Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief

Synthese Library

Volumn 342, Issue , 2009, Pages 75-93

  Frankish, Keith ^a  

^a OPEN UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian Decision Theory; Behavioural Disposition; Formal Epistemology; Intentional Explanation; Partial Belief

Indexed keywords

EID: 85145946647     PISSN: 01666991     EISSN: 25428292     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_4     Document Type: Chapter

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