The Expansion of China’ s Public Diplomacy System

Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 19-35

  d’Hooghe, Ingrid ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Chinese Foreign Policy; Epistemic Community; Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy; Soft Power

Indexed keywords

EID: 85145893104     PISSN: 27313883     EISSN: 27313891     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230116375_2     Document Type: Chapter

References (54)

1. Analysis of China’s public diplomacy is hampered by the lack of transparency in Chinese policymaking. There are few official documents on China’s public diplomacy policy available to the public. This means that the observations made in this chapter are primarily deduced from public diplomacy actions and remarks by China’s leaders.
2. See, for example, the polls of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Pew Research Center, Financial Times/Harris Monthly Polls, and Transatlantic Trends, German Marshall Fund. For Europe see Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The limits of China’s soft power in Europe: Beijing’s public diplomacy puzzle,” Clingendael Diplomacy Paper 25 (2010).
3. Paul Sharp, “Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 106.
4. Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy, 5.
5. See, for example, Zhao Kejin, Gongong waijiao de lilun yu shijian (Public Diplomacy: Theory and Practice) (Shanghai: Cishu Chubanshi, 2007); Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of China’s Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 257–273; Li Minjiang, “China Debates Soft Power,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 2 (2008): 287–308; and Zhongguo ruanshili wang (China’s Soft Power Network), http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/166866/index.html
6. Interviews by the author with diplomats and academics, April 2009. See also, for example, Zhao Qizheng, “Better Public Diplomacy to Present a Truer Picture of China,” People’s Daily, online edition, March 30, 2007; or the last page of “CNN: What Is Wrong with You,” People’s Daily, online edition, April 3, 2008.
7. Interviews by the author with academics in Shanghai and Beijing in March 2007 and, for example, “Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing Gives Year-End Interview to People’s Daily,” December 20, 2005, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
8. Web site of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Close Friends Gather Together: The Foreign Ministry Holds the First ‘Public Day’ Activity in 2006,” June 3, 2006; and “Gathering in 2007: Joining Hands with China’s Diplomacy. Sidelights on the 2007 First Public Open Day of the Foreign Ministry,” May 19, 2007.
9. Formerly called the Office of External Propaganda in English until Chinese authorities realized the bad connotation of the word “propaganda.” The Chinese term for external publicity/propaganda, duiwai xuanchuan, remained the same.
10. For a detailed description of the monitoring of publicity by various ministries and offices, see David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal, no. 57 (January 2007).
11. For examples, see Brady, “Guiding Hand.”
12. This office is closely linked to the Central Publicity Department and the International Department of the Party. For more information on the Central Publicity Department, see Anne-Marie Brady, “Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era,” in Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3, no. 1 (2006): 58-77.
13. “Main Responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” April 23, 2009. Web site Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. www.fmprc.gov.cn
14. For a recent example see spokesman Ma Zhaoxu’s remark on the ministry’s “further efforts in public diplomacy this year.” “China always welcomes foreign journalists: FM spokesman,” People’s Daily Online, January 21, 2010.
15. Author’s conversations with Chinese diplomats stationed in various European countries.
16. For more on China’s state actors in public diplomacy, see d’Hooghe, “Into High Gear,” 42; Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy,” Clingendael Diplomacy Papers 12 (July 2007); and Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Public Diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China,” in Melissen ed., The New Public Diplomacy: 88–105.
17. An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. They can function as channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from countries to countries. See Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46 (1992): 3, 27.
18. See, for example, “Diplomacy with Foreign Dignitaries: Personalities Build Up China’s New Image,” People’s Daily, January 1, 2004.
19. The majority of China’s NGOs are relatively autonomous in daily practice and can serve their own societal or commercial interests, but when it comes to the crunch they are dependent on approval—or neglect—by the authorities.
20. For example, Seungho Lee, “Environmental Movements and Social Organizations in Shanghai,” China Information 21, no. 2 (2007): 269–297; Miriam Schröder, “Transnational NGO Cooperation for China’s Climate Politics.” (Paper presented at the 2007 Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change); and Quansheng Zhao, “Epistemic Community, Intellectuals, and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Policy and Society 25, no. 1: 39–59
21. Zhao, “Epistemic Community, Intellectuals, and Chinese Foreign Policy.”
22. See, for example, the election of the top 100 Chinese soft power enterprises, http://theory. people.com.cn/GB/166866/10307066.html
23. Web site Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission R.O.C. (Taiwan): http://www.ocac. gov.tw/index.asp
24. “Premier Wen Calls for Overseas Chinese to Promote China’s Peaceful Reunification,” People’s Daily, May 21, 2005.
25. “Beijing Wooing Overseas Chinese away from Taiwan: Officials,” Taiwan Security News, May 30, 2002.
26. For example, the China Synergy Program for Outstanding Youth, which gathers outstanding Chinese youth across the world to “learn about modern China and Chinese culture,” http://www.chinasynergy.org
27. See http://www.globalvoicesonline.org, http://www.danwei.org, http://www.cmp.hku. hk, and http://www.chinadigitaltimes.net
28. “China has been using a new approach to public diplomacy to expand its influence and global appeal,” Peace Corps News, online, August 8, 2007.
29. “Govt calls for building social stability, security,” Xinhua, December 4, 2009. http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/2005–12/04/content_3876620.htm
30. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2004), 11–14.
31. Economic strength can be a source of both hard and soft power. See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, March 1, 2006.
32. See, for example, Part VII of Secretary Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Congress of the CCP, October 15, 2007, or the speeches presented at a special meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), held in summer 2007, on the topic of China’s culture as a major resource for building China’s soft power; for example “Wu Jianmin: kaizhan wenhua waijiao de jidian sikao” (Wu Jianmin: Some Thoughts on the Development of Cultural Diplomacy), speech by the President of China’s Foreign Affairs University and former Ambassador to France, Wu Jianmin, July 24, 2007.
33. Web site of the Hanban (Chinese Language Council International), www.hanban.edu.cn
34. Clive Cookson, “China Leads World in Growth of Scientific Research,” Financial Times, January 25, 2010.
35. A wealth of examples can be found in Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2007).
36. Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, May 2004): 3–4.
37. For example, Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of China’s Soft Power,” Survival, 48, no. 2 (summer 2006): 17–36; and Drew Thompson, “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the ‘Beijing Consensus’ to Health Diplomacy,” China Brief 5, no. 21 (October 13, 2005).
38. David H. Shinn, “The China Factor in African Ethics and Human Rights” (Paper presented at the Oxford-Uehiro-Carnegie Council Conference, December 2006).
39. See, for example, Jason Qian and Anne Wu, “China’s Delicate Role on Darfur,” Boston Globe, July 23, 2007.
40. See, for example, the polls of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Pew Research Center; Financial Times/Harris Monthly Polls, and Transatlantic Trends, German Marshall Fund. For Europe see d’Hooghe, “The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe.”
41. See, for example, the poll by TNS Opinion on “Perspectives on Trade and Poverty Reduction,” December 2006; and Walden Bello, “China Provokes Debate in Africa,” Foreign Policy in Focus, March 9, 2007.
42. “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001–2008),” December 18, 2008; “Global Economic Gloom, China and India Notable Exceptions,” June 12, 2008; “Global Unease with Major World Powers,” June 27, 2007, Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Pew Research Center, www.pewresearch.org
43. Ibid.
44. See “World Publics think China will Catch Up with the US—and That’s Okay,” at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/may07/CCGA+_RiseChina_article.pdf
45. The report can be found at http://www.gmi-mr.com/gmipoll/release.php?p=20060522 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/bbcworld/worldstories/pressreleases/2006/05_may/emerging_giants.shtml
46. Stephanie McCrummen, “Struggling Chadians Dream of A Better Life—in China,” Washington Post, October 6, 2007; and Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Chasing the Chinese Dream: A Growing Number of the World’s Emigrants are Heading East, rather than West, in Search of Safety, Tolerance or Opportunity,” Washington Post, October 22, 2007.
47. “Africans Keen to Grasp ‘China Opportunities’,” People’s Daily Online, November 2, 2006.
48. “Foreigners Fond of Chinese ‘Green Card’,” People’s Daily Online, August 20, 2007.
49. See, for example, Jennifer Brea, “Beijing Police Round Up and Beat African Expats,” Guardian, September 26, 2007; and McCrummen, “Struggling Chadians.”
50. See d’Hooghe, “Into High Gear,” 53–54.
51. See, for example, “Li Changchun: Nuli goujian xiandai chuanbo, tigao guonei guowai chuanbo nengli” [Li Changchun: Work hard to build a modern communication system and raise our domestic and international communication capacity), December 20, 2008. Web site China.com, accessed February 2, 2009.
52. Vivian Wu and Adam Chen, “Beijing in 45b Yuan Global Media Drive,” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2009.
53. See also d’Hooghe, “The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe,” 30–31.
54. For a discussion along these lines, see Wang Hongying, “National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,” China: An International Journal 1, no. 1 (March 2003): 67; and William A. Callahan, “Tianxia, Empire and the World: Soft Power and China’s Foreign Policy Discourse in the 21st Century,” BICC Working Paper Series 1(May 2007), University of Manchester.