of Violence, Summary Report Prepared by the ICRC of the XXVIIth Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law organised by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy in Cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland, Nov. 2003, at 9.
27. See discussion above.
28. The contribution of HRL in armed conflicts is moreover already recognized by IHL treaties. See Art. 75(8) of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter: API]; and para. 2 of the Preamble of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter: API1]. Furthermore, some IHL rules require HRL to be correctly interpreted. For example, IHL prohibits torture but does not define it. The definition must be sought in HRL. The same could be said for the right to a fair trial, which is guaranteed but not fully defined by IHL.
29. See F. Hampson & I. Salama, "Working Paper on the Relationship Between Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law", UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14, para. 57; W. Schabas, "Lex specialis? Belt and suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellumfor presentation at a conference on the Parallel Application of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 21-22 May 2006, at 5.
30. See F. Hampson & I. Salama, "Working Paper on the Relationship Between Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law", UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14, para. 57; W. Schabas, "Lex specialis? Belt and suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellumfor presentation at a conference on the Parallel Application of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 21-22 May 2006, at 5.
31. See B. Vierdag, "The Time of the 'Conclusion' of a Multilateral Treaty: Art. 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Related Provisions", LIX B.Y.B.I.L. 100 (1998).
32. The precision/clarity of the rules has to be assessed taking into consideration their customary and conventional content. Moreover, the interpretation of the rules in case-law should also be taken into account. It is too often contended that HRL rules are less detailed than IHL norms. This kind of statement overlooks the fact that the case law of the HRL implementation bodies very much adds flesh to the bones of the vague HRL rules.
33. This argument is related to the "most favorable to the individual clause" which is found in most of the HRL treaties. See Art. 53 ECHR; Art. 29(b) ACHR; Art. 5(2) ICCPR; Art. 5(2) International Covenant on Econimic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [ICESCR]; Art. 23 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979, [1979] U.N. Juridical Y.B. 115; Art. 41 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990, 28 Ï.L.M. 1457; Art. 36 of the European Social Charter, 1961, E.T.S. 35; Art. 10 of the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93. On the opposite, the ACHPR does not include such a provision. However, Arts. 60 and 61 of the ACHPR complement this gap.
34. See Art. 32(1) ECHR. See also F. Hampson, "Using International Human Rights Machinery to Enforce the International Law of Armed Conflicts", 31 Rev. de Droit Pénal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 127(1992).
35. See Art. 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter: VCLT]. This rule is considered as customary. See Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] l.C.J. Rep. para. 53; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), [2003] I.C.J. Rep, para. 41.
36. See F. Martin, "Application du Droit International Humanitaire par la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de l'Homme", 844 Rev. Internationale de la Croix Rouge 1051 (2001).
37. See F. Martin, "Le Droit International Humanitaire Devant les Organes de Contrôle des Droits de l'Homme", 1 Droits Fondamentaux 139-44 (2001).
38. See F. Capotorti, "Cours Général de Droit International Public", 248 Recueil des Cours 221 (1994-1V).
39. See Art. 15(1) ECHR: In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
40. See S. Vité, Les Procédures Internationales d'Établissement des Faits dans la Mise en Oeuvre du Droit International Humanitaire 74 (1999).
41. In fact, IHL is a special and complex field of international law which does not follow the same logic as HRL and which, therefore, requires a very specific expertise.
42. See below.
43. See below.
44. See Y. Dinstein, "The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty", in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 114 (L. Henkin ed., 1981); M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary 121 (2005); F. Sudre et ai, Les Grands Arrêts de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme 85 (2003).
45. See Y. Dinstein, "The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty", in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 114 (L. Henkin ed., 1981); M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary 121 (2005); F. Sudre et ai, Les Grands Arrêts de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme 85 (2003).
46. See Y. Dinstein, "The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty", in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 114 (L. Henkin ed., 1981); M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary 121 (2005); F. Sudre et ai, Les Grands Arrêts de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme 85 (2003).
47. th Annual Activity Report 2000-2001, para. 20.
48. th Annual Activity Report 2000-2001, para. 20.
49. th Annual Activity Report 2000-2001, para. 20.
50. th Annual Activity Report 2000-2001, para. 20.
51. See Art. 6 ICCPR; Art. 2 ECHR; Art. 4 IACHR; Art. 4 ACHPR.
52. See Art. 6(2) ICCPR; Art. 4(2) IACHR; Art. 4 ACHPR. Art. 2(1) ECHR also contains an exception to the death penalty but the latter tends to disappear in Europe as it has been prohibited by Protocol 6 in times of peace and by Protocol 13 at all times. In the Öcalan case (Öcalan v. Turkey, [2003] ECtHR, para. 196), the Court let understand that the prohibition of the death penalty may be a european customary rule.
53. See Art. 6(1) ICCPR; Art. 4(1) ACHR; Art. 4 ACHPR.
54. In light of the case law of the ECtHR, it can be concluded that, in fact, each of these legitimate aims could be subsumed under the generic term of "self-defence" in a wide sense insofar as the Court admitted the recourse to lethal force in cases of lawful arrest or for quelling a riot only if the persons against whom the force was used represented a risk more or less immediate for the life of others. Concerning Art. 2(2)(b), see, e.g.: Makaratzis v. Greece, [2004] ECtHR; Nachova et al v. Bulgaria, [2005] ECtHR; Kakoulli v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR. Concerning Art. 2(2)(c), see, e.g., Stewart v. United Kingdom, [1984] EComHR, DR 39; Güleç v. Turkey, [1998] ECtHR.
55. In light of the case law of the ECtHR, it can be concluded that, in fact, each of these legitimate aims could be subsumed under the generic term of "self-defence" in a wide sense insofar as the Court admitted the recourse to lethal force in cases of lawful arrest or for quelling a riot only if the persons against whom the force was used represented a risk more or less immediate for the life of others. Concerning Art. 2(2)(b), see, e.g.: Makaratzis v. Greece, [2004] ECtHR; Nachova et al v. Bulgaria, [2005] ECtHR; Kakoulli v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR. Concerning Art. 2(2)(c), see, e.g., Stewart v. United Kingdom, [1984] EComHR, DR 39; Güleç v. Turkey, [1998] ECtHR.
56. In light of the case law of the ECtHR, it can be concluded that, in fact, each of these legitimate aims could be subsumed under the generic term of "self-defence" in a wide sense insofar as the Court admitted the recourse to lethal force in cases of lawful arrest or for quelling a riot only if the persons against whom the force was used represented a risk more or less immediate for the life of others. Concerning Art. 2(2)(b), see, e.g.: Makaratzis v. Greece, [2004] ECtHR; Nachova et al v. Bulgaria, [2005] ECtHR; Kakoulli v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR. Concerning Art. 2(2)(c), see, e.g., Stewart v. United Kingdom, [1984] EComHR, DR 39; Güleç v. Turkey, [1998] ECtHR.
57. In light of the case law of the ECtHR, it can be concluded that, in fact, each of these legitimate aims could be subsumed under the generic term of "self-defence" in a wide sense insofar as the Court admitted the recourse to lethal force in cases of lawful arrest or for quelling a riot only if the persons against whom the force was used represented a risk more or less immediate for the life of others. Concerning Art. 2(2)(b), see, e.g.: Makaratzis v. Greece, [2004] ECtHR; Nachova et al v. Bulgaria, [2005] ECtHR; Kakoulli v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR. Concerning Art. 2(2)(c), see, e.g., Stewart v. United Kingdom, [1984] EComHR, DR 39; Güleç v. Turkey, [1998] ECtHR.
58. In light of the case law of the ECtHR, it can be concluded that, in fact, each of these legitimate aims could be subsumed under the generic term of "self-defence" in a wide sense insofar as the Court admitted the recourse to lethal force in cases of lawful arrest or for quelling a riot only if the persons against whom the force was used represented a risk more or less immediate for the life of others. Concerning Art. 2(2)(b), see, e.g.: Makaratzis v. Greece, [2004] ECtHR; Nachova et al v. Bulgaria, [2005] ECtHR; Kakoulli v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR. Concerning Art. 2(2)(c), see, e.g., Stewart v. United Kingdom, [1984] EComHR, DR 39; Güleç v. Turkey, [1998] ECtHR.
59. Art. 4(2) 1CCPR; Art. 27(2) ACHR. The ACHPR does not include a provision allowing derogations.
60. As underlined before, Art. 15(2) ECHR prohibits any derogation to the right to life "except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war".
61. It should be underlined that the ECtHR had to deal with the right to life only in situations of NIAC.
62. Some authors already contended that the right to life exists in IHL. See A. Calogeropoulos-Stratis, Droit humanitaire et Droits de l'Homme: la Protection de la Personne en Période de Conflit Armé 141 (1980); M. El-Kouhene, Les Garanties Fondamentales de la Personne en droit Humanitaire et Droits de l'Homme, 113-16 (1986).
63. Some authors already contended that the right to life exists in IHL. See A. Calogeropoulos-Stratis, Droit humanitaire et Droits de l'Homme: la Protection de la Personne en Période de Conflit Armé 141 (1980); M. El-Kouhene, Les Garanties Fondamentales de la Personne en droit Humanitaire et Droits de l'Homme, 113-16 (1986).
64. See Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol. 1: Rules) (ICRC, J.-M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), Rule 1, at 3.
65. See J.-F. Quéguiner, Le Principe de Distinction Dans la Conduite des Hostilités 296 (Thèse Université de Genève/IUHEI, 2006).
66. rd ed., 1988).
67. However, the treaties prohibitions are more and more extended to weapons in NIAC. See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention as Amended on 3 May 1996), 35 l.L.M. 1507 (1997); Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 1997, 36 l.L.M. 1507; Geneva Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. Amendment Art. 1, 21 Dec. 2001.
68. In case of a NIAC, it should also be distinguished between those where only Common Art. 3 applies and those where APII is also applicable.
69. See above.
70. Art. 15(2) ECHR.
71. Ogur v. Turkey, [1999] ECtHR; Gul v. Turkey, [2000] ECtHR.
72. Ogur v. Turkey, [1999] ECtHR; Gul v. Turkey, [2000] ECtHR.
73. See above.
74. On the prohibitive aspect of the principle of military necessity, see G. Venturini, Necessità e Proporzionalità Nel Vuso Delia Forza Militare in Diritto Internazionale 127 (1988). On the relevance of military necessity concerning the targeting of combatants, see the expert meeting convened by the ICRC in 2005 on the Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, at 45. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengo.nsf/html/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205 (last accessed 02.04.07).
75. On the prohibitive aspect of the principle of military necessity, see G. Venturini, Necessità e Proporzionalità Nel Vuso Delia Forza Militare in Diritto Internazionale 127 (1988). On the relevance of military necessity concerning the targeting of combatants, see the expert meeting convened by the ICRC in 2005 on the Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, at 45. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengo.nsf/html/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205 (last accessed 02.04.07).
76. It is sometimes erroneously contended that collateral damages are not accepted in HRL. See e.g., T. Meron, "The Humanization of Humanitarian Law", 94 A.J.I.L. 240 (2000): "Unlike human rights law, the law of war allows, or at least tolerates, the killing and wounding of innocent human beings not directly participating in an armed conflict, such as civilian victims of lawful collateral damage".
77. As underlined by Reidy: "(⋯) the test laid down by the Court in McCann and others v. UK - that the planning and control of an operation must be so as to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force (⋯)- provides a secure framework for assessing whether killings are illegal under the laws of armed conflict". See A. Reidy, "The Approach of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights to International Humanitarian Law", 324 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 526 (1998).
78. In fact, it is in the ambit of the planning of the operation that the Court finds a deficiency because the State did not avoid the confrontation from happening next to the village.
79. See L. Vierucci, "Sulla Nozione di Obiettivo Militare Nella Guerra Area: Recenti Sviluppi della Giurisprudenza Internazionale", 3 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 733 (2006).
80. These are persons taking a direct part in hostilities without having the right to do so and who therefore will not be entitled to the rights and privileges of combatants. Baxter qualifies them as "unprivileged combatants". See R. Baxter, "So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs", 28 B.Y.B.J.L. 323 (1951).
81. See the famous Yemeni incident where a car carrying six suspected members of A1 Qaeda was destroyed by a US missile fired from an unmanned drone. For an analysis of this incident, see A. Dworkin, "The Yemen Strike: The War On Terrorism Goes Global", Crimes of War Project, 14 Nov. 2002. Available at: http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-yemen.html (last accessed 2 Apr. 2007).
82. For the time being, the ECtHR reiterated that reasoning only in the context of NIAC. However, if the Court had to deal with a similar situation in IAC (supposing that the Court would be competent and that the acts would have happened within the State's jurisdiction) it would most probably adopt the same reasoning because, as underlined above, the Court does not change its reasoning according to the situation of peace or armed conflict, international or not. Moreover, in IHL, the terms employed are perfectly similar in the context of IAC and NIAC. In both situations, civilians may not be attacked "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities". This seems to indicate that the meaning of those words is identical for IAC and NIAC.
83. The Commission admits that a civilian cannot be considered as directly participating in hostilities if he does not pose any immediate threat of harm to the adversary. However, it also notes that, at least in the context of NIAC, when direct participation in hostilities of irregular combatants becomes their principal daily activity, they thereby divest themselves of their civilian status and effectively become combatants subject to direct attack to the same extent as members of regular armed forces. See IACHR, Third Report on Human Rights in Colombia (Ch. IVa), paras. 43-66 (1999). See also IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, para. 69 (2000): "(⋯) once a person qualifies as a combatant, whether regular or irregular, privileged or unprivileged, he or she cannot revert back to civilian status or otherwise alternate between combatant and civilian status". Available at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/exe.htm (last accessed 2 Apr. 2007).
84. The Commission admits that a civilian cannot be considered as directly participating in hostilities if he does not pose any immediate threat of harm to the adversary. However, it also notes that, at least in the context of NIAC, when direct participation in hostilities of irregular combatants becomes their principal daily activity, they thereby divest themselves of their civilian status and effectively become combatants subject to direct attack to the same extent as members of regular armed forces. See IACHR, Third Report on Human Rights in Colombia (Ch. IVa), paras. 43-66 (1999). See also IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, para. 69 (2000): "(⋯) once a person qualifies as a combatant, whether regular or irregular, privileged or unprivileged, he or she cannot revert back to civilian status or otherwise alternate between combatant and civilian status". Available at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/exe.htm (last accessed 2 Apr. 2007).
85. See e.g., Çirin Yilmaz v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Agdaç v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Zengin v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Menteçe et al. v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR.
86. See e.g., Çirin Yilmaz v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Agdaç v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Zengin v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Menteçe et al. v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR.
87. See e.g., Çirin Yilmaz v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Agdaç v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Zengin v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Menteçe et al. v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR.
88. See e.g., Çirin Yilmaz v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Agdaç v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Zengin v. Turkey, [2004] ECtHR; Menteçe et al. v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR.
89. Art. 38(1)(a) ECHR reads as follows: If the Court declares the application admissible, it shall: pursue the examination of the case, together with the representatives of the parties, and if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the States concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities.
90. The Court cites the following cases concerning Art. 3: Tomasi v. France, [1992] ECtHR, paras. 108-11; Ribitsch v. Austria, [1995] ECtHR, para. 34; Selmouni v. France, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87; Salman v. Turkey, [2000] ECtHR, para. 100. See also concerning enforced disappearances: Qakici v. Turkey, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87.
91. The Court cites the following cases concerning Art. 3: Tomasi v. France, [1992] ECtHR, paras. 108-11; Ribitsch v. Austria, [1995] ECtHR, para. 34; Selmouni v. France, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87; Salman v. Turkey, [2000] ECtHR, para. 100. See also concerning enforced disappearances: Qakici v. Turkey, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87.
92. The Court cites the following cases concerning Art. 3: Tomasi v. France, [1992] ECtHR, paras. 108-11; Ribitsch v. Austria, [1995] ECtHR, para. 34; Selmouni v. France, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87; Salman v. Turkey, [2000] ECtHR, para. 100. See also concerning enforced disappearances: Qakici v. Turkey, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87.
93. The Court cites the following cases concerning Art. 3: Tomasi v. France, [1992] ECtHR, paras. 108-11; Ribitsch v. Austria, [1995] ECtHR, para. 34; Selmouni v. France, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87; Salman v. Turkey, [2000] ECtHR, para. 100. See also concerning enforced disappearances: Qakici v. Turkey, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87.
94. The Court cites the following cases concerning Art. 3: Tomasi v. France, [1992] ECtHR, paras. 108-11; Ribitsch v. Austria, [1995] ECtHR, para. 34; Selmouni v. France, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87; Salman v. Turkey, [2000] ECtHR, para. 100. See also concerning enforced disappearances: Qakici v. Turkey, [1999] ECtHR, para. 87.
95. Certainly, security considerations can be taken into account and the State can refuse to submit some documents but it has to explain this refusal.
96. By the same token, Art. 6 of the ICCPR, Art. 4 of the ACHR and Art. 4 of the ACHPR do not provide for a State obligation to investigate each time a person has been killed.
97. See, e.g., Kanlibaş v. Turkey, [2005] ECtHR. In this case, a PKK local leader died during an armed clash with the Turkish security forces. The Court did not analyze the substantive obligations of the right to life because the applicant did not exhaust local remedies. However, the Court underlined that "cela n 'a guère d'incidence quant à l'appréciation du présent grief, qui porte sur des obligations positives, au titre desquelles les autorités sont tenues d'agir d'office, sans laisser aux proches du défunt l'initiative d'assumer la responsabilité d'une procédure d'enquête" (para. 42).
98. For a critical analysis of this approach, see the partly dissenting opinions of judges Tulkens (para. 5) and Bonello (paras. 5-6) in the Çirin Yilmaz case. See also the partly Dissenting Opinion of Bratza J. (para. 5) in the Agdaç case. Moreover in many cases occuring in Northern Ireland, the Court preferred to examine the investigation's (in)efflciency rather than to proceed to the difficult task of analyzing the facts (action/planning) leading to the recourse to lethal force insofar as the domestic proceedings were not terminated. See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McKerr v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Kelly et al. v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McShane v. United Kingdom, [2002] ECtHR.
99. For a critical analysis of this approach, see the partly dissenting opinions of judges Tulkens (para. 5) and Bonello (paras. 5-6) in the Çirin Yilmaz case. See also the partly Dissenting Opinion of Bratza J. (para. 5) in the Agdaç case. Moreover in many cases occuring in Northern Ireland, the Court preferred to examine the investigation's (in)efflciency rather than to proceed to the difficult task of analyzing the facts (action/planning) leading to the recourse to lethal force insofar as the domestic proceedings were not terminated. See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McKerr v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Kelly et al. v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McShane v. United Kingdom, [2002] ECtHR.
100. For a critical analysis of this approach, see the partly dissenting opinions of judges Tulkens (para. 5) and Bonello (paras. 5-6) in the Çirin Yilmaz case. See also the partly Dissenting Opinion of Bratza J. (para. 5) in the Agdaç case. Moreover in many cases occuring in Northern Ireland, the Court preferred to examine the investigation's (in)efflciency rather than to proceed to the difficult task of analyzing the facts (action/planning) leading to the recourse to lethal force insofar as the domestic proceedings were not terminated. See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McKerr v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Kelly et al. v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McShane v. United Kingdom, [2002] ECtHR.
101. For a critical analysis of this approach, see the partly dissenting opinions of judges Tulkens (para. 5) and Bonello (paras. 5-6) in the Çirin Yilmaz case. See also the partly Dissenting Opinion of Bratza J. (para. 5) in the Agdaç case. Moreover in many cases occuring in Northern Ireland, the Court preferred to examine the investigation's (in)efflciency rather than to proceed to the difficult task of analyzing the facts (action/planning) leading to the recourse to lethal force insofar as the domestic proceedings were not terminated. See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McKerr v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Kelly et al. v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McShane v. United Kingdom, [2002] ECtHR.
102. For a critical analysis of this approach, see the partly dissenting opinions of judges Tulkens (para. 5) and Bonello (paras. 5-6) in the Çirin Yilmaz case. See also the partly Dissenting Opinion of Bratza J. (para. 5) in the Agdaç case. Moreover in many cases occuring in Northern Ireland, the Court preferred to examine the investigation's (in)efflciency rather than to proceed to the difficult task of analyzing the facts (action/planning) leading to the recourse to lethal force insofar as the domestic proceedings were not terminated. See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McKerr v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Kelly et al. v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, [2001] ECtHR; McShane v. United Kingdom, [2002] ECtHR.
103. See above.
104. They were not posing an immediate threat. See above.
105. On the question of whether HRL implementation bodies can apply IHL, see above.