China’s Image Projection and Its Impact

Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 37-56

  Wang, Hongying ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Government; Foreign Policy; Socialist Country; Soft Power

Indexed keywords

EID: 85145886083     PISSN: 27313883     EISSN: 27313891     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230116375_3     Document Type: Chapter

References (39)

1. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
2. Hongying Wang and Yeh-chung Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implications: A Comparative Study of China and Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China, 17, no. 56 (2008): 425–447.
3. Official Beijing Review Web site www.bjreview.com.cn (accessed December 2002).
4. Skeptics may question how widely read the Peking Review is. My focus here is on the images the Chinese government has tried to project. Therefore, it is not my concern whether or how many foreigners actually read the Peking Review.
5. Earlier studies of national roles tend to focus on their conception rather than projection. See James N. Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R.B. Farrell (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966); Kal Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly, 14, no. 3(1970): 233–309; and Stephen Walker, ed., Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987). While the two— conception and projection—are related, they are not identical. Role conception is part of foreign policy motivations, whereas role projection is part of public diplomacy.
6. I used different coding units for the Peking Review and for the Government Work Reports— paragraphs for the former and sentences for the latter. Before the formal coding, my research assistant and I did a preliminary test. For the nine image variables, we achieved a high intercoder agreement, with an average coefficient of agreement of 0.96. Details of methodology and coding scheme are available from the author.
7. Zhou Enlai, Government Work Report, 1954, 1957, 1959, http://chinaorg.cn/zlzx/zlzx/2008– 01/24/content_5196251.htm (accessed May 2009).
8. Zhou Enlai, Government Work Report, 1964, 1975, http://chinaorg.cn/zlzx/zlzx/2008– 01/24/content_5196251.htm (accessed May 2009); Guofeng Hua, Government Work Report, 1978, http://chinaorg.cn/zlzx/zlzx/2008–01/24/content_5196251.htm (accessed May 2009).
9. New York Times, September 24, 1965.
10. Zhao Ziyang, Government Work Report, 1983, 1984, 1986, http://chinaorg.cn/zlzx/zlzx/2008–01/24/content_5196251.htm (accessed May 2009); Li Peng, Government Work Report, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, http://chinaorg.cn/zlzx/zlzx/2008– 01/24/content_5196251.htm (accessed May 2009); Zhu Rongji, Government Work Report, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, http://chinaorg.cn/zlzx/zlzx/2008–01/24/content_5196251.htm (accessed May 2009).
11. Samuel Kim, “China and the United Nations,” in China Joins the World, ed. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 45.
12. The basic ideas contained in the concept—mutual respect, common development, confidence building, and cultural tolerance—were already present in Secretary General Jiang Zemin’s speech to the 16th Party Congress in 2002.
13. Since the 1980s, Gallup has asked respondents to say how they feel about China. In March 1989, 72 percent had a “very favorable” or “mostly favorable” impression of China. A Los Angeles Times poll taken in mid-June, shortly after the Tian’anmen incident, asked the same question. It found that favorable impressions of China plummeted to just 16 percent. By August 1989, another Gallup survey revealed that favorable responses had bounced back some, but to less than half of the pre-Tian’anmen level (31 percent),http://www.americansworld.org/digest/regional_issues/china/china1.cfm (accessed September 2010).
14. Yong Deng, China’s Struggles for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
15. Peter Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
16. Tai Ming Cheung, “The Influence of the Gun: China’s Central Military Commission and Its Relationship with the Military, Party, and State Decision-Making Systems,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 61–90; Margaret Pearson, “The Case of China’s Accession to GATT/WTO,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 337–370; Peter T. Y. Cheung and James T. H. Tang, “The External Relations of China’s Provinces,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 91–120; Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 151–187.
17. Bara Vaida, “Lobbying—Red Star Rising on K Street,” National Journal, July 23, 2005.
18. Marina Walker Guevara and Bob Williams, “China Steps Up Its Lobbying Game,” Washington DC: The Center for Public Integrity, 2005, http://www.publicintegrity.org/lobby/report.aspx?aid=734 (accessed May 2009).
19. Ming Cao, “Yi Meiguo de Fangshi Shuofu Meiguo,” Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan, October 24, 2005, 38–39.
20. Yuan Han and Lei Wang, “Quanqiuhua Shidai de Xinwen Chuanbo yu Guojia Xingxiang Xuanchuan Zhanlue,” Xinan Minzu Daxue Xuebao, 26, no. 3(2005): 269–272.
21. Xiguang Li et al., Yaomohua Zhongguo de Beihou (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1996).
22. Kun Zhang and Xushan Liu, “Zhongguo Guojia Xingxiang Chuanbo de Sikao,” Lilun yu Shijian, no. 9 (2008).
23. Qiang Chen and Guilan Zheng, “Gongmin Quanli, Zhengfu Gongxin, Guojia Xingxiang,” Shengli Youtian Dangxiao Xuebao, 21, no. 5 (2008): 66–86.
24. Yuan Han and Lei Wang, “Quanqiuhua Shidai de Xinwen Chuanbo yu Guojia Xingxiang Xuanchuan Zhanlue,” Xinan Minzu Daxue Xuebao, vol. 26, no. 3(2005): 269–272.
25. Xiaozhong Huang, “Zhongguo ‘Waixuan’ Huhuan Kaifang Fei Guanfang Chuanbo Ziyuan,” Xinan Minzu Daxue Xuebao, no. 8 (2006): 176–179.
26. Yurong Wu, “Chuanmei Quanqiuhua Shidai de Zhongguo Guoji Xingxiang Zhanlue,” Zhongguo Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan, no. 6 (2002): 41–43; Ming Fang and Yueliang Cai, “Zhengfu Guoji Gongguan: Guojia Xingxiang Suzao de Xin Shiye,” Dongnan Chuanbo, no. 1 (2007): 32–33.
27. Hongwei Ma and Chen Min, “Wangshang Suzao Zhongguo Guoji Xingxiang,” Zhongguo Guoqing Guoli, no. 1 (2001): 6.
28. A limitation of this step is that the United States has not always been the main target of China’s public diplomacy. Before the Sino-American Rapprochement in the early 1970s, the Chinese government was more concerned about China’s image in other parts of the world, such as the socialist countries, the developing countries and—to a lesser extent— Western Europe. This is related to China’s identity. Social actors (including states) are more concerned with their image among members of their community. See Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and John B. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).) However, even before the rapprochement, the Chinese government was interested in influencing the “American people.” Since then, the United States has increasingly become the most important intended audience of China’s public relations.
29. The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research is in Storrs, Connecticut. It was founded just after World War II. It maintains a database of public opinion surveys conducted by academics, media organizations, and commercial pollsters dating back to 1935.
30. For example, I coded the following question as perceiving China as socialist, militant (opposite to peace-loving), and a major power: “Red China has exploded another atomic bomb. Do you think we should try to negotiate an atomic test-ban treaty with them?” I coded the following question as perceiving China as militant (opposite to peace-loving), obstructive (opposite to cooperative), and socialist: “Do you agree that the United States should come to the defense of Japan with military force if it is attacked by Soviet Russia or Communist China?”
31. Gabriel A Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960) and James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961) pioneered the study of American public opinion on foreign policy. They characterized the American public as basically disengaged from foreign policy issues. More recently, various survey data seem to confirm this perspective. For instance, the quadrennial Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll repeatedly finds that only one-third of the American public are very interested in foreign policy stories. See John E. Reilly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991) and American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).
32. Data and graphs on all the findings are available from the author if readers are interested.
33. Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman, “On the Perceptions of Incongruity: A Paradigm,” in Perception and Personality, ed. Jerome Bruner and David Ketch (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1950).
34. Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics XX, no. 3 (1968): 455.
35. Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking’s Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York: Praeger, 1976); Thomas Pettigrew, “The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5, no. 4 (1979): 461–476.
36. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
37. This phrase was first put forward in 2005 by then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in a speech at the National Committee of U.S.-China Relations.
38. Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 15.
39. Peter Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).