Research design in testing theories of international conflict

Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 177-192

  Huth, Paul ^a   Allee, Todd ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85168470230     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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